



Enterprise Risk Management as a Strategic Tool in Improving Governance

A Case Study of Commonwealth Africa



The Commonwealth

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A CASE STUDY OF COMMONWEALTH AFRICA



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Foreword

I am delighted to launch this publication of the inaugural study of enterprise risk management (ERM), focusing on six of our member countries across Commonwealth Africa (Botswana, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone and The Gambia). This ERM study cannot come at a more appropriate time, even as the world grapples with the enormous risks resulting from the COVID pandemic that has had disastrous consequences for all facets of our lives and livelihood.

As a Commonwealth Secretariat, we are committed to addressing all forms of risks and supporting our member countries in being more proactive in identifying, assessing, mitigating and reporting on all risks that this ERM study effectively promotes.

The commitment and dedication exhibited by the six participating member countries throughout this process depict the importance attached to this ERM study, as it provided an opportunity for them to reflect on the respective approaches adopted in managing risks, while also taking stock of progress and identifying avenues through which risks (and opportunities) could be better managed going forward.

Commonwealth member countries across all regions are hereby urged to use this well-designed ERM study as a blueprint in developing and pursuing their respective risk management strategies, as we seek to be more proactive across the Commonwealth in positioning ourselves to effectively and efficiently mitigate the impact of risks faced in the future, while also seizing opportunities presented.

Let me take this opportunity to express our thanks and appreciation to all those involved in this study (whether directly or indirectly), for the eagerness and willingness to share experiences garnered on holistically managing risks in their respective contexts.

Finally, our Governance and Peace Division, notably the Public Sector Governance Unit, deserves special commendation for spearheading this comprehensive inaugural ERM study as part of the Commonwealth Secretariat's Public Financial Management portfolio on improving governance across our member countries.

The Rt Hon. Patricia Scotland KC
Secretary-General

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This research was led by Dr Omodele R.N. Jones of Governance Quality Ratings and supervised by Augustus Cole, Adviser, Public Financial Management, Commonwealth Secretariat. The research benefited greatly from the active support of members of the Country Steering Groups. They encouraged a 'win/win' engagement approach which, as a benefit to the countries of interest, raised the awareness of the relevance of public sector enterprise risk management (PS-ERM) among various stakeholders and reinforced the capacity of stakeholders to implement PS-ERM. In return, the Country Steering Groups facilitated the registration of about 1,500 research participants across the six countries. Jacqueline Johnson and Clive Lawson, both of the Commonwealth Secretariat have been instrumental in facilitating the production and publication of this study report.

Members of the Country Steering Groups

#	First Name	Last Name	Job Title	Organisation	Gender	Country
1	Chazha	Matsheka	Deputy Director Internal Audit	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development	Female	Botswana
2	Joseph Letlhogonolo	Phalalo	Director Occupational Health and Safety	Government of Botswana	Male	Botswana
3	Tshireletso Mandu	Kgosidiile	Senior Manager – Corporate Services	Ministry of Mineral Resources, Green Technology and Energy Security	Female	Botswana
4	Zodwa	Ngwenya	Director	Internal Audit Office	Female	Eswatini
5	Nompumelelo	Nkambule	Senior Internal Auditor	Internal Audit Office	Female	Eswatini
6	Selby	Sukati	Principal Internal Auditor	Internal Audit Office	Male	Eswatini
7	Eric Oduro	Osae	Director-General	Internal Audit Agency	Male	Ghana
8	Nathan	Yankey	Director (Operations)	Internal Audit Agency	Male	Ghana
9	Richard	Ntim	Chief Internal Auditor	Ghana Grid Company	Male	Ghana
10	Daniel	Nyaga	Deputy Internal Auditor General	The National Treasury and Planning	Male	Kenya
11	Amos	Kilonzi	Deputy Director	Kenya Urban Roads Authority	Male	Kenya
12	Alhaji	Bangura	Deputy Director	Ministry of Finance	Male	Sierra Leone
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Description
CN	Concept Note
COSO	Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission
EH	Executive Highlights
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
EROM	Enterprise Risk and Opportunity Management
GCI	Global Competitiveness Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index/ Indicator
HDR	Human Development Report (of the United Nations)
IAO	Internal Audit Office
ICSP	In-country Support Person
ISO	International Organisation for Standardisation
KPIs	Key Performance Indicators
KRIs	Key Risk Indicators
LGAs	Local Government Authorities
LSS	Large-scale Survey
MDA	Ministries, Departments and/or Agencies of Central or local Governance
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDS	National Development Strategy
PFM	Public Financial Management
PS-ERM	Public Sector Enterprise Risk Management
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal (of the United Nations)
SG	Steering Group
SOE	State-owned Enterprises
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Read Me First: A Guide to your Navigation of this Book

This book communicates a major research exercise spanning six Commonwealth member states on the African continent. Its findings will likely have resonance much farther afield within, and globally beyond, the Commonwealth. Its mixed-methods approach includes rich and insightful qualitative research and detailed and illuminating quantitative enquiry.

Chapter 1 provides an Executive Overview and Lessons Learnt. Chapters 2 to 7 deliver the conceptual and research framework that provides direction and control to the enquiry. They also communicate relevant background to the countries included in the research.

Chapters 8 to 13 detail the outcomes of the quantitative element of the investigation, with one chapter for each country. Chapter 14 communicates the qualitative, organisational case study, contribution spanning a total of 15 volunteering public sector entities from across the six member states. Chapter 15 outlines key findings and recommendations.

To assist your digestion, “Executive Highlights” (EH) are presented at the start of Chapters 1 to 14. They provide a synthesis of the detail, with guidance to potential policy implications for the six member states and, possibly, with your reflection, for your country and organisation.

It is recommended that you, first, read the EHs. Then, selectively dive into the detail in one or more Chapters as you deem to be of value to your enquiry. This may prove to be a reference text, where you will dip into its details over an extended period of time, as you consider the implications for public sector (and possibly private sector) Enterprise Risk Management.

Foundations

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1. Executive Overview and Lessons Learnt

Executive Highlights: Executive Overview and Lessons Learnt

As indicated by the title of this book, the Commonwealth Secretariat (CS) has invested in enhancing the use of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) "...as a strategic tool in improving governance" in the public sector. Adapting and updating a leading definition of "corporate governance" to the domain of national governance, we can suggest a goal for this drive:

"National good governance should be concerned with delivering a sustainable balance between economic, social and environmental goals. At the same time, it should sustainably mediate tensions and trade-offs between individual, organisational, cultural and societal goals, rights and obligations. These twin aspirations can be seen as the "Common Good". Good governance should ensure societal trust and confidence in the efficient and accountable use of resources in the service of the Common Good".

Dr Omodele Jones, Lead Researcher, © 2023 (All rights reserved): adapting the 1999 definition of Corporate Governance by Sir Adrian Cadbury. Sir Adrian's definition was included in the foreword to the World Bank's publication: "Corporate Governance: A framework for implementation" published in 2000.

The field research that underpins this book was conducted in 2021. Subsequently, the insights have guided the CS in actions including the development of an ERM Capacity Building and Implementation

Manual for Commonwealth member states in 2022. Further, the Manual has been piloted in some Commonwealth Africa member states, through the training of trainers.

This research identified strategic (long term) and operational (short and medium term) challenges to the CS's goal to support member states in improving national good governance.

- The **strategic challenge** can be described as severe in character. For the member states forming the sample of this research, there are indications that ERM is seen as a set of processes; perhaps as another bureaucratic layer, disconnected from its real focus of driving better **decision-making** for "national good governance".

But effective ERM is really a dominant "cultural way-of-thinking" that proactively seeks evidence of uncertainties, trade-offs and conflicts in order to assess and mitigate their future consequences for "national good governance". In doing so, it delivers improved decisions that enhance the likelihood of attaining the strategic objectives of public sector organisations and, through them, of the national development strategy.

- The **operational challenges** comprise of 16 (sixteen) lessons learnt that, when addressed, can guide member states in reducing the elevated risk of ERM failure posed by the strategic challenge.

1.1 A win/win research engagement for participants and the research objective

The principles of a Theory of Change (ToC) formed the benchmark expectations that shaped the interaction with the participants in this research. The research used two main data collection instruments:

- a large-scale survey, to evaluate the wider cultural and systems environment within which the countries are implementing public sector ERM (PS-ERM); and
- case studies of a range of specific entities in each country, nominated by Country Steering Groups.

The large-scale survey secured registrations from about 1,500 public sector personnel in the six countries, from about 400 registered entities. They were consulted with four engagements, which were designed to provide a 'win/win' relationship. Specifically, there were 1,487 registered individual participants for this research across the six countries. They represented about 399 registered organisations with:

- 138 entities (35%) from Botswana;
- 82 (21%) from Eswatini;
- 19 (5%) from Ghana;
- 46 (11%) from Kenya;

- 88 (22%) from Sierra Leone; and
- 26 (6%) from The Gambia.

The registrants were planned to personally 'win' by accessing content that reinforced and/or refreshed their command of the fundamental principles of ERM, that is, the engagements delivered capacity building. As a further by-product, and as directed by the Country Steering Groups, the study was planned to have the impact of improving the awareness of the purpose and relevance of ERM to participants and their organisations. In this way, the study was designed to improve the likelihood of successful implementation of ERM after its intervention, so it contributed to ERM change management.

The study 'won' by gaining access to very rich information on the context within which ERM is being implemented, providing in-country insights and cross-country opportunities for understanding the contribution of systems, context and culture to the prospects for specific ERM implementation success.


These 'wins' were delivered by five engagements with registered participants:

- Engagement 1 – a 'win' for registrants that provided access, via an email, to proprietary and third-party (written and audio-visual) content on the fundamental principles of ERM.
- Engagement 2 – a 'win' for the study through the delivery of a cloud-powered questionnaire

Table 1.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?

#	Country	Do not know	No	Yes	Grand total	Grand total (%)	Do not know (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	Total (%)
1	Botswana	71	160	298	529	36	13	30	56	100
2	Eswatini	44	128	67	239	16	18	54	28	100
3	Ghana	13	12	30	55	3	24	22	55	100
4	Kenya	6	24	68	98	7	6	24	69	100
5	Sierra Leone	69	241	167	477	32	14	51	35	100
6	The Gambia	3	34	52	89	6	3	38	58	100
	Total no. of individual registrants	206	599	682	1487	100	14	40	46	100

Figure 1.1. Gender analysis by country of the aggregate 1,487 registered individual participants



based on Engagement 1. This contributed to the 'large-scale survey'.


- Engagement 3 – a 'win' for registrants through access to proprietary and third-party (written and audio-visual) content on the applications of ERM principles, including its relevance to the public sector.
- Engagement 4 – a 'win' for the study through the delivery of a cloud-powered questionnaire based on Engagement 3. This completed the 'large-scale survey'.
- Engagement 5 – a 'win' for selected 'Case Study' organisations and their representatives through proprietary content on the project and change management of ERM in the public sector, combined with a 'win' for the study

through related case study questions on the ERM experience of the participants within their organisation.

Engagement 2 attracted about 600 completed questionnaires, which was satisfactory. Engagement 4 received under 400 questionnaires, which probably reflected its more demanding context relative to Engagement 2. However, the numbers completed were satisfactory for the purposes of the study.

Engagement 5 was designed for much fewer and selected individuals from organisations chosen by the Country Steering Groups. It attracted 52 individuals, representing 15 organisations from 6 countries. At the request of the participating entities, their identities are not disclosed in this report and an identifying code has been used for

Figure 1.2. Steps in implementing an Enterprise Risk Management System



the analysis that indicates the relevant sector to which the organisation belongs.

Applying the technique of 'analytical review', the five engagements provided insight into the expectations of the Theory of Change.

1.2 Analytical review with reference to the prior expectations of a Theory of Change

Drawing on the public sector ERM literature, a Theory of Change was developed as a longitudinal sequence that could be analysed with a three-step process flow:

1. Step 1 – Getting started, the feasibility stage
2. Step 2 – Organising and planning for a PS-ERM ecosystem
3. Step 3 – Operating a PS-ERM ecosystem

These three steps are bound together by a common requirement for managing the risk of the PS-ERM implementation. Throughout Steps 1, 2 and 3, there will be sustained and effective monitoring of the balance of forces between the agents of positive change and the obstacles to improved risk management. Initially, this will be led by the

project sponsor and chief champion. Eventually, this responsibility will be co-owned by the Risk Unit and its chief risk officer, who must have strong management, board and/or political support.

The Theory of Change (ToC) holds that Step 1 is the 'make or break' step in which success or failure in implementation is configured.

1.3 Lessons learnt and recommendations

When the evidence of the research is compared to the ToC, 16 lessons have been learnt, which are summarised below. These lessons are consistent with the expectations of the ToC and with the insights of the global literature. In that sense, the research findings do not provide new insights. However, they do provide evidence from the context of countries that have not featured prominently as the sources of primary research in the global literature. Consequently, this research provides context-specific information that speaks to the reality of these countries and organisations. It is hoped that this relationship to the research will provide a basis for action on the lessons learnt. Together with the 'win/win' design of the research, it is anticipated that it could deliver a meaningful contribution to the enthusiasm with which PS-ERM is welcomed in the participating countries.

Figure 1.3. Considerations for ERM Implementation. Stage 1: Feasibility



 Botswana	 Ghana	 Sierra Leone
 Eswatini	 Kenya	 The Gambia

- A. Stephen Covey; **"Begin with the end in mind"**
- B. ERM exists for **decision-support to government/cabinet**
- C. ERM **co-exists** for **decision support to your entity**
- D. Must manage **opportunities** as well as **negative risks**
- E. ERM should be a **cultural** way-of-thinking and **not seen as a separate function.**
- F. **Risk unit** must be **oil in the engine** and **not the engine** itself!!
- G. Organisational and societal **trust is critical**
- H. Necessary human **competences are vital**

Table 1.2. Summary description of lessons learned and recommendations (details in Part 9, Chapter 15)

1.	ERM is more than a risk register. It demands more than taking stock of all the risks within an entity. It includes culturally driven practices that seek to actively reduce negative risks and to harness positive opportunities.
2.	PS-ERM should not be seen as a separate function or department. It should be an ingrained and reflex habit of top governance, senior management and all staff that provides an instinctive reference for planning, controlling and decision-making.
3.	Adequate human competences are the 'Base Camp' for successful public sector ERM.
4.	Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for ERM.
5.	Public sector entities should strive to create a 'risk-aware' culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. They need risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership.
6.	Public sector ERM must be a decision support mechanism – organisations must be confident in their use of information and communication technologies. They should have the management ability to use technology to capture enterprise risk information, allowing their sensible screening and evaluation and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Available technology should allow timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks.
7.	PS-ERM should be more than internal control and/or audit. It should also impact strategy setting, governance, communicating with stakeholders and measuring performance. Its principles should apply at all levels of the entity and across all functions through evident 'risk awareness' and 'risk-based problem solving'.
8.	ERM should not be viewed as a checklist. It is a way of thinking using a set of principles for problem prevention and solving; it is a system of monitoring, learning and improving performance.
9.	ERM is useful for entities of any type, sector or size. Risk and uncertainty are pervasive in the public sector as much as in any other sector.
10.	The effective integration of PS-ERM and public financial management (PFM) has room for significant improvement.
11.	Time that is well invested in Step 1 in the battle for the hearts and minds of key stakeholders (from the national cabinet to ministries, departments and/or agencies of central or local governance [MDAs] to state-owned enterprises [SOEs] to local government) will contribute significantly to success in Step 3.
12.	PS-ERM has two masters: The public sector exists to provide common effort to the attainment of societal goals, which are often described in a National Development Strategy (NDS). As the public sector is a federation of MDAs, SOEs and local government authorities (LGAs), it requires the management of intermediate organisational strategies through entity-based ERMs. Consequently, an effective PS-ERM must service both the needs of component entities and the demands of the national cabinet for the risk-informed direction and control of the NDS.
13.	Risk intelligent entities can be identified by the extent to which they use key risk indicators (KRIs). KRIs are a tool of risk thinking that exists within a risk-aware culture. They give an early warning of future performance challenges and thus are an important trigger of proactive PS-ERM. KRIs are usually best when they identify broad principles and behavioural phenomena at the individual level and at the level of groups. Consequently, their effective use tends to demand higher individual cognitive and teamwork skills, within a suitably trusting context. The capable deployment of KRIs is arguably the most demanding element of ERM and may be the feature of the highest-performing team cultures and entities.
14.	The pilot implementation approach may not be the best option across all organisations (when we consider ERM in individual entities). For smaller institutions, a full roll-out strategy could be implemented with effective stakeholder engagement. This will not apply in public sector-wide ERM rollouts, which will still need effective pilot programmes.
15.	Paper into practice: The conversion of sophisticated ERM strategies, policies and frameworks in Steps 1 and 2 into a sound operating PS-ERM in Step 3 may be a challenge.
16.	Leadership example is critical within entities and at the level of political governance, who have the authority to hire and fire entity leaders.

2. Background

Executive Highlights: Background

Section description	Highlight
2.2 A brief history of enterprise risk management	Modern Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has its roots in the foreseeable failures of private companies and their strategies which did not trigger action on preventable losses. Lessons learnt have led to a migration to its use in the public sector.
2.3 A short history of public sector ERM	The public sector is large and complex and has the task of coordinating action towards the attainment of national strategic and development goals. ERM has emerged as a means of improving that coordination and reducing the risk that sub-entity and national goals are missed through ostrich-like decision-making. As illustrated in an Engagement 1 case study for research participants, the British Cabinet Office (CO) was founded in the First World War to improve wartime coordination. The CO was an excellent tool of ERM, although the formal term – ERM – was not coined until much later in the 1970s.
2.4 COVID-19 and public sector ERM	<i>"Public sector ERM is now out of the closet: no longer a 'nice-to-have' but – in acute scenarios – a matter of human and economic 'life or death'"</i> Jones (2021)
2.5 Background to countries of focus	The six countries covered the geographical breadth of Sub-Saharan Africa: three from West Africa (The Gambia, Sierra Leone and Ghana); one from East Africa (Kenya) and two from Southern Africa (Botswana and Eswatini). They also span a diverse set of economic, social and historical pathways and attainments. So, they face differing types of risks to their national aspirations. For example, in 2020, their Human Development Indices were as follows: • Botswana – 74% • Eswatini – 61% • Ghana – 61% • Kenya – 60% • Sierra Leone – 45% • The Gambia – 50%

2.1 Outline of the terms of reference

The Governance and Peace Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat ('the Secretariat') has been supporting member countries in introducing enterprise risk management (ERM) in government ministries, departments and agencies. The objective is to facilitate improved decision-making in the implementation of national development objectives and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The Secretariat engaged Dr Omodele Jones, to undertake a 'Lessons Learnt' study on the introduction of ERM in six African member countries. The study was expected to consider, inter alia, the ERM methodology adopted, implementation experiences and strategic contributions that have been delivered by ERM. It was expected to require a series of consultative workshops, surveys and meetings. The research was intended to facilitate the strengthening of the resilience of member countries in an increasingly uncertain and challenging world.

2.2 A brief history of enterprise risk management

Enterprise risk has been defined (Dickinson 2001) as the extent to which the outcomes of an entity's strategy may differ from those specified in its

strategic objectives, or the extent to which they fail to meet these objectives. Professor Dickinson traced the emergence of ERM to two main causes:

First,...a number of high-profile company failures and preventable losses...Second, shareholder value models are playing a greater role in strategic planning. Early strategic planning models paid insufficient attention to risk. Modern strategic planning models ... draw their inspiration from the finance theory where risk has always played a central role. (ibid)

Dickinson outlined key organisational considerations for effective implementation of ERM. He saw ERM as a 'top-down process', where the chief executive and a senior executive team (in liaison with a board of directors) must determine the parameters for ERM implementation. Structures should allow for information to be fed from those closest to the sources of risk 'so that senior managers are well informed when formulating their overall risk policy'. In addition, ERM will likely require the delegation of some responsibility 'to those closest to where the risks [will happen], so that early action can be taken to prevent a small problem growing into a larger one'.

Professor Dickinson also concluded that the complexity of identifying, controlling and managing risks across an entity would require dedicated and specialist expertise, co-ordinated by a chief risk officer, who should be part of the top strategic planning team.

Figure 2.1. Participating countries – Commonwealth ERM Africa study



2.3 A short history of public sector ERM

The provenance of ERM in the public and not-for-profit sectors appears much more recent. Arguably, the current momentum in government ERM gained a sharp impetus from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007. That crisis saw the migration of previously unimaginably destructive financial risks from private to state balance sheets. The consequent programmes of economic austerity were combined with an implicit moral hazard of the privatisation of profits and socialisation of losses. The attendant and continuing threats, resulting from the loss of citizen's social trust in institutions, on the political and social stability of erstwhile mature markets, governments and societies have had global effects that have reverberated to the present day.

Writing about the USA government (Hardy 2010) asserted that:

Risk management is not a new concept within [government]. What is new is the need to integrate risk management into the strategic and decision-making processes that cut across the organization, and abandon the outdated practice of managing risks within functional silos and stovepipes.

Hardy, however, noted that the 'great expectation' for ERM had – at the time of her writing – met, even in the USA, 'very few success stories' for benchmarking best practices. Part of the challenge was seen to be a multiplicity of missions and objectives of government entities, which make a uniform approach to ERM difficult to attain. She, however, cautioned that the lack of standard methodology across the USA federal sector should not discourage the implementation of ERM. These variations, Dr Hardy believed, should be expected. She cited case studies of federal entities with 'unique perspectives' to ERM, 'driven by different goals and objectives'.

Figure 2.2. Speech by Commonwealth PFM adviser at the opening ceremony of the 2019 ERM Training for the Gambia Public Sector. Also, selected break-out sessions



What was important, she considered, was that – despite these differences – each entity's approach should subscribe to generally accepted concepts and contexts of ERM.

Among the challenges to be navigated, Dr Hardy indicated the following that, *inter alia*, may be of heightened relevance to the African context:

- avoiding insufficient sponsorship at the executive level (mirrored by Professor Dickinson above) – establish the right 'tone at the top' or the ERM will be stillborn;
- ensuring that ERM becomes a strategic management tool and not an additional task;
- mitigating government cultures that are prone to empire-building and silo management.
- providing the opportunity for government and its component entities to make more informed decisions;
- avoiding the temptation to underestimate the level of effort or to 'short-change the planning process';
- customising the ERM strategy, approach and methodology to the needs of each government entity, while providing a common foundation for monitoring risks that migrate across government entities; and
- rewarding risk identification and avoiding actions that penalise it, as this is critical to developing an organisation culture that is consistent with ERM.

In his joint publication of 2019, Kenneth Fletcher – a retired senior US federal executive – noted that government organisations can now refer to a growing body of materials that provide examples of ERM *processes and procedures*. However, he cautioned that far fewer reference materials and examples exist to help organisations develop a risk-mature organisational culture that is critical to the long-term success and strategic value that ERM represents to government organisations. He offered his publication (Fletcher 2019) as a contribution to filling that void, which presents barriers to public sector risk managers in their quest to deliver ERM as an active contributor to major decisions that top officials must make.

This study is designed to explore both aspects of ERM, that is, useful systems and the contribution of culture through group values, beliefs and practices.

2.4 COVID-19 and public sector ERM

[Public sector entities] are now faced with the prospect of quickly and effectively responding to the 'new' business environment – there is a renewed focus on enterprise resiliency that relies on co-ordinated risk assessment, planning, monitoring and response across the enterprise. Regardless of whether a formally defined ERM program is in place, [MDAs and SOEs] need to trigger co-ordinated, interdisciplinary teams to leverage risk activities to identify potential events that may affect the entity, manage risk within its risk appetite and provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of core mission objectives in support of the public. To quickly address this new environment, [public sector entities] can prioritize vital actions by focusing on the steps that ERM and other risk functions can be taking: respond to crisis, stabilize and optimize the business and transform for sustainable growth.

Ernst & Young LLP (USA) (2020)

Ernst & Young noted that, irrespective of whether entities had a functioning ERM when the COVID-19 pandemic struck in late 2019/early 2020, they had no choice but to adopt the tools of co-ordinated risk assessment and response that are demanded by ERM. Rob van der Meulen, referring to the private sector, was less polite:

Many companies pay lip service to ERM, but the COVID-19 pandemic shows the clear business benefits of managing risk from an enterprise-wide perspective.

van der Meulen (2020)

It is unlikely that the public sector is immune to this malaise. Van der Muelen noted that, as the coronavirus spread beyond China in early 2020, some organisations responded swiftly while others took a more 'wait-and-see' approach. He attributed the disparity, at least in part, from different approaches to ERM. For the late responders, he observed that for many companies, ERM had become a box-ticking activity that was expensively exposed as short-sighted by the pandemic. In other words, the entity culture was inadequate for effective ERM.¹ He concluded that the pandemic

¹ Van der Muelen's concern about the cultural substance overriding the systems form of ERM is similar to that of Fletcher, examined in the previous section. Taken together,

also showed that aligning ERM with strategy positions an organisation to take certain risks to seize opportunities that might otherwise be missed:

More than simply avoiding downside risk such as coronavirus, an agile and effective ERM function empowers an organization to take the right risks to grow. (ibid)

In principle, the Commonwealth Secretariat, in a joint statement with its 56 member countries, agreed:

...We note the risk posed by COVID-19 to Commonwealth priorities, including Universal Health Coverage, and halving malaria in the Commonwealth by 2023. We will seek to balance our immediate response and our long-term commitments ... We will also strengthen preparedness, detection and response capacities...This will achieve greater resilience and sustainability, reduce the risk of future shocks and accelerate progress on all seventeen Sustainable Development Goals through the Decade of Action...

(Commonwealth Secretariat 2020)

With radically differing public health stresses, death rates and economic harm between countries during the pandemic:

Public sector ERM is now out of the closet: no longer a 'nice-to-have' but – in acute scenarios – a matter of human and economic 'life or death'

Jones (2021)

they provide support to this study's emphasis on the exploration of the contribution of cultural dispositions to the success of ERM implementations.

2.5 Background to countries of focus

2.5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the development, governance and related strategic risk management priorities in each country of focus.

2.5.2 Botswana

The Encyclopaedia Britannica identifies Botswana as a country in the centre of Southern Africa (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2021a). Within the confines of its borders is a rich variety of wildlife, including many species of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish.

Botswana's total population, in 1964, was estimated at 550,000. Since then, the population has grown and was approaching 2.4 million as at 2021 (Worldometer n.d.). Meanwhile, the rate of labour migration abroad has been lowered by a combination of restrictions by South Africa and better employment opportunities at home. The country has provided a home, and sometimes eventual citizenship, for significant numbers of refugees from South Africa, Angola and Zimbabwe.

The national age and gender composition is weighted by an increasingly youthful population. About one-third are younger than 15, and another one-third are between the ages of 15 and 29. The 2001 census showed life expectancy of 49.6 years at birth for females and 51.6 years for males, compared with the 1981 figures of

Figure 2.3. Wildlife in Botswana



Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. (2021)

Figure 2.4. Map of Botswana



Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. (2021)


61.2 and 54.7 years, respectively. Life expectancy for Botswana males and females in 2019 was 58 and 65 years respectively (World Health Organization, 2021).

Botswana has a free market economy with a strong tradition of central government planning to provide infrastructure for private investment. It has experienced rapid economic growth since the mid-1960s, with the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita reportedly increasing more than a hundredfold.

National revenues reaped from mining development have been spent on basic rural infrastructure and welfare services, and on schemes to subsidise the development of cattle and crop production, which have in general benefited the richer rural households.

The World Bank notes that Botswana has historically enjoyed strong and stable growth since independence, with significant fiscal buffers and prudent policies helping to shield the economy (The World Bank 2021c). However, in recent

Figure 2.5. Botswana: Human Development Index 1990 to 2020



Source: UNDP (2020a)

times, the limitations of Botswana's diamond-led development model have become more apparent: growth is slower, inequality remains high and job creation is limited. At the same time, increased diamond market volatility – including growing competition from synthetic diamonds, reduced Southern African Customs Union transfers and fiscal expansion have delivered eroded fiscal buffers.

NOTE

COVID-19 has exacerbated existing growth challenges, leading to an estimated real GDP contraction of 7.9 per cent in 2020 (the largest on record). The contraction reflected the impact that reduced global demand, travel restrictions and social distancing measures have had on output in key production and export sectors, including the diamond industry and tourism. While a recovery was expected in 2021 due to a favourable outlook for the diamond industry, the economic impact of COVID-19 is likely to be deep and long lasting.

Since independence, Botswana has held free elections every five years and maintained a relatively

Table 2.1. Botswana: Global Competitiveness Index ranking (of 141 countries) 2014–2019

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank	74	71	63	85	90	91

Source: World Economic Forum (2019)

uncorrupted bureaucracy and judicial respect for human rights and the rule of law (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2021a).

2.5.3 Eswatini

Eswatini, previously called Swaziland, is a landlocked country bordering South Africa and Mozambique, with a population of 1.2 million (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2021b). Eswatini has a very young population, with more than one-third under the age of 15 and almost another one-third between 15 and 29 years of age. Life expectancy for males and females in 2019 was 53 and 63 years respectively (World Health Organization 2021a).

Figure 2.6. Map of Eswatini



Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. (2021)

The Kingdom of Eswatini, like most economies, comprises both public and private enterprises. The private sector has been historically the engine of the Eswatini economy. In terms of the structure of the economy, the service sector constitutes 53.5 per cent of GDP, followed by the secondary sector, which contributes 31.2 per cent, and the primary sector, which contributes 8.6 per cent. The manufacturing sector is largely dominated by agro-processing, with sugarcane production a crucial sector of the economy – largely produced for the export market. Conversely, global sugar prices have been volatile in the recent past and climatic shocks have been prevalent.

In 2020, the Eswatini economy contracted by 1.85 per cent due to COVID-19-induced disruptions, which affected the secondary and primary sectors. This came after the economy grew by 2.6 per cent in 2019. The medium term remains uncertain; however, the economy was anticipated to recover at the back of the rebound from both the secondary sector and the primary sector, which are expected to benefit from improved global demand for local exports (Eswatini Central Statistics Office 2020).

Eswatini is a member of the Common Monetary Area (CMA), along with Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa. Consequently, the Eswatini lilangeni (the domestic currency) is pegged at par to the South African rand, which is also legal tender in the country. Fiscal revenues largely depend on Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenues, which in turn largely depend on developments in South Africa (The World Bank 2021a).

Table 2.2. Eswatini: Global Competitiveness Index ranking 2015–2019

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank	128	NA	122	120	121


Source: World Economic Forum (2019)

The United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) for 2020 ranks Eswatini 138 out of 189 countries with an index of 0.611.

In the World Economic Forum (WEF)'s 2019 Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), Eswatini was ranked 121st out of 141 countries surveyed (World Economic Forum 2019).

For the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Eswatini is ranked 144th among a total of 193 countries with an overall score of 53.4 (for the measurement of how far along the country is to achieving the SDGs by 2030). Nevertheless, Eswatini has made great strides in the health sector, being the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to achieve the Global Fund's 95-95-95 HIV target, ten years ahead of the 2030 deadline. In addition, Eswatini is positioned to be a pioneer in malaria elimination in sub-Saharan Africa, as the country has also made great progress in reducing the incidence of malaria. Eswatini was listed among the 21 countries in the world with the potential of interrupting indigenous malaria transmission and thereby making a significant contribution the elimination of malaria globally (World Health Organization 2017).

Figure 2.7. Eswatini: Human Development Index 1990–2020



Source: UNDP (2020a)

2.5.4 Ghana

Ghana, a country in West Africa with a population of 30 million, is situated on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. In the past two decades, Ghana has taken major strides towards entrenching democracy under a multiparty system, with its independent judiciary winning increasing public trust. Ghana now consistently ranks in the top-three countries in Africa for freedom of speech and press freedom, with strong broadcast media (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2018). Factors such as these provide Ghana with solid social capital. Life expectancy for Ghana males and females in 2019 was 63 and 69 years respectively (World Health Organization 2021d).

The economy is a mixture of private and public enterprise. About three-fifths of the GDP is derived from the services sector, agriculture contributes almost one-fifth, and industry about one quarter. Cacao – grown commercially for its seeds, cocoa beans – is cultivated on more than one half of Ghana's arable land and is a significant source of the country's export revenue. Consequently, the world price paid for cocoa beans directly determines Ghana's economic fortunes.

Real GDP growth was 6.5 per cent in 2019, up from 6.3 per cent in 2018. But for 2020, economic growth was projected at about 1 per cent due to the COVID-19 crisis, which triggered a reduction in

external demand and a terms-of-trade shock in the oil sector. Rapidly falling domestic economic activity will also add to the impact.

Growth is expected to remain low even after the COVID-19 crisis, as oil production slows further due to maintenance and lower oil prices. As a result of significant shortfalls in revenues and COVID-related increases in expenditure, the projected fiscal deficit in excess of 11 per cent of GDP is expected to present the government with significant challenges.

While Ghana's medium-term economic outlook is generally positive, it faces several risks and challenges. A further spread of COVID-19 and lower oil prices would reduce Ghana's trade, investment and tourism activities. Growth from the pre-COVID-19 forecast of 5.8 per cent is now expected to be around 1 per cent. Furthermore, the risks of fiscal slippage, beyond the need to accommodate the COVID-19 impact, are deemed to be significant.

The HDR for 2020 ranked Ghana 138 out of 189 countries with an index of 0.611.


In the World Economic Forum's 2019 Global Competitiveness Index, Ghana was ranked 111th out of 141 countries surveyed, a slight drop from its 2018 ranking of 106th – its highest ranking over the past five years.

Figure 2.8. Map of Ghana



Source: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. (2021)

Figure 2.9. Ghana: Human Development Index 1990–2020



Source: UNDP (2020a)

Table 2.3. Ghana: Global Competitive-ness Index ranking 2015–2019

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank	119	114	111	106	111

Source: World Economic Forum (2019)

When measured against the 2020 achievement of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, Ghana is ranked 100th among a total of 193 countries with an overall score of 65.3 (for the measurement of how far along the country is to achieving the SDGs by 2030).

2.5.5 Kenya

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the total population of Kenya was fewer than four million. It was estimated to rise to nearly 55 million in 2021 (Worldometer n.d.), delivering socioeconomic challenges including providing employment opportunities and decent housing in both urban and rural areas. Life expectancy for Kenya males and females in 2019 was 63 and 68 years respectively (World Health Organization, 2021e).


After an interlude of one-party rule, constitutional reforms allowed multiparty politics once again in 1991 and a new constitution was promulgated in

Figure 2.10. Map of Kenya



Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. (2021)

Figure 2.11. Kenya: Human Development Index 1990–2020



Source: UNDP (2020a)

2010. Changes included a reduction in the power of the presidency, the elimination of the prime minister post after the next round of elections, the re-establishment of a bicameral parliament, provisions for a new decentralised government structure based on counties, and the addition of a bill of rights for Kenyans.

According to the World Bank, Kenya's economic growth between 2015 and 2019 averaged 5.7 per cent, making it one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Its 2019 GDP was \$95.5 billion. However, the main development challenges the country continues to face include poverty, growing inequality, climate change, weak private sector investment, and the vulnerability of the economy to internal and external shocks. The outbreak of COVID-19 has adversely affected the economy with GDP growth slowing down from an estimated 5.4 per cent in 2019 to -0.1 per cent in 2020. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects economic growth to pick up to 7.6 per cent in 2021, subject to the post-pandemic global economic recovery (Banco Santander SA 2020).

The life expectancy for Kenya in 2021 was 66.95 years, a 0.39 per cent increase from 2020. This was a 15-year rise from 51.7 in 2000. The HDR for 2020 ranked Kenya 143 out of 189 countries with an index of 0.601.

In the World Economic Forum's 2019 Global Competitiveness Index, Kenya was ranked 95th out of 141 countries surveyed, a slight drop from its 2018 ranking.

Table 2.4. Kenya: Global Competitiveness Index ranking 2014–2019

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank	90	99	91	93	93	95

Source: World Economic Forum (2019)

The 2020 evaluation of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals ranked Kenya 123rd among a total of 193 countries with an overall score of 60.17 (measuring how far along the country is to achieving the SDGs by 2030).

2.5.6 Sierra Leone

As at 2019, the West African state of Sierra Leone had a fast growing population of 7.8 million and a GDP of US\$4.12 billion (current US\$).

It has rich mineral deposits including gold and diamonds. The country has enjoyed two peaceful transitions of power from 2007 to 2018.

Table 2.5. Sierra Leone: Global Competitiveness Index ranking 2014–2019

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank	138 of 144	137	130	134	134	NA

Source: World Economic Forum (2019)

Figure 2.12. Map of Sierra Leone



Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. (2021)

Estimated life expectancy for Sierra Leone males and females in 2019 was 59 and 61 years respectively (World Health Organization 2021f).

Sierra Leone has been making slow, if not fully satisfactory, progress in its Human Development Indicators (HDIs) over the last 30 years. The HDR for 2020 ranked the country 182 out of 189 countries with an index of 0.452.

Sierra Leone has a free market economy with weak infrastructure development. The road sector has been playing catch-up over the past decade.


Sierra Leone was ranked 134th in the Global Competitiveness Index of 2018. The 2020

evaluation of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals ranked the country 153rd among a total of 193 countries with an overall score of 51.91 (measuring how far along the country is to achieving the SDGs by 2030).

2.5.7 The Gambia


The Gambia is a West African country of 2.2 million people. It is situated on the Atlantic coast, surrounded by the neighbouring country of Senegal, except for its 80km coastline. Life expectancy for Gambia males and females in 2019 was 63 and 67 years respectively (World Health Organization 2021c).

Figure 2.13. Sierra Leone: Human Development Index 1990–2020



Source: UNDP (2020a)

Figure 2.14. Map of The Gambia



Source: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. (2021)

The country has 176 people per square kilometre and is one of Africa's most densely populated countries (Encyclopædia Britannica 2020b). A few towns are located upriver, but most of the population (57%) is concentrated around urban and peri-urban centres. Those Gambians who live in rural villages rely on rainfed agriculture for their livelihood. While some rural farming is devoted to subsistence food production, the Gambian economy as a whole is heavily dependent on groundnut production and export.

The Gambia has one of the smallest economies in Africa, with a low per capita GDP of US\$780. Execution of development plans (including its Poverty Reduction Strategy [PRSP], the Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment [PAGE] and now the National Development Plan [NDP]) have had varying degrees of success, partly due to perennial budget constraints and partly because The Gambia, as a small open economy that is dependent on rain-fed agriculture, has always been vulnerable to a number of exogenous shocks. In addition, institutional weaknesses in government and the public sector have also been an important factor in weakening the public sector's capacity to efficiently execute the government's programmes and policies.


One of The Gambia's development challenges is its very youthful population: 68 per cent of the

population are 35 years old and under, with 55 per cent being 19 and under. Meanwhile, any hopes of The Gambia benefitting from a 'youth dividend' are undermined by the lack of employment opportunities. This has led to a high incidence of Gambian youths migrating abroad in search of 'greener pastures'. This phenomenon has in turn led to a steady growth in in-bound remittances (through formal and informal channels), which now represents an estimated 22 per cent of GDP.

The World Bank observed that real GDP growth exceeded 6 per cent two years in a row before COVID-19 struck. This was seen to be driven by rebounding confidence, investment, low interest rates and growing tourism (The World Bank 2021b). While tourism arrivals had started well at the beginning of 2020, they reportedly collapsed by about 50 per cent in March 2020, as containment measures were put in place swiftly. GDP growth was expected to have stagnated in 2020; however, the economy was expected to gradually recover in 2021 as the pandemic receded, conditional on political stability and normal weather conditions.

The impact of the pandemic has also hindered poverty reduction and reversed some of the poverty reduction in 2020, with most households reporting declining incomes from

Figure 2.15. The Gambia: Human Development Index 1990–2020



Source: UNDP (2021a)

Table 2.6. The Gambia: Global Competitiveness Index ranking 2015–2019

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank	123	123	117	119	124

Source: World Economic Forum (2019)

agriculture and fishing, non-farm businesses, and salaried employment.

The HDR for 2020 ranks The Gambia 172 out of 189 countries with an HDI of 0.496.

In the World Economic Forum's 2019 Global Competitiveness Index, The Gambia was ranked 124th out of 141 countries surveyed.

When measured against the achievement of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals, The Gambia is ranked 129th among a total of 193 countries with an overall score of 57.9 (measuring how far along the country is to achieving the SDGs by 2030).

2.5.8 Key cross-country comparisons

Country	Botswana	Eswatini	Ghana	Kenya	Sierra Leone	The Gambia	World
HDI 2020 ranking	100	138	138	143	182	172	189 countries
HDI 2020 score	0.735	0.611	0.611	0.601	0.452	0.496	0.737

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank Botswana	74	71	63	85	90	91

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank Eswatini	128	N.A.	122	120	121

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank Ghana	119	114	111	106	111

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank Kenya	90	99	91	93	93	95

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank Sierra Leone	138	137	130	134	134	NA

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GCI Rank The Gambia	123	123	117	119	124

3. The Commonwealth Secretariat's ERM Support to Member Countries

Executive Highlights: The Commonwealth Secretariat's ERM Support to Member Countries

Since 2016, the Commonwealth Secretariat has promoted public sector ERM as an integral element of the governance and risk management support to member countries through the Public Financial Management/Enterprise Risk Management programme. This ERM support has included a blend of direct technical/advisory assistance, targeted peer-to-peer exchange learning programmes and conferences. In 2022, building on the results of this research, a Commonwealth ERM Capacity Building Manual was developed for member countries. Pilot training of trainers on the use of the manual was delivered in Botswana, Ghana and The Gambia.

3.1 Details of ERM Support to Member Countries

The Commonwealth Secretariat has over the years provided technical and advisory support to member countries, geared towards improving governance, transparency and accountability. Key to this is promoting a sound system of public financial management (PFM), which

is arguably critical to a well-managed and sustained economic development. The need for governments' 'ownership' and 'co-ordination' of PFM reform in improving the chances of success cannot be overemphasised. Nonetheless, some PFM reform interventions in recent years have also critically introduced risk management as a key element in successfully developing and executing PFM reform programmes. In underscoring the pivotal role of proactive and holistic management of risks in promoting sound governance, the Commonwealth Secretariat has in recent years also provided technical and advisory assistance to its member countries on enterprise risk management (ERM) as part of its PFM assistance. It is the considered view that having risk management considerations at the core of PFM reform increases the likelihood of successful outcomes of PFM reform programmes.

Since March 2016, the Commonwealth Secretariat's ERM support, championed by the Adviser, Public Financial Management, has been a blend of direct technical/advisory assistance, targeted peer-to-peer exchange learning programmes and conferences. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the ERM support provided to member countries between 2016 and 2021.

Table 3.1. Commonwealth Secretariat enterprise risk management support activities March 2016 to date

	Type of Support	Details	Period	Host country	Beneficiaries	Commonwealth Secretariat Oversight Team
1.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Enterprise Risk Management Scoping	March 2016	Botswana	Botswana	Adviser, Public Financial Management
2	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Enterprise Risk Management Scoping	March 2016	Namibia	Namibia	Adviser, Public Financial Management
3.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Enterprise Risk Management Scoping (ERM)/ Drafting ERM Policy and Framework	May 2016	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	Adviser, Public Financial Management
4.	Exchange Learning	Enterprise Risk Management	June 2016	United Kingdom	Botswana; Ghana; Guyana	Adviser, Public Financial Management; Projects Manager Finance and Risks
5.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Introducing ERM in Ministry of Finance and five line ministries in Botswana	Sept – Dec 2017	Botswana	Botswana	Adviser, Public Financial Management
6.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Enterprise Risk Management Training	May 2017	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	Adviser, Public Financial Management; Finance Manager Projects and Risks
7.	Conference	Internal Audit and Enterprise Risk Management	May 2018	Ghana	Antigua and Barbuda; Botswana; Eswatini; Ghana; Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; Lesotho; Namibia; Nigeria; Sierra Leone; The Gambia	Adviser, Public Financial Management; Programme Officer (PSG)

(Continued)

	Type of Support	Details	Period	Host country	Beneficiaries	Commonwealth Secretariat Oversight Team
8.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Enterprise Risk Management Scoping	August 2018	The Gambia	The Gambia	Adviser, Public Financial Management
9.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Developing ERM Policy and Framework	Sept 2018	The Gambia	The Gambia	Adviser, Public Financial Management
10.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Introducing ERM in Ministry of Finance and five line ministries in The Gambia	Jan/Feb 2019	The Gambia	The Gambia	Adviser, Public Financial Management
11.	Exchange Learning	Commonwealth Public Financial Management and Enterprise Risk Management	May 2019	Kenya	Eswatini; Kenya; The Gambia	Adviser, Public Financial Management
12.	Conference	Governance and Enterprise Risk Management	June 2019	Jamaica	Antigua and Barbuda; Botswana; Eswatini; Ghana; Guyana; Jamaica; Saint Lucia; The Gambia	Adviser, Public Financial Management; Finance Manager Projects and Risks; Programme Officer (PSG)
13.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Extending ERM to additional line ministries in The Gambia	Nov 2019	The Gambia	The Gambia; Ghana	Adviser, Public Financial Management
14.	Exchange Learning	Commonwealth Enterprise Risk Management	Dec 2019	The Gambia	Botswana; Eswatini; Kenya; Sierra Leone; The Gambia	Adviser, Public Financial Management
15.	Technical and Advisory Assistance	Enterprise Risk Management Scoping	Jan 2020	Eswatini	Eswatini	Adviser, Public Financial Management

4. Study Methodology

Executive Highlights: Study Methodology


Section Description	Highlight
4.1 Public sector ERM Theory of Change (ToC)	Drawing on the global literature on Public Sector ERM (PS-ERM) and the researcher's professional work and experience, a view of the habits and steps that should be forged in the delivery of successful PS-ERM was presented. This would form the lens through which the research was designed and its results evaluated. The ToC included three process steps and three habit propositions, which should be present in successful PS-ERM implementations. <i>Three Process Steps:</i> • <i>Step 1: A robust Feasibility Stage:</i> in a sense, to mitigate the risks of the failure of a PS-ERM implementation! • <i>Step 2: Organising and Planning</i> for the PS-ERM: ensuring that necessary resources are deployed and effectively project managed. Harnessing champions to the cause and mitigating the effects of blockers. Promoting the dominance of PS-ERM-friendly cohesive cultural norms. • <i>Step 3: Operating</i> a PS-ERM eco-system: a resolute focus on quality assurance that delivers value-for-money, attainment of system decision-support goals, system accountability and a virtuous cycle of learning and improvement. <i>Three Propositions of Good Habits:</i> • <i>Proposition 1: Adequate human competences</i> are the base camp for successful PS-ERM. The most effective levels of ERM, so-called "risk intelligent" systems, require advanced capabilities of lateral thinking, communication and problem-solving/synthesis skills. Continuous investment in competitive human capital is critical. • <i>Proposition 2: Organisational and societal trust</i> within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for PS-ERM. A dominant culture of rent-seeking, cynicism and dishonesty is a graveyard of PS-ERM. Trust is the "engine-oil" of the PS-ERM vehicle! • <i>Proposition 3: PS-ERM should be a connected decision-support mechanism</i> for sub-entity (MDAs/SOEs/LGAs) strategy and for the national cabinet's direction of the national development strategy. If it does not improve the quality of decision-making and the lives of citizens, it is not PS-ERM. The effectiveness of these <i>Steps</i> and <i>Propositions</i> in the countries of research focus are evaluated in the field research presented in chapters 8 et seq.
4.2 Research delivery principles, tools and related project management structures	The research was managed by country-level steering committees, coordinated by the Adviser, Public Financial Management of the Commonwealth Secretariat. The lead researcher was supported in each country by an ICSP – In Country Support Person – hired by the researcher. The ICSPs liaised with the Steering Committees. With the encouragement of the beneficiary Steering Committees, the four Research 'Engagements' were designed to deliver 'win/win' interaction. The participants benefited from in-built capacity building as well as access to information that should facilitate the change project management of PS-ERM in the six countries.

4.1 Public sector ERM Theory of Change

4.1.1 Overview: three steps and a cross-cutting process

Karen Hardy suggested that we can break the implementation of a public sector ERM system into three steps and one cross-cutting process (Hardy 2010; 2014). Using this framework, combined with the insights and experience of this researcher (Jones 2012), we consider how an appropriate balance of effort between systems and culture may deliver effective ERM. These principles formed the benchmark expectations that shaped the interaction with the participants in this research.

Figure 4.1. Implementing ERM - getting the right balance between systems and culture



Source: Jones (2021)

Step 1: Getting started

This can be seen as a feasibility phase, which clarifies the need, the benefit and generates informed organisational commitment to ERM. It should create awareness of the necessary changes in personnel attitudes and habits and it should establish the required allocation of time, money and other resources. It will determine

potential obstacles to change and the prospective champions of ERM. It should develop a realistic plan to manage the balance of power between the two forces. If we get this stage wrong, failure of the ERM is almost inevitable.

Box 4.1. Analytical review – the approach adopted for this study

The study method is a form of 'analytical review'. First, we establish what we expect to see by way of good practices for public sector ERM. This is done in Section 4.1.

Then we check, in Sections 8 to 14, to see what has actually happened in the countries of interest. We compare expectations with reality, draw conclusions and determine lessons to be learnt.

Step 2: Organising and planning For ERM implementation

At the beginning of this stage, there should ideally already be irreversible buy-in from the *dominant cultural influencers* of the organisation, especially the political authorities. Otherwise, there is a high risk of implementation failure.

The resources and structures outlined during the feasibility stage will be delivered and will form the foundation for this stage. Now, **a risk co-ordination function** will be established to act as a channel for the risk information flows that will inform decision-making. This Risk Unit should be designed to act without the reduction of the responsibilities of the political authorities, the board (where it exists) and management for the taking of decisions.

The Risk Unit's job will include:

- to help risks to be seen before they pose problems;
- for risk information to get to:
 - the people who need it

Figure 4.2. Successfully implementing ERM – three steps and one cross-cutting process



Adapted from Hardy (2010)

- when they need it and
- in the form that they need it;
- to help the organisation analyse its universe of risks and opportunities for tactical and strategic insights;
- to assist the organisation in its learning and growing from the successes and failures of decisions made with risk tools;
- to have lines of accountability to senior management, the board of directors and/or political decision-makers, while avoiding conflicts of interest.

An efficient information technology system, overseen by the Risk Unit, will be designed to improve the efficiency of the management of risk information.

This stage will see a pilot test of the ERM system, followed by a digestible rollout to the entire organisation.

Step 3: Operating an ERM ecosystem

An effective public sector ERM ecosystem will flourish best where there is trust and confidence between key organisational and political leaders. Where such trust exists, the interests of:

- the state; of
- the organisation; and those of

- the key decision-makers will be managed with the minimum of conflict.

Trust will *promote incentives and sanctions* that will encourage the timely identification, reporting, action and learning from risk information.

This stage will see ERM efficiently working as a support to the decision-making of the organisation, with a vital link to the decision-making of the national cabinet for risks and opportunities that impact on national priorities.

Cross-cutting process: change and ERM implementation risk management


Throughout Steps 1, 2 and 3, there will be sustained and effective monitoring of the balance of forces between the agents of positive change and the obstacles to improved risk management. Initially, this will be led by the project sponsor and chief champion. Eventually, this responsibility will be co-owned by the Risk Unit and its chief risk and opportunity officer, who must have strong management, board and/or political support.

4.1.2 Step 1: Getting started – the feasibility stage

Introduction

Stephen Covey (of '7 Habits of Highly Effective People' fame) advised that success should 'Begin With The End In Mind'!

Figure 4.3. Considerations for public sector ERM Stage 1 - Feasibility



Source: Jones (2021)

This means that a clear vision, at the start, of how a successful public sector ERM system would work will be indispensable to its effective implementation.

Decision support to government

A public sector ERM system may resemble that of a multinational organisation. So, each ministry, department and/or agency of central or local governance (MDA), state-owned enterprise (SOE), local government authority (LGA) etc. must have its own ERM to improve decision-making for attaining its strategic goals. However, some risks and opportunities may also be relevant to the National Development Strategy (NDS). Where this happens, there should be a mechanism to ensure that relevant negative risks and opportunities get to the national cabinet, on time, to influence decision-making on national priorities.

An effective public sector ERM system will inform timely decisions and actions on the NDS, which in turn should have been influenced, in its formation, by the strategic goals of devolved local governance, the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Each public sector entity will have a clear

knowledge of the critical risks and opportunities of the NDS that fall within its mandate.

The central government will have a central surveillance/monitoring and evaluation function that will be able to scan the ERM indicators of all public sector entities for their relevance to central and/or devolved priorities for decision-making and control. That surveillance function will be an integral contributor to key policy-makers in political and administrative governance.


Decision support to individual public sector entities

State entities, including devolved governance, should have surveillance/monitoring and evaluation functions of their ERM entity that will be embedded within the decision-making of entity governance. They should have mechanisms that are alert to priority negative risks and positive opportunities that require the attention of their senior management, board and/or political leaders.

Managing opportunities as well as negative risks

Strong ERMs may focus equally on the harnessing of opportunities as well as the reduction of the effect

Figure 4.4. Visioning the link between the ERM of individual public sector entities and the National Development Strategy, via the National Cabinet



Source: Jones (2021)


of negative risks. To be respected by key decision-makers, the ERM should reflect the performance needs of the entity and should be seen as adding value to decision-making and control.

The existence of a risk register will not, on its own, be evidence of a well-functioning ERM!

The ideal ERM ecosystem will be a cultural way of thinking for all directors and staff and will not be seen as a separate function.

The Risk Unit will be seen as oil in the engine and not as the engine itself.

Figure 4.5. Powering ERM through a trusting culture: managing the balance between public service interests and the private interests of public servants



Source: Jones (2021)

Organisational and societal trust

A critical success factor of an ERM ecosystem will be the cultural congruence between the public service interests of the entity and the private interests of key decision-makers. Strong public sector ERMs will be associated with conditions of societal trust between the governed and the governors.


Necessary human competences

Other negative implementation risks will include the efficiency, agility and effectiveness of entity strategies, policies, processes and systems. The human competencies of entity stakeholders will also influence their willingness and/or capacity to operate a well-functioning ERM.

4.1.3 Step 2: Organising and planning for an ERM ecosystem

Introduction

During this stage, the outline plans and budgets made during Step 1 need to be fully developed and should be adequately resourced in terms of financial inputs, cultural/leadership support, systems development and human capabilities. A small-scale pilot implementation should be carried out to allow for testing of the rollout and timely correction of

Figure 4.6. An action cycle for negative risks and opportunities

Source: Jones (2021)

plans, without affecting the entire organisation and wasting valuable time and resources.

Risk strategy, policies and processes

An ERM strategy will be developed that is understandable and forms a practical basis for action. Everyone will know how much risk the organisation is willing to take to attain its goals (its 'risk appetite'). The ERM strategy will clearly service the needs of the entity and that of the central government's National Development Strategy.

To implement the ERM strategy, understandable policies and processes will be specified that provide for everyone to know what they (and others) contribute to ERM and why their contribution matters. There will be avoidance of conflicts of interest between the Risk Unit, the internal audit function (which checks on the proper operation of the Risk Unit) and the decision-makers who are the risk owners (operational staff/directors/politicians). The policies and processes will include mechanisms for:


- risk/opportunity identification and recording;
- risk/opportunity screening (to ensure that recorded risks are credible);

- risk/opportunity classification (for ease of analysis and for timely allocation to risk-owners for action);
- assignment of risks/opportunities exposures to risk owners (for action leading to reduction of risks);
- alerts for priorities of urgency and importance (so that some risks can legitimately jump the queue);
- monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the risk/opportunity environment; and
- learning of lessons from successes or failures in the reduction of risk exposures to acceptable limits.

The pilot implementation

The pilot implementation will be subject to independent review by the internal audit function (where it exists), as well as internal review by the Risk Unit. Lessons will be documented and are used to make suitable improvements in the draft ERM strategy, policies and processes. Key stakeholders, including the central government/cabinet Risk Unit, the board of directors (where applicable),

Figure 4.7. Considerations for public sector ERM Stage 2 – Organising and planning



Source: Jones (2021)

key internal and external politicians, senior management and other decision-makers, are part of the review process and they support its findings and recommendations.

Thought is given to potential contingency plans in the event of unforeseeable, but imaginable and possible, hazards to the ERM implementation. An example of the latter may be the replacement of a key ERM supporter by political authorities or an unexpected change in government.

Full rollout of the ERM ecosystem

A practical roll-out plan for the ERM system is developed and is effectively project managed by the Risk Unit. The roll-out programme reflects the ability of the organisation to digest the system successfully; and to manage the foreseeable and unforeseeable (but imaginable) implementation risks.

Essential human competences

The Risk Unit should be empowered with staff who have sufficiently advanced lateral and vertical thinking skills, technical risk knowledge and training, communication skills, work experience, personal credibility and respect among key decision-makers

(from the board/political authorities to first-line management) to be able to effectively support the implementation process. The Risk Unit is seen as an elite destination that attracts the very best staff.

4.1.4 Step 3: Operating an ERM ecosystem


Introduction

Where the feasibility and the planning and organising stages have been managed well, the operation stage should prove to be the easiest! Any problems encountered at this stage are likely to arise from weak management of key systems or culture aspects of the feasibility and/or planning and organising stages.

Periodic review of the ERM ecosystem

An operational public sector ERM system should be subject to periodic internal performance review by the Risk Unit, as well as autonomous assessment by the internal audit function. It should also be subject to regular fully independent assessment by an external independent expert. This will be a key contributor to the ongoing management of the risks to the success of the ERM system.

Figure 4.8. Considerations for public sector ERM Stage 3 - Operating an ERM ecosystem



Source: Jones (2021)

4.2 Research delivery principles, tools and related project management structures

4.2.1 Project management structures

Separate inaugural meetings were successfully held, virtually, between the researcher, representatives of the Commonwealth Secretariat ('the Secretariat') and the principal state representatives (PSRs) for the six countries. An agenda and meeting notes were prepared by the consultant and shared in advance of each meeting. The template is shown as Annex A. The objective was to manage the risks of the assignment by clarifying the responsible – participatory, inclusive, confidential, transparent, impact focused – assignment principles and ethics that should provide productive trust and confidence between the consultant, the client (the Secretariat) and the beneficiaries (PSRs). It also provided a preliminary overview of the methodology, approach and timing proposed for the study. The meetings also allowed the beneficiaries to communicate any contextual apprehensions about the conduct of the study, as for example, about the weakness of internet connections in some parts of some countries, given the proposed remote working and related consultations.

After the inaugural meetings, the beneficiary countries nominated persons to join a Steering Group (SG) that would liaise with the researcher on the assignment. The membership of the SG included the country nominees, the consultants' primary support team and a Secretariat representative as an observer. The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the SG are at Annex B. The membership of the SG is shown at Annex C. The consultant's team communicated with the SG through a six-country WhatsApp group, country-specific WhatsApp groups, emails, periodic progress review voice calls to the leadership of each country SG, and two one-hour virtual progress review meetings.

The behavioural guidelines for the research were documented in an informal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the consultant and the PSRs. A combined Concept Note (CN) and MoU is attached as Annex D. PSRs were asked to mobilise country stakeholders to register for the study consultations. A copy of the online registration form is attached as Annex E. An example of the letter of invitation sent to the PSRs by the consultant is shown as Annex F.

A draft Research Framework was prepared to guide the design and development of the research instruments. The draft was shared with the SG for its comments.

The researcher mobilised a team of in-country support persons (ICSPs) to support the country SGs with the mobilisation of stakeholders. The TOR for the ICSPs is shown in Annex G.

4.2.2 Research delivery principles and tools

The principles of the Theory of Change, in Section 4.1, formed the benchmark expectations that shaped the interaction with the participants in this research. The research used two main data collection instruments:

- a) a large-scale survey, to evaluate the wider cultural and systems environment within which the countries are implementing public sector ERM; and
- b) case studies of a range of specific entities in each country, nominated by Country Steering Groups.

The large-scale survey secured registrations from about 1,500 public sector personnel in the six countries, from dozens of entities. They were consulted via four engagements, which were designed to provide a 'win/win' relationship.

It was planned that the registrants would personally 'win' by accessing content which reinforced and/or refreshed their command of the fundamental principles of ERM, that is, the engagements delivered capacity building. As a further by-product, and as directed by the Country Steering Groups, the study was planned to have the impact of improving

the awareness of the purpose and relevance of ERM to participants and their organisations. In this way, the study was designed to improve the likelihood of successful implementation of ERM after its intervention – that is, it contributed to ERM change management.

The study 'wins' by gaining access to very rich information on the context within which ERM is being implemented, providing in-country insights and cross-country opportunities for understanding the contribution of systems, context and culture to the prospects for specific ERM implementation success.

These 'wins' were delivered by five engagements with registered participants:

- Engagement 1 – a 'win' for registrants that provided access, via an email, to proprietary and third-party (written and audio-visual) content on the fundamental principles of ERM.
- Engagement 2 – a 'win' for the study through the delivery of a cloud-powered questionnaire based on Engagement 1. This contributed to the 'large-scale survey'.
- Engagement 3 – a 'win' for registrants through access to proprietary and third-party (written and audio-visual) content on the applications of ERM principles, including its relevance to the public sector.
- Engagement 4 – a 'win' for the study through the delivery of a cloud-powered questionnaire based on Engagement 3. This completed the 'large-scale survey'.
- Engagement 5 – a 'win' for selected 'case study' organisations and their representatives through proprietary content on the project and change management of ERM in the public sector, combined with a 'win' for the study through related case study questions on the ERM experience of the participants within their organisation.

Engagement 2 attracted about 600 completed questionnaires, which was satisfactory. Engagement 4 received just under 400 questionnaires, which probably reflected its more demanding content relative to Engagement 2. However, the numbers completed were satisfactory for the purposes of the study.

Box 4.2. Research tools with built-in positive impact on participants

With the encouragement of the beneficiary Steering Group, the Research 'Engagements' were designed to deliver 'win/win' interaction.

The participants benefited from in-built capacity building as well as access to information that should facilitate the change project management of public sector ERM in the six countries.

Table 4.1. Organisations participating in the case study and the number of individual respondents per entity

Organisation type and reference	Identifying Code	Country	No. of people completing the case study	People completing the case study (%)
Central Government Ministry 1	MGB01	Botswana	16	31
Central Government Ministry 2	MGB02	Botswana	3	6
State Owned Enterprise	SEBO1	Botswana	2	4
Central Government Ministry 3	MGB03	Botswana	1	2
Autonomous Agency	AAES1	Eswatini	2	4
State Owned Enterprise	SEES1	Eswatini	2	4
State Owned Enterprise	SEGH1	Ghana	3	6
Autonomous Agency	AAKE1	Kenya	1	2
Central Government Ministry	MGSL1	Sierra Leone	6	12
State Owned Enterprise	SESL1	Sierra Leone	4	8
Autonomous Agency	AASL1	Sierra Leone	1	2
Autonomous Agency 2	AATG2	The Gambia	5	10
Autonomous Agency 1	AATG1	The Gambia	4	8
Central Government Ministry 1	MGTG1	The Gambia	1	2
Central Government Ministry 2	MGTG2	The Gambia	1	2
		Total	52	100

Engagement 5 was designed for much fewer and selected individuals from organisations chosen by the Country Steering Groups. It attracted 52 individuals, representing organisations from six countries. At the request of the participating entities, their identities are not disclosed in this report and an identifying code has been used for the analysis that indicates the relevant sector to which the organisation belongs. The participating countries and their nominated organisations are shown in Table 4.1, with a note of the status of participation shown above.

Applying the technique of 'analytical review', the five engagements provided insight into the expectations of the Theory of Change (ToC) outlined in Box 4.1, Section 4.1. The contribution of the questions in Engagements 2, 4 and 5 is mapped to the ToC in Chapters 7 and 14. This provides a framework for the analysis of the results of the research.

4.2.3 Sampling method

There were two considerations: the breadth and the size of the samples.

The Commonwealth Secretariat has mainly focused on supporting Ministries of Finance and their rolled-out institutions in the implementation of public sector ERM. The breadth of the sample was extended to include the full range of public sector entities, i.e., MDAs, SOEs and LGAs. The objective was to understand the context within which the interventions of the Secretariat are delivered. This provides a holistic assessment of the ERM capabilities of each country and the contribution of that wider context to the interventions of the Secretariat.

Sample size is relevant at two levels. First, we can draw inferences from the aggregate population of ERM stakeholders across the six countries. Second, we can draw inferences about ERM stakeholders in each individual country. In both cases, we do not have information on the size of the population. For the purposes of computing statistical sample size for tests of population proportion, we therefore assume unlimited population size in both cases. The working parameters for statistical confidence levels at the level of the aggregate population and that of individual countries are shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2. Statistical sample sizes and related levels of confidence in the results obtained

Population	Aggregate Six-country Population of ERM Stakeholders	Aggregate Six-country Population of ERM Stakeholders	Aggregate Six-country Population of ERM Stakeholders	Individual Country Population of ERM Stakeholders	Individual Country Population of ERM Stakeholders	Individual Country Population of ERM Stakeholders	Individual Country Population of ERM Stakeholders	Individual Country Population of ERM Stakeholders
Ref	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Confidence level	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	90%	80%	70%
Margin of error	5%	6%	5%	8%	10%	10%	10%	10%
Population Proportion	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%
Population size	Unlimited	Unlimited	1,500	Unlimited	Unlimited	Unlimited	Unlimited	Unlimited
Minimum sample size	385	267	306	151	97	69	41	28

As an illustration, this means that, for the aggregate six-country population of ERM stakeholders, Ref A indicates that 385 or more measurements/surveys are needed to have a confidence level of 95 per cent that the real value is within ± 5 per cent of the measured/surveyed value (Maple Tech International LLC 2021). However, if we limit ourselves to the approximately 1,500 registered stakeholders (Ref C), then the same level of confidence about inferences limited to that population can be secured from 306 survey responses.

For an individual country that provides at least 151 responses to a survey question (Ref D), this will provide a confidence level of 95 per cent that the real value is within ± 8 per cent of the measured/surveyed value (ibid). Where the number of responses from another country is relatively low, say about 28 (Ref H), we will have a confidence level of 70 per cent that the real value is within ± 10 per cent of the measured/surveyed value (ibid).

Scenarios A to H of Table 4.2 will be utilised when the results of the large-scale survey is being analysed.

4.2.4 Research questions

Drawing on the Theory of Change (ToC) and the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the study, the following six research questions were defined.

1. To what extent has there been an application, in ERM design and in practice, of the dual service of the national cabinet (in its oversight of the National Development Strategy) and

the leadership of state entities (in its oversight of the entity's long-term plan)? (Source: Research consultant/Public Sector ERM ToC)

2. To what extent is the wider national operating environment congruent with the values, beliefs and practices that facilitate the optimal operation of a public sector ERM? (Source: Research consultant/Public Sector ERM ToC)
3. To what extent has there been an application, in practice, of an enterprise-wide approach in the state planning, implementation, reporting, monitoring and review processes? (Source: ToR)
4. To what degree have key institutions of government (including but not limited to the supreme audit institution and legislature) have been involved in the ERM process during the initiation, training, implementation and rollout across government? (Source: ToR)
5. To what extent do case studies show early gains in governance and public financial management, particularly risk management decision-making, resulting from the introduction and rollout of the ERM, in achieving the strategic objectives of government? (Source: ToR)
6. What lessons have been learnt and how can such lessons be applied elsewhere across the Commonwealth? (Source: ToR)

The contribution of the questions in Engagements 2, 4 and 5 is mapped to the research questions in Chapters 7 and 14. This completes a framework for the analysis of the results of the research.

5. Approach to the Implementation of ERM by the Six Member Countries

Executive Highlights: Approach to the Implementation of ERM by the Six Member Countries

There are two principal international standards that guide the design and implementation of ERM systems. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO 31000: 2018) and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 2017). They complement each other so that a hybrid approach can be developed that draws on the strengths of both.

Typically, a Public Sector ERM (PS-ERM) implementation would be guided by the following tools:

- A baseline maturity assessment – that identifies the current quality of PS-ERM practices and their impact. The Deloitte & Touche 5-step scale is a leading example of such a tool.
- A national PS-ERM vision, strategy, policy and framework to guide the aspirations for improvement on a generally accepted maturity scale over a realistic period of time.
- A PS-ERM implementation plan

Botswana

- PS-ERM started in 2016 at which stage the maturity was assessed at Stage 2 (fragmented) of a five step Deloitte & Touche maturity scale. Development has been based on COSO 2017. As at 31 March 2021, 14 MDAs had commenced PS-ERM implementation. However, most activities that were ongoing related to training, sensitisation and risk assessment. MDAs were not at a stage where PS-ERM was fully

functional – that is, implementing risk action plans, reporting and using outcomes from risk assessments for decision-making. The Commonwealth ERM Capacity Building Manual was piloted in Botswana in 2022.

Eswatini

- Commenced PS-ERM in 2017 and benchmarked to the COSO 2017 standard. Implementation was still at an early stage at the point of this research. In 2022, the Commonwealth Secretariat provided technical assistance to support a pilot implementation. Additionally, two officials from the Ministry of Finance were trained as trainers in the use of the Commonwealth ERM Capacity Building Manual that was developed for member states in 2022.

Ghana

- Ghana's history of ERM dates back to 2003, when related responsibilities were incorporated into the mandate of the new Internal Audit Agency. The Agency has subsequently provided oversight support to the development of PS-ERM. The Commonwealth ERM Capacity Building Manual was piloted in Ghana Grid Company Ltd (GRIDCo) in 2022.

Kenya

- The emergence of ERM in Kenya can be traced to the Public Finance Management Act of 2012. Subsequently, to promote a coherent approach to discharging these duties and to assist public sector entities understand the requirements for managing risk, the National Treasury prepared Risk Management Guidelines as an element of

the Public Management Reform Agenda. A national ERM policy and framework document was still in the process of development at the time of this research in 2021, with the National Treasury and Planning as the lead entity.

Sierra Leone

- ERM commenced in 2016 and has been benchmarked to ISO 31000. The Ministry of Finance has been the lead entity. Key risk management documents developed by 2021 included a draft National ERM Policy, draft ERM Framework, Fiscal Risk Strategy Statement (FSS), ERM Strategy and an ERM flyer. As of 31 March 2021, there were three PS-ERM implementations in progress comprising the Ministry of Finance, National Revenue Authority and the Ministry of Basic and Senior Secondary Education. A senior official from the Ministry of Finance was trained as a trainer in the use of the Commonwealth ERM Capacity Building Manual that was developed for member states in 2022.

The Gambia

- A national PS-ERM strategy developed in 2018 established that the PS-ERM maturity level was 'Fragmented' (level 2 according to the five-level Deloitte and Touche scale). The strategy was a 'hybrid' of the ISO and the COSO global standards. The strategy committed the government to reach a 'Risk Intelligent' level of maturity (level 5) in the long term. An enterprise risk management policy and framework were developed. Strategic and operational risk assessments were conducted for pilot ministries and departments. The Commonwealth ERM Capacity Building Manual was piloted in The Gambia in 2022.

At the time the research was conducted, none of the six country implementations had attained a level of maturity where they provided effective connected decision support to the national development strategy (see Proposition 3 of the Executive Highlights to Chapter 4).

5.1 ISO or COSO or a hybrid?

There are two primary ERM standards: ISO 31000:2018 and COSO 2017.

A revised version of ISO 31000 was published in 2018. The update was intended to reflect the evolution of the market and new challenges faced by business and organisations since the standard was first released in 2009. An example of such change is the increased complexity of economic systems and emerging risk factors such as digital currency, both of which can present new and different types of risks to an organisation on an international scale. The new standard provides more strategic guidance than ISO 31000:2009. It places more emphasis on both the involvement of senior management and the integration of risk management into the organisation. This includes the recommendation to develop a statement or policy that confirms a commitment to risk management, assigning authority, responsibility and accountability at the appropriate levels within the organisation and ensuring that the necessary resources are allocated to managing risk (International Organisation for Standardisation 2018).

COSO 2017 is entitled *Enterprise Risk Management – Integrating with Strategy and Performance* (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission 2017). It builds on the 2004 *Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework*. The 2004 framework had secured broad acceptance by organisations in their efforts to manage risk. However, over the decade since its issue, the complexity of risk had changed and – as also identified by ISO – new risks had emerged. The 2017 document highlights the importance of considering risk in both the strategy-setting process and in driving performance. The first part of the 2017 standard offers a perspective on current and evolving concepts and applications of enterprise risk management. The second part, the framework, is organised into five components that accommodate different viewpoints and operating structures, and are designed to enhance strategies and decision-making.

ISO and COSO can be seen as alternatives that can also provide useful references for the development of a hybrid approach that draws on relevant insights from both. This research has been informed by a hybrid perspective.

5.2 Contents of a typical PS-ERM national strategy, policy and framework

A public sector-enterprise risk management (PS-ERM) national strategy would have the following minimum contents:

- a) An evaluation of the history and the contemporary direction and control of enterprise risk management in the public sector. This should inform a baseline assessment of the maturity of ERM in the public sector. Such a maturity assessment could rank the status on a scale that might, for example, include the five step Deloitte and Touche levels (Deloitte and Touche 2015):
 - i. *Unaware*, i.e., chaotic and disorganised;
 - ii. *Fragmented*, i.e., organised but poorly co-ordinated;
 - iii. *Top Down*, i.e., reasonably co-ordinated, fairly risk aware, but with too much central control;
 - iv. *Integrated*, i.e., fairly trusting two-way flows of risk awareness, information and decisions; and
 - v. *Risk Intelligent*, i.e., fully integrated risk driven strategies and decision-making within efficient trust-based risk-aware culture that manages both downside risks and opportunities in an agile and innovative style.
- b) A vision and a realistic strategy for migration from the contemporary risk maturity level to an attainable enhanced level within a defined period of time, say five years. This strategy will be founded on a practical set of tactics for managing the downside risks of change, as well as the steps to be taken to harness the potential enablers of progress.
- c) An implementation plan for the PS-ERM strategy.

A PS-ERM national policy would have the following minimum contents:

- A clear link – possibly through a *policy statement* – to the PS-ERM national strategy, for which the policy provides the first step in

implementation. The policy statement would include the primary principles or policies that would drive the strategy implementation.

- An identification of the principal roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for the delivery of the strategy.

A PS-ERM national framework would have the following minimum contents:

- Definition of terms – to allow for the common interpretation of key risk terms across participating entities.
- A link to the PS-ERM national strategy.
- A link to the PS-ERM national policy.
- A statement of the broad PS-ERM process cycle distinguishing – as a minimum – between identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment and controls, monitoring, reporting, learning and improvement.
- The national approach to the categorisation of risk types.
- The management of the relationship between the ERMs of individual public sector entities and the central overarching risk management function that informs the direction and control of the National Development Strategy.
- A process for PS-ERM quality assurance.

5.3 Botswana

In part to improve public financial management (PFM), the Botswana government developed an ERM strategy, ERM policy and framework that were approved in 2016 to guide implementation of ERM across government. It was initially assessed that the government was at Stage 2 (fragmented) of a five-stage ERM maturity model.

Excluding SOEs and local government, there were 18 ministries and 14 departments comprising the central government in 2021. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (through the Department of Internal Audit) was the lead entity for the co-ordination of the Botswana PS-ERM. The ERM framework for the Botswana central government is based on the COSO standard. The current ERM strategy provides direction and control for the period 2017 to 2022.

ERM policies are tailored to the needs of the component entity. Central government has one which has been extended to local government, while SOEs have different policy documents that reflect the nature of their business. The implementation of the PS-ERM started in August 2017 with a pilot of five central government ministries and independent departments, and proceeded to a wider rollout in 2018. Before the commencement of the pilot, sensitisation was done for all ministries and independent departments prior to approval of the ERM policy. This took place between 2014 and 2015. As at 31 March 2021, 14 MDAs had commenced PS-ERM implementation. They are:

- Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
- Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
- Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development
- Ministry of Health and Wellness
- Ministry of Land Management, Water and Sanitation Services
- Ministry of Mineral Resources, Green Technology and Energy Security
- Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Natural Resources
- Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security
- Botswana Police
- Ministry of International Affairs and Cooperation
- Ministry of Transport and Communications
- Ministry of Youth Empowerment, Sport and Culture Development
- Ministry for Presidential Affairs, Governance and Public Administration
- Ministry of Infrastructure and Housing Development

However, most activities that are ongoing relate to training, sensitisation and risk assessment. MDAs are not at a stage where PS-ERM is fully functional – that is, implementing risk action plans, reporting and using outcomes from risk

assessments for decision-making. In practice, they are at the initial stage of having policy, being aware about PS-ERM and conducting risk assessments.

The Internal Audit Department, housed within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED), was co-ordinating PS-ERM efforts across government as part of its consultancy responsibilities. The role is to facilitate rather than take ownership of the process. However, the team is working hand in hand with chief risk officers nominated by ministries, who serve as the main liaison. Internal Audit periodically reports on the PS-ERM to the permanent secretary, MFED and, quarterly, to the Government Audit Committee.

A PS-ERM Capacity Needs Analysis and Training/Development Plan is in place. On an annual basis, MDAs identify training needs for their teams and these are met in-house through the Internal Audit Department's ERM Coordinating Unit, which had three qualified risk management officers. MDAs are advised to also get training from other institutions. There is no dedicated budget for ERM capacity building, apart from roll-out activities that are planned and led by MFED. MDAs conducted 60 training events from 2017 to the time of writing, with about 25 participants per event. Thus, approximately 1,500 people have been trained, excluding those trained as part of the Commonwealth Secretariat's ERM research process.

5.4 Eswatini

Public sector risk management in the Kingdom of Eswatini has a relatively recent history, dating back to its introduction of the COSO Framework in 2017. Soon after the establishment of the Internal Audit Office (IAO) under the statutory authority of the PFM Act, the Government of Eswatini received technical assistance from the EU to strengthen its internal audit capacity. It was through this technical assistance that the importance of risk management was brought into sharp focus, with one of the specific objectives being to develop technical and institutional capacity within the IAO to assist the government to embed risk management in all government ministries. In pursuit of that objective, the establishment of a formal risk management system in all ministries was prioritised. Eswatini

has been a beneficiary of technical assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat through the Secretariat's Africa ERM programmes; and it was in this context that a scoping meeting for piloting ERM implementation in six ministries was conducted in 2020.

There were approximately 988 entities comprising 31 ministries and departments, 49 public agencies, 58 Tinkhundla (constituencies) and 850 schools under the supervision of the central government in 2021. The Internal Audit Office (IAO), reporting quarterly to the Ministry of Finance, was the lead entity that co-ordinates the implementation of PS-ERM in the central government. However, there was no dedicated staff complement for PS-ERM nor was there a central risk unit. The IAO had conducted risk management awareness workshops in 36 MDAs and facilitated risk assessments in some of these entities, as outlined in Table 5.1.

There was no full implementation of PS-ERM in ministries and departments. Nevertheless, in advancing the ERM implementation process, the Government of Eswatini was in consultation with the Commonwealth Secretariat to provide technical assistance for sustainable PS-ERM implementation in six pilot ministries.

5.5 Ghana

The recent history of risk management in the Ghana's public sector dates to 2003, with the promulgation of the Internal Audit Agency Act, incorporating risk management into the legislative responsibilities of the agency as a regulatory institution. The said Act specifically states that 'The Agency shall ensure that risks are adequately managed in the MDAs..'. It further provides that ministries should undertake continuous risk identification and management and that the agency will be responsible for assessing the risk management activities of ministries.

In line with the various legislative requirements, the Internal Audit Agency, as the oversight body for internal audit practice and the institution with the mandate to oversee risk management in Ghana's public sector, has over the years developed and deployed various tools to support effective risk management.

Table 5.1. Eswatini: MDAs for which Risk Management Awareness Workshops were facilitated by 2021

#	Target	No. of participants
1.	Principal secretaries	20
2.	Under secretary and heads of department (HOD)	20
3.	Deeds Registry Office	8
4.	Tinkhundla – regional secretary, Lubombo	12
5.	Primary schools inspectors	25
6.	Secondary schools inspectors	18
7.	Ministry of Agriculture	16
8.	Ministry of Works – Buildings Dept	26
9.	Ministry of Works – Roads Dept	13
10.	Ministry of Works – Road and Transportation Board	14
11.	Ministry of Works – Administration	8
12.	Ministry of Education-HOD	30
13.	Ministry of Education-Other	7
14.	St Anne High School	10
15.	Teaching Service Commission	30
16.	Government accountants and stores personnel	20
17.	Government accountants	21
18.	Examination Council of Eswatini	8
19.	Ministry of Tourism	10
20.	Ministry of Tourism – Forestry Dept	6
21.	Internal Audit Office	24
22.	Meteorology Department	13
23.	Public Enterprise Unit	6
24.	Ministry of Finance	8
25.	Ministry of Housing and Urban Development	16
26.	His Majesty's Correctional Services	36
27.	Ministry of Economic Planning – Planning Department	17
28.	Micro projects	15
29.	Parliament	12
30.	Treasury	10
31.	Government accounts and stores personnel	20
32.	Computer Services Dept	12
33.	Ministry of Home Affairs – Administration	20
34.	Ministry of Home Affairs – Immigration Dept	14
35.	Ministry of Labor and Social Security	13
36.	Royal Eswatini Police Service	91
	Total trained	649

5.6 Kenya

A framework for governance and accountabilities was established by the Constitution of Kenya 2010, through Articles 10, 201, and 232. The Public Finance Management Act, 2012, and its attendant Regulations 2015, mandate accountable officers of all public sector entities and companies, in both levels of government (national and county), to establish and maintain appropriate systems of risk oversight and management for the entity. To promote a coherent approach to discharging these duties and to assist public sector entities understand the requirements for managing risk, the National Treasury prepared Risk Management Guidelines as an element of the Public Management Reform Agenda (PMRA).

The PMRA reforms encourage 'engaging with risk [as] a necessary first step in improving performance'. The government also released the Mwongozo Governance Code for State Corporations to guide the effective management of risks. The purpose of the National Treasury Guidelines is to facilitate the establishment of a risk management policy, risk management framework and risk management registers for the oversight and management of risk within the public sector.

A national ERM policy document was still in the process of development at the time of this research, with the National Treasury and Planning as the lead entity. Thus, each entity was expected to develop its own specific ERM policy. Similarly, a national ERM Framework was under development.

5.7 Sierra Leone

The current ERM policy for Sierra Leone was developed in 2016 with technical assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat, and involved various stakeholders including the Ministry of Finance (Internal Audit Division, Public Financial Management Reform Division [PFMRD], Fiscal Decentralisation Division [FDD]), National Public Procurement Authority (NPPA) and Audit Service Sierra Leone (ASSL). Through further technical assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat in 2017, a comprehensive ERM training was conducted for 30 officials from central government.

Key risk management documents developed to 2021 included the draft National ERM Policy, draft ERM Framework, Fiscal Risk Strategy

Statement (FSS), ERM Strategy and an ERM flyer. The national ERM Framework is based on the ISO31000 standard.

Excluding SOEs and local government, there are over 100 MDAs in the Sierra Leone public sector, with the Ministry of Finance the lead entity for the public sector ERM. The ERM consultation process involved MDAs, local government and parliament.

As of 31 March 2021, there were three PS-ERM implementations in progress comprising the Ministry of Finance (MoF), National Revenue Authority (NRA) and the Ministry of Basic and Senior Secondary Education (MBSSE). The MoF focussed on fiscal risks and had not yet expanded to enterprise risks; MBSSE was at an early stage with NRA at an advanced stage of PS-ERM implementation.


5.8 The Gambia

The Government of The Gambia in February 2018 launched the National Development Plan (NDP) 2018–2021, whose overall goal was to 'deliver good governance and accountability', supported by eight strategic priorities.

For the period 2021 to 2025, an updated strategy has been designed to build on achievements attained over the previous period. The overall objective of the updated strategy for the new period was *inter alia* to sustain the improvements in budget credibility and transparency, implement recommendations from both internal and external audit reports, and enhance functional LGA treasuries. It revolves around seven specific pillars, one of which is 'internal control, audit, governance and risk management'. The reforms under this pillar support the provision of assurance on systems and processes and seek to build a culture of risk management across the operations of all MDAs.

The key outcome under this pillar is having the framework and processes in place for improved management of risk across MDAs under government enterprise risk management. A number of the key activities are already underway or have already been completed – including the training of ERM risk officers.

A national PS-ERM strategy developed in 2018 established that the PS-ERM maturity level was 'Fragmented' (level 2 according to the five-level Deloitte and Touche scale). The strategy had

Figure 5.1. Risk Management Framework of the Government of The Gambia

Source: Government of The Gambia

a 'hybrid' foundation, i.e., it drew from both the ISO and the COSO global standards. The strategy committed the government to reach a 'Risk Intelligent' level of maturity (level 5) in the long term. As part of the process, an enterprise risk management policy was developed and approved by the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs. Also developed was an Enterprise Risk Management Framework. Furthermore, strategic and operational risk assessments were conducted for selected pilot ministries and departments.

The Minister of Finance is ultimately responsible for the governance and oversight of risk management activities within the Government of The Gambia. The minister approves the risk management policy and delegates the approval of the risk management framework and strategy to the permanent secretary of the ministry. The permanent secretary provides leadership and guidance for implementation of the policy and framework. The minister is ultimately accountable to the national cabinet to form an opinion on the effectiveness of the risk management process across the public sector.

A phased approach to the migration from fragmented to risk intelligent status was planned, with an initial three-year (2018 to 2021) detailed implementation plan to provide the first attempt to enhance the maturity level. The plan provided for periodic reassessment of maturity level, to indicate progress and provide for tactical adjustments

where necessary on the way to 'Risk Intelligent' status by 2026. In the short term, the embedding of risk management focuses on the governance of risk, appointment of dedicated ERM officials within the Internal Audit Directorate, financial resource allocation from the national budget, and training and awareness facilitation. With the support of the Commonwealth Secretariat, two rounds of stakeholder training were delivered between 2018 and 2019, with each targeting about 30 participants. The training was delivered in collaboration with the West African Insurance Institute, Banjul. Training participants were drawn from pilot ministries, including but not limited to:

- Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education
- Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
- Ministry of Transport, Works and Infrastructure
- Ministry of Petroleum and Energy

The Gambia also benefitted directly from exchange learning with Ghana's Internal Audit Agency and Grid Company as part of the Commonwealth Secretariat's technical assistance.

Overall, The Gambia is at a formative stage of the implementation of its PS-ERM, albeit with significant preparatory work already done.

6. Approach to the Integration of PFM and ERM by the Six Member Countries

Executive Highlights: Approach to the Integration of PFM and ERM by the Six Member Countries

Botswana

- In Botswana, at the time of the research in 2021, PFM was not integrated with ERM, although Public Sector ERM (PS-ERM) was implemented as an initiative under the PFM reform programme. It was expected that the revision of the PFM laws that were underway would take ERM into account. There were, however, limited overlaps between PS-ERM and the existing PFM legislation.

Eswatini

- Eswatini had a partly implemented PFM strategy, but it was yet to be revised to integrate PFM with the ERM strategy. There was limited consideration of PS-ERM issues in

the PFM regulations. It was expected that the full implementation of the PFM strategy would lead to the formal integration of ERM.

Ghana

- The passing of the Public Finance Management Act in 2016 saw the full integration of ERM and PFM.

Kenya

- The enactment of the Public Finance Management Act in 2018 saw the full integration of ERM and PFM.

Sierra Leone

- The Public Finance Management Act 2016 provides the full integration of ERM and PFM.

The Gambia

- The integration of PFM and ERM is work-in-progress in The Gambia.

6.1 Botswana

In Botswana, PFM, in 2021, was not integrated with risk, although the PS-ERM was implemented as an initiative under the PFM reform programme. It was expected that the revision of the PFM laws that were ongoing will take the aspect of risk management into account. There are limited overlaps between PS-ERM and the existing PFM legislation, as shown below.

The present Public Finance Management (PFM) Act 2013 is described as an Act to make provision for the control and management of public moneys and public supplies and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. Section 12 provides for a Government Audit Committee, whose specifications include the provision of an independent review and oversight of government financial and other reporting activities; reviewing of internal controls, risk management and governance processes; and monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of the government internal audit function.

Section 5 charges the minister with the development and implementation of a macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework as part of the National Development Plan, which plan is the ultimate focus of ERM. The proactive stance of ERM is reflected in the Act's requirement of the minister to discharge the prudent management of the fiscal risks facing the government; to pursue policies that are consistent with a reasonable degree of predictability about the level and stability of tax rates for future years; and to annually present to the National Assembly a report on the current and projected state of the economy.

6.2 Eswatini

In 2021, Eswatini had a PFM strategy which was yet to be revised to integrate PFM with the ERM strategy. There was limited consideration of PS-ERM issues in the PFM regulations. The PFM Act was enacted in 2017, with regulations being subsequently generated. The full implementation of the PFM strategy had not yet been achieved. When completed, this will include the PFM risk process. PFM specific risk types had yet to be defined and PFM risk assessments were not being performed.

6.3 Ghana

In Ghana, 2016 saw the enactment of the Public Financial Management Act, which was part of the country's public financial management reforms. The Act is a consolidation of the relevant existing financial management legislation, with updated and additional provisions designed to ensure comprehensive coverage of the government's financial management activities. The Act also places responsibility for effective risk management of 'Covered Entities' in the public sector on the respective principal spending officers and the governing bodies of SOEs, who in turn are expected to establish an effective system of risk management and internal control systems. More specifically, the PFM Act provides in Section 90 (c) that, 'The governing body of a public corporation or state-owned enterprise shall establish and maintain risk management and internal control systems.' Passage of the PFM Act has also made it mandatory for public sector internal audit in Ghana to be risk based.

6.4 Kenya

The Kenya PFM legal framework comprehensively addresses all aspects of risk management, and PS-ERM is a component of the PFM strategy. In March 2015, the Public Finance Management (PFM) Act (No. 18 of 2012) Arrangement of Regulations provided that '*Internal audit planning shall be carried out on the basis of risk assessment...*'. By 2020, Kenya had gazetted a draft Guidelines on Risk Management for national and county (local government) entities. The PFM Act places a duty on accountable officers of all public sector entities and companies, at both levels of government (national and county), to establish and maintain appropriate systems of risk oversight and management for the entity.

In 2021, the implementation of the PFM risk process is a work in progress, as were the definitions of PFM specific risk types and the design of the risk assessment process. The development of a PFM risk management manual is also underway. At the time of writing, there was no unit dedicated to the monitoring of PFM risk. Consequently, there was also no PFM chief risk officer. However, periodic PFM reports are reportedly prepared that address risk.

6.5 Sierra Leone

The PFM legal framework in Sierra Leone comprehensively addresses all elements of risk management. With the Ministry of Finance serving as host for both the development of the ERM, as well as PFM, the integration of the two benefits from common direction and control. The Public Financial Management Act, 2016, was described as an Act to make provision for the prudent, efficient, effective and transparent management and use of public financial resources and to provide for other related matters and is, in principle, consistent with the principles of enterprise risk management. It defines structures for responsibilities and accountabilities in the deployment of budget systems; principles and tools for the management of macroeconomic and fiscal policies – including a fiscal risk statement; and mechanisms for the proactive management and control of budget preparation and execution and treasury management.

The PS-ERM strategy is a subset of the PFM reform strategy. PFM specific risk types have been defined and a risk assessment process has been developed.

However, a comprehensive PFM risk management manual was reportedly not yet in place. The director of fiscal risk and state-owned enterprises is the chief PFM risk officer and periodic PFM reports are prepared that specifically address risk.

6.6 The Gambia

The PFM strategy 2016–2020 was launched a year after the enactment of the National Audit Office Act (2015). It was designed to support the implementation of the PFM reforms, aimed at creating a transparent, accountable and credible system that could better manage public resources for informed decision-making and the effective provision of public services. During this strategy period, significant progress was made in the implementation of PFM reforms, while the need for improvement in a number of areas was also highlighted.

In 2021, the integration of PFM and PS-ERM was a work in progress in The Gambia.

7. Introduction to the Large-scale Survey – Engagements 2 and 4

Executive Highlights: Introduction to the Large-scale Survey: Engagements 2 and 4 (*with complementary information on the Case Study Engagement 5*)

There were two tools of research enquiry:

1. **A large-scale survey (LSS)**, to evaluate the wider cultural and systems environment within which the countries are implementing public sector ERM (PS-ERM).
 - a. The LSS is the evidence base for the six chapters 8 to 13, which examine the findings for the six countries.
 - i. 1,487 (one thousand four hundred and eighty-seven) persons from 399 (three hundred and ninety-nine) entities across the six countries registered to participate in the research.
 - ii. When asked if their entity had a functioning or partly implemented ERM system, 54% of registrants either stated "No" or "I do not know".
 - b. Participants were given multi-media introductory information about ERM in Engagement 1. Engagement 2 asked 5 (five) related questions and received about 600 (six hundred) completed questionnaires.
 - c. Participants were given relatively advanced multi-media information about ERM in Engagement 3. Engagement 4 asked 18 (eighteen) related questions and attracted just under 400 (four hundred) completed responses.
2. **In-depth case studies** of specific entities in each country, nominated by Country Steering Groups.
 - a. Engagement 5 asked for specific information about the participating entities from a limited set of knowledgeable participants.
 - b. The identities of the selected public sector entities were not disclosed in the report. An anonymised naming convention was applied.
 - c. 15 (fifteen) public sector entities participated, with information provided by 52 (fifty-two) relevant persons.
 - i. 4 (four) entities were from Botswana with a total of 22 (twenty-two) key informants
 - ii. 2 (two) entities were from Eswatini with a total of 4 (four) key informants
 - iii. 1 (one) entity was from Ghana with a total of 3 (three) key informants
 - iv. 1 (one) entity was from Kenya with 1 (one) key informant
 - v. 3 (three) entities were from Sierra Leone with a total of 11 (eleven) key informants
 - vi. 4 (four) entities were from The Gambia with a total of 11 (eleven) key informants

Of 1,487 registrants	Of 399 organisations
Botswana attracted 36% (thirty-six percent)	Botswana attracted 35% (thirty-five percent)
Eswatini recorded 16% (sixteen percent)	Eswatini recorded 21% (twenty-one percent)
Ghana fielded 3% (three percent)	Ghana fielded 5% (five percent)
Kenya had 7% (seven percent)	Kenya had 11% (eleven percent)
Sierra Leone attracted 32% (thirty-two percent)	Sierra Leone attracted 22% (twenty-two percent)
The Gambia fielded 6% (six percent)	The Gambia fielded 6% (six percent)

7.1 Introduction and overview

The research framework was described in Section 4.2.2 above. It outlined the primary tools of enquiry, i.e.

- a large-scale survey, to evaluate the wider cultural and systems environment within which the countries are implementing public sector ERM; and
- case studies of a range of specific entities in each country, nominated by Country Steering Groups.

This chapter examines the findings of the large-scale survey. The sampling method and research questions are described in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 respectively. The results of the case studies are explored in Chapter 14.

7.2 The analytical framework for the research findings


7.2.1 Outline

As described in Section 4.1, Box 4.1, the process of 'analytical review' was deployed to generate insights from this research. First, we established what we expected to see by way of good practices for public sector ERM. This is done in Section 4.1 and described as a 'Theory of Change' (ToC).

Then we checked Chapters 8 to 13 to see what actually happened in the countries of interest. We compared expectations with reality, drew conclusions and determined lessons to be learnt.

Box 4.1 illustrates the application of 'analytical review' in this context. The ToC was the starting point. Then survey questions were developed to provide information on the practical manifestation

Figure 7.1. Generating insights from survey enquiries – the analytical framework for the research findings



of the constructs in the ToC. The insights from this process then provided a basis for conclusion on the research questions and the identification of lessons worth learning.

The technical knowledge of private and public sector applications of ERM and the country-specific contextual information, both of which are detailed in Chapter 2, provided essential inputs into the development of the ToC. The digested knowledge, skills and experiences of the researcher, accumulated over decades in the field, were the final contributor to the ToC.

7.2.2 Analytical framework for the ToC Stages 1 to 3

The analysis of the expectations of the ToC Step 1 is outlined in Section 4.1.2. This mapping provides a structure for discussing the findings of the five questions of Engagement 2 (Table 7.1). It indicates that all the survey questions (2.1 to 2.5) provide insight on ToC Step 1 items C, G and H. They are of little relevance to items A, B, D, E and F.

The analysis of the expectations of the ToC Step 2 is outlined in Section 4.1.3. This mapping provides a structure for discussing the findings of the five

Table 7.1. Mapping of Engagement 2 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 1

Survey questions for Engagement 2 ToC Step 1 – Getting Started: The Feasibility Stage	2.1. How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?	2.2 To what extent is your organisation so engaged in 'firefighting' that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	2.3. In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?	2.4 'To make money, there are no right and wrong ways any more, only easy and hard ways.' Do you agree or disagree?	2.5 'These days a person doesn't really know whom s/he can count on?' Do you agree or disagree?
A. Stephen Covey: 'Begin with the end in mind'					
B. ERM exists for decision support to government/ cabinet					
C. ERM co-exists for decision support to your entity			Mapped		
D. ERM must manage opportunities as well as negative risks					
E. ERM should be a cultural way of thinking and not seen as a separate function					
F. Risk Unit must be oil in the engine and not the engine itself!					
G. Organisational and societal trust is critical		Mapped		Mapped	Mapped
H. Necessary human competences are vital	Mapped				

Source: Jones (2021)

Table 7.2. Mapping of Engagement 2 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 2

Survey questions for Engagement 2 ToC Step 2 – Planning and organising for an ERM ecosystem	2.1. How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?	2.2 To what extent is your organisation so engaged in 'firefighting' that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	2.3. In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?	2.4 'To make money, there are no right and wrong ways any more, only easy and hard ways.' Do you agree or disagree?	2.5 'These days a person doesn't really know whom s/he can count on?' Do you agree or disagree?
A. Understandable risk strategy, policies and processes					
B. Effective pilot implementation to reduce ERM change risk					
C. Realistic full rollout of the ERM ecosystem					
D. Essential human competences	Mapped				

Source: Jones (2021)

Table 7.3. Mapping of Engagement 2 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 3

Survey questions for Engagement 2 ToC Step 3 – Operating an ERM ecosystem	2.1. How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?	2.2 To what extent is your organisation so engaged in 'firefighting' that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	2.3. In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?	2.4 'To make money, there are no right and wrong ways any more, only easy and hard ways.' Do you agree or disagree?	2.5 'These days a person doesn't really know whom s/he can count on?' Do you agree or disagree?
A. Managing the risk of the ERM system's failure – 'the proof of the pudding is in the eating'		Mapped			
B. Quality assurance			Mapped		

Source: Jones (2021)

questions of Engagement 2 (Table 7.2). It indicates that the survey Question 2.1 provides insight on ToC Step 2 item D. They are of little relevance to items A, B, and C.

The analysis of the expectations of the ToC Step 3 is outlined in Section 4.1.4. This mapping provides a structure for discussing the findings of the five questions of Engagement 2 (Table 7.3). It indicates that the survey Questions 2.2 and 2.3 provide insight on ToC Step 3 items A and B.

In summary, it is evident that the questions in Engagement 2 have the broad relevance to the Feasibility Step 1, i.e., all five questions provide insights relevant to an initial assessment of the viability and value of ERM in a particular organisation. Two questions also provide some useful guidance on the assessment of the effectiveness of a fully implemented ERM system using the Step 3 framework. One question provides insight into the need for investing in adequate human training and development during the Planning Step 2.

The analysis of the expectations of the ToC Step 1 is outlined in Section 4.1.2. This mapping provides a structure for discussing the findings of the 19 questions of Engagement 4 (Table 7.4). It indicates that all the survey questions (4.1 to 4.19) provide insight on ToC Step 1 items A, B, C, E, F, G and H. They are of little relevance to item D.

The analysis of the expectations of the ToC Step 2 is outlined in Section 4.1.3. This mapping provides a structure for discussing the findings of the 19 questions of Engagement 4 (Table 7.5). It indicates that the survey questions provide insight on ToC Step 2 item A and D only. They are of little relevance to items B and C, which will be primarily examined in the case studies reported in Section 14.

The analysis of the expectations of the ToC Step 3 is outlined in Section 4.1.4. This mapping provides a structure for discussing the findings of the 19 questions of Engagement 4 (Table 7.6). It indicates that the survey questions provide insight on ToC Step 3 item A only. The examination of issues relating to item B will be a concern for the case studies in Section 8.

In summary, the questions in Engagement 4 have broad relevance to the Feasibility Step 1, that is, all 19 questions provide insights relevant to an initial assessment of the viability and value of ERM in a particular organisation. Eleven (11) questions also shed useful light on the planning and organising for an ERM implementation using the Step 2 framework. Ten (10) questions allow the analysis of the effectiveness of an operational ERM system utilising the framework of Step 3.

Table 7.4. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 1

Survey questions for Engagement 4 ToC Step 1 – Getting started: the feasibility stage	A. Stephen Covey: 'Begin with the end in mind'	B. ERM exists for decision support to government/cabinet	C. ERM co-exists for decision support to your entity	D. Must manage opportunities as well as negative risks	E. ERM should be a cultural way of thinking and not seen as a separate function	F. Risk Unit must be oil in the engine and not the engine itself!	G. Organisational and societal trust is critical	H. Necessary human competences are vital
4.1. How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?								Mapped
4.2. To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?	Mapped				Mapped		Mapped	
4.3 'Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.' Do you agree or disagree?					Mapped			
4.4 'Next to health, money is the most important thing in life.' Do you agree or disagree?					Mapped			
4.5 People: my organisation strives to create a 'risk-aware' culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?						Mapped		

(Continued)

Table 7.4. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 1

Survey questions for Engagement 4 ToC Step 1 – Getting started: the feasibility stage	A. Stephen Covey: 'Begin with the end in mind'	B. ERM exists for decision support to government/cabinet	C. ERM co-exists for decision support to your entity	D. Must manage opportunities as well as negative risks	E. ERM should be a cultural way of thinking and not seen as a separate function	F. Risk Unit must be oil in the engine and not the engine itself!	G. Organisational and societal trust is critical	H. Necessary human competences are vital
4.6 Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technologies to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation, and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?								Mapped
4.7 'It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world with the way things look for the future.' Do you agree or disagree?								
4.8 'Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man.' Do you agree or disagree?								

(Continued)

Table 7.4. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 1

Survey questions for Engagement 4 ToC Step 1 – Getting started: the feasibility stage	A. Stephen Covey: 'Begin with the end in mind'	B. ERM exists for decision support to government/cabinet	C. ERM co-exists for decision support to your entity	D. Must manage opportunities as well as negative risks	E. ERM should be a cultural way of thinking and not seen as a separate function	F. Risk Unit must be oil in the engine and not the engine itself!	G. Organisational and societal trust is critical	H. Necessary human competences are vital
4.9 Strategy: internal and external risks to my organisation's mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?	Mapped		Mapped					
4.10 Budget: our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough, and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?	Mapped		Mapped					

(Continued)

Table 7.4. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 1

Survey questions for Engagement 4 ToC Step 1 – Getting started: the feasibility stage	A. Stephen Covey: 'Begin with the end in mind'	B. ERM exists for decision support to government/cabinet	C. ERM co-exists for decision support to your entity	D. Must manage opportunities as well as negative risks	E. ERM should be a cultural way of thinking and not seen as a separate function	F. Risk Unit must be oil in the engine and not the engine itself!	G. Organisational and societal trust is critical	H. Necessary human competences are vital
4.11 'You sometimes can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile any more.' Do you agree or disagree?					Mapped			
4.12 'In spite of what some people say, the lot (situation/condition) of the average person is getting worse, not better.' Do you agree or disagree?					Mapped			
4.13 Performance using key performance indicators (KPI) and key risk indicators (KRIs): KRIs are 'lagging indicators' that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be 'leading indicators' that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?	Mapped		Mapped			Mapped	Mapped	

(Continued)

Table 7.4. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 1

Survey questions for Engagement 4	A. Stephen Covey: 'Begin with the end in mind'	B. ERM exists for decision support to government/cabinet	C. ERM co-exists for decision support to your entity	D. Must manage opportunities as well as negative risks	E. ERM should be a cultural way of thinking and not seen as a separate function	F. Risk Unit must be oil in the engine and not the engine itself	G. Organisational and societal trust is critical	H. Necessary human competences are vital
4.14 Two-way information street: rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders, who perform vital management and programme functions. This allows for better departmental decision-making. Question: To what extent is information for decision-making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?	Mapped		Mapped		Mapped		Mapped	
4.15 Not used								
4.16 Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks, or does it make hazards worse?						Mapped		

(Continued)

Table 7.4. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 1

Survey questions for Engagement 4 ToC Step 1 – Getting started: the feasibility stage	A. Stephen Covey: 'Begin with the end in mind'	B. ERM exists for decision support to government/cabinet	C. ERM co-exists for decision support to your entity	D. Must manage opportunities as well as negative risks	E. ERM should be a cultural way of thinking and not seen as a separate function	F. Risk Unit must be oil in the engine and not the engine itself	G. Organisational and societal trust is critical	H. Necessary human competences are vital
4.17 Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely two-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)/Public Enterprises (PES) and Local Government Authorities (LGAs) that are relevant to its decision-making?		Mapped						
4.18 Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?		Mapped						
4.19 'To get what a person wants, any means to that end is justifiable.' Do you agree or disagree?							Mapped	

Source: Jones (2021)

Table 7.5. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 2

ToC Survey questions for Engagement 2 ToC Step 2 – Planning and organising for an ERM ecosystem	A. Under-standable risk strategy, policies and processes	B. Effective pilot imple- mentation to reduce ERM change risk	C. Realistic full rollout of the ERM ecosystem	D. Essential human com- petences
4.1. How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?				Mapped
4.2 To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?	Mapped			
4.3 'Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.' Do you agree or disagree?				
4.4 'Next to health, money is the most important thing in life.' Do you agree or disagree?				
4.5 People: my organisation strives to create a 'risk-aware' culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?	Mapped			
4.6 Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technologies to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation, and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?				Mapped
4.7 'It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world with the way things look for the future.' Do you agree or disagree?				
4.8 'Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man.' Do you agree or disagree?				

(Continued)

Table 7.5. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 2

ToC Survey questions for Engagement 2 ToC Step 2 – Planning and organising for an ERM ecosystem	A. Under-standable risk strategy, policies and processes	B. Effective pilot imple- mentation to reduce ERM change risk	C. Realistic full rollout of the ERM ecosystem	D. Essential human com- petences
4.9 Strategy: internal and external risks to my organisation's mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?	Mapped			Mapped
4.10 Budget: our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough, and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?	Mapped			Mapped
4.11 'You sometimes can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile any more.' Do you agree or disagree?				
4.12 'In spite of what some people say, the lot (situation/condition) of the average person is getting worse, not better.' Do you agree or disagree?				
4.13 Performance using key performance indicators (KPI) and key risk indicators (KRIs): KPIs are 'lagging indicators' that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be 'leading indicators' that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?	Mapped			Mapped

(Continued)

Table 7.5. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 2

ToC Survey questions for Engagement 2 ToC Step 2 – Planning and organising for an ERM ecosystem	A. Under-standable risk strategy, policies and processes	B. Effective pilot imple- mentation to reduce ERM change risk	C. Realistic full rollout of the ERM ecosystem	D. Essential human com- petences
4.14 Two-way information street: rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders, who perform vital management and programme functions. This allows for better departmental decision-making. Question: To what extent is information for decision-making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?	Mapped			
4.15 Not used				
4.16 Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks, or does it make hazards worse?	Mapped			
4.17 Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely two-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/local government that are relevant to its decision-making?	Mapped			
4.18 Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	Mapped			
4.19 'To get what a person wants, any means to that end is justifiable.' Do you agree or disagree?				

Source: Jones (2021)

Table 7.6. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 3

Survey questions for Engagement 4 ToC Step 3 – Operating an ERM ecosystem	A. Managing the risk of the ERM system's failure – 'The proof of the pudding is in the eating'	B. Quality assurance
4.1. How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?		
4.2 To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?	Mapped	
4.3 'Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.' Do you agree or disagree?		
4.4 'Next to health, money is the most important thing in life.' Do you agree or disagree?		
4.5 People: my organisation strives to create a 'risk-aware' culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?	Mapped	
4.6 Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technologies to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation, and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?	Mapped	
4.7 'It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world with the way things look for the future.' Do you agree or disagree?		
4.8 'Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man.' Do you agree or disagree?		
4.9 Strategy: internal and external risks to my organisation's mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?	Mapped	
4.10 Budget: our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough, and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?	Mapped	

(Continued)

Table 7.6. Mapping of Engagement 4 survey questions to the expectations of ToC Step 3

Survey questions for Engagement 4 ToC Step 3 – Operating an ERM ecosystem	A. Managing the risk of the ERM system's failure – 'The proof of the pudding is in the eating'	B. Quality assurance
4.11 'You sometimes can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile any more.' Do you agree or disagree?		
4.12 'In spite of what some people say, the lot (situation/condition) of the average person is getting worse, not better.' Do you agree or disagree?		
4.13 Performance using key performance indicators (KPI) and key risk indicators (KRIs): KPIs are 'lagging indicators' that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be 'leading indicators' that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?	Mapped	
4.14 Two-way information street: rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders, who perform vital management and programme functions. This allows for better departmental decision-making. Question: To what extent is information for decision-making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?	Mapped	
4.15 Not used.		
4.16 Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks, or does it make hazards worse?	Mapped	
4.17 Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely two-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/local government that are relevant to its decision-making?	Mapped	
4.18 Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	Mapped	
4.19 'To get what a person wants, any means to that end is justifiable.' Do you agree or disagree?		

Source: Jones (2021)

8. Large-scale Survey: Botswana



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Executive Highlights: Botswana

Three Propositions of the Theory of Change

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 4 on the Study Methodology, three Propositions were

advanced of 'good habits' that will be essential to a well-functioning Public Sector Enterprise Risk Management (PS-ERM) system. The implications of the perceptions of Botswana respondents for these propositions are summarised in the table below.

Theory of Change Proposition	Indicative Research Conclusion
Adequate human competences are the base camp for successful PS-ERM	There appears to be a reasonably strong base of foundational comprehension to support the implementation of PS-ERM in Botswana. Investment in people must be sustained and generationally upgraded if PS-ERM in Botswana is to move up the generally accepted scales of ERM maturity and usefulness to national development.
Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for ERM	PS-ERM for Botswana may need to invest in building significantly greater personal and organisational trust in order for the risk management objectives to have a reasonable chance of being attained. There are indications of a concerning level of alienation of public sector staff, indicating a deficit of trust that is perilous for ERM. Further, there should, perhaps, be an emphasis on risk management as a 'way of thinking', rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.
PS-ERM should be a connected decision support mechanism for sub-entity (MDAs/SOEs/LGAs) strategy and for the national cabinet's direction of the national development strategy	This proposition is the ultimate purpose and value of a PS-ERM system. It is the "end" in Stephen Covey's Habit 2 of <i>Highly Effective People</i> : "Begin with the End in Mind". Botswana respondents suggest that there are very significant shortcomings in the attainment of this goal.

Current Status of PS-ERM in Botswana and its position among the Six Countries

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 7 the large-scale survey (LSS) that was one of two primary sources of field evidence for this research was described. Of the twenty-three (23) LSS questions,

four (4) survey questions have been identified as providing reliable insight into the perceptions of respondents in Botswana of the status of PS-ERM in their country at the time of the research in 2021. One (1) question was from Engagement 2 and three (3) were from Engagement 4. The table below also includes a reference to the Figure (chart) that illustrates the data within this chapter on Botswana.

Question #	Figure #	Description	Short reference
2.2	8.7	To what extent is your organisation so engaged in "fire-fighting" that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	Firefighting
4.16	8.30	Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?	Top Governance

Question #	Figure #	Description	Short reference
4.17	8.32	Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities	NDS (National Development Strategy)
4.18	8.34	Consider the video that you watched on COVID 19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	COVID

Respondents were asked to rate each question from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating an extremely negative view; and 5 suggesting an extremely positive satisfaction. The median value is 3, which territory would suggest a relatively neutral view, indicating that the outcome can be good or bad, depending on future circumstances.

For each of the four questions, the Botswana outcome was expressed as (a) a percentage of the average for all countries and (b) a percentage of the median. A fair outcome would be above the average for all countries and above the median i.e. above 100% for both measures.

Percentage of the average for all countries


Three of the four measures are below the six country average. Only the NDS question 4.17 exceeds (a little) the six country average. Overall

(see the "average of averages"), Botswana respondents are less optimistic than their peers.

Percentage of the median score

The fire-fighting and top governance measures lie just above the median, providing limited satisfaction, with scope for significant growth. The NDS and COVID measures lie significantly below the median, demanding an investigation and timely remedial action. As with all other countries, the COVID rating signals a pressing need for improvements in contingency planning and disaster preparedness. Overall, the "average of averages" lies, unsatisfactorily, below the median.

The perceptions of respondents suggest that there was major scope for improvement in the status of PS-ERM in Botswana at the point of the field research.



8.1 Participation information and survey questions

8.1.1 Introduction

The large-scale survey (LSS), which is the subject of this chapter, is described in Chapter 4.2. This chapter provides demographic information on the participation of Botswana in the LSS research. The research was delivered via five 'engagements', as outlined in Section 4.2. This chapter analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 1, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. It further analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 3, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 4 questionnaire.

Table 8.1 shows the total number of individuals from Botswana who registered to participate in this research. Botswana contributed the highest proportion of registrants, at 36 per cent. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, the proportion of respondents who considered that their entity did not have an ERM system in place or in progress, was the fourth highest of the six countries, at 30 per cent. The six-country average was 40 per cent stating 'No'. Most Botswana respondents (56%) provided a definitive confirmation ('Yes') on the existence of an ERM in their entity,

compared to the six-country average of 46 per cent.

The actual number and characteristics of the respondents to the Engagements 2 and 4 questionnaires are shown in Sections 8.1.2 and 8.1.3.

8.1.2 Participation information for the Engagement 2 research questionnaire

There were 256 respondents to the Engagement 2 questionnaire from Botswana, i.e., a response rate of 48 per cent of the registered total of 529 persons. Proportions of female and male respondents were roughly equal from Botswana, at 50 per cent each. This compares to the six-country average, which showed women contributing an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 85 participating organisations from Botswana to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. Roughly one-third (90 of the total 256 respondents/35%) were from three entities:

- the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (52 respondents/20%);
- the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food Security (26 respondents/10%); and
- Office of the Auditor General (12 respondents/5%).

Table 8.1 Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?

#	Country	Do not know	No	Yes	Grand total	Grand total (%)	Do not know (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	Grand total (%)
1	Botswana	71	160	298	529	36	13	30	56	100
2	Eswatini	44	128	67	239	16	18	54	28	100
3	Ghana	13	12	30	55	3	24	22	55	100
4	Kenya	6	24	68	98	7	6	24	69	100
5	Sierra Leone	69	241	167	477	32	14	51	35	100
6	The Gambia	3	34	52	89	6	3	38	58	100
	Grand total	206	599	682	1487	100	14	40	46	100

Figure 8.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?




Table 8.2. Engagement 2 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	127	129	256	50	50	100
Eswatini	69	46	115	60	40	100
Ghana	7	18	25	28	72	100
Kenya	17	22	39	44	56	100
Sierra Leone	33	81	114	29	71	100
The Gambia	7	22	29	24	76	100
Grand Total	260	318	578	45	55	100

Table 8.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development	52
2.	Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food Security	26
3.	Office of the Auditor General	12
4.	Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development	10
5.	Botswana Defence Force	10
6.	Department of Water and Sanitation	8
7.	Civil Aviation Authority of Botswana	6
8.	Botswana Power Corporation	6
9.	Land Tribunal	5
10.	Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime	5
11.	Botswana Gambling Authority	5
12.	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development	4
13.	Legal Aid Botswana	4

(Continued)

Table 8.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
14.	Department of Agricultural Research Policy and Statistics	4
15.	Ministry of Transport and Communications	3
16.	Ministry of Mineral Resources, Green Technology and Energy Security	3
17.	Ministry of Land Management, Water and Sanitation Services	3
18.	Financial Intelligence Agency	3
19.	Attorney General's Chambers	3
20.	Tati Land Board	2
21.	Sowa Town Council	2
22.	Selibe-Phikwe Town Council	2
23.	Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources Conservation and Tourism	2
24.	Minerals Development Company Botswana	2
25.	Government Printing and Publishing Services	2
26.	Government Audit Committee	2
27.	Gambling Authority of Botswana	2
28.	Directorate of Public Service Management	2
29.	Department of Meteorological Services	2
30.	Department of Local Government Technical Services	2
31.	Department of Animal Production	2
32.	Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological Weapon Management Authority	2
33.	Botswana Unified Revenue Service	2
34.	Botswana Oil Limited (BOL)	2
35.	Botswana Institute of Chartered Accountants	2
36.	Botswana Development Corporation	2
37.	Bank of Botswana	2
38.	Tlokweng Land Board	1
39.	Statistics Botswana	1
40.	Rolong Land Board	1
41.	Public Service Management	1
42.	Palapye Technical College	1
43.	Nswazwi Brigade	1
44.	Motor Vehicle Accident Fund	1
45.	Ministry of Youth Empowerment, Sport and Culture Development	1
46.	Ministry of Presidential Affairs, Governance and Public Administration	1
47.	Ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs	1
48.	Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry	1
49.	Ministry of Health and Wellness	1

(Continued)

Table 8.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
50.	Ministerial Technical Unit of the Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security, Gaborone-Botswana	1
51.	Matsheng Brigade Centre	1
52.	Marapong Brigade Centre	1
53.	Lobatse Town Council	1
54.	Kweneng Land Board	1
55.	Kweneng Bophirima Development Association	1
56.	Kgatleng Land Board	1
57.	Kgatleng District Council	1
58.	Kgatleng Brigade Centre, Development of Skills Development	1
59.	Kgalagadi District Council	1
60.	Industrial Court of Botswana	1
61.	Independent Electoral Commission	1
62.	Human Resource Development Council	1
63.	Health Policy Research and Development	1
64.	Ghanzi Land Board	1
65.	Ghanzi District Council	1
66.	Department of Occupational Health and Safety	1
67.	Department of National Service and Internship	1
68.	Department of Labour	1
69.	Department of Civil and National Registration	1
70.	Competition and Consumer Authority	1
71.	Companies and Intellectual Property Authority (CIPA)	1
72.	Chobe Land Board	1
73.	Central District Council	1
74.	Botswana Tourism Organisation	1
75.	Botswana Public Service College	1
76.	Botswana Post	1
77.	Botswana Police Service	1
78.	Botswana National Youth Council	1
79.	Botswana National Productivity Centre	1
80.	Botswana Ministry of Health and wellness, Department of Health Inspectorate	1
81.	Botswana Investment and Trade Centre	1
82.	Botswana Government	1
83.	Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board	1
84.	Botswana Accountancy Oversight Authority	1
85.	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis	1
Total number of respondents		256

8.1.3 Participation information for the Engagement 4 research questionnaire

There were 169 respondents to the Engagement 4 questionnaire from Botswana, i.e., a response rate of 32 per cent of the registered total of 529 persons. Females made up 48 per cent while males were 52 per cent of the respondents from Botswana. The number of respondents was lower than for Engagement 2 (256 respondents) and the proportion of males was higher for Engagement 4 (it was 50:50 for Engagement 2). This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 66 participating organisations from Botswana to the Engagement 4 questionnaire (85 for Engagement 2). About 41 per cent (70 of the total 169 respondents) were from three entities: the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (38 respondents/22%), the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food Security (23 respondents/14%) and the Office of the Auditor General (9 respondents/5%). The top three contributing organisations remain the same for both Engagements 2 and 4.

Table 8.4. Engagement 4 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	81	88	169	48	52	100
Eswatini	43	30	73	59	41	100
Ghana	2	9	11	18	82	100
Kenya	8	15	23	35	65	100
Sierra Leone	17	30	47	36	64	100
The Gambia	4	15	19	21	79	100
Grand total	155	187	342	45	55	100

Table 8.5. Engagement 4 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered Name of Participating Organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development	38
2.	Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food Security	23
3.	Office of the Auditor General	9
4.	Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development	5
5.	Gambling Authority of Botswana	4
6.	Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC)	4
7.	Botswana Power Corporation	4
8.	Botswana Defence Force	4
9.	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development	3
10.	Civil Aviation Authority of Botswana	3
11.	Attorney General's Chambers	3
12.	Selibe-Phikwe Town Council	2
13.	Ministry of Transport and Communications	2
14.	Ministry of Mineral Resources, Green Technology and Energy Security	2

(Continued)

Table 8.5. Engagement 4 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered Name of Participating Organisation	No. of respondents
15.	Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry	2
16.	Ministry of Health and Wellness	2
17.	Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources Conservation and Tourism	2
18.	Legal Aid Botswana	2
19.	Land Tribunal	2
20.	Kweneng Land Board	2
21.	Government Audit Committee	2
22.	Department of Water and Sanitation	2
23.	Department of Local Government Technical Services	2
24.	Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological Weapon Management Authority	2
25.	Bank of Botswana	2
26.	Tlokweng Land Board	1
27.	Tati Land Board	1
28.	Statistics Botswana	1
29.	Sowa Town Council	1
30.	Rolong Land Board	1
31.	Palapye Technical College	1
32.	Office of Accountant General	1
33.	Nswazwi Brigade	1
34.	National Plant Protection Office	1
35.	Motor Vehicle Accident Fund	1
36.	Ministry of Youth Empowerment, Sport and Culture Development	1
37.	Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration	1
38.	Ministry of Land Management water and Sanitation Services	1
39.	Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security	1
40.	Minerals Development Company Botswana	1
41.	Matsheng Brigade Centre	1
42.	Marapong Brigade Centre	1
43.	Kgatleng Land Board	1
44.	Kgatleng Brigade Centre, Department of Skills Development	1
45.	Kgalagadi District Council	1
46.	Industrial Court of Botswana	1
47.	Independent Electoral Commission	1
48.	Human Resource Development Council	1
49.	Health Policy Research and Development	1
50.	Government Printing and Publishing Services	1
51.	Ghanzi Land Board	1
52.	Ghanzi Brigade	1

(Continued)

Table 8.5. Engagement 4 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered Name of Participating Organisation	No. of respondents
53.	Financial Intelligence Agency	1
54.	Directorate of Public Service Management	1
55.	Department of Road Transport and Safety	1
56.	Department of National Service and Internship	1
57.	Department of Meteorological Services	1
58.	Department of Local Government Finance and Procurement Services	1
59.	Competition and Consumer Authority	1
60.	Companies and Intellectual Property Authority	1
61.	Botswana Tourism Organisation	1
62.	Botswana Police Service	1
63.	Botswana Oil Limited	1
64.	Botswana National Productivity Centre	1
65.	Botswana Government	1
66.	Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board	1
	Total number of respondents	169

8.1.4 List of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

Table 8.6 provides a reference list of the 23 questions that are analysed for the Botswana element of the large-scale survey (LSS) in the

subsequent chapters of this report. Q4.15 was not used. The 'Remarks' identify a group of nine (9) questions collectively known in social science research as 'anomie' questions. Their purpose will be explained in the relevant analysis below.

Table 8.6. List of survey questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

#	Survey questions	Remarks
1.	2.1 How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?	
2.	2.2 To what extent is your organisation so engaged in 'firefighting' that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	
3.	2.3 In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?	
4.	2.4 'To make money, there are no right and wrong ways anymore, only easy and hard ways.' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie
5.	2.5 'These days a person doesn't really know whom s/he can count on?' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie
6.	4.1 How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?	

(Continued)

Table 8.6. List of survey questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

#	Survey questions	Remarks
7.	4.2 To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?	
8.	4.3 'Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie
9.	4.4 'Next to health, money is the most important thing in life.' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie
10.	4.5 People: my organisation strives to create a 'risk-aware' culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?	
11.	4.6 Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technologies to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation, and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?	
12.	4.7 'It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world with the way things look for the future.' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie
13.	4.8 'Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man.' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie
14.	4.9 Strategy: internal and external risks to my organisation's mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?	
15.	4.10 Budget: our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough, and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?	
16.	4.11 'You sometimes can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile any more.' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie
17.	4.12 'In spite of what some people say, the lot (situation/condition) of the average person is getting worse, not better.' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie
18.	4.13 Performance using key performance indicators (KPI) and key risk indicators (KRIs): KPIs are 'lagging indicators' that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be 'leading indicators' that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?	

(Continued)

Table 8.6. List of survey questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

#	Survey questions	Remarks
19.	4.14 Two-way information street: Rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders, who perform vital management and programme functions. This allows for better departmental decision-making. Question: To what extent is information for decision-making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?	
20.	4.15 Not used	
21.	4.16 Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks, or does it make hazards worse?	
22.	4.17 Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely two-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/local government that are relevant to its decision-making?	
23.	4.18 Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	
24.	4.19 'To get what a person wants, any means to that end is justifiable.' Do you agree or disagree?	Anomie

8.2 Sample size for Botswana Engagements 2 and 4 and the level of statistical confidence

Rated questions were scored from 1 to 5, with a lower score representing an unfavourable risk to an ERM implementation and a higher score indicating a positive risk or opportunity.

Engagement 2 attracted 256 responses from Botswana out of a registered total of 529, giving a response rate of 48 per cent. Engagement 4 attracted 169 responses from Botswana, giving a response rate of 32 per cent. When we apply the parameters for determining the statistical level of confidence in our results, as outlined in Section 4.2.3 above, we derive the levels as presented in Table 8.7.

Table 8.7. Statistical sample sizes and related levels of confidence in the results obtained for the large-scale survey

Botswana respondent population	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
Ref	D	D
Confidence level	95%	95%
Margin of error	8%	8%
Population proportion	50%	50%
Population size	Unlimited	Unlimited
Computed sample size	256	169

For both Engagement 2 and 4, this provides a confidence level of 95 per cent that the real value is within ± 8 per cent of the measured/surveyed value of the responses. This is a fairly robust platform on which to seek inferences about the population of public sector ERM stakeholders in Botswana.

8.3 ToC proposition: adequate human competences are the base camp for successful public sector ERM

Readers should refer to the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions in Table 8.8.

The responses to these questions were examined individually for their relevance to the adequacy of human competences in the Botswana context, with a collective synthesis at the end. The survey questions with an asterisk (*) are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

Table 8.8. Survey questions mapped to the human competence proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*
2	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*, Q4.9*, Q4.10*, Q4.13*
3	N/A	N/A

Question 2.1 addressed the comprehension of a short foundational article on ERM by the researcher (Jones 2020a) that was enriched with illustrative secondary videos. It was delivered as Engagement 1 and was intended as a sound introduction to ERM for the layperson, as well as a refresher for the experienced. Given the highly accessible language and style, its comprehension was seen as a fair indicator of a reader's readiness for an ERM journey. Weak comprehension would indicate a reader that may have significant challenges in the development and/or operation of an ERM system. All countries had average scores in the highest scale, which provides a generally favourable outlook on the basic competences of the respondents in all countries. Botswana was one of three countries that exceeded the average for all countries. This is consistent with its high HDI indicator outlined in Section 2.5.2 (Part 1). The Botswana average was itself exceeded by three senior levels of staff. The data also indicated that state owned enterprises were the only entities that exceeded the Botswana average and that men rated their comprehension slightly higher than the average for women (Figure 8.6).

The Engagement Question 4.1 (Figure 8.5) had the same objective as Question 2.1. It addressed the comprehension of the reading and viewing material delivered as Engagement 3. This included an article on corporate governance by the researcher (Jones 2020b), a third-party video on the effective use of ERM by the British Cabinet during the First World War (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011), and a proprietary video by the researcher's firm on the experience of corporate Africa during COVID-19

Figure 8.2. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?)




Figure 8.3. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 (Rating by staff roles) by job description




Figure 8.4. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 (Rating by staff roles) by job description






Figure 8.5. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?)



(GovernanceQualityRatings.com 2021). At an average 4.3 on a 5-point scale, the average score for all countries was lower than the average 4.4 for Question 2.1. This probably reflects the more demanding content of this engagement, but still leaves the average in the top scale. The Botswana

average, at 4.1, was slightly lower than the six-country average. However, the conclusion from both 2.1 and 4.1 is that there is a reasonably strong base of foundational comprehension to support the implementation of ERM in Botswana.

Figure 8.6. Average rating of responses to Question 2.1 by gender



8.4 ToC proposition: organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for ERM

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7. This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions in Table 8.9.

The survey questions with a double asterisk ** are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

The questions marked with a single asterisk * are intended to provide a measure of the sociological concept of 'anomie' within the group of respondents. Anomie, in societies or individuals, has been described as a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020). The concept was introduced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. When a social system is in a state of anomie, common values and common meanings are no longer understood or accepted, and new values and meanings have not developed. According to Durkheim, such a society produces, in many of its members, psychological states

Table 8.9. Survey questions mapped to the trust and enabling culture proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.2, Q2.4*, Q2.5*	Q4.2, Q4.3*, Q4.4*, Q4.5, Q4.7*, Q4.8*, Q4.11*, Q4.12*, Q4.13**, Q4.14**, Q4.19*
2	N/A	N/A
3	N/A	N/A

Figure 8.7. Average response to survey Question 2.2 (To what extent is your organisation so engaged in 'fire-fighting' that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?)





Figure 8.8. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation

characterised by a sense of futility, lack of purpose, and emotional emptiness and despair. Anomie can be used as a proxy for the alienation of an individual from his or her organisation and/or society, as it has been used by this researcher (Jones 2012). It has been introduced to this study as high levels of alienation or anomie are evidently inconsistent with the conditions of trust and enabling culture that is required by an effective ERM system.

The anomie measures are nine in number, two of which were utilised in Engagement 2 and the other seven in Engagement 4. For the purposes of this study, the results will be combined into two composite measures, i.e., Engagement 2 composite (two items) and Engagement 4 composite (seven items).

Before the anomie results, we consider Q2.2, which is intended to assess the scope for the contribution of ERM to public sector organisational efficiency and productivity. A 'firefighting' culture indicates a reactive set of relationships which can

be improved by the 'proactive' thinking demanded by ERM. It is noteworthy that the six-country average (at 3.4) is markedly lower (bottom of the fourth quintile) relative to the confidence shown in proposition 1 above. Botswana, at 3.1, is the most pessimistic of the six countries on this measure. Botswana SOEs, once again, exceed the average for the country, while autonomous agencies, departments and local authorities are particularly pessimistic, with average scores well below the median of 3. Even the most optimistic of Botswana entities score near the median score. This indicates that public sector ERM, in principle, has much to offer the Botswana context in times of improving organisational efficiency and effectiveness.

This anomie subset is consistent with the findings and implications of Question 2.2, above, for the six-country average and the Botswana outcome. Unexpectedly, the relative optimism of SOEs and central government ministries shown in


Figure 8.9. Average response to combined Engagement 2 anomie by country (Questions 2.4 and 2.5)

Figure 8.10. Average ratings of combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5 by type of organisation




Figure 8.11. Average response to combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19






Figure 8.12. Average ratings of combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19 by type of organisation



Question 2.2 is reversed here. However, it is noted that the actual SOE average for this anomie subset and Question 2.2 is the same, at 3.2.

The Botswana average for the seven anomie questions of Engagement 4 is, at 3.2, the same as the average for the Engagement 2 subset. It is

Figure 8.13. Combined Botswana Engagement 4 anomie by gender



slightly below the six-country average of 3.3 and is the fifth most 'alienated' set of respondents. At 3.2 and 3.3 for females and males, respectively, the anomie is materially the same across the genders. It should be noted that the sample size of responses from Botswana was the most robust and statistically reliable.

The two sets of anomie responses for Botswana suggest that the successful implementation of public sector ERM must include a conscious element that seeks to address social cynicism and to improve the sense of collective purpose of public sector staff.

The six-country and the Botswana data for Question 4.2 is broadly consistent with the other questions so far in this Proposition. It indicates that there is scope for public sector ERM to add to the quality of management and outcomes of all types of public sector entities.

Looking at Figure 8.16, the six-country average and the Botswana average are both more pessimistic on Question 4.5. This suggests that current

ERM implementation efforts may focus too much on 'systems and processes' (for example, development and maintenance of a risk register) and not adequately on ERM as 'an attitude of mind', which then influences the use of processes to attain agreed risk management goals. It is noteworthy that local government respondents were the only ones that were significantly above the median score of 3. The others were in the third quintile, with some, such as autonomous agencies, with average 2.4, in the lower reaches of this pessimistic quintile.

In conclusion for this 'trust' proposition, all questions have mutually reinforcing responses that are broadly consistent with each other. In Botswana, public sector ERM should invest in building personal and organisational trust in order for the risk management objectives to have a reasonable chance of being attained. There should, perhaps, be an emphasis on risk management as a 'way of thinking', rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.

Figure 8.14. Average response to survey Question 4.2 (To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?)




Figure 8.15. Average rating of survey Question 4.2 by type of organisation




Figure 8.16. Average response to survey Question 4.5 (People: my organisation strives to create a 'risk aware' culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?)





Figure 8.17. Average rating of survey Question 4.5 by type of organisation (People: my organisation strives to create a "risk aware" culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?)



8.5 ToC proposition: public sector ERM as a decision support mechanism

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions in Table 8.10.

Survey questions with a double asterisk ** have already been examined under earlier ToC propositions with which they overlap. Consequently, this analysis will be limited to those that do not have a double asterisk.

In this final section, we focus on the use of public sector ERM as a means to improve specific types of decision-making at the entity level and at the level of the national cabinet as it manages the

implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). Considerations include:

- the use of technology as an enabler of timely and efficient management of risk information (Q4.6);
- the use of risk information to give shape to strategic planning and its subsequent monitoring and evaluation (Q4.9);
- whether budgetary planning and control is influenced by risk information (Q4.10);
- the existence of key risk indicators as early warning signals for governance and control (Q4.13);
- the avoidance of information silos by ensuring vertical and horizontal movement of risk information (Q4.14);

Table 8.10. Survey questions mapped to the decision support proposition of the ToC

TOC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.3	Q4.2**, Q4.5**, Q4.6, Q4.9, Q4.10, Q4.13, Q4.14, Q4.16, Q4.17, Q4.18
2	N/A	ditto
3	N/A	ditto

Figure 8.18. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 (In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?)





Figure 8.19. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 by type of organisation (In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?)



- the impact of governance practices on the management of enterprise risks (Q4.16);
- the existence of central co-ordination – at the level of the national cabinet – of NDS relevant enterprise risks across the entire public sector (Q4.17); and
- the quality of enterprise risk mitigation in the case of COVID-19 (Q4.18).

We also examine the status of ERM implementation across the public sector (Q2.3, Figures 8.18 and 8.19).

This question, on the status of ERM implementation, was addressed in Engagement 2. One-third of Botswana respondents identified their ERM as being in the embryonic phases 1 and 2. This compares with Eswatini, with 45 per cent, and Sierra Leone, with 30 per cent in

those stages. The Gambia, Kenya and Ghana had relatively low responses to Engagement 2, with corresponding low statistical levels of confidence in the data, i.e., they may not be fully representative of their public sectors. Within Botswana, SOEs were the most advanced, with only 11 per cent in this elementary bracket. Autonomous departments, at 55 per cent, had the most entities at the very earliest stages of ERM implementation. Only 7 per cent of SOE and 2 per cent of ministry respondents, claimed to have excellent ERM implementation. The overall average of 'excellence' for Botswana was 2 per cent. Ghana, at 8 per cent, was the country with the highest claim of excellence.

The six-country average of technological adoption is quite downbeat at 2.8. Botswana, at 2.5, dips below that average. Indeed, only

Figure 8.20. Average response to survey Question 4.6 (Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technology to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?)




Figure 8.21. Average rating of survey Question 4.6 by type of organisation.






Figure 8.22. Average response to survey Question 4.9



Ghana and Kenya – both with low response rates and correspondingly low levels of statistical confidence, managed to exceed the median of 3 – with ratings of 3.1 each. Within Botswana, SOEs are at the lowest level of rating (2.2), with

autonomous departments the highest at 2.6. There is clearly a lot of room for improvement of the efficiency of the deployment of risk information systems through the use of information technology.

Figure 8.23. Average rating of survey Question 4.9 by type of organisation (Strategy: Internal and External Risks to my organisation's mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?)



The use of risk information in the development and implementation of strategy is arguably the most important deployment of ERM. It is central to the defined purpose of ERM, as examined in section 2.2 of Part 1. At 2.91, the six-country average is well into pessimistic territory, below the median. Sierra Leone claims the most confidence in the integration of risk and strategy, at a middling 3.3. Botswana, at 2.8, joins two other countries to lie below the six-country average.

Within Botswana, SOEs – at 3.2 – have the most claim for integration of risk and strategy (Figure 8.23). At 2.4, autonomous departments are the least responsive in this key attribute. Given the importance of such integration to the objective of risk management, this appears to offer significant scope for improvement. Further, the tools to secure this improvement are not overly demanding.

Thus, this may offer a 'low hanging fruit' for future interventions to demonstrate the value of ERM and risk thinking.

Considering Figure 8.24, budgetary control, within a well-defined strategy, is arguably the second most important use of public sector ERM for decision-making and control. It is of particular interest to the Commonwealth Secretariat, given the specialist interest of its commissioning unit for this study in public financial management (PFM). The six-country average just beats the median rating at 3.2, indicating a relatively low level of confidence among respondents in the integration of risk and budgetary control within PFM. At 2.9, the Botswana average again dips below the six-country average. This time, it is among the most pessimistic of the countries.

Within Botswana, autonomous departments and agencies are the most pessimistic – at

Figure 8.24. Average response to survey Question 4.10 (Budget. Our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?)




Figure 8.25. Average rating of survey Question 4.10 by type of organisation




Figure 8.26. Average response to survey Question 4.13 (Performance using Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs): KPIs are 'lagging indicators' that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be 'leading indicators' that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?)





Figure 8.27. Average rating of survey Question 4.13 by type of organisation



approximately 2.7 each. SOEs (Figure 8.25) claim the highest confidence, just above the median at 3.1.

Overall, this indicates significant scope for improving Botswana PFM by the effective integration of risk thinking into PFM. This, as with strategy, may also be a 'low hanging fruit', as the supportive tools are not too demanding. However, in both contexts, the picking of such fruit will demand the prior embracement of risk thinking within a risk-aware culture.

Key risk indicators (KRIs) are a productive tool of risk thinking that exists within a risk-aware culture. They provide an early warning of future performance challenges and thus are an important trigger of proactive public sector ERM. The article on corporate governance within Engagement 3

is a classic illustration of the use of KRIs to guide top-level decision-making and control. KRIs usually perform best when they identify broad principles and behavioural phenomena at the individual and group levels. Consequently, their effective use tends to demand higher individual cognitive and teamwork skills, within a suitably trusting context. The capable deployment of KRIs is arguably the most demanding element of ERM and may be a feature of the highest performing team cultures and entities.

Given this expectation, it is not surprising that the six-country average is among the lowest of the research in this area, at 2.7. The Botswana average, at 2.4, is the lowest of the countries. It is worth recalling that three countries – Ghana, Kenya and The Gambia – have small sample

sizes, with consequently lower confidence in the representativeness of their outcomes.

There are no public sector entities in Botswana that come close to the median rating of 3 (Figure 8.27). SOEs and LGAs are the highest, at 2.6 each, with autonomous departments the lowest at 2.3.

The deterrence of information silos is also easier said than done (Figure 8.28). Like KRIs, this demands pervasive risk thinking within a risk-aware entity culture. At 3, the six-country average is broadly in the same downbeat territory as the rating of KRIs. The Botswana average is the second lowest at 2.7. Within Botswana, SOEs – at 3.1 – are the only group to break the median ‘barrier’ of 3 (Figure 8.29). Autonomous agencies and departments each record the lowest confidence at 2.4.

With Sierra Leone rating the highest – at 3.4 – this measure seeks to indicate the impact of top governance on the management of risks and opportunities, i.e., whether the top governance style amplifies or absorbs risks. The range of country ratings, with a six-country average of about 3.1, indicates a generally pessimistic outlook, with scope for much improvement. As with KRIs and risk silos, top governance risks are possibly among the more demanding elements to manage in public sector ERM. This is especially the case as appointments, elevation and removals of senior governance will have political influence that may not always be aligned to the best interests of the individual entity or the public interest as a whole.

Consequently, governance risks will typically involve a constellation of factors, those that are:

Figure 8.28. Average response to survey Question 4.14 (Two-way information street: Rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders who perform vital management and program functions. This allows for better departmental decision making. Question: To what extent is information for decision making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?)




Figure 8.29. Average rating of survey Question 4.14 by type of organisation




Figure 8.30. Average response to survey Question 4.16 (Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?)





Figure 8.31. Average rating of survey Question 4.16 by type of organisation



(a) internal to a particular public sector entity; and
(b) factors outside its control, which are determined by administrative and/or political superiors within central government. These may be the most difficult element of a public sector ERM to manage and possibly the ones with the greatest potential impact on the entity.

Within Botswana, the group ratings are tightly clustered around the country average of 3, with only SOEs exceeding this median with a rating of 3.4 (Figure 8.31). This difference may reflect the fact that SOEs would normally have a separate board of directors, who may be expected to take a more 'business-like' approach to risk management. However, even with this in mind, SOE respondents clearly consider that there is scope for significant improvement in the risk effectiveness of top governance.

A vital part of a public sector ERM is the use of relevant risk and opportunity information from all component entities to inform the

decision-making of the national cabinet on the development and implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). This question sought to evaluate the extent to which this happens in the participating countries.

At roughly 2.8, the Botswana average is the same as the six-country average – in territory that indicates significant room for improvement in this essential element of public sector ERM. This perception may be influenced by the access of respondents to relevant information about links with the NDS. However, effective PS-ERM requires that such information silos are avoided, if present. This elimination of silos provides for easier identification and reporting of related risks. This likely belongs to the cluster of risk delivery elements that demand risk thinking in a pervasive risk-aware culture. It keeps company with KRIs, risk silos and governance risks.

Once again, the entity results are tightly clustered around the Botswana average, with only SOEs

Figure 8.32. Average response to survey Question 4.17 (Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/Local government that are RELEVANT to its decision making?)





Figure 8.33. Average rating of survey question 4.17 by type of organisation



breaking the median barrier of 3 – with a rating of 3.4 – which indicates much scope for growth (Figure 8.33). For the public sector, ERM cannot end at the doorsteps of individual entities, it must provide for relevant and timely transmission of risk information to the national cabinet to guide decisions on the NDS.

‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating’. The ultimate test of any public sector ERM system is its response ‘under fire’. At a six-country average of 2.1 and a Botswana average of roughly 2, this Question 4.18 COVID-19 response evaluation is the weakest rating of the survey series (Figure 8.34). Only Ghana (with a relatively low sample size) and Sierra Leone broke a new ‘barrier’ of 2.0 of hyper-

pessimism. Perhaps the Sierra Leone average of 3, barely making the median rating, reflects its prior experience of the Ebola epidemic, which probably left the country with more resilience than its peers.

Within Botswana, only central ministries and autonomous agencies broke the ‘hyper-pessimism’ barrier of 2, with ratings of 2.1 and 2.4, respectively (Figure 8.34). Autonomous departments and LGAs jointly scored the lowest rating of 1.8.

This measure is broadly consistent with the other findings of this research, which indicate much scope, within Botswana, for improvement of the contribution of public sector ERM to sustainable attainment of National Development Strategies.

Figure 8.34. Average response to survey Question 4.18 (Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?)





Figure 8.35. Average rating of survey Question 4.18 by type of organisation



The Executive Highlights on Page 70 suggest an overall conclusion on the findings of this Large-scale Survey research for Botswana.

9. Large-scale Survey: Eswatini



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Executive Highlights: Eswatini

Three Propositions of the Theory of Change

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 4 on the Study Methodology, three Propositions were

advanced of ‘good habits’ that will be essential to a well-functioning Public Sector Enterprise Risk Management (PS-ERM) system. The implications of the perceptions of Eswatini respondents for these propositions are summarised in the table below.

Theory of Change Proposition	Indicative Research Conclusion
Adequate human competences are the base camp for successful PS-ERM	There are indications of a reasonable base of foundational comprehension to support the implementation of PS-ERM in Eswatini. Human capital must be systemically sustained and relentlessly upgraded if PS-ERM in Eswatini is to gradually move up the generally accepted scales of ERM maturity and usefulness.
Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is ‘mission critical’ for PS-ERM	PS-ERM for Eswatini will likely require significant investment in building levels of personal and organisational trust that are essential for ERM to have a reasonable chance of being attained. There are signs of a material level of alienation of public sector staff, indicating a deficit of trust that is perilous for ERM. In addition, there is a need for greater emphasis on risk management as a ‘way of thinking’, rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.
PS-ERM should be a connected decision support mechanism for sub-entity (MDAs/SOEs/LGAs) strategy and for the national cabinet’s direction of the national development strategy	This proposition is the ultimate purpose and value of a PS-ERM system. It is the “end” in Stephen Covey’s Habit 2 of <i>Highly Effective People</i> : “Begin with the End in Mind”. Eswatini respondents suggest that there are very material shortcomings in the progress towards this goal.

Current Status of PS-ERM in Eswatini and its position among the Six Countries

Consider the Executive Highlights to Chapter 7. It described the large scale survey (LSS) that was one of two primary sources of field evidence for this research. Of the twenty-three (23) LSS questions,


four (4) survey questions have been identified as providing reliable insight into the perceptions of respondents in Eswatini of the status of PS-ERM in their country at the time of the research in 2021. One (1) question was from Engagement 2 and three (3) were from Engagement 4. The table below also includes a reference to the Figure (chart) that illustrates the data within this chapter on Eswatini.

Question #	Figure #	Description	Short reference
2.2	9.7	To what extent is your organisation so engaged in “fire-fighting” that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	Firefighting

Question #	Figure #	Description	Short reference
4.16	9.30	Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?	Top Governance
4.17	9.32	Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities	NDS (National Development Strategy)
4.18	9.34	Consider the video that you watched on COVID 19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	COVID

Respondents were asked to rate each question from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating an extremely negative view; and 5 suggesting an extremely positive satisfaction. The median value is 3, which territory would suggest a relatively neutral view, indicating that the outcome can be good or bad, depending on future circumstances.

For each of the four questions, the Eswatini outcome was expressed as (a) a percentage of the average for all countries and (b) a percentage of the median. A fair outcome would be above the average for all countries and above the median i.e. above 100% for both measures.



Percentage of the average for all countries

Eswatini respondents are less optimistic than their peers on all four measures (less than 100%).

Percentage of the median score

The combined rating of the four indicators ("average of averages") lies below the median (i.e. less than 100%). The fire-fighting measure lies just above the median, providing limited satisfaction

with significant scope for growth. The other three are significantly below the median, requiring an investigation and timely remedial action. As with all other countries, the COVID rating signals a pressing need for improvements in contingency planning and disaster preparedness.

The perceptions of respondents suggest that there was major scope for improvement in the status of PS-ERM in Eswatini at the point of the field research.

9.1 Participation information and survey questions

9.1.1 Introduction

The large-scale survey (LSS) that forms the subject of this chapter, is described in Section 4.2. (Volume 1). This chapter provides demographic information on the participation of Eswatini in the LSS research. The research was delivered via five 'engagements', as outlined in Section 4.2. This chapter analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 1, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. It further analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 3, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 4 questionnaire.

Table 9.1 shows the total number of individuals from Eswatini who registered to participate in this research. Eswatini contributed 16 per cent of registrants. As illustrated in Figure 9.1, the proportion of respondents who considered that their entity does not have an ERM system in place, or in progress, was just over half, at 54 per cent. The six-country average was 40 per cent stating 'No'. Less than one-third of respondents (28%) provided a definitive confirmation ('Yes') of the existence of an ERM in their entity, compared to the six-country average of 46 per cent.

The actual number and characteristics of the respondents to the Engagements 2 and 4 questionnaires are shown in Sections 9.1.2 and 9.1.3 below.

9.1.2 Participation information for the Engagement 2 research questionnaire

There were 115 respondents to the Engagement 2 questionnaire from Eswatini, i.e., a response rate of 48 per cent of the registered total of 239 persons. Females made up the majority of contributors at 60 per cent, with male respondents at 40 per cent. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 51 participating organisations from Eswatini to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. Just over one-third (44 of the total 115 respondents/38%) were from four entities:

- Eswatini Government Internal Audit Office (24 respondents/21%);
- Ministry of Finance (8 respondents/7%);
- Eswatini National Fire and Emergency Services Department (7 respondents/6%); and
- Ministry of Labour and Social Security (5 respondents/4%).

9.1.3 Participation information for the Engagement 4 research questionnaire

There were 73 respondents to the Engagement 4 questionnaire from Eswatini, i.e., a response rate of 31 per cent of the registered total of 239 persons. Females made up 59 per cent, while males were 41 per cent of the respondents from

Table 9.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?

#	Country	Do not know	No	Yes	Grand total	Grand total (%)	Do not know (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	Grand total (%)
1	Botswana	71	160	298	529	36	13	30	56	100
2	Eswatini	44	128	67	239	16	18	54	28	100
3	Ghana	13	12	30	55	3	24	22	55	100
4	Kenya	6	24	68	98	7	6	24	69	100
5	Sierra Leone	69	241	167	477	32	14	51	35	100
6	The Gambia	3	34	52	89	6	3	38	58	100
	Grand Total	206	599	682	1487	100	14	40	46	100

Figure 9.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?




Table 9.2. Engagement 2 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	127	129	256	50	50	100
Eswatini	69	46	115	60	40	100
Ghana	7	18	25	28	72	100
Kenya	17	22	39	44	56	100
Sierra Leone	33	81	114	29	71	100
The Gambia	7	22	29	24	76	100
Grand Total	260	318	578	45	55	100

Table 9.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Eswatini Government Internal Audit Office	24
2.	Ministry of Finance	8
3.	Eswatini National Fire and Emergency Services Department	7
4.	Ministry of Labour and Social Security	5
5.	Eswatini Institute of Management for Public Administration	4
6.	Ministry of Home Affairs	3
7.	Ministry of Education and Training	3
8.	Ministry of Agriculture	3
9.	Government	3
10.	The Deputy Prime Minister's Office	2
11.	Siteki Town Council	2
12.	Royal Science and Technology Park	2
13.	Parliament	2
14.	Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Affairs	2

(Continued)

Table 9.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
15.	Ministry of Public Works and Transport	2
16.	Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs	2
17.	Ministry of Housing and Urban Development	2
18.	Ministry of Health	2
19.	Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Trade	2
20.	Eswatini Revenue Authority	2
21.	Eswatini Posts and Telecommunications Corporation	2
22.	Anti-Corruption Commission	2
23.	Youth Enterprise Revolving Fund	1
24.	Umbutfo Eswatini Defence Force, Ministry of Defence	1
25.	The Judiciary of Eswatini	1
26.	The Government of Eswatini	1
27.	Sincephetelo Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund	1
28.	Public Service Pensions Fund	1
29.	National Meteorological Service	1
30.	National Maize Corporation	1
31.	National Disaster Management Agency	1
32.	Municipal Council of Mbabane	1
33.	Ministry of Sports Culture and Youth Affairs	1
34.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1
35.	Ministry of Economic Planning and Development	1
36.	Microprojects Programme Coordination Unit	1
37.	His Majesty's Correctional Services	1
38.	Government ministry	1
39.	Examinations Council of Eswatini	1
40.	Eswatini Standards Authority (SWASA)	1
41.	Eswatini Public Procurement Regulatory Agency	1
42.	Eswatini Nazarene Health Institutions	1
43.	Eswatini National Trust Commission	1
44.	Eswatini Meteorological Service	1
45.	Eswatini Medical Christian University	1
46.	Eswatini Government Public Enterprises Unit	1
47.	Eswatini Government Ministry of Tinkhundla Administration and Development	1
48.	Eswatini Cotton Board	1
49.	Eswatini Communications Commission	1
50.	Directorate of Industrial and Vocational Training	1
51.	Department of Forestry under Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Affairs	1
Total number of respondents		115

Eswatini. The number of respondents was lower than for Engagement 2 (115 respondents) and the proportion of males as roughly the same as for Engagement 2. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 35 participating organisations from Eswatini to the Engagement 4 questionnaire (51 for Engagement 2). About 44 per cent (32 of the total 73 respondents) were from four entities:

- Eswatini Government Internal Audit Office (16 respondents/22%),
- Ministry of Finance (6 respondents/8%),
- Ministry of Education and Training (5 respondents/7%),
- Eswatini National Fire and Emergency Services Department (5 respondents/5%),

The top contributing organisation was the same for both Engagements 2 and 4.

9.1.4 List of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

See Section 8.1.4, Table 8.6 for the list of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires.

9.2 Sample size for Eswatini Engagements 2 and 4 and the level of statistical confidence

Rated questions were scored from 1 to 5, with a lower score representing an unfavourable risk to an

ERM implementation and a higher score indicating a positive risk or opportunity.

Engagement 2 attracted 115 responses from Eswatini out of a registered total of 239, giving a response rate of 48 per cent. Engagement 4 received 73 responses from Eswatini, giving a response rate of 31 per cent. When we apply the parameters for determining the statistical level of confidence in our results, as outlined in Section 4.2.3, we derive the levels as presented in Table 9.6.

For Engagement 2, this provides a confidence level of 95 per cent that the real value is within ± 10 per cent of the measured/surveyed value of the responses. This is a reasonable platform on which to seek inferences about the population of public sector ERM stakeholders in Eswatini. The Engagement 4 response rate provides a lower confidence level of 90 per cent, with the same margin of error.

9.3 ToC proposition: Adequate human competences are the base camp for successful public sector ERM

Readers should refer to the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped to the survey questions presented in Table 9.7.

The responses to these questions are examined individually for their relevance to the adequacy of human competences in the Eswatini context, with a collective synthesis at the end. The survey

Table 9.4. Engagement 4 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	81	88	169	48	52	100
Eswatini	43	30	73	59	41	100
Ghana	2	9	11	18	82	100
Kenya	8	15	23	35	65	100
Sierra Leone	17	30	47	36	64	100
The Gambia	4	15	19	21	79	100
Grand Total	155	187	342	45	55	100

Table 9.5. Engagement 4 – number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Eswatini Government Internal Audit Office	16
2.	Ministry of Finance	6
3.	Ministry of Education and Training	5
4.	Eswatini National Fire and Emergency Services Department	5
5.	Ministry of Agriculture	3
6.	The Government of Eswatini	2
7.	The Deputy Prime Minister's Office	2
8.	Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Affairs	2
9.	Ministry of Labour and Social Security	2
10.	Ministry of Housing and Urban Development	2
11.	Ministry of Health	2
12.	Eswatini Institute of Management and Public Administration (SIMPA)	2
13.	Eswatini Posts and Telecommunications Corporation	2
14.	Sports, Culture and Youth Affairs	1
15.	Siteki Town Council	1
16.	Sincephetelo Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund	1
17.	Royal Science and Technology Park	1
18.	Public Service Pensions Fund	1
19.	Parliament	1
20.	National Disaster Management Agency	1
21.	Municipal Council of Mbabane	1
22.	Ministry of Tinkhundla Administration and Development	1
23.	Ministry of Public Works and Transport	1
24.	Ministry of Public Service	1
25.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation	1
26.	Ministry of Defence	1
27.	Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Trade – MSME	1
28.	Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs	1
29.	Microprojects Programme Coordination Unit	1
30.	Home Affairs	1
31.	His Majesty's Correctional Services	1
32.	Examinations Council of Eswatini	1
33.	Eswatini Revenue Authority	1
34.	Cotton Board	1
35.	Anti-Corruption Commission	1
	Total number of respondents	73

Table 9.6. Statistical sample sizes and related levels of confidence in the results obtained for the large-scale survey

Eswatini respondent population	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
Ref	E	F
Confidence level	95%	90%
Margin of error	10%	10%
Population proportion	50%	50%
Population size	Unlimited	Unlimited
Computed sample size	115	73

questions with an asterisk * are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

Table 9.7. Survey questions mapped to the human competence proposition of the ToC

TOC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*
2	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*, Q4.9*, Q4.10*, Q4.13*
3	N/A	N/A

Q2.1 addressed the comprehension of a short foundational article on ERM by the researcher (Jones 2020a) that was enriched with illustrative secondary videos. It was delivered as Engagement 1 and was intended as a sound introduction to ERM for the layperson, as well as a refresher for the experienced. Given the highly accessible language and style, its comprehension was seen as a fair indicator of a reader's readiness for an ERM journey.

Figure 9.2. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?)




Figure 9.3. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 by job description




Figure 9.4. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?)






Figure 9.5. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 by job description



Weak comprehension would indicate a reader that may have significant challenges in the development and/or operation of an ERM system. All countries had average scores in the highest quintile, which provides a generally favourable outlook on the basic competences of the respondents in all countries. While the six-country average was 4.4, Eswatini's average was 4.3. The female average for Eswatini was 4.2 and the male average was slightly more optimistic at 4.6 (Figure 9.6).

Within Eswatini, the results were tightly clustered around the country average, with only political authorities/executives of local government as an outlier with an average rating of 2. This is significant, as it suggests major capacity gaps in

Figure 9.6. Average rating of responses to Question 2.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?) by gender



local authorities that must be addressed prior to the implementation of ERM for the sector.

This Engagement 4 Question 4.1 had the same objective as Question 2.1 (Figure 9.4). It addressed the comprehension of reading and viewing material delivered as Engagement 3. This included an article on corporate governance by the researcher (Jones 2020a), a third-party video on the effective use of ERM by the British Cabinet during the First World War (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011), and a proprietary video by the researcher's firm on the experience of corporate Africa during COVID-19 (GovernanceQualityRatings.com 2021). With an average 4.3 on a 5-point scale, the average score for all countries was lower than the average 4.4 for Question 2.1. This probably reflects the more demanding content of this engagement, but still leaves the average in the top quintile. Eswatini had a rating of 4.0, which is still within the top quintile.

Within Eswatini, the responses for three categories of respondents were outside the top quintile, suggesting the need to address capacity issues in these groups, i.e., technical heads of central government (3.4), ministers of central government (3.5) and general staff (3.9).

In conclusion, the effective implementation of ERM must be complemented by an investment in reinforcing the human capacity of key stakeholders.

9.4 ToC proposition: Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for ERM

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 9.8.

The survey questions with a double asterisk ** are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

The questions marked with a single asterisk * are intended to provide a measure of the sociological concept of 'anomie' within the group of respondents. Anomie, in societies or individuals, has been described as a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals (Encyclopaedia Britannica

Table 9.8. Survey questions mapped to the trust and enabling culture proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.2, Q2.4*, Q2.5*	Q4.2, Q4.3*, Q4.4*, Q4.5, Q4.7*, Q4.8*, Q4.11*, Q4.12*, Q4.13**, Q4.14**, Q4.19*
2	N/A	N/A
3	N/A	N/A

Figure 9.7. Average response to survey Question 2.2 (To what extent is your organisation so engaged in "fire-fighting" that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?)





Figure 9.8. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation



2020a) . The concept was introduced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. When a social system is in a state of anomie, common values and common meanings are no longer understood or accepted, while new values and meanings have not developed. According to Durkheim, such a society produces, in many of its members, psychological states characterised by a sense of futility, lack of purpose, and emotional emptiness and despair. Anomie can be used as a proxy for the alienation of an individual from his or her organisation and/or society, as it has been used by this researcher (Jones 2012). It has been introduced to this study because high levels of alienation or anomie are evidently inconsistent with the conditions of trust and enabling culture that are required by an effective ERM system.

The anomie measures are nine in number, two of which were utilised in Engagement 2 and the other seven in Engagement 4. For the purposes of this study, the results will be combined into two composite measures, i.e., Engagement 2 composite (two items) and Engagement 4 composite (seven items).

First, we consider Question 2.2, which is intended to assess the scope for the contribution of ERM to public sector organisational efficiency and productivity (Figure 9.7). A 'firefighting' culture indicates a reactive set of relationships that can be improved by the 'proactive' thinking demanded by ERM. It is noteworthy that the six-country average (at 3.4) is markedly lower (bottom of the fourth quintile) relative to the confidence shown in proposition 1 above (average 4.1 across the two component measures). At 3.3, Eswatini equals the six-country average. Within Eswatini, the entity ratings are tightly clustered around the country average, with central government ministries providing one end of the range at 3.2 and autonomous departments providing the other end at 3.4. Overall, the insight suggests significant room for public sector ERM to contribute to organisational productivity in Eswatini.

This anomie subset from Engagement 2 reinforces the message from Question 2.2. The six-country average, at 3.3, is even lower than the Question 2.2 average of 3.4. The Eswatini rating for this indicator of alienation is just below the six-country average,

Figure 9.9. Average response to combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5





Figure 9.10. Average ratings of combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5 by type of organisation



at 3.2. The Gambia is the only country that exceeds 3.3, with an average rating of 3.4. Within Eswatini, the entity groups are tightly clustered around the mean, with autonomous agencies being the main outlier with a rating of 2.7. SOEs are the most optimistic, with a rating of 3.4.

The Eswatini average for the seven anomie questions of Engagement 4 is, at 3.2, the same as the average for the Engagement 2 subset. It is also slightly below the six-country average of 3.3. It should be noted that the sample size of responses from Eswatini is the second most statistically reliable, after that of Botswana. Within Eswatini, the range by organisation type is between autonomous agencies at 3.1 and autonomous departments at 3.4. There is a small difference between female anomie at 3.1 and male anomie at 3.3.

In conclusion, the two sets of anomie responses for Eswatini suggest that the successful implementation of public sector ERM must include

a conscious element that seeks to address social cynicism and to improve the sense of collective purpose of public sector staff.

The six-country average (roughly 3.6) and the Eswatini data for Question 4.2 (about 3.3) are broadly consistent with the other questions so far in this proposition. Within Eswatini, the range is provided by autonomous departments (3.0) and by SOEs and local government authorities at 3.6. The relatively high rating of LGAs contrasts with the concerns noted in earlier analyses with capacity constraints in that sector, and will require further investigation for a conclusion. This is outside the scope of the present research.

In conclusion, Question 4.2 reinforces the message that there is scope for public sector ERM to add to the quality of management and outcomes of all types of public sector entities.

The six-country average (3.3) and the Eswatini average (3.0) are both more pessimistic on this Question 4.5. This suggests that current

Figure 9.11. Combined Eswatini Engagement 4 anomie by gender




Figure 9.12. Average response to combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19




Figure 9.13. Average ratings by type of organisation of combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19





Figure 9.14. Average response to survey Question 4.2 (To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?)



ERM implementation efforts may focus too much on 'systems and processes' (for example, development and maintenance of a risk register) and not adequately on ERM as 'an attitude of mind' that then influences the use of processes to attain agreed risk management goals.

Within Eswatini (Figure 9.17), the range is given by autonomous departments, with a markedly pessimistic 2.3; all other entities are at or above the median of 3.0, including SOEs with a relatively optimistic 3.4.

Figure 9.15. Average rating of survey Question 4.2 by type of organisation





Figure 9.16. Average response to survey Question 4.5 (People: my organisation strives to create a “risk aware” culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?)



In conclusion for this ‘trust’ proposition, all questions have mutually reinforcing responses that are broadly consistent with each other. Public sector ERM should invest in building personal and organisational trust in order for the risk management objectives to have a reasonable chance of being attained. There should, perhaps, be an emphasis on risk management as a ‘way of thinking’, rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.

9.5 ToC proposition: Public sector ERM as a decision support mechanism

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 9.9.


Table 9.9. Survey questions mapped to the decision support proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.3	Q4.2**, Q4.5**, Q4.6, Q4.9, Q4.10, Q4.13, Q4.14, Q4.16, Q4.17, Q4.18
2	N/A	ditto
3	N/A	ditto

Survey questions with a double asterisk ** have already been examined under earlier ToC propositions with which they overlap. Consequently, this analysis will be limited to those that do not have a double asterisk.

In this final section, we focus on the use of public sector ERM as a means of improving specific

Figure 9.17. Average rating of survey Question 4.5 by type of organisation



types of decision-making at the entity level and at the level of the national cabinet as it manages the implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). Considerations include:

- the use of technology as an enabler of timely and efficient management of risk information (Question 4.6);
- the use of risk information to give shape to strategic planning and its subsequent monitoring and evaluation (Question 4.9);
- whether budgetary planning and control is influenced by risk information (Question 4.10);
- the existence of key risk indicators as early warning signals for governance and control (Question 4.13);
- the avoidance of information silos, by ensuring vertical and horizontal movement of risk information (Question 4.14);
- the impact of governance practices on the management of enterprise risks (Question 4.16);
- the existence of central co-ordination – at the level of the national cabinet – of NDS-relevant enterprise risks across the entire public sector (Question 4.17); and
- the quality of enterprise risk mitigation in the case of COVID-19 (Question 4.18).

In Figure 9.18, we also examine the status of ERM implementation across the public sector (Question 2.3).

Figure 9.18. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 (In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?)





Figure 9.19. Average rating of survey Question 2.3 by type of organisation



This question, on the status of ERM implementation, was addressed in Engagement 2. Here, 45 per cent of Eswatini respondents identified their ERM as being in the embryonic phases 1 and 2. This compares with Botswana, at 33 per cent, and Sierra Leone, at 30 per cent, in those stages. The Gambia, Kenya and Ghana had relatively low responses to Engagement 2, with corresponding low statistical levels of confidence in the data, i.e., their responses may not be fully representative of their public sectors. Within Eswatini, SOEs were the most advanced, with only 16 per cent in this elementary bracket. Central ministries, at 58 per cent, had the most entities at the very earliest stages of ERM implementation. Only 1.5 per cent of ministry respondents claimed their ERM

implementation was 'excellent'. No other Eswatini entity made such a claim. The overall average of excellence for Eswatini was 1 per cent. Ghana, at 8 per cent, was the country with the highest claim of excellence in this area.

The six-country average for technological adoption is quite downbeat at 2.8. Eswatini, at 2.4, dips below that average. Indeed, only Ghana and Kenya – both with low response rates and correspondingly low levels of statistical confidence – manage to exceed the median of 3, with ratings of 3.1 each. Within Eswatini, the range is provided by LGAs, with a severely pessimistic 2.0, and by SOEs at 2.6. No entity comes close to the median of 3.0.

Figure 9.20. Average response to survey Question 4.6 (Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technology to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?)





Figure 9.21. Average rating of survey Question 4.6 by type of organisation



There is clearly a lot of room for improvement of the efficiency of the deployment of risk information systems through the use of information technology.

The use of risk information in the development and implementation of strategy is arguably the most important deployment of ERM. It is central to the defined purpose of ERM, as examined in section 2.2. At 3, the six-country average is well into pessimistic territory, barely making the median. Sierra Leone is the country that claims the most confidence in the integration of risk and strategy, at a middling 3.3. Eswatini, at 2.8, joins The Gambia and Botswana to lie below the six-country average.

Within Eswatini, LGAs – at 4.0 – have the highest claim for integration of risk and strategy, which is intriguing given the capacity constraints noted earlier (Figure 9.23). At 2.3, autonomous departments are the least responsive in this key

attribute. Indeed, all entities other than LGAs rank themselves at or below the median of 3.0.

Given the importance of such integration to the objective of risk management, this area appears to offer significant scope for improvement. Further, the tools to secure this improvement are not overly demanding. Thus, this may offer a ‘low hanging fruit’ for future interventions to demonstrate the value of ERM and risk thinking. Had there been a confirmed basis for the optimism of the LGA sector, the LGAs’ successful practices could have been recommended as a model for other sectors. However, without further investigation (which is outside the scope of the present research), we are not in the position to make such a recommendation.

Budgetary control, within a well-defined strategy, is arguably the second most important use of public sector ERM for decision-making and control.

Figure 9.22. Average response to survey Question 4.9 (Strategy: Internal and External Risks to my organisation’s mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?)





Figure 9.23. Average rating of survey Question 4.9 by type of organisation



It is of particular interest to the Commonwealth Secretariat, given the specialist interest of its commissioning unit for this study in public financial management (PFM). The six-country average is just above the median rating of 3.2, indicating a relatively low level of confidence among respondents in the integration of risk and budgetary control within PFM. At 2.9, the Eswatini average dips below the six-country average. This time, it is the second most pessimistic of the countries, with only Botswana expressing more pessimism.

Within Eswatini, LGAs, once again, claim the highest level of self-confidence, which is well into the highest scale at 4.2. All other entities are at or below the median of 3.0.

Overall, this indicates significant scope for improving Eswatini PFM by the effective integration of risk thinking into PFM. This, as with strategy, may also be a 'low hanging fruit', as the supportive tools are not too demanding. However, in both contexts, the picking of such fruit will demand

the prior embrace of risk thinking within a risk-aware culture (Figure 9.26). Had there been an established basis for the optimism of the LGA sector, the LGAs' successful practices could have been recommended as a model for other sectors. However, without further investigation (which is outside the scope of the present research), we are not in a position to make such a recommendation.

Key risk indicators (KRIs) are a productive tool of risk thinking that exists within a risk-aware culture. They provide an early warning of future performance challenges and thus are an important trigger of proactive public sector ERM. The article on corporate governance within Engagement 3 is a classic illustration of the use of KRIs to guide top-level decision-making and control. KRIs usually perform best when they identify broad principles and behavioural phenomena at the individual and group levels. Consequently, their effective use tends to demand higher individual cognitive and teamwork skills, within a suitably trusting context.

Figure 9.24. Average response to survey Question 4.10 (Budget. Our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?)




Figure 9.25. Average rating of survey Question 4.10 by type of organisation




Figure 9.26. Average response to survey Question 4.13 (Performance using Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs): KPIs are "lagging indicators" that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be "leading indicators" that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?)





Figure 9.27. Average rating of survey Question 4.13 by type of organisation




The capable deployment of KRIs is arguably the most demanding element of ERM and may be a feature of the highest performing team cultures and entities.

Given this expectation, it is not surprising that the six-country average is among the lowest of the research in this area, at 2.8. The Eswatini average

is at 2.5. It is worth recalling that three countries – Ghana, Kenya and The Gambia – have small sample sizes with consequently lower confidence in the representativeness of their outcomes.

Within Eswatini, at 3.8, LGAs are once again the leaders in optimism for the use of KRIs. The next highest are SOEs, with 2.7. The other end of the

Figure 9.28. Average response to survey Question 4.14 (Two-way information street: Rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders who perform vital management and program functions. This allows for better departmental decision making. Question: To what extent is information for decision making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?)



range is provided by autonomous departments at 2.1. Had there been an established basis for the optimism of the LGA sector, the LGAs' successful practices could have been recommended as a model for other sectors. However, without further investigation (which is outside the scope of the present research), we are not in the position to make such a recommendation

The deterrence of information silos is also easier said than done. Like KRIs, this demands pervasive risk thinking within a risk-aware entity culture. At 3, the six-country average is, as would be expected, in the same downbeat territory as the rating of KRIs. The Eswatini average is 2.4, with Botswana just above at 2.7 and Kenya providing the greatest optimism at 3.4.

Within Eswatini, LGAs once again provide the most optimism at a modest 3.2 (Figure 9.29). Autonomous departments are at the other end of the range, with an average of 1.4. The other entity groups are tightly clustered between 2.4

and 2.7, well into pessimistic territory. Had there been a proven basis for the optimism of the LGA sector, the LGAs' successful practices could have been recommended as a model for other sectors. However, without further investigation (which is outside the scope of the present research), we are not in the position to make such a recommendation. In general, successful ERM is not feasible where there are barriers to the efficient and timely flow of information to those parties who need to know and act upon such information.

Question 4.16 features a range between Sierra Leone – at 3.4– and Eswatini at 2.8. This measure seeks to indicate the impact of top governance on the management of risks and opportunities, i.e., whether the style of top governance amplifies or absorbs risks. A six-country average of about 3.1, indicates a generally pessimistic outlook with scope for much improvement. As with KRIs and risk silos, top governance risks are possibly among the more demanding elements to manage in public sector

Figure 9.29. Average rating of survey Question 4.14 by type of organisation





Figure 9.30. Average response to survey Question 4.16 (Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?)



ERM. This is especially the case as appointments, elevations and removals of senior governance will have a political influence that may not always be aligned to the best interests of the individual entity or the public interest as a whole.

Consequently, governance risks will typically involve a constellation of factors, including: (a) those that are internal to a particular public sector entity; and (b) factors outside the entity's control that are determined by administrative and/or political superiors within central government. Governance risks may be the most difficult element of a public sector ERM to manage and possibly the ones with the greatest potential impact on the entity.

Within Eswatini, the range has at one end, autonomous departments and central ministries, with 2 and 2.8 (Figure 9.31). The other end features LGAs again, with a relatively optimistic 3.8. Overall, respondents clearly consider that there is scope for significant improvement in the risk effectiveness of top governance. Had there been a confirmed basis for the optimism of the LGA sector, the LGAs' successful practices could have

been recommended as a model for other sectors. However, without further investigation (which is outside the scope of the present research), we are not in the position to make such a recommendation.

A vital part of a public sector ERM is the use of relevant risk and opportunity information from all component entities to inform the decision-making of the national cabinet on decision-making and control of the development and implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). This question sought to evaluate the extent to which participants are aware of the need to integrate ERM and the NDS in the participating countries.

At roughly 2.5, the Eswatini average joins The Gambia and Botswana in being at or below the six-country average of 2.8. This perception may be influenced by the access of respondents to relevant information about links with the NDS. However, effective PS-ERM requires that such information silos (if present) are avoided. This elimination of silos provides for easier identification and reporting of related risks. This likely belongs to the cluster of risk delivery elements that demand risk thinking in a

Figure 9.31. Average rating of survey Question 4.16 by type of organisation




Figure 9.32. Average response to survey Question 4.17 (Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/Local government that are RELEVANT to its decision making?)




Figure 9.33. Average rating of survey Question 4.17 by type of organisation





Figure 9.34. Average response to survey Question 4.18 (Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?) for all six countries




pervasive risk-aware culture. It keeps company with KRIs, risk silos and governance risks.

Within Eswatini, all entities have an average rating well below the median of 3.0 (Figure 9.33). Central

ministries provide the ceiling with 2.6 and SOEs the floor at 2.4. For the public sector, ERM cannot end at the doorsteps of individual entities; it must provide for relevant and timely transmission of

Figure 9.35. Average rating of survey Question 4.18 by type of organisation



risk information to the national cabinet to guide decisions on the NDS.

'The proof of the pudding is in the eating.' The ultimate test of any public sector ERM system is its response 'under fire'. At a six-country average of 2.1 and an Eswatini average of roughly 1.8, this Question 4.18 COVID-19 response evaluation is the weakest rating of the survey series. Only Ghana (with its relatively low sample size) and Sierra Leone broke a new 'barrier' of 2.0 of hyper-pessimism. Perhaps the Sierra Leone average of 3.0, barely making the median rating, reflects the recent experience of the Ebola epidemic – which probably left the country with

more experience to respond relatively better than its peers.

Within Eswatini, LGAs again provide one end of the range, this time with a pessimistic 2.4. SOEs, at 1.1, delivered a very pessimistic other end of the range. Ministries and autonomous departments ranked themselves in downbeat territory, below 2, and only autonomous agencies, at 2.2, joined LGAs above the '2 barrier'.

This measure is broadly consistent with the other findings of this research, which indicate much scope for improvement in the contribution of public sector ERM to sustainable attainment of national development strategies.

The Executive Highlights on page 100 suggests an overall conclusion on the findings of this Large-scale Survey research for Eswatini.

10. Large-scale Survey: Ghana



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Executive Highlights: Ghana

Sample Size

The sample size for Ghana was a bit on the low side, limiting the level of statistical confidence that could be secured. However, the aggregate outcomes for Ghana were broadly similar to the three countries which had robust sample sizes. Consequently, we can draw some useful insights from the research for Ghana.

Three Propositions of the Theory of Change

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 4 on the Study Methodology, three Propositions were advanced of 'good habits' that will be essential to a well-functioning Public Sector Enterprise Risk Management (PS-ERM) system. Given the caveat above, the implications of the perceptions of Ghana respondents for these propositions are summarised in the table below.

Theory of Change Proposition	Indicative Research Conclusion
Adequate human competences are the base camp for successful PS-ERM	There are indications of a fair base of foundational comprehension to support the implementation of PS-ERM in Ghana. To fully benefit from PS-ERM, human capital must be determinedly sustained and generationally improved if PS-ERM in Ghana is to beneficially move up the generally accepted scales of ERM maturity and value.
Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for PS-ERM	The sector analysis for Ghana included extremes, with a few sectors reporting high levels of productive trust and cohesion, and others at the other extreme. Overall, PS-ERM for Ghana will likely require significant investment in building levels of personal and organisational trust that are essential for ERM to have a reasonable chance of being attained. In some sectors, there are signs of a material level of alienation of public sector staff, indicating a deficit of trust that is perilous for ERM. Taken as a whole, there may be a need for greater emphasis on risk management as a 'way of thinking', rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes. There may be a base from which more advanced entities can be a role model for others.
PS-ERM should be a connected decision support mechanism for sub-entity (MDAs/SOEs/LGAs) strategy and for the national cabinet's direction of the national development strategy (NDS)	This proposition is the ultimate purpose and value of a PS-ERM system. It is the "end" in Stephen Covey's Habit 2 of <i>Highly Effective People</i> : "Begin with the End in Mind". At an individual entity level, the extremes detected above were replicated, with a few sectors suggesting high levels of decision infrastructure and focus and others at the other extreme. However, the connectedness to the NDS and the national response to COVID was broadly identified as requiring major improvements in decision support.

Current Status of PS-ERM in Ghana and its position among the Six Countries


Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 7, the large-scale survey (LSS) that was one of two primary sources of field evidence for this research was described. Of the twenty-three (23) LSS questions, four (4) survey questions

have been identified as providing reliable insight into the perceptions of respondents in Ghana of the status of PS-ERM in their country at the time of the research in 2021. One (1) question was from Engagement 2 and three (3) were from Engagement 4. The table below also includes a reference to the Figure (chart) that illustrates the data within this chapter on Ghana.

Question #	Figure #	Description	Short reference
2.2	10.7	To what extent is your organisation so engaged in “fire-fighting” that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	Firefighting
4.16	10.30	Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?	Top Governance
4.17	10.32	Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities	NDS (National Development Strategy)
4.18	10.34	Consider the video that you watched on COVID 19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	COVID

Respondents were asked to rate each question from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating an extremely negative view; and 5 suggesting an extremely positive satisfaction. The median value is 3, which territory would suggest a relatively neutral view, indicating that the outcome can be good or bad, depending on future circumstances.

For each of the four questions, the Ghana outcome was expressed as (a) a percentage of the average for all countries and (b) a percentage of the median. A fair outcome would be above the average for all countries *and* above the median i.e. above 100% for both measures.



Percentage of the average for all countries

All of the four measures are a little above 100%, indicating that Ghana respondents are a *bit* more optimistic about their PS-ERM status than their peers.

Percentage of the median score

The fire-fighting, Top Governance and NDS measures are a little above the six-country average, indicating limited satisfaction with significant scope for growth. The COVID measure is markedly below

100%, suggesting a need for an investigation and timely remedial action. As with all other countries, the COVID rating signals a pressing need for improvements in contingency planning and disaster preparedness. In general, the combined rating of the four indicators ("average of averages") lies just above the median.

Overall, we can see that the perceptions of respondents suggest that there was major scope for improvement in the status of PS-ERM in Ghana at the point of the field research.

10.1 Participation Information and survey questions

10.1.1 Introduction

The large-scale survey (LSS), which forms the subject of this chapter, is described in Section 4.2. (Volume 1). This chapter provides demographic information on the participation of Ghana in the LSS research. The research was delivered via five 'engagements', as outlined in Section 4.2. This chapter analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 1, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. It further analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 3, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 4 questionnaire.


Table 10.1 shows the total number of individuals from Ghana who registered to participate in this research. Ghana contributed 3 per cent of registrants. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, the proportion of respondents who considered that their entity does not have an ERM system in place or in progress, was 22 per cent. The six-country average was 40 per cent stating 'No'. Just over half of respondents (55%) provided a definitive confirmation ('Yes') of the existence of an ERM in their entity, compared to the six-country average of 46 per cent. Due to the small sample size, the results for Ghana should be interpreted with caution.

The actual number and characteristics of the respondents to the Engagements 2 and 4 questionnaires are shown in Sections 10.1.2 and 10.1.3 below.

Table 10.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?

#	Country	Do not know	No	Yes	Grand total	Grand total (%)	Do not know (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	Grand total (%)
1	Botswana	71	160	298	529	36	13	30	56	100
2	Eswatini	44	128	67	239	16	18	54	28	100
3	Ghana	13	12	30	55	3	24	22	55	100
4	Kenya	6	24	68	98	7	6	24	69	100
5	Sierra Leone	69	241	167	477	32	14	51	35	100
6	The Gambia	3	34	52	89	6	3	38	58	100
	Grand Total	206	599	682	1487	100	14	40	46	100

Figure 10.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?



10.1.2 Participation information for the Engagement 2 research questionnaire

There were 25 respondents to the Engagement 2 questionnaire from Ghana, i.e., a response rate of 45 per cent of the registered total of 55 persons. Females made up the minority of contributors at 28 per cent, with male respondents at 72 per cent. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 14 participating organisations from Ghana to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. Nearly

two-thirds (16 of the total 25 respondents/64%) were from five entities:

- Internal Audit Agency (4 respondents/16%);
- Community Water and Sanitation Agency (3 respondents/12%);
- Ghana Grid Company Ltd (3 respondents/12%);
- Ministry of Works and Housing (3 respondents/12%); and
- National Insurance Commission (3 respondents/12%).

Table 10.2. Engagement 2 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	127	129	256	50	50	100
Eswatini	69	46	115	60	40	100
Ghana	7	18	25	28	72	100
Kenya	17	22	39	44	56	100
Sierra Leone	33	81	114	29	71	100
The Gambia	7	22	29	24	76	100
Grand Total	260	318	578	45	55	100

Table 10.3. Ghana Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Internal Audit Agency	4
2.	Community Water and Sanitation Agency	3
3.	Ghana Grid Company Ltd (GRIDCo)	3
4.	Ministry of Works and Housing	3
5.	National Insurance Commission	3
6.	Ghana Audit Service	1
7.	Minerals Commission	1
8.	Ministry of Defence	1
9.	Ministry of Finance	1
10.	National Development Planning Commission	1
11.	Public Works Department	1
12.	State Interest and Governance Authority	1
13.	Presbyterian Health Service Agogo	1
14.	Ministry of Roads and Highways	1
	Total number of respondents	25

Table 10.4. Engagement 4 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	81	88	169	48	52	100
Eswatini	43	30	73	59	41	100
Ghana	2	9	11	18	82	100
Kenya	8	15	23	35	65	100
Sierra Leone	17	30	47	36	64	100
The Gambia	4	15	19	21	79	100
Grand Total	155	187	342	45	55	100

10.1.3 Participation information for the Engagement 4 research questionnaire

There were 11 respondents to the Engagement 4 questionnaire from Ghana, i.e., a response rate of 20 per cent of the registered total of 55 persons. Females made up 18 per cent, while males were 82 per cent of the respondents from Ghana. The number of respondents is lower than for Engagement 2 (25 respondents) and the proportion of males is a bit higher than it was in Engagement 2. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 9 participating organisations from Ghana to the Engagement 4 questionnaire (14 for Engagement 2). Just over one-third (4 of the total 11 respondents/64%) were from two entities:

- Internal Audit Agency (2 respondents/18.5%);

- Ministry of Works and Housing (2 respondents/18.5%);

The top contributing organisation remains the same for both Engagements 2 and 4.

10.1.4 List of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

See Section 8.1.4, Table 8.6 for the list of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

10.2 Sample size for Ghana Engagements 2 and 4 and the level of statistical confidence

Rated questions were scored from 1 to 5, with a lower score representing an unfavourable risk to an ERM implementation and a higher score indicating a positive risk or opportunity.

Table 10.5. Engagement 4 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Internal Audit Agency	2
2.	Ministry of Works and Housing	2
3.	Ghana Grid Company Ltd (GRIDCo)	1
4.	Minerals Commission	1
5.	National Insurance Commission	1
6.	National Development Planning Commission	1
7.	State Interests and Governance Authority	1
8.	Public Works Department	1
9.	Community Water and Sanitation Agency	1
Total number of respondents		11

Table 10.6. Statistical sample sizes and related levels of confidence in the results obtained for the large-scale survey

Ghana respondent population	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
Ref	Custom	Custom
Confidence Level	80%	70%
Margin of Error	10%	15%
Population Proportion	50%	50%
Population Size	55	55
Actual Sample Size	25	11

Engagement 2 attracted 25 responses from Ghana out of a registered total of 55, giving a response rate of 46 per cent. Engagement 4 attracted 11 responses from Ghana, giving a response rate of 20 per cent. When we apply the parameters for determining the statistical level of confidence in our results, as outlined in Section 4.2.3 above, we derive the levels as presented in Table 10.6.

For Engagement 2, this provides a confidence level of 80 per cent that the real value is within ± 10 per cent of the measured/surveyed value of the responses. Given the small number of registrants, the inference has been limited to the registered population, rather than the wider population of public sector stakeholders. The Engagement 4 response rate provides a lower confidence level of 70 per cent, with a wider margin of error. Ghana's low response rate means that the survey inferences must be seen as 'indicative' and not 'definitive', given the relatively low statistical levels of confidence relative to, for example, that of Botswana.

10.3 ToC proposition: adequate human competences are the 'base camp' for successful public sector ERM

Readers should refer to the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 10.7.

The responses to these questions are examined individually for their relevance to the adequacy of human competences in the Ghana context, with a collective synthesis at the end. The survey questions with an asterisk * are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.


Table 10.7. Survey questions mapped to the human competence proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*
2	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*, Q4.9*, Q4.10*, Q4.13*
3	N/A	N/A

Q2.1 (Figure 10.2) addressed the comprehension of a short foundational article on ERM by the researcher (Jones 2020a), which was then enriched with illustrative secondary videos. It was delivered as Engagement 1 and was intended as a sound introduction to ERM for the layperson, as well as a refresher for the experienced. Given the highly accessible language and style, its comprehension was seen as a fair indicator of a reader's readiness for an ERM journey. Weak comprehension would indicate a reader that may have significant challenges in the development and/or operation of an ERM system. All countries had average scores in the highest quintile, which provides a generally favourable outlook on the basic competences of the respondents in all countries. With a six-country average of 4.4, Ghana's average of 4.3 was just below the average. The female average for Ghana was 4.4 and the male average was slightly less optimistic at 4.3 – see Figure 10.6.

Within Ghana, the results were tightly clustered around the country average, with general staff providing one end of the range at 4.1 and senior management delivering the other end at 4.4 (Figure 10.3). This suggests a reasonably firm level of comprehension and an adequate foundation for the delivery of an ERM system in Ghana.

Figure 10.2. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?)



This Engagement 4 Question 4.1 had the same objective as Question 2.1. It addressed the comprehension of reading and viewing material delivered as Engagement 3. This included an article on corporate governance by the researcher (Jones 2020b), a third-party video on the effective use of ERM by the British Cabinet during the First World War (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011), and a proprietary video by the researcher's firm on the experience of corporate Africa during

COVID-19 (GovernanceQualityRatings.com 2021). With an average 4.3 on a 5-point scale, the average score for all countries was lower than the average of 4.4 for Question 2.1. This probably reflects the more demanding content of this engagement, but still leaves the average in the top scale. Ghana had a rating of 4.2, which is still within the top quintile.

Within Ghana, all respondent groups were in the top quintile (Figure 10.5), with ministers and general

Figure 10.3. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 by job description




Figure 10.4. Average rating of survey Question 4.1




Figure 10.5. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?) by job description





Figure 10.6. Q2.1 Rating by Gender



staff providing one end of the range at 4.0 and 'other management' providing the other end at 4.3.

In conclusion, the effective implementation of ERM must be complemented by strong human capacity of key stakeholders. The evidence suggests a sound foundation for Ghana to build upon.

10.4 ToC proposition:
organisational and societal
trust within an enabling culture
is 'mission critical' for ERM

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions provided in Table 10.8.

The survey questions with a double asterisk ** are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

Table 10.8. Survey questions mapped to the trust and enabling culture proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.2, Q2.4*, Q2.5*	Q4.2, Q4.3*, Q4.4*, Q4.5, Q4.7*, Q4.8*, Q4.11*, Q4.12*, Q4.13**, Q4.14**, Q4.19*
2	N/A	N/A
3	N/A	N/A

The questions marked with a single asterisk * are intended to provide a measure of the sociological concept of 'anomie' within the group of respondents. Anomie, in societies or individuals, has been described as a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020a). The concept was introduced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. When a social system is in a state of anomie, common values and common meanings are no longer understood or accepted, while new values and meanings have not developed. According to Durkheim, such a society produces, in many of its members, psychological states characterised by a sense of futility, lack of purpose, and emotional emptiness and despair. Anomie can be used as a proxy for the alienation of an individual from his or her organisation and/or society, as used by this researcher (Jones 2012). It has been introduced to this study as high levels of alienation or anomie are evidently inconsistent with

Figure 10.7. Average response to survey Question 2.2 (To what extent is your organisation so engaged in "fire-fighting" that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?)




Figure 10.8. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation





Figure 10.9. Average response to combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5



the conditions of trust and enabling culture that is required for an effective ERM system.

The anomie measures are nine in number, two of which were utilised in Engagement 2, with the other seven in Engagement 4. For the purposes of this study, the results will be combined into two composite measures, i.e., Engagement 2 composite (two items) and Engagement 4 composite (seven items).

First, we consider Q2.2 (Figure 10.7), which is intended to assess the scope for the contribution of ERM to public sector organisational efficiency and productivity. A 'firefighting' culture indicates a reactive

set of relationships, which can be improved by the 'proactive' thinking demanded by ERM. It is noteworthy that the six-country average (at 3.4) is markedly lower (bottom half of the fourth quintile) relative to the confidence shown in proposition 1 above. At 3.6, Ghana is above the six-country average, with Sierra Leone providing the most optimistic outcome at 3.8.

Within Ghana, central ministries and autonomous departments are fairly bullish, breaking into the top quintile with 4.0 (Figure 10.8). Autonomous agencies and SOEs are more sedate, with 3.3 and 3.6 respectively. Overall, the insight is mixed, perhaps because of the low sample size. However,

Figure 10.10. Average ratings of combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5 by type of organisation





Figure 10.11. Combined Ghana Engagement 4 Anomie



some room clearly exists in Ghana for public sector ERM to contribute to organisational productivity.

This anomie subset from Engagement 2 reinforces the message from Q2.2. The six-country average, at 3.3 is broadly at the Q2.2 average of 3.3. Ghana just matches this average, at 3.3. The Gambia is the only country that attained 3.4. Within Ghana, autonomous departments indicate a “perfect” social cohesion rating of 5. This is a clear outlier from other entities, with central ministries providing a fairly pessimistic 2.8 and autonomous agencies and SOEs registering a circumspect 3.3 and 3.4 respectively.

The low sample size, may account for the radical variation in ratings between the autonomous departments and the rest. It may also be the case that the optimistic organisations are being managed in a manner that could offer lessons to the others.

The Ghana average for the seven anomie questions of Engagement 4 is, at 3.4, slightly more optimistic than the average (3.3) for the Engagement 2 subset. This figure is level with The Gambia and Sierra Leone, which also register 3.4. It is evident that the six countries are tightly clustered in this measure of alienation. Within Ghana, central ministries are an outlier, providing a cynical outcome of 2.8, well below the median of 3 (Figure 10.13). The other entities are clustered at or above the average. Females self-rated at 3.1, while males self-rated at a slightly more optimistic 3.5 (Figure 10.11).

In conclusion, the two sets of anomie responses for Ghana suggests that the successful implementation of public sector ERM must include a conscious element that seeks to address social cynicism and to improve the sense of collective purpose of public sector staff.

Figure 10.12. Average response to combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19




Figure 10.13. Average Ratings of combined Engagement 4 Anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19 by type of organisation




Figure 10.14. Average response to survey Question 4.2 (To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?)





Figure 10.15. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation



The six-country average (roughly 3.6) and the Ghana data for Question 4.2 (also 3.6) is broadly consistent with the other questions so far in this proposition. Within Ghana, one end of the range is provided by autonomous departments (with a modest 3.0) and the other end by SOEs and central ministries in the top scale, with 4.0 and 4.5 respectively (Figure 10.15). The low sample size may account for the radical variation in

ratings between the Ghana entities. However, it may also be the case that the optimistic organisations are being managed in a manner that could offer lessons to the others.

In conclusion, Question 4.2 broadly reinforces the message that there is scope for public sector ERM to add to the quality of management and outcomes for public sector entities in Ghana. This is consistent with the data from other countries,

Figure 10.16. Average response to survey Question 4.5 (People: my organisation strives to create a “risk aware” culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?)





Figure 10.17. Average rating of survey Question 4.5 by type of organisation



which have sample sizes that convey greater statistical confidence.

The six-country average (3.3) is more pessimistic on Question 4.5 than for Question 4.2 (3.6). The Ghana average (3.5) is just below that for Question 4.2. The broad message may be that current ERM implementation efforts are focusing too much on ‘systems and processes’ (for example, development and maintenance of a risk register) and not adequately on ERM as ‘an attitude of mind’ that then influences the use of processes to attain agreed risk management goals. Within Ghana, the radical differences persist (Figure 10.17). This time, SOEs deliver a perfectly risk-aware rating of 5, while autonomous departments record deep concern with a rating of 2. Once again, the low sample size may account for the radical variation. It may also be the case that the optimistic organisations are being managed in a manner that could offer lessons to the others. However, the six-country average and in-country examples suggest that Ghana may have room for improvement.

In conclusion for this ‘trust’ proposition, all questions have mutually reinforcing responses that are broadly consistent with each other. Public sector ERM should invest in building personal

and organisational trust in order for the risk management objectives to have a reasonable chance of being attained. There should, perhaps, be an emphasis on risk management as a ‘way of thinking’, rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.

10.5 ToC proposition: public sector ERM as a decision support mechanism

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 10.9.

Survey questions with a double asterisk ** have already been examined under earlier ToC propositions with which they overlap. Consequently, this analysis will be limited to those that do not have a double asterisk.

In this final section, we focus on the use of public sector ERM as a means to improve specific types of decision-making at the entity level and at the level of the national cabinet as it manages the

Table 10.9. Survey questions mapped to the decision support proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.3	Q4.2**, Q4.5**, Q4.6, Q4.9, Q4.10, Q4.13, Q4.14, Q4.16, Q4.17, Q4.18
2	N/A	ditto
3	N/A	ditto

implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). Considerations include:

- the use of technology as an enabler of timely and efficient management of risk information (Question 4.6);
- the use of risk information to give shape to strategic planning and its subsequent monitoring and evaluation (Question 4.9);
- whether budgetary planning and control is influenced by risk information (Question 4.10);

- the existence of key risk indicators as early warning signals for governance and control (Question 4.13);
- the avoidance of information silos by ensuring vertical and horizontal movement of risk information (Question 4.14);
- the impact of governance practices on the management of enterprise risks (Question 4.16);
- the existence of central co-ordination – at the level of the national cabinet – of NDS-relevant enterprise risks across the entire public sector (Question 4.17); and
- the quality of enterprise risk mitigation in the case of COVID-19 (Question 4.18).


We also examine the status of ERM implementation across the public sector (Question 2.3, Figure 10.18).

This question, on the status of ERM implementation, was addressed in Engagement 2. Eight (8) per cent of Ghana respondents identified their ERM as being in the embryonic phases 1 and 2. This compares with Eswatini at 45 per cent, Botswana at 33 per cent,

Figure 10.18. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 (In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?)



Figure 10.19. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 by type of organisation



and Sierra Leone at 30 per cent in those stages. The Gambia, Kenya and Ghana had relatively low responses to Engagement 2, with corresponding low statistical levels of confidence in the data; i.e., the responses may not be fully representative of their public sectors. Ghana, at 8 per cent, was also the country with the most optimistic claim of excellence (category 5). Within Ghana, autonomous departments claimed the most progress, with all respondents asserting a level 4 category of a reasonably well functioning ERM (Figure 10.19). The low sample size may make the interpretation of Ghana's data rather challenging. (Note: The shades in the Ghana chart are for levels 2–5 only).

The six-country average of technological adoption is quite downbeat at 2.8. Ghana, at 3.1, is above

that average, but still at a modest rating. Indeed, only Ghana and Kenya – both with low response rates and correspondingly low levels of statistical confidence – managed to exceed the median of 3, with ratings of 3.1 each. Within Ghana, autonomous departments have a highly pessimistic rating of 1.0, while central ministries provide a top quintile positive 4.0. SOEs and autonomous agencies post a more modest 3.0 and 3.1 respectively (Figure 10.21).

If the optimism of the central ministry sector is well founded, it would suggest that other sectors in Ghana may benefit from learning from that sector's successful technology and risk integration practices. There is clearly a lot of room for improvement of the efficiency of the deployment

Figure 10.20. Average response to survey Question 4.6 (Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technology to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?)




Figure 10.21. Ghana – Average rating of survey Question 4.6 by type of organisation




Figure 10.22. Average response to survey Question 4.9 (Strategy: Internal and External Risks to my organisation's mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?)





Figure 10.23. Average rating of survey Question 4.9 by type of organisation




of risk information systems through the use of information technology.

The use of risk information in the development and implementation of strategy is arguably the most important deployment of ERM. It is central to the

defined purpose of ERM, as examined in section 2.2. At roughly 3, the six-country average is well into pessimistic territory, barely rounding up the median. Sierra Leone claims the most confidence of the integration of risk and strategy, at a middling 3.3. Ghana, at 3.1, joins Kenya and Sierra Leone to

Figure 10.24. Average response to survey Question 4.10 (Budget. Our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?)



lie above the six-country average. However, the low sample size must be kept in mind for Ghana.

Within Ghana, the radical differences continue. Autonomous agencies record a pessimistic 2.9 (Figure 10.23), with central ministries just making the median at 3. Autonomous departments and SOEs both claim sound integration of risk and strategy, with a self-rating of 4.

Given the importance of this strategy and risk integration to the objective of risk management, this appears to offer significant scope for improvement, especially given the variations within Ghana. Further, the tools to secure this improvement are not overly demanding. Thus, this area may offer a 'low hanging fruit' for future interventions to demonstrate the value of ERM and risk thinking. If the optimism of the SOE and autonomous department sectors is well founded, it would suggest that other Ghana sectors may benefit from learning from their successful strategy practices.

Budgetary control, within a well-defined strategy, is arguably the second most important use of public sector ERM for decision-making and control. It is of particular interest to the Commonwealth Secretariat, given the specialist interest of its commissioning unit for this study in public financial management (PFM). The six-country average, at 3.2, just exceeds the median rating of 3.0, indicating a relatively low level of confidence among respondents in the integration of risk and budgetary control within PFM. At 3.3, the Ghana average joins Kenya, Sierra Leone and The Gambia in being just above the six-country average. Eswatini and Botswana are relatively pessimistic.

Within Ghana, SOEs claim a high self-rating of 4, while other sectors are more modest (Figure 10.25). Autonomous departments provide one end of the range, with the median of 3. Autonomous agencies are close by with 3.1 and central ministries are more optimistic at 3.5.

Overall, this indicates significant scope for improving Ghana's PFM by the effective integration

Figure 10.25. Average rating of survey Question 4.10 by type of organisation





Figure 10.26. Average response to survey Question 4.13 (Performance using Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs): KPIs are "lagging indicators" that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be "leading indicators" that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?)



of risk thinking into PFM. This, as with strategy, may also be a 'low hanging fruit', as the supportive tools are not too demanding. However, in both contexts, the picking of such fruit will demand the prior embrace of risk thinking within a risk-aware culture. If the optimism of the SOE sector is well founded, it would suggest that other sectors may benefit from learning from the successful budgetary control practices of SOEs in Ghana.

Key risk indicators (KRIs) are a productive tool of risk thinking that exists within a risk-aware culture. They are an early warning of future performance challenges and thus are an important trigger of proactive public sector ERM. The article on corporate governance within Engagement 3 is a classic illustration of the use of KRIs to guide top-level decision-making and control. KRIs usually perform best when they identify broad principles and behavioural phenomena at the individual level and at the level of groups. Consequently, their effective use tends to demand higher individual cognitive and teamwork skills, within a suitably trusting context. The capable deployment of KRIs is arguably the most

demanding element of ERM and may be a feature of the highest performing team cultures and entities.

Given this expectation, it is not surprising that the six-country average is among the lowest of the research, at 2.8. The Ghana average, at 2.7, is just below the average. It is worth recalling that three countries – Ghana, Kenya and The Gambia – have small sample sizes, with consequently lower confidence in the representativeness of their outcomes. However, all countries are fairly tightly clustered, suggesting that the data for the low sample sizes may be reflective of a wider reality in those countries.

Within Ghana, SOEs again rate themselves a top-scale 4.0 for the use of KRIs (Figure 10.27). The next highest are central ministries, with a humble 3.0. Autonomous departments rate themselves at a very pessimistic 2.0. If the optimism of the SOE sector is well founded, it would suggest that other sectors may benefit from learning from the successful KRI practices of SOEs in Ghana.

The deterrence of information silos is also easier said than done. Like KRIs, this demands pervasive

Figure 10.27. Average rating of survey Question 4.13 by type of organisation




Figure 10.28. Average response to survey Question 4.14 (Two-way information street: Rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders who perform vital management and program functions. This allows for better departmental decision making. Question: To what extent is information for decision making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?)




Figure 10.29. Average rating of survey Question 4.14 by type of organisation





Figure 10.30. Average response to survey Question 4.16 (Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?)




risk thinking within a risk-aware entity culture (Figure 10.28). At 2.78, the six-country average is, as would be expected, in the neighbourhood of the downbeat territory of the rating of KRIs. The Eswatini average is at 2.4, with Botswana just above at 2.7 and Kenya providing one end of the range at 3.4. Ghana rates itself a modest 2.9.

Within Ghana, autonomous departments provide an optimistic top quintile ceiling at 4.0 (Figure 10.29). Autonomous agencies deliver a radically different outcome, with an average 2.7. The other entity groups are tightly clustered at the modest

median of 3.0. If the optimism of the autonomous department sector is well founded, it would suggest that other sectors may benefit from learning from its successful silo-deterrence practices in Ghana. In general, successful ERM is not feasible where there are barriers to the efficient and timely flow of information to those parties who need to know and act upon such information. There is clearly scope for significant improvement in Ghana.

With Sierra Leone rating relative optimism – at 3.4, this measure seeks to indicate the impact of top governance on the management of risks and

Figure 10.31. Average rating of survey Question 4.16 by type of organisation



opportunities, i.e., whether the top governance style amplifies or absorbs risks. The range of country ratings, with a six-country average of about 3.1 and a Ghana rating of 3.2, indicates a generally pessimistic outlook with scope for much improvement. As with KRIs and risk silos, top governance risks are possibly among the more demanding elements to manage in public sector ERM. This is especially the case as appointments, elevations and removals of senior governance will have political influence that may not always be aligned to the best interests of the individual entity or the public. Consequently, governance risks will typically involve a constellation of factors, those that are: (a) internal to a particular public sector entity; and (b) factors outside its control that are determined by administrative and/or political superiors within central government. Governance risks may be the most difficult element of a public sector ERM to manage and possibly the ones with the greatest potential impact on the entity.

Within Ghana, autonomous departments provide a deeply pessimistic outcome of 2.0 (Figure 10.31). Autonomous agencies and central ministries are at a modest 3.1 and 3.5 respectively. SOEs again provide relative optimism, with a top scale 4.0. Overall, respondents clearly consider that there is scope for significant improvement in the risk effectiveness of top governance. If the optimism of the SOE sector is well founded, it would suggest that other Ghana sectors may benefit from learning from its successful senior governance practices.

A vital part of a public sector ERM is the use of relevant risk and opportunity information from all component entities to inform the decision-making of the national cabinet on decision-making and control of the development and implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). This question sought to evaluate the extent to which the participants are aware of the need to integrate ERM and the NDS in the participating countries.

Figure 10.32. Average response to survey Question 4.17 (Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/Local government that are RELEVANT to its decision making?)




Figure 10.33. Average rating of survey Question 4.17 by type of organisation




Figure 10.34. Average response to survey Question 4.18 (Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?)





Figure 10.35. Average rating of survey Question 4.18 by type of organisation



At a modest 3.2, the Ghana average is above the six-country average of 2.8 – in territory that indicates significant room for improvement in this essential element of public sector ERM. This perception may be influenced by the access of respondents to relevant information about links with the NDS. However, effective PS-ERM

requires that such information silos (if present) are avoided. This elimination of silos provides for easier identification and reporting of related risks. It likely belongs to the cluster of risk delivery elements that demand risk thinking in a pervasive risk-aware culture. It keeps company with KRIs, risk silos and governance risks.

Within Ghana, central ministries provide relative optimism with 3.5, while autonomous departments are the other end of the range at 2.0. For the public sector, ERM cannot end at the doorsteps of individual entities; rather, it must provide for relevant and timely transmission of risk information to the national cabinet to guide decisions on the NDS.

'The proof of the pudding is in the eating'. The ultimate test of any public sector ERM system is its response 'under fire'. At a six-country average of 2.1, this Question 4.18 COVID-19 response evaluation is the weakest rating of the survey series. Only Ghana (at 2.5, but with relatively low sample size) and Sierra Leone broke a new 'barrier' of 2.0 of hyper-pessimism. Perhaps the Sierra Leone average of 3.0,

barely making the median rating, reflects the recent experience of the Ebola epidemic, which probably left the country with more experience to respond relatively better than its peers.

Within Ghana, autonomous agencies provide relative optimism, this time with 2.6 (Figure 10.35). Autonomous departments, at 2.0, were at the other end of the range.

This measure is broadly consistent with the other findings of this research, which indicate much scope for improvement of the contribution of public sector ERM to sustainable attainment of National Development Strategies.

The Executive Highlights on page 126 suggests an overall conclusion on the findings of this Large-scale Survey research for Ghana.

11. Large-scale Survey: Kenya



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Executive Highlights: Kenya

Sample Size

The sample size for Kenya was rather low, which limited the level of statistical confidence that could be obtained. But, the overall outcomes for Kenya were roughly similar to the three countries which had robust sample sizes. So, we can draw some useful insights from the research for Kenya.

Three Propositions of the Theory of Change

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 4 on the Study Methodology, three Propositions were advanced of “good habits” that will be essential to a well-functioning Public Sector Enterprise Risk Management (PS-ERM) system. Given the reservation above, the implications of the perceptions of Kenya respondents for these propositions are summarised in the table below.

Theory of Change Proposition	Indicative Research Conclusion
Adequate human competences are the base camp for successful PS-ERM	The findings suggest a reasonable base of foundational comprehension to support the implementation of PS-ERM in Kenya. Note, however, that to fully exploit PS-ERM, human capital must be resolutely sustained and cyclically improved if PS-ERM in Kenya is to rise up the generally accepted scales of ERM maturity and value.
Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is ‘mission critical’ for PS-ERM	As with Ghana, the sector analysis for Kenya included extremes, with a few sectors reporting high levels of productive trust and cohesion, and others indicating the opposite. Overall, PS-ERM for Kenya will need material investment in creating and sustaining levels of personal and organisational trust that are essential for ERM. ERM cannot work where people do not trust each other. In some sectors, there are signs of a concerning level of alienation of public sector staff, indicating a deficit of trust that is perilous for ERM. In addition, there may be a need for culture change that places risk management as a ‘way of thinking’, and not as the mechanical (and less effective) deployment of rigid policies and processes. If the variations in sector performance are valid, there may be opportunities for more advanced entities to be a role model for others.
PS-ERM should be a connected decision support mechanism for sub-entity (MDAs/SOEs/LGAs) strategy and for the national cabinet’s direction of the national development strategy (NDS)	This proposition is the ultimate purpose and value of a PS-ERM system. It is the “end” in Stephen Covey’s Habit 2 of <i>Highly Effective People</i> : “Begin with the End in Mind”. The sector extremes detected above were replicated, with a few sectors suggesting high levels of decision focus and others much less so. However, the link of ERM to the NDS and the national response to COVID was generally identified as requiring significant improvements in decision support.

Current Status of PS-ERM in Kenya and its position among the Six Countries

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 7, the large-scale survey (LSS) that was one of

two primary sources of field evidence for this research was described. Of the twenty-three (23) LSS questions, four (4) survey questions have been identified as providing reliable insight into the perceptions of respondents in Kenya of the status of PS-ERM in their country at the

time of the research in 2021. One (1) question was from Engagement 2 and three (3) were from

Engagement 4. The table below also includes a


Question #	Figure #	Description	Short reference
2.2	11.7	To what extent is your organisation so engaged in "fire-fighting" that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	Firefighting
4.16	11.30	Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?	Top Governance
4.17	11.32	Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities	NDS (National Development Strategy)
4.18	11.34	Consider the video that you watched on COVID 19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	COVID

reference to the Figure (chart) that illustrates the data within this chapter on Kenya.

Respondents were asked to rate each question from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating an extremely negative view; and 5 suggesting an extremely positive satisfaction. The median value is 3, which territory would suggest a relatively neutral view, indicating

that the outcome can be good or bad, depending on future circumstances.

For each of the four questions, the Kenya outcome was expressed as (a) a percentage of the average for all countries and (b) a percentage of the median. A fair outcome would be above the average for all countries and above the median i.e. above 100% for both measures.



Percentage of the average for all countries

All but one of the four measures (i.e. NDS) are below the six country average. The NDS measure is a little above 100%. Overall ("average of averages"), Kenya respondents are a less optimistic about their PS-ERM status than their peers.

Percentage of the median score

The Top Governance measure is at the median and the Fire-fighting indicator is a little above the median. This provides limited satisfaction with

significant scope for growth. The NDS and COVID measures are below the median, communicating the need for an investigation and timely remedial action. As with all other countries, the COVID rating signals a pressing need for improvements in contingency planning and disaster preparedness. Overall, the combined rating of the four indicators ("average of averages") lies, unsatisfactorily, below the median.

The perceptions of respondents suggest that there was major scope for enhancements in the status of PS-ERM in Kenya at the point of the field research.

11.1 Participation information and survey questions

11.1.1 Introduction

The large-scale survey (LSS), which forms the subject of this chapter, is described in Section 4.2 (Part 1). This chapter provides demographic information on the participation of Kenya in the LSS research. The research was delivered via five 'engagements', as outlined in Section 4.2. This chapter analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 1, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. It further analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 3, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 4 questionnaire.

Table 11.1 shows the total number of individuals from Kenya who registered to participate in this research. Kenya contributed 7 per cent of registrants. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, the proportion of respondents who considered that their entity does not have an ERM system in place or in progress, was 24 per cent. The six-country average was 40 per cent stating 'No'. Just over two-thirds of respondents (69%) provided a definitive confirmation ('Yes') of the existence of an ERM in their entity, compared to the six-country average of 46 per cent. The small sample size suggests interpreting the results for Kenya with caution.

The actual number and characteristics of the respondents to the Engagements 2 and 4

questionnaires are shown in Sections 11.1.2 and 11.1.3, below.

11.1.2 Participation information for the Engagement 2 research questionnaire

There were 39 respondents to the Engagement 2 questionnaire from Kenya, i.e., a response rate of 40 per cent of the registered total of 98 persons. Females made up the minority of contributors at 44 per cent, with male respondents at 56 per cent. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 17 participating organisations from Kenya to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. Nearly two-thirds (24 of the total 39 respondents/62%) were from five entities:

- Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company (9 respondents/23%);
- Communications Authority of Kenya (6 respondents/15%);
- Kenya Urban Roads Authority (3 respondents/8%);
- Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (3 respondents/8%); and
- The National Treasury and Planning (3 respondents/8%).

11.1.3 Participation Information for the Engagement 4 research questionnaire

There were 23 respondents to the Engagement 4 questionnaire from Kenya, i.e., a response rate of

Table 11.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?

#	Country	Do not know	No	Yes	Grand total	Grand total (%)	Do not know (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	Grand total (%)
1	Botswana	71	160	298	529	36	13	30	56	100
2	Eswatini	44	128	67	239	16	18	54	28	100
3	Ghana	13	12	30	55	3	24	22	55	100
4	Kenya	6	24	68	98	7	6	24	69	100
5	Sierra Leone	69	241	167	477	32	14	51	35	100
6	The Gambia	3	34	52	89	6	3	38	58	100
	Grand Total	206	599	682	1487	100	14	40	46	100

Figure 11.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?




Table 11.2. Engagement 2 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	127	129	256	50	50	100
Eswatini	69	46	115	60	40	100
Ghana	7	18	25	28	72	100
Kenya	17	22	39	44	56	100
Sierra Leone	33	81	114	29	71	100
The Gambia	7	22	29	24	76	100
Grand Total	260	318	578	45	55	100

24 per cent of the registered total of 98 persons. Females made up 35 per cent, while males were 65 per cent of the respondents from Kenya. The number of respondents is lower than for Engagement 2 (39 respondents) and the proportion of males is a bit higher than for Engagement 2. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent. There were 16 participating organisations from Kenya to the Engagement 4 questionnaire (17 for Engagement 2). Just under half of the total 23 respondents were from ten entities:

- Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company (6 respondents/26%);
- County Government of Kisumu (2 respondents/9%);
- Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (2 respondents/9%);

The top contributing organisation remains the same for both Engagements 2 and 4.

11.1.4 List of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

See Section 8.1.4, Table 8.6 for the list of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

11.2 Sample size for Kenya Engagements 2 and 4 and the level of statistical confidence

Rated questions were scored from 1 to 5, with a lower score representing an unfavourable risk to an ERM implementation and a higher score indicating a positive risk or opportunity.

Table 11.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company	9
2.	Communications Authority of Kenya	6
3.	Kenya Urban Roads Authority	3
4.	Public Sector Accounting Standards Board	3
5.	The National Treasury and Planning	3
6.	Kenya Railways	2
7.	Ministry of Health and Sanitation	2
8.	Directorate of Criminal Investigations	2
9.	County Government of Kisumu	1
10.	Kaimosi University College	1
11.	Kenya Industrial Property Institute	1
12.	Wajir Community Radio	1
13.	Kenya National Highways Authority	1
14.	State Department for Co-operatives	1
15.	National Government Constituencies Development Fund (NGCDF)	1
16.	Kenya Revenue Authority	1
17.	Chuka University	1
	Total number of respondents	39

Engagement 2 attracted 39 responses from Kenya out of a registered total of 98, giving a response rate of 40 per cent. Engagement 4 received 23 responses from Kenya, giving a response rate of 24 per cent. When we apply the parameters for determining the statistical level of confidence in our results, as outlined in Section 4.2.3 above, we derive the levels as presented in Table 11.6.

For Engagement 2, this provides a confidence level of 80 per cent that the real value is within ± 8 per cent of the measured/surveyed value of the responses. Given the small number of registrants, the inference has been limited to the registered population, rather than the wider population of public sector stakeholders. The Engagement 4 response rate provides a lower confidence level of 70 per cent, with a wider margin of error.

Table 11.4. Engagement 4 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	81	88	169	48	52	100
Eswatini	43	30	73	59	41	100
Ghana	2	9	11	18	82	100
Kenya	8	15	23	35	65	100
Sierra Leone	17	30	47	36	64	100
The Gambia	4	15	19	21	79	100
Grand Total	155	187	342	45	55	100

Table 11.5. Engagement 4 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company	6
2.	County Government of Kisumu	2
3.	Public Sector Accounting Standards Board	2
4.	Embu County Health Department	1
5.	Kaimosi University College	1
6.	Kenya Industrial Property Institute	1
7.	Kenya Railways	1
8.	National Treasury	1
9.	Thika Water and Sewerage Co. Ltd	1
10.	Ministry of East African Community and Regional Development	1
11.	State Department for Co-operatives	1
12.	Sports Kenya	1
13.	Kenya Revenue Authority	1
14.	Kenya National Highways Authority	1
15.	Directorate of Criminal investigations	1
16.	Chuka University	1
	Total number of respondents	23

Table 11.6. Statistical sample sizes and related levels of confidence in the results obtained for the large-scale survey

Kenya respondent population	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
Ref	Custom	Custom
Confidence Level	80%	70%
Margin of Error	8%	10%
Population Proportion	50%	50%
Population Size	98	98
Actual Sample Size	39	23

Kenya's low response rate means that the survey inferences must be seen as 'indicative' and not 'definitive', given the relatively low statistical levels of confidence relative to, for example, those of Botswana.

11.3 ToC proposition: adequate human competences are the 'base camp' for successful public sector ERM

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 11.7.

The responses to these questions are examined individually for their relevance to the adequacy

Table 11.7. Survey questions mapped to the human competence proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*
2	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*, Q4.9*, Q4.10*, Q4.13*
3	N/A	N/A

Figure 11.2. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?)




Figure 11.3. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 by job description





Figure 11.4. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?)



of human competences in the Kenya context, with a collective synthesis at the end. The survey questions with an asterisk * are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

Q2.1 addressed the comprehension of a short foundational article on ERM by the researcher (Jones 2020a) that was enriched with illustrative secondary videos. It was delivered as Engagement 1 and was intended as a sound introduction to ERM for the layperson, as well as a refresher for the experienced. Given the highly accessible language and style, its comprehension was seen as a fair indicator of a reader's readiness for an ERM journey.

Weak comprehension would indicate a reader that may have significant challenges in the development and/or operation of an ERM system. All countries had average scores in the highest quintile, which provides a generally favourable outlook on the basic competences of the respondents in all countries. With a six-country average of 4.4, Kenya's average was 4.5. The female average for Kenya was 4.4 and the male average was slightly more optimistic at 4.6 – see Figure 11.6.

Within Kenya, there was a wider range of ratings, with general staff providing a modest 3.9. All other categories of staff exceeded the average, with the most optimism expressed with a 'perfect' 5

Figure 11.5. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 by job description





Figure 11.6. Question 2.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?) Rating by Gender



by technical heads. This suggests a reasonably firm level of comprehension and an adequate foundation for the delivery of an ERM system in Kenya.

This Engagement 4 Question 4.1 had the same objective as Question 2.1. It addressed the comprehension of reading and viewing material delivered as Engagement 3. This included an article on corporate governance by the researcher (Jones 2020b), a third-party video on the effective use of ERM by the British Cabinet during the First World War (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011), and a proprietary video by the researcher’s firm on the experience of corporate Africa during COVID-19 (GovernanceQualityRatings.com 2021). At an average 4.3 on a 5-point scale, the average score for all countries was lower than the average 4.4 for Question 2.1. This probably reflects the more demanding content of this engagement, but still leaves the average in the top quintile. Kenya’s rating was 4.5.

Within Kenya, general staff self-rated at 3.7. Other respondent groups remained in the top scale, with technical heads dropping from perfection (5.0) to 4.0. There were self-ratings of 4.7 occupied by other management and senior management.

In conclusion, the effective implementation of ERM must be complemented by strong human capacity of key stakeholders. The evidence, subject to the low sample size, suggests a reasonable foundation for Kenya to build upon.

**11.4 ToC proposition:
organisational and societal
trust within an enabling culture
is ‘mission critical’ for ERM**

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 11.8.

Table 11.8. Survey questions mapped to the trust and enabling culture proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.2, Q2.4*, Q2.5*	Q4.2, Q4.3*, Q4.4*, Q4.5, Q4.7*, Q4.8*, Q4.11*, Q4.12*, Q4.13**, Q4.14**, Q4.19*
2	N/A	N/A
3	N/A	N/A

The survey questions with a double asterisk ** are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

The questions marked with a single asterisk * are intended to provide a measure of the sociological concept of anomie within the group of respondents. Anomie, in societies or individuals, has been described as a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020a). The concept was introduced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. When a social system is in a state of anomie, common values and common meanings are no longer understood or accepted, while new values and meanings have not developed. According to Durkheim, such a society produces, in many of its members, psychological states characterised by a sense of futility, lack of purpose, and emotional emptiness and despair. Anomie can be used as

a proxy for the alienation of an individual from his or her organisation and/or society, as it has been used by this researcher (Jones 2012). It has been introduced to this study as high levels of alienation or anomie are evidently inconsistent with the conditions of trust and enabling culture that is required by an effective ERM system.

The anomie measures are nine in number, two of which were utilised in Engagement 2 and the other seven in Engagement 4. For the purposes of this study, the results will be combined into two composite measures, i.e., Engagement 2 composite (two items) and Engagement 4 composite (seven items).

First, we consider Question 2.2 (Figure 11.7), which is intended to assess the scope for the contribution of ERM to public sector organisational efficiency and productivity. A 'firefighting' culture indicates a reactive set of relationships, which can be improved by the 'proactive' thinking demanded by ERM. It is noteworthy that the six-country average (at 3.4) is markedly lower (bottom of the fourth quintile) relative to the confidence shown in proposition 1, above. At 3.2, Kenya is below the six-country average, with Sierra Leone providing relative optimism at 3.8. Within Kenya (Figure 11.8), central ministries provide a pessimistic rating at 2.6, with LGAs slightly higher at 2.8. SOEs and autonomous departments are relatively bullish – at 3.7 and top-quintile 4.0, respectively. Overall, the insight is mixed, perhaps because of the low sample size. However, it is clear that some room exists in Kenya for public sector ERM to contribute to organisational productivity.

Figure 11.7. Average response to survey Question 2.2 (To what extent is your organisation so engaged in "fire-fighting" that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?)





Figure 11.8. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation

This anomie subset from Engagement 2 reinforces the message from Q2.2. The six-country average, at 3.3, is the same as the Question 2.2 average of 3.3. Kenya just equals this average. The Gambia is the only country that exceeds 3.3, with an average rating of 3.4. Within Kenya, autonomous agencies provide a rating at 3.7 and autonomous departments a pessimistic outcome at 2.5 (Figure 11.10). The low sample size may account for the radical variation in ratings between the autonomous departments and the ceiling. However, it may also be the case that the more optimistic organisations are being managed in a manner that could offer lessons to the others.

The Kenya average for the seven anomie questions of Engagement 4 is, at 3.3, slightly more optimistic than the average (3.2) for the Engagement 2 anomie subset. Kenya is just below Ghana. The Gambia and Sierra Leone, which register

a modest optimism at 3.4. Eswatini provides a modest outcome with 3.2. It is evident that the six countries are tightly clustered in this measure of alienation. Within Kenya, tightly clustered results have central ministries providing relative optimism at 3.7, with autonomous departments delivering relative pessimism at 3.0 (Figure 11.13). Females self-rated at 3.2 while males self-rated at a slightly more optimistic 3.3 (Figure 11.11).

In conclusion, the two sets of anomie responses for Kenya suggests that the successful implementation of public sector ERM must include a conscious element that seeks to address social cynicism and to improve the sense of collective purpose of public sector staff.

The six-country average (roughly 3.6) is broadly consistent with the other questions so far in this proposition. The Kenya data for Question 4.2, at


Figure 11.9. Average response to combined Engagement 2 anomie Qs 2.4 and 2.5

Figure 11.10. Average ratings of combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5 by type of organisation





Figure 11.11. Combined Kenya Engagement 4 anomie by gender



an average of 4.0, is relatively bullish. Within Kenya, results are mainly tightly clustered, with one end of the range provided by LGAs (an optimistic 3.9) and the other end by autonomous departments at 4.3 (Figure 11.15). The low sample size may account

for the difference in ratings from other countries. It may also be the case that the Kenya organisations are being managed in a manner that could offer lessons to their peers in other countries.

In conclusion, Question 4.2, when taken with the other questions in this proposition, broadly reinforces the message that there is some scope for public sector ERM to add to the quality of management and outcomes of public sector entities in Kenya. This is consistent with the data from other countries, which have sample sizes that convey greater statistical confidence.

The six-country average (3.3) is more pessimistic on this Question 4.5 than for Question 4.2 (3.6). The Kenya average (3.7) is lower than that for Question 4.2 (4.0). The broad message may be

Figure 11.12. Average response to combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, Q4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19




Figure 11.13. Average ratings of combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19 by type of organisation




Figure 11.14. Average response to survey Question 4.2 (To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?)






Figure 11.15. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation



that current ERM implementation efforts are focusing too much on 'systems and processes' (for example, development and maintenance of

a risk register) and not adequately on ERM as 'an attitude of mind' that then influences the use of processes to attain agreed risk management goals.

Figure 11.16. Average response to survey Question 4.5 (People: my organisation strives to create a “risk aware” culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?)



Within Kenya, the radical differences persist. This time, central ministries present a modest outcome of 3.0, with autonomous agencies bullish at 4.3. Once again, the low sample size may account for the radical variation. It may also be the case that the optimistic organisations are being managed in a manner that could offer lessons to the others. However, the six-country average and in-country examples suggest that Kenya may have room for improvement.

In conclusion for this ‘trust’ proposition, all questions have mutually reinforcing responses that are broadly consistent with each other. Public sector ERM should invest in building personal and organisational trust in order for the risk management objectives to have a reasonable chance of being attained. There should, perhaps, be an emphasis on risk management as a ‘way of thinking’, rather than the mechanical (and

likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.

11.5 ToC proposition: public sector ERM as a decision support mechanism

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 11.9.

Survey questions with a double asterisk ** have already been examined under earlier ToC propositions with which they overlap. Consequently, this analysis will be limited to those that do not have a double asterisk.

In this final section, we focus on the use of public sector ERM as a means to improve specific types

Figure 11.17. Average rating of survey Question 4.5 by type of organisation




Table 11.9. Survey questions mapped to the decision support proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.3	Q4.2**, Q4.5**, Q4.6, Q4.9, Q4.10, Q4.13, Q4.14, Q4.16, Q4.17, Q4.18
2	N/A	ditto
3	N/A	ditto

of decision-making at the entity level and at the level of the national cabinet as it manages the implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). Considerations include:

- the use of technology as an enabler of timely and efficient management of risk information (Question 4.6);
- the use of risk information to give shape to strategic planning and its subsequent monitoring and evaluation (Question 4.9);
- whether budgetary planning and control is influenced by risk information (Question 4.10);

- the existence of key risk indicators as early warning signals for governance and control (Question 4.13);
- the avoidance of information silos by ensuring vertical and horizontal movement of risk information (Question 4.14);
- the impact of governance practices on the management of enterprise risks (Question 4.16);
- the existence of central co-ordination – at the level of the national cabinet – of NDS-relevant enterprise risks across the entire public sector (Question 4.17); and
- the quality of enterprise risk mitigation in the case of COVID-19 (Question 4.18).

We also examine the status of ERM implementation across the public sector (Question 2.3).

This question, on the status of ERM implementation, was addressed in Engagement 2. Kenya had no entities in the embryonic phases 1 and 2. Forty-five (45) per cent of those in Eswatini, 33 per cent of Botswana and 30 per cent of Sierra Leone are in those stages. The Gambia, Kenya and Ghana had relatively low responses to


Figure 11.18. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 (In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?)

Figure 11.19. Kenya – Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 by type of organisation



Figure 11.20. Average response to survey Question 4.6 (Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technology to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?)






Figure 11.21. Average rating of survey Question 4.6 by type of organisation



Engagement 2, with corresponding low statistical levels of confidence in the data, i.e., the responses may not be fully representative of their public

sectors. Ghana, at 8 per cent, was the country with the most significant proportion in the category of excellence (category 5), with Kenya featuring at 5.1

Figure 11.22. Average response to survey Question 4.9 (Strategy: Internal and External Risks to my organisation’s mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?)



per cent. Within Kenya (Figure 11.19), SOEs claimed the most optimism, with over 5 per cent claiming excellent ERM. The low sample size may make the interpretation for Kenya’s data rather challenging.

The six-country average of technological adoption is quite downbeat at 2.8. Kenya, at 3.1, is above that average, but still at a modest rating. Indeed, only Ghana and Kenya – both with low response rates and correspondingly low levels of statistical confidence – managed to exceed the median of 3, with ratings of 3.1 each. Within Kenya, autonomous departments have a relatively optimistic outcome at 4.0, while LGAs deliver a relatively pessimistic rating of 2.9 (Figure 11.21).

If the optimism of the autonomous department sector is well founded, this would suggest that other Kenya sectors may benefit from learning

from that sector’s successful technology and risk integration practices.

There is clearly a lot of room for improvement of the efficiency of the deployment of risk information systems through the use of information technology.

The use of risk information in the development and implementation of strategy is arguably the most important deployment of ERM. It is central to the defined purpose of ERM, as examined in Section 2.2 of Part 1. At barely 3, the six-country average is bordering on pessimistic territory. Sierra Leone claims the most confidence on the integration of risk and strategy, at a middling 3.3. Kenya (3.1) joins Ghana and Sierra Leone to lie above the six-country average. The low sample size must be kept in mind for Kenya.

Figure 11.23. Average rating of survey Question 4.9 by type of organisation





Figure 11.24. Average response to survey Question 4.10 (Budget. Our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?)



Within Kenya, the radical differences continue. LGAs are pessimistic at the end of the range, with 2.6, while autonomous departments are mildly optimistic at the other end of the range, with 3.7 (Figure 11.23).

Given the importance of this integration to the objective of risk management, this appears to offer significant scope for improvement, especially given the variations within Kenya. Further, the tools to secure this improvement are not overly demanding. Thus, this may offer a 'low hanging fruit' for future interventions to demonstrate the value of ERM and risk thinking.

Budgetary control, within a well-defined strategy, is arguably the second most important use of public sector ERM for decision-making and control. It is of particular interest to the Commonwealth Secretariat, given the specialist interest of its

commissioning unit for this study in public financial management (PFM). The six-country average is, at 3.2, just above the median rating of 3.0, indicating a relatively low level of confidence among respondents in the integration of risk and budgetary control within PFM. At 3.3, the Kenya average joins Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia just above the six-country average. Eswatini and Botswana are relatively pessimistic, as is Botswana at 2.9.

Within Kenya, central ministries provide a relatively optimistic outcome of 3.8, with LGAs again providing the other end of the range, this time at 2.7 (Figure 11.25). Other entities are clustered above the median of 3.0.

Overall, this indicates significant scope for improving Kenya PFM by the effective integration of risk thinking into PFM. This, as with strategy, may also be a 'low hanging fruit', as the supportive tools

Figure 11.25. Average rating of survey Question 4.10 by type of organisation





Figure 11.26. Average response to survey Question 4.13 (Performance using Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs): KPIs are "lagging indicators" that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be "leading indicators" that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?)



are not too demanding. However, in both contexts, the picking of such fruit will demand the prior embrace of risk thinking within a risk-aware culture.

If the mild optimism of the central ministry sector is well founded, this would suggest that other sectors may benefit from learning from its successful budgetary control practices in Kenya.

Key risk indicators (KRIs) are a productive tool of risk thinking that exists within a risk-aware culture. They are an early warning of future performance challenges and thus are an important trigger of proactive public sector ERM. The article on corporate governance within Engagement 3 is a classic illustration of the use of KRIs to guide top-level decision-making and control. KRIs usually perform best when they identify broad principles and behavioural phenomena at the individual and group levels. Consequently, their effective use tends to demand higher individual cognitive and teamwork skills, within a suitably trusting context. The capable deployment of KRIs is arguably the

most demanding element of ERM and may be the feature of a highest performing team cultures and entities.

Given this expectation, it is not surprising that the six-country average is among the lowest of the research, at 2.8, with the Kenya average, at 3.2, providing relative optimism. It is worth recalling that three countries – Ghana, Kenya and The Gambia – have small sample sizes, with consequently lower confidence in the representativeness of their outcomes. However, all countries are fairly tightly clustered, suggesting that the data for the low sample sizes may be reflective of a wider reality in those countries.

Within Kenya, LGAs again provide relative pessimism, with 2.7 (Figure 11.27). Autonomous departments record a top-quintile optimism of 4.0. If the optimism of the autonomous department sector is well founded, this would suggest that other sectors may benefit from learning from its successful KRI practices in Kenya.

Figure 11.27. Average rating of survey Question 4.13 by type of organisation





Figure 11.28. Average response to survey Question 4.14 (Two-way information street: Rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders who perform vital management and program functions. This allows for better departmental decision making. Question: To what extent is information for decision making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?)



The deterrence of information silos is also easier said than done. Like KRIs, it demands pervasive risk thinking within a risk aware entity culture. At 3, the six-country average is not far from the downbeat territory as the rating of KRIs. Kenya again provides relative optimism at 3.4. The low sample size of Kenya nonetheless remains a caution. Within Kenya (Figure 11.29), entity groups are tightly clustered with one end of the range at 3.2 from Central government ministries and the other end of the range of 3.7 from autonomous agencies and SOEs. In general, successful ERM is not feasible where there are barriers to the efficient and timely flow of information to those parties who need to know

and act upon such information. It is clear that there is scope for material improvement in Kenya.

With Sierra Leone rating the highest – at 3.4 – this measure seeks to indicate the impact of top governance on the management of risks and opportunities; that is, whether the top governance style amplifies or absorbs risks. The range of country ratings, with the six-country average of about 3.1 and the Kenya rating of 3.0, indicates a generally pessimistic outlook – with scope for much improvement. As with KRIs and risk silos, top governance risks are possibly among the more demanding elements to manage in public sector ERM. This is especially the case as appointments, elevations and removals of senior governance

Figure 11.29. Average rating of survey Question 4.14 by type of organisation





Figure 11.30. Average response to survey Question 4.16 (Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?)



will have political influence that may not always be aligned to the best interests of the individual entity or the public. Consequently, governance risks typically involve a constellation of factors, including: (a) those that are internal to a particular public sector entity; and (b) factors outside that entity’s control that are determined by administrative and/or political superiors within central government. Governance risks may be the most difficult element of a public sector ERM to manage and possibly the ones with the greatest potential impact on the entity.

Within Kenya, autonomous agencies provide relative optimism, with a self-rating of 4.0. Central ministries provide relative pessimism at 2.3. SOEs self-rated themselves at 3.2. If the optimism of the autonomous agency sector is well founded, this would suggest that other Kenya sectors may benefit from learning from its successful senior governance practices. The low sample size for Kenya remains a caution.

A vital part of a public sector ERM is the use of relevant risk and opportunity information from all component entities to inform the decision-making of the national cabinet on decision-making and control of the development and implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). This question sought to evaluate the extent to which the participants are aware of the need to integrate ERM and the NDS in the participating countries.

At barely 3, the Kenya average is just above the six-country average of 2.8 – into territory that indicates significant room for improvement in this essential element of public sector ERM. This perception may be influenced by the access of respondents to relevant information about links with the NDS. However, effective PS-ERM requires that such information silos (if present) are avoided. This elimination of silos provides for easier identification and reporting of related risks. It likely belongs to the cluster of risk delivery elements that demand risk

Figure 11.31. Average rating of survey Question 4.16 by type of organisation




Figure 11.32. Average response to survey Question 4.17 (Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/Local government that are RELEVANT to its decision making?)




Figure 11.33. Average rating of survey Question 4.17 by type of organisation






Figure 11.34. Average response to survey Question 4.18 (Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?)



thinking in a pervasive risk-aware culture. It keeps company with KRIs, risk silos and governance risks. Within Kenya, autonomous departments provide modest optimism with 3.3 and Local Government Authorities a tightly clustered relative pessimism

at 2.7 (Figure 11.33). For the public sector, ERM cannot end at the doorsteps of individual entities; it must provide for relevant and timely transmission of risk information to the national cabinet to guide decisions on the NDS.

Figure 11.35. Average rating of survey Question 4.18 by type of organisation



'The proof of the pudding is in the eating'. The ultimate test of any public sector ERM system is its response 'under fire'. At a six-country average of 2.1, this Question 4.18 COVID-19 response evaluation is the weakest rating of the survey series. Only Ghana (at 2.5, but with a relatively low sample size) and Sierra Leone broke a new 'barrier' of 2.0 of hyper-pessimism. Perhaps the Sierra Leone average of 3.0, barely making the median rating, reflects the recent experience of the Ebola epidemic, which probably left the country with more


experience to respond relatively better than its peers. Kenya recorded relative pessimism at 1.7.

Within Kenya, autonomous departments were pessimistic, at 2.0. LGAs, at 1.6, were yet more pessimistic (Figure 11.35).

This measure is broadly consistent with the other findings of this research, which indicate much scope for improvement of the contribution of public sector ERM to sustainable attainment of National Development Strategies.

The Executive Highlights on page 152 suggests an overall conclusion on the findings of this Large-scale Survey research for Kenya.

12. Large-scale Survey: Sierra Leone



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Executive Highlights: Sierra Leone

Sample Size

The Engagement 4 sample size for Sierra Leone was a bit low, which limited the level of statistical confidence that could be obtained. But, the overall outcomes for Sierra Leone were roughly similar to other countries which had robust sample sizes. The Engagement 2 sample size was adequate. Consequently, we can draw some useful insights from the research for Sierra Leone.

Three Propositions of the Theory of Change

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 4 on the Study Methodology, three Propositions were advanced of 'good habits' that will be essential to a well-functioning Public Sector Enterprise Risk Management (PS-ERM) system. The implications of the perceptions of Sierra Leone respondents for these propositions are summarised in the table below.

Theory of Change Proposition	Indicative Research Conclusion
Adequate human competences are the base camp for successful PS-ERM	Responses suggest a fair base of foundational comprehension to support the implementation of PS-ERM in Sierra Leone. As with other countries, it is essential that human capital must be systematically sustained and upgraded if PS-ERM in Sierra Leone is to move up the broadly accepted scales of ERM maturity and usefulness.
Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for PS-ERM	The perceptions of respondents tended to be among the most positive of the six countries. However, the broad territory of all country responses suggest significant room for improvement. So, PS-ERM for Sierra Leone will probably require significant investment in building levels of personal and organisational trust. ERM cannot thrive in conditions of pervasive mistrust and alienation. Also, as with other countries, there may be a need for greater emphasis on risk management as a 'way of thinking', rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.
PS-ERM should be a connected decision support mechanism for sub-entity (MDAs/SOEs/LGAs) strategy and for the national cabinet's direction of the national development strategy	This proposition is the ultimate purpose and value of a PS-ERM system. It is the "end" in Stephen Covey's Habit 2 of <i>Highly Effective People</i> : "Begin with the End in Mind". Sierra Leone respondents suggest that there are material shortcomings in the progress towards this goal. Some sectors make claims of relative sophistication and may provide useful role models for others within Sierra Leone.

Current Status of PS-ERM in Sierra Leone and its position among the Six Countries


Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 7. It described the large scale survey (LSS) that was one of two primary sources of field evidence for this research was described. Of the twenty-three (23) LSS questions, four (4) survey questions have

been identified as providing reliable insight into the perceptions of respondents in Sierra Leone of the status of PS-ERM in their country at the time of the research in 2021. One (1) question was from Engagement 2 and three (3) were from Engagement 4. The table below also includes a reference to the Figure (chart) that illustrates the data within this chapter on Sierra Leone.

Question #	Figure #	Description	Short reference
2.2	12.7	To what extent is your organisation so engaged in "fire-fighting" that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	Firefighting
4.16	12.30	Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?	Top Governance
4.17	12.32	Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities	NDS (National Development Strategy)
4.18	12.34	Consider the video that you watched on COVID 19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	COVID

Respondents were asked to rate each question from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating an extremely negative view; and 5 suggesting an extremely positive satisfaction. The median value is 3, which territory

would suggest a relatively neutral view, indicating that the outcome can be good or bad, depending on future circumstances.



For each of the four questions, the Sierra Leone outcome was expressed as (a) a percentage of the average for all countries and (b) a percentage of the median. A fair outcome would be above the average for all countries and above the median i.e. above 100% for both measures.

Percentage of the average of all countries

The COVID measure was 45% higher than the six-country average – a major difference and indicating significantly more confidence than Sierra Leone's peers. This was probably due to its hard-won

experience in fighting the Ebola epidemic. The other three measures were a little above the six-country average. Overall ("average of averages"), Sierra Leone respondents are a bit more optimistic about their PS-ERM than their peers.

Percentage of the median score

All of the four measures are at or a bit above the median, providing limited satisfaction and suggesting significant scope for growth. The fire-fighting measure lies notably (25%) above the median with the other three much closer

to the median. Indeed, the COVID rating equals the median. As with the other countries, this suggests an important need for improvements in contingency planning and disaster preparedness, despite the relative optimism in comparison to Sierra Leone's peers. The combined rating ("average of averages") is a little above the median.

In general, the perceptions of respondents suggest that there was major scope for improvement in the status of PS-ERM in Sierra Leone at the point of the field research.

12.1 Participation Information and survey questions

12.1.1 Introduction

The large-scale survey (LSS), which forms the subject of this chapter, is described in Section 4.2 (Part 1). This chapter provides demographic information on the participation of Sierra Leone in the LSS research. The research was delivered via five 'engagements', as outlined in Section 4.2. This chapter analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 1, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. It further analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 3, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 4 questionnaire.

Table 12.1 shows the total number of individuals from Sierra Leone who registered to participate in this research. Sierra Leone contributed thirty-two (32) per cent of registrants. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, the proportion of respondents who considered that their entity does not have an ERM system in place or in progress, was 51 per cent. The six-country average was 40 per cent stating 'No'. Just over one-third of respondents (35%) provided a definitive confirmation ('Yes') of the existence of an ERM in their entity, compared to the six-country average of 46 per cent.

The actual number and characteristics of the respondents to the Engagements 2 and 4 questionnaires are shown in Sections 12.1.2 and 12.1.3, below.

12.1.2 Participation information for the Engagement 2 research questionnaire

There were 114 respondents to the Engagement 2 questionnaire from Sierra Leone, i.e., a response rate of 24 per cent of the registered total of 477 persons. Females made up the minority of contributors at 29 per cent, with male respondents at 71 per cent. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 45 participating organisations from Sierra Leone to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. Nearly half (48 of the total 114 respondents/42%) were from five entities:

- Ministry of Finance (17 respondents/15%);
- National Social Security and Insurance Trust (NASSIT) (11 respondents/10%);

Figure 12.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?




Table 12.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?

#	Country	Do not know	No	Yes	Grand total	Grand total (%)	Do not know (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	Grand total (%)
1	Botswana	71	160	298	529	36	13	30	56	100
2	Eswatini	44	128	67	239	16	18	54	28	100
3	Ghana	13	12	30	55	3	24	22	55	100
4	Kenya	6	24	68	98	7	6	24	69	100
5	Sierra Leone	69	241	167	477	32	14	51	35	100
6	The Gambia	3	34	52	89	6	3	38	58	100
	Grand Total	206	599	682	1487	100	14	40	46	100

Table 12.2. Engagement 2 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	127	129	256	50	50	100
Eswatini	69	46	115	60	40	100
Ghana	7	18	25	28	72	100
Kenya	17	22	39	44	56	100
Sierra Leone	33	81	114	29	71	100
The Gambia	7	22	29	24	76	100
Grand Total	260	318	578	45	55	100

Table 12.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Ministry of Finance – Sierra Leone	17
2.	National Social Security and Insurance Trust (NASSIT)	11
3.	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development	10
4.	National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA)	5
5.	Sierra Leone Maritime Administration	5
6.	Rokel Commercial Bank SL Ltd	4
7.	Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO)	4
8.	Koidu New Sembehun City Council	3
9.	Kono District Council	3
10.	Port Loko City Council	3
11.	Office of the President	3
12.	Sierra Leone Correctional Service	3
13.	Falaba District Council	2
14.	Freetown City Council	2
15.	Ministry of Labour and Social Security	2
16.	Human Resource Management Office	2
17.	Accountant General's Department (but currently posted to the Sierra Leone Meteorological Agency)	2
18.	Public Sector Reform Unit	2
19.	Ministry of Technical and Higher Education	2
20.	Ministry of Defence	2
21.	University of Sierra Leone	2
22.	Sierra Leone Electricity and Water Regulatory Commission	2
23.	Audit Service Sierra Leone	1
24.	Bonthe District Council	1

(Continued)

Table 12.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
25.	Fiscal Decentralisation Division	1
26.	Kambia District Council	1
27.	Local council	1
28.	Public Financial Management Reform Unit	1
29.	Ministry of Information and Communications	1
30.	Government of Sierra Leone	1
31.	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces	1
32.	Sierra Leone Water Company	1
33.	Office of the Vice President	1
34.	Embassy and Permanent Representation of Sierra Leone	1
35.	Ministry of Planning and Economic Development	1
36.	INTEGEMS Limited	1
37.	Accountant General's Department	1
38.	Sierra Leone Postal Services Limited (SALPOST)	1
39.	Petroleum Directorate Sierra Leone	1
40.	Ministry of Youth Affairs	1
41.	Tertiary Education Commission	1
42.	National Tourist Board of Sierra Leone	1
43.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of The Republic of Sierra Leone	1
44.	National Minerals Agency	1
45.	National Revenue Authority	1
	Total number of respondents	114

- Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (10 respondents/9%);
- National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) (5 respondents/4%); and
- Sierra Leone Maritime Administration (5 respondents/4%).

12.1.3 Participation information for the Engagement 4 research questionnaire

There were 47 respondents to the Engagement 4 questionnaire from Sierra Leone, i.e., a response rate of 10 per cent of the registered total of 477 persons. Females made up 36 per cent, while males were 64 per cent of the respondents from Sierra Leone. The number of respondents is lower than for Engagement 2 (114 respondents) and

the proportion of males is a bit lower than it was in Engagement 2. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 25 participating organisations from Sierra Leone to the Engagement 4 questionnaire (45 for Engagement 2). Just over half (24 of the total 47 respondents/51%) were from five entities:

- Ministry of Finance (9 respondents/19%);
- National Social Security and Insurance Trust (NASSIT) (5 respondents/11%);
- Sierra Leone Maritime Administration (4 respondents/9%);

Table 12.4. Engagement 4 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	81	88	169	48	52	100
Eswatini	43	30	73	59	41	100
Ghana	2	9	11	18	82	100
Kenya	8	15	23	35	65	100
Sierra Leone	17	30	47	36	64	100
The Gambia	4	15	19	21	79	100
Grand Total	155	187	342	45	55	100

Table 12.5. Engagement 4 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Ministry of Finance, Sierra Leone	9
2.	National Social Security and Insurance Trust (NASSIT)	5
3.	Sierra Leone Maritime Administration	4
4.	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development	3
5.	Sierra Leone Correctional Service	3
6.	Kono District Council	2
7.	Port Loko City Council	2
8.	Office of the President	2
9.	Audit Service Sierra Leone	1
10.	Ministry of Defence	1
11.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation	1
12.	Ministry of Defense	1
13.	Ministry of Technical and Higher Education	1
14.	Sierra Leone Water Company	1
15.	Human Resource Management Office	1
16.	Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO)	1
17.	Freetown City Council	1
18.	Ministry of Youth Affairs	1
19.	Sierra Leone Electricity and Water Regulatory Commission	1
20.	National Tourist Board of Sierra Leone	1
21.	National Revenue Authority	1
22.	Petroleum Directorate	1
23.	Accountant General's Department	1
24.	University of Sierra Leone	1
25.	Rokel Commercial Bank Sierra Leone Limited	1
	Total number of respondents	47

- Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (3 respondents/6%); and
- Sierra Leone Correctional Service (3 respondents/6%).

The top four contributing organisations for Engagement 4 featured in the top five for Engagement 2.

12.1.4 List of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

See Section 8.1.4, Table 8.6 for the list of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

12.2 Sample size for Sierra Leone Engagements 2 and 4 and the level of statistical confidence

Rated questions were scored from 1 to 5, with a lower score representing an unfavourable risk to an ERM implementation and a higher score indicating a positive risk or opportunity.

Engagement 2 attracted 114 responses from Sierra Leone out of a registered total of 493, giving a relatively low response rate of 23 per cent; this was significantly less than the highest response rate of 50 per cent. Engagement 4 received 47 responses from Sierra Leone, giving a response

rate of 10 per cent. When we apply the parameters for determining the statistical levels of confidence in our results as outlined in section 4.2.3 above, we derive the levels as presented in Table 12.6.

For Engagement 2, this provides a confidence level of 95 per cent that the real value is within ± 10 per cent of the measured/surveyed value of the responses. The Engagement 4 response rate provides a lower confidence level of 80 per cent, with the same margin of error.

12.3 ToC proposition: adequate human competences are the 'base camp' for successful public sector ERM

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 12.7.

The responses to these questions are examined individually for their relevance to the adequacy of human competences in the Sierra Leone context, with a collective synthesis at the end. The survey questions with an asterisk * are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

Question 2.1 addressed the comprehension of a short foundational article on ERM by the researcher (Jones 2020a) that was enriched with illustrative secondary videos. It was delivered as Engagement 1 and was intended as a sound introduction to ERM for the layperson, as well as a refresher for the experienced. Given the highly accessible language and style, its comprehension was seen as a fair indicator of a reader's readiness for an ERM journey.


Table 12.6. Statistical sample sizes and related levels of confidence in the results obtained for the large-scale survey

Sierra Leone respondent population	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
Ref	E	G
Confidence Level	95%	80%
Margin of Error	10%	10%
Population Proportion	50%	50%
Population Size	Unlimited	Unlimited
Actual Sample Size	114	47

Table 12.7. Survey questions mapped to the human competence proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*
2	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*, Q4.9*, Q4.10*, Q4.13*
3	N/A	N/A

Figure 12.2. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?)



Weak comprehension would indicate a reader that may have significant challenges in the development and/or operation of an ERM system. All countries had average scores in the highest quintile, which provides a generally favourable outlook on the basic competences of the respondents in all countries. With a six-country average of 4.4, Sierra Leone's average equalled the six-country average, with Kenya just exceeding this at 4.5. The results were all tightly clustered. The female average for Sierra Leone was 4.5, with the male average slightly less optimistic at 4.4 – see Figure 12.6.

Within Sierra Leone, the results were fairly spread (Figure 12.3), indicating significant differences in competences. Central government ministers provided one end of the range, at a modest 3.0, with local government executives self-rating at 3.8. All other roles rated their comprehension within the top quintile (4 and above), with the most significant optimism provided by administrative heads of central government who scored themselves a 'perfect' 5. This is notable, as it suggests important capacity gaps in important positions that must be addressed prior to the implementation of ERM for the public sector.

This Engagement 4 Question 4.1 had the same objective as Question 2.1. It addressed the comprehension of reading and viewing material delivered as Engagement 3. This included an article on corporate governance by the researcher (Jones 2020b), a third-party video on the effective use of ERM by the British Cabinet during the First World War (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011), and a proprietary video by the researcher's firm on the experience of corporate Africa during COVID-19 (GovernanceQualityRatings.com 2021). At an average 4.3 on a 5-point scale, the average score for all countries was lower than the average 4.4 for Question 2.1. This probably reflects the more demanding content of this engagement, but still leaves the average in the top quintile. Sierra Leone had a rating of 4.4. All countries had ratings within the top quintile.

Within Sierra Leone (Figure 12.5), there was again a wide range of ratings among job positions. Ministers of central government provided one end of the range at 3.5, whereas local government executives move from relative pessimism in Question 2.1 to providing the other end of the range (5.0) in this more demanding engagement. All other role groups

Figure 12.3. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 by job description




Figure 12.4. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?)




Figure 12.5. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 by job description





Figure 12.6. Question 2.1 rating by gender



have averages in the top quintile (≥ 4), which is consistent with their performance in Question 2.1.

In conclusion, the effective implementation of ERM must be complemented by an investment in reinforcing the human capacity of key stakeholders.

12.4 ToC proposition: organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for ERM

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions shown in Table 12.8.

The survey questions with a double asterisk ** are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

The questions marked with a single asterisk * are intended to provide a measure of the sociological concept of anomie within the group of respondents. Anomie, in societies or individuals, has been described as a condition of instability resulting from

Table 12.8. Survey questions mapped to the trust and enabling culture proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.2, Q2.4*, Q2.5*	Q4.2, Q4.3*, Q4.4*, Q4.5, Q4.7*, Q4.8*, Q4.11*, Q4.12*, Q4.13**, Q4.14**, Q4.19*
2	N/A	N/A
3	N/A	N/A

a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020a). The concept was introduced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. When a social system is in a state of anomie, common values and common meanings are no longer understood or accepted, while new values and meanings have not developed. According to Durkheim, such a society produces, in many of its members, psychological states characterised by a sense of futility, lack of purpose, and emotional emptiness and despair. Anomie can be used as a proxy for the alienation of an individual from his or her organisation and/or society, as it has been used by this researcher (Jones 2012). It has been introduced to this study as high levels of alienation or anomie are evidently inconsistent with the conditions of trust and enabling culture that is required by an effective ERM system.

The anomie measures are nine in number, two of which were utilised in Engagement 2 and the other seven in Engagement 4. For the purposes of this study, the results will be combined into two composite measures, i.e. Engagement 2 composite

(two items) and Engagement 4 composite (seven items).

First, we consider Question 2.1 (Figure 12.7), which is intended to assess the scope for the contribution of ERM to public sector organisational efficiency and productivity. A 'firefighting' culture indicates a reactive set of relationships, which can be improved by the 'proactive' thinking demanded by ERM. It is noteworthy that the six-country average (at 3.4) is markedly lower (bottom of the fourth quintile) relative to the confidence shown in proposition 1 above. At 3.8, Sierra Leone lies above the six-country average. Within Sierra Leone, the entity ratings are broadly spread around the country average (Figure 12.8), with central government ministries and local government authorities providing relatively positive 4.0 and 4.1, respectively. Autonomous agencies delivered a more modest rating of 3.2. Overall, the insight suggests room for public sector ERM to contribute to organisational productivity in Sierra Leone. If the confidence indicated by LGAs and central government ministries is well founded, then they may have lessons for the other sectors in the design of effective team cultures.

This anomie subset from Engagement 2 reinforces the general message from Question 2.2. The six-country average, at 3.3, is slightly lower than the Question 2.2 average of 3.4. Sierra Leone provides the floor in this indicator of social and organisational alienation, with a rating of 3. The Gambia is the only country that exceeds 3.3, with an average rating of 3.4. Within Sierra Leone, the entity groups are tightly clustered around the mean (Figure 12.10), with central government ministries providing relative pessimism at 2.8 and local government authorities at the other end of the range, with 3.4.

Figure 12.7. Average response to survey Question 2.2 (To what extent is your organisation so engaged in "fire-fighting" that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?)




Figure 12.8. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation




Figure 12.9. Average response to combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5





Figure 12.10. Sierra Leone – Average ratings of combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5 by type of organisation



The Sierra Leone average for the seven anomie questions of Engagement 4 is, at 3.4, relatively positive for this measure. It is slightly above the six-country average of 3.3. Within Sierra Leone, local government entities provide one end of the range at a relatively optimistic 3.8 and central government ministries give the other end of the range at 3.3 (Figure 12.12). Females self-rated at 3.2, while males self-rated at a slightly more optimistic 3.6 (Figure 12.13).

In conclusion, the two sets of anomie responses for Sierra Leone suggest that the successful implementation of public sector ERM must include a conscious element that seeks to address social cynicism and to improve the sense of collective purpose of public sector staff.

The six-country average (roughly 3.6) is broadly consistent with the other questions so far in this proposition. The Sierra Leone average (an

Figure 12.11. Average response to combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19




Figure 12.12. Average ratings of combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19 by type of organisation





Figure 12.13. Combined Sierra Leone Engagement 4 anomie by gender



optimistic 3.9) is above the six-country average. Within Sierra Leone, a high minimum (above the six-country average) is provided by autonomous departments at 3.7 (Figure 12.15), while the other end of the range is provided by local government authorities at 4.6. The low sample size may account for the difference in ratings from other countries. However, it may also be the case that the Sierra Leone organisations are being managed in a manner that could offer lessons to their peers in other countries.

In conclusion, Question 4.2, on a six-country basis, reinforces the message that there is scope for public sector ERM to add to the quality of management and outcomes of all types of public sector entities.

The six-country average (3.3) and the Sierra Leone average (3.4) are both more pessimistic on Question 4.5 relative to Question 4.2. This suggests that current ERM implementation efforts maybe focusing too much on 'systems and processes' (for example, development and maintenance of a risk register) and not adequately on ERM as 'an attitude of mind' that then influences the use of processes to attain agreed risk management goals. Sierra Leone again exceeds the six-country average. Within Sierra Leone (Figure 12.17), central ministries provide one end of the range, with a relatively pessimistic 3.2. SOEs are robustly optimistic at the other end of the range, with a self-rating of 4.1. If the confidence indicated by SOEs is well founded, then they may have lessons for the other sectors in the building of effective risk-aware cultures. The low sample size for Engagement 4 responses from Sierra Leone remains a caution.

Figure 12.14. Average response to survey Question 4.2 (To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?)




Figure 12.15. Average rating of survey Question 4.2 by type of organisation






Figure 12.16. Average response to survey Question 4.5 (People: my organisation strives to create a “risk aware” culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?)



In conclusion for this ‘trust’ proposition, on a six-country basis, all questions have mutually reinforcing responses that are broadly consistent with each other. Public sector ERM should invest in

building personal and organisational trust in order for the risk management objectives to have a reasonable chance of being attained. There should, perhaps, be an emphasis on risk management

Figure 12.17. Average rating of survey Question 4.5 by type of organisation

as a 'way of thinking', rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.

12.5 ToC proposition: public sector ERM as a decision support mechanism

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7. This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions shown in Table 12.9.

Survey questions with a double asterisk ** have already been examined under earlier ToC propositions with which they overlap. Consequently, this analysis will be limited to those that do not have a double asterisk.

In this final section, we focus on the use of public sector ERM as a means to improve specific types of decision-making at the entity level and at the

level of the national cabinet as it manages the implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). Considerations include:

- the use of technology as an enabler of timely and efficient management of risk information (Question 4.6);
- the use of risk information to give shape to strategic planning and its subsequent monitoring and evaluation (Question 4.9);
- whether budgetary planning and control is influenced by risk information (Question 4.10);
- the existence of key risk indicators as early warning signals for governance and control (Question 4.13);
- the avoidance of information silos by ensuring vertical and horizontal movement of risk information (Question 4.14);
- the impact of governance practices on the management of enterprise risks (Question 4.16);
- the existence of central co-ordination – at the level of the national cabinet – of NDS-relevant enterprise risks across the entire public sector (Question 4.17); and
- the quality of enterprise risk mitigation in the case of COVID-19 (Question 4.18).


We also examine the status of ERM implementation across the public sector (Question 2.3).

Question 2.3, on the status of ERM implementation, was addressed in Engagement 2.

Table 12.9. Survey questions mapped to the decision support proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.3	Q4.2**, Q4.5**, Q4.6, Q4.9, Q4.10, Q4.13, Q4.14, Q4.16, Q4.17, Q4.18
2	N/A	ditto
3	N/A	ditto

Figure 12.18. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 (In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?)



Thirty (30) per cent of Sierra Leone respondents identified their ERM as being in the embryonic phases 1 and 2, relative to 45 per cent of Eswatini respondents and 33 per cent of Botswana respondents. The Gambia, Kenya and Ghana had relatively low responses to Engagement 2, with corresponding low statistical levels of confidence in the data; i.e., these responses may not be fully representative of their public sectors. Within Sierra Leone, autonomous agencies were the

most advanced, with the least responses in this elementary bracket (Figure 12.19). Five (5) per cent of Sierra Leone respondents claimed excellence (stage 5) with autonomous departments and central ministries being the source of those claims. Ghana, at 8 per cent, was the country with the highest claim of excellence.

The six-country average of technological adoption is quite downbeat at 2.8. Sierra Leone, matches that average, but remains below the median of

Figure 12.19. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 by type of organisation





Figure 12.20. Average response to survey Question 4.6 (Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technology to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?)



3.0. Indeed, only Ghana and Kenya – both with low response rates and correspondingly low levels of statistical confidence – managed to exceed the median of 3.0 (each), with ratings of 3.1. Within Sierra Leone, SOEs provide one end of the range with 2.3, with the other end of the range provided by autonomous departments at 3.2 (Figure 12.21).

There is clearly a lot of room for improvement of the efficiency of the deployment of risk information systems through the use of information technology.

The use of risk information in the development and implementation of strategy is arguably the most important deployment of ERM. It is central to the defined purpose of ERM, as examined in Section 2.2 of Part 1. At 3, the six-country average borders pessimistic territory, below the median.

Sierra Leone claims the most confidence of the integration of risk and strategy, at a middling 3.3.

Within Sierra Leone (Figure 12.23), autonomous departments – at 3.7 – have the greatest claim to integration of risk and strategy. Local government authorities are the least responsive, at 2.4.

Given the importance of this integration to the objective of risk management, this six-country data appears to offer significant scope for improvement. Further, the tools to secure this improvement are not overly demanding. Thus, this may offer a 'low hanging fruit' for future interventions to demonstrate the value of ERM and risk thinking.

Budgetary control, within a well-defined strategy, is arguably the second most important use of public sector ERM for decision-making and control.

Figure 12.21. Average rating of survey Question 4.6 by type of organisation




Figure 12.22. Average response to survey Question 4.9 (Strategy: Internal and External Risks to my organisation's mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?)




Figure 12.23. Average rating of survey Question 4.9 by type of organisation




Figure 12.24. Average response to survey Question 4.10 (Budget. Our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?)





Figure 12.25. Average rating of survey Question 4.10 by type of organisation

It is of particular interest to the Commonwealth Secretariat, given the specialist interest of its commissioning unit for this study in public financial management (PFM). The six-country average barely makes the median rating of 3.0, indicating a relatively low level of confidence among respondents in the integration of risk and budgetary control within PFM. At 3.3, the Sierra Leone average again exceeds the six-country average, exceeded only by The Gambia at 3.5. The low sample size of Sierra Leone for Engagement 4 remains a caution.

Within Sierra Leone, LGAs again provide one end of the range at 2.2. Autonomous agencies claim the other end of the range, with a fairly optimistic 3.8 (Figure 12.25).

Overall, this indicates fair scope for improving Sierra Leone PFM by the effective integration of risk thinking into PFM. This, as with strategy, may also be a 'low hanging fruit', as the supportive tools are

not too demanding. However, in both contexts, the picking of such fruit will demand the prior embrace of risk thinking within a risk-aware culture. If the optimism of the autonomous agency sector is well founded, this would suggest that other sectors may benefit from learning from the successful budgetary control practices of autonomous agencies in Sierra Leone.

Key risk indicators (KRIs) are a productive tool of risk thinking that exists within a risk-aware culture. They provide an early warning of future performance challenges and thus are an important trigger of proactive public sector ERM. The article on corporate governance within Engagement 3 is a classic illustration of the use of KRIs to guide top-level decision-making and control. KRIs usually perform best when they identify broad principles and behavioural phenomena at the individual and group levels. Consequently, their effective use tends to demand higher individual cognitive and

Figure 12.26. Average response to survey Question 4.13 (Performance using Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs): KPIs are "lagging indicators" that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be "leading indicators" that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?)





Figure 12.27. Average rating of survey Question 4.13 by type of organisation

teamwork skills, within a suitably trusting context. The capable deployment of KRIs is arguably the most demanding element of ERM and may be a feature of the highest performing team cultures and entities.

Given this expectation, it is not surprising that the six-country average is among the lowest of the research, at 2.8. The Sierra Leone average, at 3.1, again exceeds the mean for all countries, with Kenya providing relative optimism at 3.2. It is worth recalling that three countries – Ghana, Kenya and The Gambia – have small sample sizes, with consequently lower confidence in the representativeness of their outcomes. Sierra Leone also has a low sample size for Engagement 4, which indicates a need for caution in interpretation of the data here.

Within Sierra Leone (Figure 12.27), at 4.3, SOEs are an outlier providing one end of the range, suggesting very strong deployment of KRIs. At the other end of the range, LGAs provide a self-rating

average of 2.0. The other entities are clustered just below or just above the median of 3.0. If the optimism of the SOE sector is well founded, this would suggest that other sectors may benefit from learning from the successful KRI practices of SOEs in Sierra Leone.

The deterrence of information silos is also easier said than done. Like KRIs, it demands pervasive risk thinking within a risk-aware entity culture. At 3, the six-country average is close to the same downbeat territory as the rating of KRIs. The Sierra Leone average, at 3.2, again exceeds the six-country mean, with Kenya providing relative optimism at 3.4. Both Sierra Leone and Kenya have low sample sizes for Engagement 4, which suggest caution in interpreting these data.

Within Sierra Leone (Figure 12.29), the entity groups are tightly clustered between with central ministries providing one end of the range, at 2.9, and autonomous agencies giving the other end of the range, with a relatively optimistic 3.7. In

Figure 12.28. Average response to survey Question 4.14 (Two-way information street: Rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders who perform vital management and program functions. This allows for better departmental decision making. Question: To what extent is information for decision making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?)





Figure 12.29. Average rating of survey Question 4.14 by type of organisation

general, successful ERM is not feasible where there are barriers to the efficient and timely flow of information to those parties who need to know and act upon such information. The six-country average indicates that there is significant room for improvement.

With Sierra Leone rating the highest, at 3.4, this measure seeks to indicate the impact of top governance on the management of risks and opportunities, i.e., whether the top governance style amplifies or absorbs risks. The range of country ratings, with a six-country average of about 3.1, indicates a generally pessimistic outlook, with scope for much improvement. As with KRIs and risk silos, top governance risks are possibly among the more demanding elements to manage in public sector ERM. This is especially the case as appointments, elevations and removals of senior governance have political influence that may not always be aligned to the best interests of the individual entity or the

public. The low sample size of Sierra Leone for Engagement 4 suggests treating the data with caution. Governance risks typically involve a constellation of factors, those that are: (a) internal to a particular public sector entity; and (b) factors outside its control that are determined by administrative and/or political superiors within central government. Governance risks may be the most difficult element of a public sector ERM to manage and possibly the ones with the greatest potential impact on the entity.

Within Sierra Leone, LGAs provide one end of the range, with 2.8, and central ministries the other end, with a relatively optimistic 3.5 (Figure 12.31). Overall, respondents clearly consider that there is scope for significant improvement in the risk effectiveness of top governance.

A vital part of a public sector ERM is the use of relevant risk and opportunity information from all component entities to inform the national



Figure 12.30. Average response to survey Question 4.16 (Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?)

Figure 12.31. Average rating of survey Question 4.16 by type of organisation



cabinet on decision-making and control of the development and implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). This question sought to evaluate the extent to which the participants are aware of the need to integrate ERM and the NDS in the participating countries.

This territory indicates significant room for improvement in this essential element of public sector ERM. Sierra Leone again exceeds the average, with a modest 3.1, while Ghana provides relative optimism with a similarly modest 3.2. Both countries have low sample sizes for Engagement 4, which remains a caution. This modest six-country perception (at 2.8) may be influenced by the access of respondents to relevant information about links with the NDS. However, effective PS-ERM requires that such information silos (if present) are avoided. The elimination of silos provides for easier identification and reporting of related risks. It likely belongs to the cluster of risk delivery elements

that demand risk thinking in a pervasive risk-aware culture. It keeps company with KRIs, risk silos and governance risks.

Within Sierra Leone, SOEs provide one end of the range, with a pessimistic 2.0 (Figure 12.33). Central ministries are at the other end, with 3.4, while other entities at or just above the modest median of 3.0. For the public sector, ERM cannot end at the doorsteps of individual entities, it must provide for relevant and timely transmission of risk information to the national cabinet to guide decisions on the NDS. There is evidently a lot of room for improvement.

'The proof of the pudding is in the eating.' The ultimate test of any public sector ERM system is its response 'under fire'. At a six-country average of 2.1 and a Sierra Leone average of roughly 3.0, this Question 4.18 COVID-19 response evaluation is the weakest rating of the survey series. Only Ghana and Sierra Leone (both with relatively low

Figure 12.32. Average response to survey Question 4.17 (Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/Local government that are RELEVANT to its decision making?)




Figure 12.33. Average rating of survey Question 4.17 by type of organisation




Figure 12.34. Average response to survey Question 4.18 (Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?)





Figure 12.35. Average rating of survey Question 4.18 by type of organisation



sample sizes) broke a new 'barrier' of 2.0 of hyper-pessimism. Perhaps the Sierra Leone average of 3.0, barely making the median rating, reflects the recent experience of the Ebola epidemic which probably left the country with more experience to respond relatively better than its peers.

Within Sierra Leone (Figure 12.35), LGAs provide one end of the range, with a highly robust 4.2 – a very clear outlier. Autonomous agencies are at the

other end of the range, with a self-rating of 2.6. Other entities are tightly clustered just under or at the median of 3.0.

This measure is broadly consistent with the other findings of this research, which indicate much scope for improvement of the contribution of public sector ERM to sustainable attainment of national development strategies.

The Executive Highlights on page 178 suggests an overall conclusion on the findings of this Large-scale Survey research for Sierra Leone.

13. Large-scale Survey: The Gambia



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Executive Highlights: The Gambia

Sample Size

The sample size for The Gambia was on the low side, which limited the level of statistical confidence that could be secured. But, the aggregate outcomes for The Gambia were broadly similar to the three countries which had robust sample sizes. Hence, we can draw some useful insights from the research for The Gambia.

Three Propositions of the Theory of Change

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 4 on the Study Methodology, three Propositions were advanced of ‘good habits’ that will be essential to a well-functioning Public Sector Enterprise Risk Management (PS-ERM) system. Given the reservation above, the implications of the perceptions of The Gambia respondents for these propositions are summarised in the table below.

Theory of Change Proposition	Indicative Research Conclusion
Adequate human competences are the base camp for successful PS-ERM	There appears to be a reasonable foundation of comprehension to support the implementation of PS-ERM in The Gambia. Note, however, that - as with its peers - the quality of human capital must be resolutely sustained and generationally improved if PS-ERM in The Gambia is to steadily move up the generally accepted scales of ERM maturity and usefulness.
Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is ‘mission critical’ for PS-ERM	The sector analysis for The Gambia included extremes, with a few sectors reporting high levels of productive trust and cohesion, and others at the opposite extreme. However, PS-ERM for The Gambia will likely require major investment in building levels of personal and organisational trust that are <u>essential</u> for ERM to have a reasonable chance of being attained. In some sectors, there are signs of a high level of alienation of public sector staff, indicating a deficit of trust that is perilous for ERM. Overall, there may be a need for greater emphasis on risk management as a ‘way of thinking’, rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes. If the extremes are well founded, there may be a base from which more advanced entities can be a role model for others.
PS-ERM should be a connected decision support mechanism for sub-entity (MDAs/SOEs/LGAs) strategy and for the national cabinet’s direction of the national development strategy (NDS)	This proposition is the ultimate purpose and value of a PS-ERM system. It is the “end” in Stephen Covey’s Habit 2 of <i>Highly Effective People</i> : “Begin with the End in Mind”. At an individual entity level, the extremes identified above were repeated, with some sectors suggesting high levels of decision focus and others at the opposite extreme. However, the connectedness of ERM to the NDS and the quality of the national response to COVID was generally identified as requiring major improvements in public sector decision support.

Current Status of PS-ERM in The Gambia and its position among the Six Countries

Recalling the Executive Highlights to Chapter 7. It described the large scale survey (LSS) that was

one of two primary sources of field evidence for this research was described. Of the twenty-three (23) LSS questions, four (4) survey questions have been identified as providing reliable insight into the perceptions of respondents in The Gambia of the status of PS-ERM in their country at the


time of the research in 2021. One (1) question was from Engagement 2 and three (3) were from Engagement 4. The table below also includes a

reference to the Figure (chart) that illustrates the data within this chapter on The Gambia.

Question #	Figure #	Description	Short reference
2.2	13.7	To what extent is your organisation so engaged in “fire-fighting” that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	Firefighting
4.16	13.30	Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?	Top Governance
4.17	13.32	Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities	NDS (National Development Strategy)
4.18	13.34	Consider the video that you watched on COVID 19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?	COVID

Respondents were asked to rate each question from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating an extremely negative view; and 5 suggesting an extremely positive satisfaction. The median value is 3, which territory would suggest a relatively neutral view, indicating that the outcome can be good or bad, depending on future circumstances.

For each of the four questions, The Gambia's outcome was expressed as (a) a percentage of the average for all countries and (b) a percentage of the median. A fair outcome would be above the average for all countries and above the median i.e. above 100% for both measures.



Percentage of the average for all countries

The Fire-fighting and Top Governance measures are only just above the average of their peers. The NDS and COVID measures are below the six-country average, with the NDS falling 20% below. Overall (“average of averages”), The Gambia’s

respondents are a *little* more pessimistic about their PS-ERM status than their peers.

Percentage of the median score

The Fire-fighting and Top Governance measures are a little above the median; giving limited satisfaction

and suggesting significant scope for growth. The COVID rating is 35% below the median and, as with all other countries, communicates a pressing need for improvements in contingency planning and disaster preparedness. The link between ERM and the NDS (a critical relationship) is also markedly (26%) below the median. Overall, the combined

rating ("average of averages") of the four indicators, unsatisfactorily, lies just below the median.

In general, the perceptions of respondents suggest that there was significant scope for improvement in the status and quality of PS-ERM in The Gambia at the point of the field research.

13.1 Participation information and survey questions

13.1.1 Introduction

The large-scale survey (LSS), which forms the subject of this chapter, is described in Section 4.2

(Part 1). This chapter provides demographic information on the participation of The Gambia in the LSS research. The research was delivered via five 'engagements', as outlined in Section 4.2. This chapter analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 1, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. It further analyses the insights gained from the administration of Engagement 3, which was the introduction given to participants for their response to the Engagement 4 questionnaire.

Table 13.1 shows the total number of individuals from The Gambia who registered to participate in this research. The Gambia contributed 6 per cent of registrants. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, the proportion of respondents who considered that their entity does not have an ERM system in place or in progress, was 39 per cent. The six-country average was 40 per cent stating 'No'. Nearly 60 per cent of respondents (58%) provided a definitive confirmation ('Yes') of the existence of an ERM in their entity, compared to the six-country average of 46 per cent. The small sample size suggests interpreting the results for The Gambia with caution.

The actual number and characteristics of the respondents to the Engagements 2 and 4 questionnaires are shown in Sections 13.1.2 and 13.1.3 below.

13.1.2 Participation Information for the Engagement 2 research questionnaire

There were 29 respondents to the Engagement 2 questionnaire from The Gambia, i.e., a response rate of 33 per cent of the registered total of 89 persons. Females made up the minority of contributors, at 24 per cent, with male respondents at 76 per cent. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 12 participating organisations from The Gambia to the Engagement 2 questionnaire. Just over half (17 of the total 29 respondents/59%) were from three entities:

- Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation (8 respondents/28%);
- Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (5 respondents/17%); and
- Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (4 respondents/14%).


13.1.3 Participation information for the Engagement 4 research questionnaire

There were 19 respondents to the Engagement 4 questionnaire from The Gambia, i.e., a response rate of 21 per cent of the registered total of 89

Table 13.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?

#	Country	Do not know	No	Yes	Grand total	Grand total (%)	Do not know (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	Grand total (%)
1	Botswana	71	160	298	529	36	14	30	56	100
2	Eswatini	44	128	67	239	16	18	54	28	100
3	Ghana	13	12	30	55	3	24	22	54	100
4	Kenya	6	24	68	98	7	6	25	69	100
5	Sierra Leone	69	241	167	477	32	14	51	35	100
6	The Gambia	3	34	52	89	6	3	39	58	100
	Grand Total	206	599	682	1487	100	14	40	46	100

Figure 13.1. Registration Question G: Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?



persons. Females made up 21 per cent, while males were 79 per cent of the respondents from The Gambia. The number of respondents is lower than for Engagement 2 (29 respondents) and the proportion of males is a bit higher than it was in Engagement 2. This compares to the six-country average, which shows that women contributed an overall average of 45 per cent.

There were 9 participating organisations from The Gambia to the Engagement 4 questionnaire (12 for Engagement 2). Nearly two-thirds (12 of the total 19 respondents/63%) were from three entities:

- Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (6 respondents/32%);
- Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation (4 respondents/21%); and
- Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (2 respondents/10%).

The top three contributing organisations for Engagement 4 were also the top three for Engagement 2.

13.1.4 List of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

See Section 8.1.4, Table 8.6 for the list of questions for the Engagements 2 and 4 research questionnaires

13.2 Sample size for The Gambia Engagements 2 and 4 and the level of statistical confidence

Rated questions were scored from 1 to 5, with a lower score representing an unfavourable risk to an ERM implementation and a higher score indicating a positive risk or opportunity.

Table 13.2. Engagement 2 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	127	129	256	50	50	100
Eswatini	69	46	115	60	40	100
Ghana	7	18	25	28	72	100
Kenya	17	22	39	44	56	100
Sierra Leone	33	81	114	29	71	100
The Gambia	7	22	29	24	76	100
Grand Total	260	318	578	45	55	100

Table 13.3. Engagement 2 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation	8
2.	Gambia Civil Aviation Authority	5
3.	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs	4
4.	National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)	2
5.	National Water and Electricity Company Limited (NAWEC)	2
6.	Gambia Ports Authority	2
7.	Central Bank of The Gambia	1
8.	Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment	1
9.	Gambia Radio and Television Services	1
10.	Gambia Ports Authority – Ferry Services	1
11.	Ministry of Petroleum and Energy	1
12.	Gambia Revenue Authority	1
	Total number of respondents	29

Table 13.4. Engagement 4 – Comparative gender analysis of actual large-scale survey respondents per participating country

Country	Female	Male	Grand total	Female (%)	Male (%)	Grand total (%)
Botswana	81	88	169	48	52	100
Eswatini	43	30	73	59	41	100
Ghana	2	9	11	18	82	100
Kenya	8	15	23	35	65	100
Sierra Leone	17	30	47	36	64	100
The Gambia	4	15	19	21	79	100
Grand Total	155	187	342	45	55	100

Table 13.5. Engagement 4 – Number of large-scale survey respondents by organisation

#	Registered name of participating organisation	No. of respondents
1.	Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA)	6
2.	Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation (SSHFC)	4
3.	Ministry of Finance and Economics Affairs	2
4.	National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)	2
5.	Central Bank of The Gambia	1
6.	National Water and Electricity Company Limited (NAWEC)	1
7.	Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment	1
8.	Gambia Ports Authority	1
9.	Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS)	1
	Total number of respondents	19

Table 13.6. Statistical sample sizes and related levels of confidence in the results obtained for the large-scale survey

The Gambia respondent population	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
Ref	Custom	Custom
Confidence Level	80%	70%
Margin of Error	10%	11%
Population Proportion	50%	50%
Population Size	89	89
Actual Sample Size	29	19

Engagement 2 attracted 29 responses from The Gambia out of a registered total of 89, giving a response rate of 33 per cent. Engagement 4 received 19 responses from The Gambia, giving a response rate of 21 per cent. When we apply the parameters for determining the statistical level of confidence in our results as outlined in Section 4.2.3 above, we derive the levels as presented in Table 13.6.

For Engagement 2, this provides a confidence level of 80 per cent that the real value is within ± 10 per cent of the measured/surveyed value of the responses. Given the small number of registrants, the inference has been limited to the registered population, rather than the wider population of public sector stakeholders. The Engagement 4 response rate provides a lower confidence level of 70 per cent, with a wider margin of error.

The Gambia's low response rate means that the survey inferences must be seen as 'indicative' and

not 'definitive', given the relatively low statistical levels of confidence.

13.3 ToC proposition: Adequate human competences are the 'base camp' for successful public sector ERM

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 13.7.

The responses to these questions are examined individually for their relevance to the adequacy of human competences in the Gambian context, with a collective synthesis at the end. The survey questions with an asterisk * are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

Question 2.1 addressed the comprehension of a short foundational article on ERM by the researcher (Jones 2020a) that was enriched with illustrative secondary videos. It was delivered as Engagement 1 and was intended as a sound introduction to ERM for the layperson, as well as a refresher for the

Table 13.7. Survey questions mapped to the human competence proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*
2	Q2.1	Q4.1, Q4.6*, Q4.9*, Q4.10*, Q4.13*
3	N/A	N/A

Figure 13.2. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 1?)





Figure 13.3. Average rating of survey Question 2.1 by job description

experienced. Given the highly accessible language and style, its comprehension was seen as a fair indicator of a reader's readiness for an ERM journey. Weak comprehension would indicate a reader that may have significant challenges in the development and/or operation of an ERM system. All countries had average scores in the highest quintile, which provides a generally favourable outlook on the basic competences of the respondents in all countries. There is a six-country average of 4.4, while The Gambia's average was 4.2, with Kenya providing relative optimism at 4.5. The female average for The Gambia was 4.1 and the male average was slightly more optimistic at 4.3.

Within The Gambia (Figure 13.3), most job roles rated at or above 4.0, with administrative heads of central government providing one end of the range at 5.0. Central government ministers delivered the other end of the range at 3.0, which was an outlier. This suggests a reasonably firm level of comprehension and an adequate foundation for the

delivery of an ERM system in The Gambia. However, significant engagement of the senior political authority is required, given the pivotal role played by them in the control of enterprise risks.

This Engagement 4 Question 4.1 had the same objective as Question 2.1. It addressed the comprehension of reading and viewing material delivered as Engagement 3. This included an article on corporate governance by the researcher (Jones 2020b), a third-party video on the effective use of ERM by the British Cabinet during the First World War (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011) and a proprietary video by the researcher's firm on the experience of corporate Africa during COVID-19 (GovernanceQualityRatings.com 2021). At an average 4.3 on a 5-point scale, the average score for all countries was lower than the average 4.4 for Question 2.1. This probably reflects the more demanding content of this engagement, but still leaves the average in the top quintile. The Gambia had an average rating of


Figure 13.4. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 (How understandable was the reading and viewing material for Engagement 3?)

Figure 13.5. Average rating of survey Question 4.1 by job description





Figure 13.6. Question 2.1 rating by gender



4.2, while Kenya provided relative optimism at 4.5. Kenya’s low sample size suggests interpreting the data with caution.

Within The Gambia, the results were closely clustered between ratings of 4.2 and 4.3 (Figure 13.5).

In conclusion, the effective implementation of ERM must be complemented by strong human capacity of key stakeholders. The evidence, subject to the low sample size, suggests a fair foundation for The Gambia to build upon.

13.4 ToC proposition:
organisational and societal
trust within an enabling culture
is ‘mission critical’ for ERM

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 13.8.


The survey questions with a double asterisk ** are also relevant to a subsequent proposition on decision-making. They will be examined in that section.

The questions marked with a single asterisk * are intended to provide a measure of the sociological concept of anomie within the group of respondents. Anomie, in societies or individuals, has been described as a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020a). The concept was introduced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. When a social system is in a state of anomie, common values and common meanings are no longer understood or accepted,

Table 13.8. Survey questions mapped to the trust and enabling culture proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.2, Q2.4*, Q2.5*	Q4.2, Q4.3*, Q4.4*, Q4.5, Q4.7*, Q4.8*, Q4.11*, Q4.12*, Q4.13**, Q4.14**, Q4.19*
2	N/A	N/A
3	N/A	N/A

Figure 13.7. Average response to survey Question 2.2 (To what extent is your organisation so engaged in "fire-fighting" that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?)



while new values and meanings have not developed. According to Durkheim, such a society produces, in many of its members, psychological states characterised by a sense of futility, lack of purpose, and emotional emptiness and despair. Anomie can be used as a proxy for the alienation of an individual from his or her organisation and/or society, as it has been used by this researcher (Jones 2012). It has been introduced to this study as high levels of alienation or anomie are evidently inconsistent with the conditions of trust and enabling culture that is required by an effective ERM system.

There are nine anomie measures, two of which were utilised in Engagement 2 and the other seven in Engagement 4. For the purposes of this study, the results will be combined into two composite measures, i.e., Engagement 2 composite (two items) and Engagement 4 composite (seven items).

First, we consider Q2.2, which is intended to assess the scope for the contribution of ERM

to public sector organisational efficiency and productivity. A 'firefighting' culture indicates a reactive set of relationships, which can be improved by the 'proactive' thinking demanded by ERM. It is noteworthy that the six-country average (at 3.4) is markedly lower (bottom of the fourth quintile) relative to the confidence shown in proposition 1 above. Sierra Leone provides one end of the range at 3.8, while The Gambia equals the average. Within The Gambia (Figure 13.8), there is a wide range of responses. Central entities are robustly positive – at or above 4.0. However, local government and SOEs are more circumspect, at roughly 3 each. Overall, the insight is mixed, perhaps because of the low sample size. However, it is clear that room exists in The Gambia for public sector ERM to contribute to organisational productivity.

This anomie subset from Engagement 2 reinforces the message from Question 2.2. The six-country

Figure 13.8. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation




Figure 13.9. Average response to combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5




Figure 13.10. Average ratings of combined Engagement 2 anomie Questions 2.4 and 2.5 by type of organisation





Figure 13.11. Average response to combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19



average, at 3.3, is even lower than the Question 2.2 average of 3.4. The Gambia is the only country that exceeds 3.3, with a still modest average rating of 3.4. Within The Gambia (Figure 13.10), LGAs provide one end of the range with 2.0, closely followed by autonomous agencies at 2.25, while SOEs provide a relatively positive 3.6. This generally downbeat

finding is inconsistent with the robustly positive responses to Question 2.2.

The Gambia average for the seven anomie questions of Engagement 4 is, at 3.4, the same as that for the Engagement 2 anomie subset. The Gambia and Sierra Leone provide one end of the range of outcomes. It is evident that the six

Figure 13.12. Average ratings of combined Engagement 4 anomie Questions 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.19 by type of organisation





Figure 13.13. Combined Engagement 4 Anomie by Gender



countries are tightly clustered in this measure of alienation. Within The Gambia (Figure 13.12), tightly clustered results have autonomous departments providing a relative optimism at 3.6, with central ministries delivering relative pessimism at 2.9.

Females self-rated at 3.2, while males self-rated at a slightly more optimistic 3.5.

In conclusion, the two sets of anomie responses for The Gambia suggests that the successful implementation of public sector ERM must include a conscious element that seeks to address social cynicism and to improve the sense of collective purpose of public sector staff.

The six-country average (roughly 3.6) is broadly consistent with the other questions so far in this proposition. The Gambia data for Question 4.2 once again equals the six-country average. Within The Gambia (Figure 13.15), one end of the range is provided by central ministries, with 3.3, while the other end of the range comes from autonomous agencies and departments, with a robustly positive 4.0. If the finding for the autonomous agencies and departments is soundly based, this would suggest that these organisations may have lessons for

Figure 13.14. Average response to survey Question 4.2 (To what extent does your organisation learn from the lessons of experience and use that to improve future outcomes?)





Figure 13.15. Average rating of survey Question 2.2 by type of organisation

other public sector entities in terms of generating a learning organisation.

In conclusion, Question 4.2, when taken with the other questions in this proposition, broadly reinforces the message that there is some scope for public sector ERM to add to the quality of management and outcomes of public sector entities in The Gambia. This is consistent with the data from other countries, which have sample sizes that convey greater statistical confidence.

The six-country average (3.3) is more pessimistic on Question 4.5 than for Question 4.2 (3.6). The Gambia average (3.4) is lower than that for Question 4.2 (3.6). The broad message may be that current ERM implementation efforts may focus too much on 'systems and processes' (for instance, development and maintenance of a risk register) and not adequately on ERM as 'an attitude of mind' that then influences the use of processes to attain agreed risk management

goals. Within The Gambia (Figure 13.17), the radical differences persist. This time, autonomous departments are at the pessimistic end of the range at 2.0, while SOEs offer a relatively positive 3.7. Once again, the low sample size may account for the radical variation. It may also be the case that the optimistic organisations are being managed in a manner that could offer lessons to the others. However, the six-country average and in-country examples suggest that The Gambia may have room for improvement.

In conclusion for this 'trust' proposition, all questions have mutually reinforcing responses that are broadly consistent with each other. Public sector ERM should invest in building personal and organisational trust in order for the risk management objectives to have a reasonable chance of being attained. There should, perhaps, be an emphasis on risk management as a 'way of thinking', rather than the mechanical (and likely ineffective) deployment of rigid policies and processes.

Figure 13.16. Average response to survey Question 4.5 (People: my organisation strives to create a "risk aware" culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. We have risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership. Do you agree or disagree?)





Figure 13.17. Average rating of survey Question 4.5 by type of organisation



13.5 ToC proposition: public sector ERM as a decision support mechanism

Readers should refer the mapping of the survey questions to the ToC in Chapter 7 (Part 1). This proposition was mapped, as summarised below, to the survey questions presented in Table 13.9.

Survey questions with a double asterisk ** have already been examined under earlier ToC propositions with which they overlap. Consequently, this analysis will be limited to those that do not have a double asterisk.

In this final section, we focus on the use of public sector ERM as a means to improve specific types of decision-making at the entity level and at the level of the national cabinet as it manages the implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). Considerations include:

- the use of technology as an enabler of timely and efficient management of risk information (Question 4.6);
- the use of risk information to give shape to strategic planning and its subsequent monitoring and evaluation (Question 4.9);
- whether budgetary planning and control is influenced by risk information (Question 4.10);
- the existence of key risk indicators as early warning signals for governance and control (Question 4.13);
- the avoidance of information silos by ensuring vertical and horizontal movement of risk information (Question 4.14);
- the impact of governance practices on the management of enterprise risks (Question 4.16);
- the existence of central co-ordination – at the level of the national cabinet – of NDS-relevant enterprise risks across the entire public sector (Question 4.17); and
- the quality of enterprise risk mitigation in the case of COVID-19 (Question 4.18).


Table 13.9. Survey questions mapped to the Decision Support Proposition of the ToC

ToC Step	Engagement 2	Engagement 4
1	Q2.3	Q4.2**, Q4.5**, Q4.6, Q4.9, Q4.10, Q4.13, Q4.14, Q4.16, Q4.17, Q4.18
2	N/A	ditto
3	N/A	ditto

We also examine the status of ERM implementation across the public sector (Question 2.3).

This question, on the status of ERM implementation, was addressed in Engagement 2. The Gambia, Kenya and Ghana had relatively low responses to Engagement 2, with corresponding low statistical levels of confidence in the data; i.e., these responses may not be fully representative of their public sectors. Overall, The Gambia

Figure 13.18. Average percentage response to survey Question 2.3 (In your opinion, to what extent are the basic principles of risk and opportunity management outlined in Engagement 1 practised in your organisation?)



had 17 per cent of responses saying that their organisations are in the embryonic phases. Ghana, at 8 per cent, was the country with the highest claim of excellence (Category 5), with The Gambia having no claims at that level. Sixty-five (65) per cent of Gambian respondents indicate a stage 3 position, i.e., their organisations are on the journey to reasonable risk management. The low sample size may make the interpretation for The Gambia rather challenging.

The six-country average for technological adoption is quite downbeat at 2.8. The Gambia, at 2.6,

lies just below the average. Indeed, only Ghana and Kenya – both with low response rates and correspondingly low levels of statistical confidence – manage to exceed the median of 3.0, each with ratings of 3.1. Within (Figure 13.21), central ministries are at the optimistic end of the range at 3.7, while autonomous agencies, departments and SOEs deliver relative pessimism at 1.5, 2.0 and 2.7 respectively.

If the optimism of the central ministries sector is well founded, this would suggest that other Gambian sectors may benefit from learning from

Figure 13.19. Percentage response to survey Question 2.3 by type of Organisation




Figure 13.20. Average response to survey Question 4.6 (Technology: My organisation is confident in our use of information and communication technologies. We have the management ability to use technology to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Our technology allows timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks. Do you agree or disagree?)




Figure 13.21. Average rating of survey Question 4.6 by type of organisation




Figure 13.22. Average response to survey Question 4.9 (Strategy: Internal and External Risks to my organisation's mission inform and shape the development of our entity strategy. Risk information also creates awareness of challenges that may arise from putting our strategy into practice. Question: Does your organisation explicitly use risk information to develop, track and guide the implementation of strategy?)





Figure 13.23. Average rating of survey Question 4.9 by type of organisation

their successful technology and risk integration practices. However, there is clearly a lot of room for the improvement of the efficiency of the deployment of risk information systems through the use of information technology.

The use of risk information in the development and implementation of strategy is arguably the most important deployment of ERM. It is central to the defined purpose of ERM, as examined in Section 2.2 of Part 1. At 3, the six-country average is bordering on pessimistic territory. Sierra Leone claims the most confidence in the integration of risk and strategy, at a middling 3.25. Ghana joins Kenya (3.1) and Sierra Leone to lie above the six-country average. The Gambia, at 2.9, is just below the six-country average.

Within The Gambia (Figure 13.23), the radical differences continue. Autonomous agencies, departments and SOEs sit at the pessimistic end of the range, at 2.0, 2.5 and 2.9 respectively. Central

ministries deliver a relatively optimistic end of the range, with 3.7.

Given the importance of this integration to the objective of risk management, this appears to offer significant scope for improvement, especially given the variations within The Gambia. Further, the tools to secure this improvement are not overly demanding. Thus, this may offer a 'low hanging fruit' for future interventions to demonstrate the value of ERM and risk thinking.

Budgetary control, within a well-defined strategy, is arguably the second most important use of public sector ERM for decision-making and control. It is of particular interest to the Commonwealth Secretariat, given the specialist interest of its commissioning unit for this study in public financial management (PFM). The six-country average at 3.2, barely exceeds the median indicating a relatively low level of confidence among respondents in the integration of risk and budgetary control



Figure 13.24. Average response to survey Question 4.10 (Budget. Our leadership considers risk information when making budget decisions. Money is never enough and tough choices are always necessary. So, trade-offs, between the effect of one budget choice and the effects of competing alternatives, are considered in advance. So, the impact of resource allocation on risks is a conscious choice in my organisation. Do you agree or disagree?)

Figure 13.25. Average rating of survey Question 4.10 by type of organisation

within PFM. At 3.5, the Gambia average joins Ghana, Sierra Leone and Kenya just above the six-country average.

Within The Gambia, autonomous departments provide a very optimistic end of the range at 4.5 (Figure 13.25). Autonomous agencies lie at the other end of the range with a relatively pessimistic 2.5. If the optimism of the autonomous departments sector is well founded, this would suggest that other Gambian sectors may benefit from learning from their budget and risk integration practices. The low sample size for The Gambia suggests the data should be interpreted with caution.

Overall, this indicates significant scope for improving The Gambia's PFM by the effective integration of risk thinking into PFM. This, as with strategy, may also be a 'low hanging fruit', as the supportive tools are not too demanding. However, in both contexts, the picking of such fruit will demand the prior embrace of risk thinking within a risk-aware culture.

Key risk indicators (KRIs) are a productive tool of risk thinking that exists within a risk-aware culture. They provide an early warning of future performance challenges and thus are an important trigger of proactive public sector ERM. The article on corporate governance within Engagement 3 is a classic illustration of the use of KRIs to guide top-level decision-making and control. KRIs usually perform best when they identify broad principles and behavioural phenomena at the individual and group levels. Consequently, their effective use tends to demand higher individual cognitive and teamwork skills, within a suitably trusting context. The capable deployment of KRIs is arguably the most demanding element of ERM and may be a feature of the highest performing team cultures and entities.

Given this expectation, it is not surprising that the six-country average is among the lowest of the research, at 2.8. The Kenya average, at 3.2 provides one end of the range, with The Gambia matching the six-country average, at 2.8. It is

Figure 13.26. Average response to survey Question 4.13 (Performance using Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs): KPIs are "lagging indicators" that measure progress toward entity objectives. KRIs can be "leading indicators" that provide early warnings of risks to achieving our KPIs. Question: To what extent does your organisation track leading risk indicators that give early warning of threats to performance goals?)





Figure 13.27. Average rating of survey Question 4.13 by type of organisation

worth recalling that three countries – Ghana, Kenya and The Gambia – have small sample sizes with consequently lower confidence in the representativeness of their outcomes. However, all countries are fairly tightly clustered, suggesting that the data for the low sample sizes may be reflective of a wider reality in those countries.

Within The Gambia, autonomous agencies provide an acutely pessimistic end of the range, with 1 (Figure 13.27). SOEs provide a relatively optimistic other end of the range at 3.1. The Gambia may benefit from assistance in improving this aspect.

The deterrence of information silos is also easier said than done. Like KRIs, it demands pervasive

risk thinking within a risk-aware entity culture. At 3, the six-country average is bordering the same downbeat territory as the rating of KRIs. Kenya again provides a relatively optimistic end of the range at 3.4, whereas The Gambia is just below at 3.3. The Gambia's low sample size suggests treating the data with caution.

Within The Gambia (Figure 13.28), entity groups again record a very wide variation. Autonomous departments and agencies record relative pessimism at 2.0 and 2.5 respectively. A relatively optimistic other end of the range is given by central ministries, with 4.3, while SOEs are in a modest middle with 3.4. In general, successful ERM is not feasible where there are barriers to the efficient

Figure 13.28. Average rating of survey Question 4.14 (Two-way information street: Rather than simply collecting risk information from core departments, my organisation centrally analyses business information and delivers it back in a timely and value-added way to department stakeholders who perform vital management and program functions. This allows for better departmental decision making. Question: To what extent is information for decision making and control a very good two-way street in your organisation?) by type of organisation




Figure 13.29. Average response to survey Question 4.14




Figure 13.30. Average response to survey Question 4.16 (Consider the article that you read on entity governance for Engagement 3. Is your entity leadership and governance a shock absorber or a shock amplifier? To what extent does your governance culture help to reduce risks or does it make hazards worse?)





Figure 13.31. Average rating of survey Question 4.16 by type of organisation



and timely flow of information to those parties who need to know and act upon such information. There is clearly an opportunity for improvement in this regard.


With Sierra Leone providing one end of the range at 3.4, this measure seeks to indicate the impact of top governance on the management of risks and opportunities; that is, whether the top governance style amplifies or absorbs risks. The range of country ratings, with a six-country average of about 3.1, indicates a generally pessimistic outlook

with scope for much improvement. As with KRIs and risk silos, top governance risks are possibly among the more demanding elements to manage in public sector ERM. This is especially the case as appointments, elevations and removals of senior governance will have political influence that may not always be aligned to the best interests of the individual entity or the public interest as a whole.

Consequently, governance risks will typically involve a constellation of factors; that is, those that are:

(a) internal to a particular public sector entity; and

Figure 13.32. Average response to survey Question 4.17 (Consider the video that you watched on the creation of the British Cabinet Office for Engagement 3. To what extent does your national cabinet have reliable, comprehensive and timely TWO-way access to information about negative risks and opportunities of MDAs, SOEs/PEs and LGAs/Local government that are RELEVANT to its decision making?)



(b) factors outside its control that are determined by administrative and/or political superiors within central government. Governance risks may be the most difficult element of a public sector ERM to manage and possibly the ones with the greatest potential impact on the entity. Within The Gambia (Figure 13.31), results are clustered around the country average of 3.3, with one end of the range supplied by central ministries at 3.0 and the other end of the range by autonomous departments and agencies at 3.5. It is evident that there is scope for the contribution of effective ERM to this element.

A vital part of a public sector ERM is the use of relevant risk and opportunity information from all component entities to inform the decision-making of the national cabinet on decision-making and control of the development and implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS). This question sought to evaluate the extent to which the participants are aware of the need to integrate ERM and the NDS in the participating countries.

At 2.2, The Gambia average is at one end of the range, while Ghana provides relative optimism at 3.2. With the six-country average of 2.8, this is territory that generally indicates significant room for improvement in this mission-critical element of public sector ERM. Both countries have low sample sizes for Engagement 4, which remains a caution. This modest six-country perception may be influenced by the access of respondents to relevant information about links with the NDS. However, effective PS-ERM requires that such information silos (if present) are avoided. This elimination of silos provides for easier identification and reporting of related risks. It likely belongs to the cluster of risk delivery elements that demand risk thinking in a pervasive risk-aware culture. It keeps company with KRIs, risk silos and governance risks.

Within The Gambia (Figure 13.33), results are clustered between 2.0 and 2.7. For the public sector, ERM cannot end at the doorsteps of individual entities; rather, it must provide for relevant and

Figure 13.33. Average rating of survey Question 4.17 by type of organisation




Figure 13.34. Average response to survey Question 4.18 (Consider the video that you watched on COVID-19 for Engagement 3. Given Africa's recent experience with Ebola, communicable diseases in general and other socio-political systemic disruptions over recent decades, to what extent was your public sector, as a whole, adequately prepared for the pandemic?)





Figure 13.35. Average rating of survey Question 4.18 by type of organisation



timely transmission of risk information to the national cabinet to guide decisions on the NDS.

'The proof of the pudding is in the eating.' The ultimate test of any public sector ERM system is its response 'under fire'. At a six-country average of 2.1, this COVID-19 response evaluation is the weakest rating of the survey series. Only Ghana (at 2.5, but with relatively low sample size) and Sierra Leone broke a new 'barrier' of 2.0 of hyper-pessimism. Perhaps the Sierra Leone average of 3.0, barely making the median rating, reflects the recent experience of the Ebola epidemic – which probably left the country with more experience to

respond relatively better than its peers. The Gambia recorded its lowest average at 1.9.

Within The Gambia, autonomous departments provide relative pessimism, at 1.0, with SOEs providing the other end of the range at 2.2 (Figure 13.35).

This measure is broadly consistent with the other findings of this research, which indicate much scope for improvement of the contribution of public sector ERM to sustainable attainment of national development strategies.

The Executive Highlights on page 206 suggests an overall conclusion on the findings of this Large-scale Survey research for The Gambia

14. Country Case Studies

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Executive Highlights: Country Case Studies

The Executive Highlights to Chapter 4 (Study Methodology) outlined the Theory of Change (ToC) that shaped the design of this research. It identified three Process Steps that are expected of a competent Public Sector Enterprise Risk management (PS-ERM) implementation and three "Propositions" of "Good Habits" that are expected to significantly increase the effectiveness of the three process steps.

The Executive Highlights to Chapter 7 (Introduction to the field research instruments) included an outline of a cross-sectional Large Scale Survey (LSS) and in-depth Country Case Studies (CCS). This Chapter details the results of the CCS which included 15 (fifteen) public sector entities, from the six countries based on information provided by 52 (fifty-two) relevant persons.

Findings on the Process Steps from the "closed" questions

- **Step 1: A robust Feasibility Stage:** in a sense, this step aims to mitigate the risks of the failure of a PS-ERM implementation!

The two case study questions ("closed" with responses on a scale from 1 to 5) that investigated the effectiveness of this stage focussed on the extent to which decision-support was the focus of the earliest stage of planning i.e. decision support to (a) the organisational strategy and (b) to the national development strategy (NDS). A failure to link PS-ERM to both sets of strategic goals would be a fatal omission, as envisioned by the ToC. So, these questions tested the application of "Proposition 3" of the expected "Good Habits".

The Case Studies found that there was greater overall appreciation of the contribution of PS-ERM to organisational decision-making (40% of respondent organisations rated themselves highly).

However, there was much less appreciation of the need to provide support to the NDS (only 27% of respondent organisations gave themselves the top scale rating).

It is essential for the PS-ERM of each country to be seen as an organic whole, in need of centralised standards to guide design, development, operation, quality control and governance. There is a risk that current practices may encourage the perspective that entity ERMs are 'independent' or only loosely associated. This poses a material risk to the goal effectiveness of the wider national PS-ERM ecosystem. Ultimately, PS-ERM can be a key contributor to national competitiveness and to sustainably improving national living standards.

- **Step 2: Organising and Planning** for the PS-ERM: i.e. ensuring that necessary resources are deployed and effectively project managed.

The five case study closed questions explored four attributes of a good implementation. This included "Proposition 1" that expects adequate human skills to be available. In addition, it checked for good project management habits such as the use of a pilot phase, effective communication and a robust organisational understanding and application of the principles of the ToC.

Nine (9) of the fifteen (15) case study organisations (i.e. 60%) rated themselves poorly on these measures with overall ratings below the median of 3. Only one entity, from The Gambia, evaluated itself in the top quintile, at 4 and above (about 7% of the total of 15). There is clearly major room for improvement. Three of the six countries (Eswatini, Kenya and Botswana had overall self-ratings below the median. Sierra Leone entities rated themselves just above the

median at 3.2. The Gambia and Ghana had entities that rated themselves at an average 3.5 and 3.7 respectively.

- **Step 3: Operating** a PS-ERM eco-system: i.e. delivering a resolute focus on a quality assured system that delivers value-for-money, attainment of system decision-support goals, system accountability and a virtuous cycle of learning and improvement.

The 13 questions mapped to Step 3 related to the practical effect of ERM on the entity and on national strategy (four questions); the adequacy of the scope of the ERM (two questions); the overall effect of ERM on the organisation's efficiency and effectiveness (four questions); the extent of the implementation of ERM (one question); and the quality assurance of ERM (two questions). At 3.0, the overall rating for this step is just at the median, indicating much room for improvement.

The 15 entities had an average 'combined' rating for Step 3 that ranged from 1.2 for Botswana's MGBO1 to 3.7 for The Gambia's AATG1. No entity had a combined rating at 4.0 or above. Two entities had combined averages in the '1' ratings range (13%), while four were in the '2' range (27%) and nine were in the '3' range (60%). So, 40% were below the median of 3.0; but 60 per cent were above that median. There is undoubtedly much scope for growth, but the foundations for such growth appear to be in place.

- **A Caveat**

The ratings of closed questions are the individual perceptions of the participants. Further, some organisations provided a higher number of individual respondents, which improves the degree to which we can be satisfied that the views expressed are truly reflective of reality in their entities.

Minimum expectations, and thus the ratings of questions, can validly vary between entities and between countries. An old management adage is that 'a problem is a deviation from a standard'. So, when some respondents rate their compliance with a question as lower (relative to the self-rating of others), it may be the result of higher minimum expectations of themselves.

Findings on the Process Steps from the "open" questions

These questions invited narrative responses from the individual contributors, which were analysed using content analysis techniques. The content analysis sought to identify the underlying theme within each narrative contributed by a respondent. That theme was then classified using a classification scheme developed from issues arising from the LSS, documented in Parts 2 to 7 of this research. This provides a link between the emergent lessons from the LSS to this case study Chapter.

213 (two hundred and thirteen) narratives related to Process Step 1. 198 (one hundred and ninety-eight) narratives related to Process Step 2. 105 (one hundred and five) narratives related to Process Step 3. This gave a grand total of 516 (five hundred and sixteen) narratives from open questions that were analysed using content analysis.

The findings suggest that the conversion of reasonably fine plans into a sound operating PS-ERM system is a challenge. Further, negative entity trust and governance practices feature among the top considerations of all three Steps. This indicates that there may be a need for stronger entity and central government political leadership of PS-ERM. This is likely to be mission-critical if it is to realise its potential for enhancing the attainment of national and entity strategies and related development outcomes.

14.1 Introduction

The contribution of the case studies to the study, and the countries and organisations participating, is outlined in Section 4.2.2 (Part 1). To secure their co-operation, the participating organisations were provided with an undertaking that they would not be explicitly identified with the research findings. Consequently, the analysis will focus on the insights gained from Engagement 5 without specifying the names of the related entities.

14.2 Mapping the findings of the Engagement 5 case study to the Theory of Change (ToC)

The public sector enterprise risk management (PS-ERM) ToC is detailed in Section 4.1 (Part 1). It is a longitudinal process that suggests an appropriate vision for the direction and control of PS-ERM. It also suggests a three-step process flow for realising that vision:

- 1) Step 1 – Getting started, the feasibility stage
- 2) Step 2 – Organising and planning for a PS-ERM ecosystem
- 3) Step 3 – Operating a PS-ERM ecosystem

The large-scale survey (Parts 2 to 7/Chapters 9 to 13) was designed to assess, through Engagements 1 to 4, the characteristics of the wider operating environment in the six countries within which PS-ERM must be embedded. It examined the 'soft' cultural factors that can make or break PS-ERM even before it starts. It also investigated the 'hard' factors, that is, the goals, policies, processes and systems that can support the introduction of PS-ERM. It considered the evidence from each country and related that to the aggregate evidence from the other countries.

This case study volume takes an in-depth look at both the soft and the hard factors within volunteer organisations, covering a range of ministries, autonomous agencies and departments, local authorities and state-owned enterprises. The analysis is shaped by issues arising from the LSS, which are used to inform content analysis of Engagement 5 narrative responses to 'open' questions. The case study analysis is also influenced by the allocation of responses to Engagement 5 'closed' questions (rated on a scale from 1 to 5),

which are allocated or 'mapped' to the three steps outlined above.

The mapping of the closed questions is shown in Table 14.1.

Based on this mapping, an overall average rating (between 1 and 5) for each step is derived that provides a basis for analysis within this volume.

The 'open' narrative responses were subjected to content analysis and coded to PS-ERM-influencing factors that emerged from the LSS. The mapping of those coded factors to the delivery of PS-ERM, using a systems analysis framework, is shown in Table 14.2. The open questions asked respondents to provide commentary on practical examples of positive (+ve) and negative (-ve) experiences that they encountered during the three steps of PS-ERM implementation.

Sections 14.3 to 14.5 present and explore the implications of 'dashboard' data highlights of the insights from the closed questions with respect to Steps 1 to 3. An overall review of these insights is presented in Section 14.6, which also considers complementary issues arising from the open questions.

14.3 Case study insights on the ERM journey: Step 1 – Getting started, the feasibility stage

Table 14.3 presents the overall responses for Stage 1 across all countries, by organisation code.

The codes represent specific entities in each country. As requested by the responding entities, their identities have been anonymised in this report. There are 15 entities in total, of which 6 are ministries (40%), 4 are state-owned enterprises (27%) and 5 are autonomous agencies (33%). Botswana and The Gambia contribute the largest number of organisations, with four each; followed by three from Sierra Leone, two from Eswatini and one each from Ghana and Kenya. Fifty-three (53) per cent of respondent organisations are from Botswana and The Gambia.

The analysis by country only is shown in Table 14.5.

Table 14.4 shows that Botswana provided the highest number of persons contributing to the case studies by organisation code and by country. Thirty-one (31) per cent (16 in number) of the 52 persons contributing to the case studies were from a single Botswana central government ministry.

Table 14.1. Mapping of closed questions from Engagement 5 to the three steps of the ToC

Closed question from Engagement 5	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
5A. To what extent is your organisation so engaged in 'firefighting' that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?			Mapped
5.2 To what extent did your ERM implementation start with a clear vision of its role as 'decision support' to the national cabinet, in a manner consistent with the above outline (section 4.1.2 – Volume 1)?	Mapped		
5.3 To what extent did your ERM implementation start with a clear vision of its role as 'decision support' to your entity, in a manner consistent with the above outline (section 4.1.2 – Volume 1)?	Mapped		
5.4 To what extent does your entity manage 'enterprise risks' (i.e., the full range of exposures to governance, strategy, people, funding, business-specific etc. risks and opportunities) and to what extent do you primarily manage business-specific 'operational' risks, such as the credit risks of a bank?			Mapped
5.10 To what extent did/does your ERM implementation plan have features consistent with the above outline?		Mapped	
5.16 To what extent does your entity ERM provide relevant and timely risk information for decision-making on the National Development Strategy, directly or indirectly, to the national cabinet?			Mapped
5.17 To what extent does your entity ERM provide relevant and timely risk information for decision-making on your organisation's strategy, directly or indirectly, to its most senior governance levels?			Mapped
5.18 To what extent does your entity ERM provide relevant and timely information for decision-making on both positive opportunities as well as negative events?			Mapped
5.19 To what extent does your entity ERM have the maintenance of a risk register as its primary focus?			Mapped
5.20 To what extent does your entity ERM see the Risk Unit as the risk management owners?			Mapped
5.21 To what extent is your entity ERM supported by trust and confidence between staff, management, the board of directors and/or political stakeholders?			Mapped
5.22 To what extent is your entity ERM supported by strong human competences in the Risk Unit?		Mapped	
5.23 To what extent is your entity ERM supported by strong human competences in the management and governance functions?		Mapped	

(Continued)

Table 14.1. (Continued) Mapping of closed questions from Engagement 5 to the three steps of the ToC


Closed question from Engagement 5	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
5.24 To what extent are your entity ERM strategy, policies and processes understandable and a practical basis for action?		Mapped	
5.25 To what extent was your entity ERM implementation supported (or is expected to be supported) by a well-planned pilot test that increases the chances of successful implementation?		Mapped	
5.26 To what extent has your entity ERM implementation been fully implemented (or has sensible plans for full implementation) throughout your organisation?			Mapped
5.27 To what extent has your entity ERM implementation made provisions for, or has been subjected to, autonomous review by your internal audit function that is free from conflicts of interest?			Mapped
5.28 To what extent has your entity ERM implementation made provisions for, or has been subjected to, external review by an independent expert from outside your organisation?			Mapped
5.29 To what extent does your entity ERM capture all the negative and positive risks (from governance risks to operational risks and everything in between) to which your organisation is exposed, on a timely basis before they become a serious problem?			Mapped
5.30 To what extent does your organisation act on time to manage and satisfactorily reduce the impact of risks that have been identified by your ERM system?			Mapped

Table 14.2. Mapping of codes used to analyse open questions to the three steps of the ToC

PS-ERM Step	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Impact
Description of PS-ERM factor highlighted in the LSS	Input	Processing	Output	Outcome
Enabling Human Capacity (+ve)	Mapped			
Disabling Human Capacity (-ve)	Mapped			
PS-ERM System Structures (+ve)		Mapped		
PS-ERM System Structures (-ve)		Mapped		
Enabling Culture Trust (+ve)		Mapped		
Disabling Culture Alienation (-ve)		Mapped		
Enabling Technology (+ve)		Mapped		
Disabling Technology (-ve)		Mapped		
Entity and National Strategy (+ve)				Mapped
Entity and National Strategy (-ve)				Mapped
Entity and National Budget Control (+ve)				Mapped
Entity and National Budget Control (-ve)				Mapped
Key Risk Indicators (+ve)			Mapped	
Key Risk Indicators (-ve)			Mapped	
Information Silos (+ve)				Mapped
Information Silos (-ve)				Mapped
Entity Governance (+ve)				Mapped
Entity Governance (-ve)				Mapped
National Governance [Cabinet] (+ve)				Mapped
National Governance [Cabinet] (-ve)				Mapped
COVID-19 effect (+ve)				Mapped
COVID-19 effect (-ve)				Mapped
Others not classified above (+ve)	Unallocated			
Others not classified above (-ve)				Unallocated

Table 14.3. Case study analysis of closed questions on Step 1 – Getting started, by country and by organisation code

Organisation	Identifying code	Country	Q5.2	Q5.3	Combined Step 1 rating	Standard deviation	Upper bound	Lower bound
Central Government Ministry 1	MGB01	Botswana	3.0	3.0	3.0	0	3.0	3.0
Central Government Ministry 2	MGB02	Botswana	2.3	2.7	2.5	0.2	2.7	2.3
Central Government Ministry 3	MGB03	Botswana	2.0	1.0	1.5	0.7	2.2	0.8
State-owned Enterprise	SEBO1	Botswana	2.5	2.5	2.5	0	2.5	2.5
Autonomous Agency	AAES1	Eswatini	3.5	3.5	3.5	0	3.5	3.5
State-owned Enterprise	SEES1	Eswatini	3.5	4.0	3.8	0.3	4.1	3.4
State-owned Enterprise	SEGH1	Ghana	2.7	4.7	3.7	1.4	5.1	2.3
Autonomous Agency	AAKE1	Kenya	5.0	5.0	5.0	0	5.0	5.0
Autonomous Agency	AASL1	Sierra Leone	3.0	4.0	3.5	0.7	4.2	2.8
Central Government Ministry	MGSL1	Sierra Leone	4.2	4.2	4.2	0	4.2	4.2
State-owned Enterprise	SESL1	Sierra Leone	3.0	3.0	3.0	0	3.0	3.0
Autonomous Agency 1	AATG1	The Gambia	4.3	4.5	4.4	0.2	4.6	4.2
Autonomous Agency 2	AATG2	The Gambia	3.6	3.8	3.7	0.1	3.8	3.6
Central Government Ministry 1	MG TG1	The Gambia	4.0	3.0	3.5	0.7	4.2	2.8
Central Government Ministry 2	MG TG2	The Gambia	3.0	3.0	3.0	0	3.0	3.0
Central Government Ministry 1	MGB01	Botswana	3.0	3.0	3.0	0	3.0	3.0
Central Government Ministry 2	MGB02	Botswana	2.3	2.7	2.5	0.2	2.7	2.3
Central Government Ministry 3	MGB03	Botswana	2.0	1.0	1.5	0.7	2.2	0.8
State-owned Enterprise	SEBO1	Botswana	2.5	2.5	2.5	0	2.5	2.5
Autonomous Agency	AAES1	Eswatini	3.5	3.5	3.5	0	3.5	3.5
State-owned Enterprise	SEES1	Eswatini	3.5	4.0	3.8	0.3	4.1	3.4
State-owned Enterprise	SEGH1	Ghana	2.7	4.7	3.7	1.4	5.1	2.3
Autonomous Agency	AAKE1	Kenya	5.0	5.0	5.0	0	5.0	5.0
Autonomous Agency	AASL1	Sierra Leone	3.0	4.0	3.5	0.7	4.2	2.8
Central Government Ministry	MGSL1	Sierra Leone	4.2	4.2	4.2	0	4.2	4.2
State-owned Enterprise	SESL1	Sierra Leone	3.0	3.0	3.0	0	3.0	3.0
Autonomous Agency 1	AATG1	The Gambia	4.3	4.5	4.4	0.2	4.6	4.2
Autonomous Agency 2	AATG2	The Gambia	3.6	3.8	3.7	0.1	3.8	3.6
Central Government Ministry 1	MG TG1	The Gambia	4.0	3.0	3.5	0.7	4.2	2.8
Central Government Ministry 2	MG TG2	The Gambia	3.0	3.0	3.0	0	3.0	3.0

Figure 14.1. Case studies – combined Step 1 average rating by country

Where there is a greater diversity of individuals contributing to the case study, it provides greater satisfaction that the quantitative analysis of the closed questions (examined in this section) reduces potential bias. It also provides a richer insight from the qualitative responses to the open questions (which latter are examined in a subsequent section below).

These closed questions (in Table 14.4) were rated from 1 to 5, with a lower score suggesting a negative risk to the ERM implementation for a country and a higher score broadly indicating an opportunity for a successful implementation. The 'combined Step 1 rating' provides an average of the responses of all questions that contribute to Step 1. A small standard deviation means that

the values in the set of questions are close to the mean of the group, on average, and a large standard deviation means that the values in the set of questions are farther away from the mean, on average. Question ratings that exceed the 'upper bound' are unusually high and those that are lower than the 'lower bound' are unusually low. The bounds are computed by adding (upper bound) and subtracting (lower bound) the standard deviation from the combined (average) rating.

Only two questions are mapped to Step 1, and they both test the extent to which the vital decision-making support function of ERM was built into the initial thinking that informed the entity's PS-ERM. The overall considerations of the ToC for Step 1



Figure 14.2. Case studies – Combined Step 1 average rating by organisation

Figure 14.3. Case study – Combined Step 1 rating by gender

are outlined in Section 4.1.2 (Part 1). This highlights the importance of goal-oriented design that is informed by Covey's First Habit: 'Begin with the End in Mind' (Covey 2020). Mistakes made at the conceptual stage can lead to significant strategic drift during implementation, reducing the likelihood of attaining the expected benefits of PS-ERM for the public sector as a whole, and not just for the specific implementing organisation. In this case, insufficient prioritisation of the primary benefit (of decision support) leads to subsequent actions that may create challenges in delivering a successful PS-ERM ecosystem.

Question 5.2 checks the extent to which decision support to the national cabinet was a key factor in the design of the organisation's ERM. Question 5.3 assesses the extent to which decision support to the entity was prioritised. Table 14.13, below, shows that roughly 30 per cent of persons responding to the case study were female and 70 per cent were male. Figure 14.3 suggests that female respondents were on average more worried about their organisation's performance for Step 1, with an average rating at the modest median of 3.0. Males, however, were more positive, with an average rating of 3.6. Overall, the ratings for Step 1 suggest that there is room for improvement in its contribution to a successful PS-ERM.

Eight (8) entities (53%) rated the 'decision support to the national cabinet' Question 5.2 at or below the median score of 3. This includes all four entities from Botswana, two of the three Sierra Leone entities, one of the four Gambian entities, and the sole Ghanaian entity. This suggests that the value of those entity ERMs to the ultimate goal of decision support to the National Development Strategy (NDS) can be significantly enhanced by an appropriate re-engineering of the design. Both Eswatini entities and one Gambian entity

Table 14.4. Number and percentage of persons contributing to the case study by country and organisation code

Organisation Code	Country	No. of people completing the case study	People completing the case study (%)
MGB01	Botswana	16	31
MGB02	Botswana	3	6
SEB01	Botswana	2	4
MGB03	Botswana	1	2
SEES1	Eswatini	2	4
AAES1	Eswatini	2	4
SEGH1	Ghana	3	6
AAKE1	Kenya	1	2
MGSL1	Sierra Leone	6	12
SESL1	Sierra Leone	4	8
AASL1	Sierra Leone	1	2
AATG2	The Gambia	5	10
AATG1	The Gambia	4	8
MG TG1	The Gambia	1	2
MG TG2	The Gambia	1	2
Total		52	100

(20% of the total of 15 entities) suggest some, but not entirely confident incorporation of this consideration, with ratings of between 3.5 and 3.6, below the top scale (ratings of 4–5 inclusive). This also suggests a fair scope for improvement in support of the monitoring of the NDS. These two groups, taken together, suggest that 73 per cent (almost three-quarters) of the responding entities have significant or major enhancements that can be provided in their support of the development and/or monitoring of the NDS.

Twenty-seven (27) per cent of the responding entities – two from The Gambia, one each from Sierra Leone and Kenya – rate their incorporation of NDS considerations in the top scale (4 to 5 inclusive). We only have one respondent entity from Kenya, which makes it difficult to make an inference about wider practices of public sector entities in that country. In the case of the four Gambian entities, it is noteworthy that they are represented in all three groups – (a) weak NDS incorporation; (b) some, but not quite sufficient; and (c) those with high confidence of incorporation. This suggests weak quality assurance of the wider PS-ERM of the country; that is, greater central oversight of the design approach of entity ERMs would be beneficial to the attainment of the NDS through better decision-making and/or control of its implementation. Similar considerations apply to Sierra Leone, where two of the three entities are in the lowest band (a) and one is in the highest band (c).

The data suggest that the PS-ERMs of the other three countries (Botswana, Eswatini and Ghana) would also significantly benefit from improved central oversight of the design approach of entity ERMs.

Seven entities (47%) rate the 'entity decision support' Question 5.3 at or below the median

score of 3.0. This includes all four Botswana entities, one (of three) from Sierra Leone, and two (of four) from The Gambia. Two entities (13%) – from The Gambia and Eswatini – have ratings between 3 and 4 (exclusive of either extremity). This provides a total of 60 per cent of respondent entities for which significant or major enhancements can be provided in support of the decision-making and/or monitoring of their organisational strategy.

Six entities (40% of the total of 15) rate their incorporation of organisational strategy considerations in the top scale (4 and above). These include the sole contributor entities from Ghana and Kenya, as well as two (of three) from Sierra Leone, one (of two) from Eswatini, and one (of four) from The Gambia. The sole contributors from Ghana and Kenya make it difficult to ascertain whether this is standard practice in their public sectors. However, the variability of practices in the other four countries indicates that they can benefit from the establishment of easy-to-use centralised and monitored reference standards for the design and implementation of public sector entity ERMs.

When we consider the relative responses to Questions 5.2 and 5.3, it is evident that there is greater overall appreciation of the contribution of PS-ERM to organisational decision-making (40% of respondent organisations rated themselves highly); but less appreciation of the need to provide support to the NDS or of the organisations' contribution to decision-making in pursuance of the NDS (only 27% of respondent organisations gave themselves the top scale rating). There is a need for the PS-ERM of each country to be seen as an organic whole, in need of centralised development and implementation standards and central implementation oversight. There is

Table 14.5. Case study analysis of closed questions on Step 1 – Getting started, by country

Your country of residence	Q5.2	Q5.3	Combined Group 1 Indicator
Kenya	5.0	5.0	5.0
The Gambia	3.8	3.9	3.9
Sierra Leone	3.6	3.7	3.7
Ghana	2.7	4.7	3.7
Eswatini	3.5	3.8	3.6
Botswana	2.8	2.8	2.8

a risk that current practices may encourage the perspective that entity ERM's are 'independent' or only loosely associated. This poses a material risk to the goal effectiveness of the wider country PS-ERM ecosystem.

Given the small number of questions that contribute to this Step 1 analysis, it is not surprising that all question ratings fall within the upper and lower bounds (see Table 14.3 and the explanation at the start of this section) for all reporting entities; that is, there are no unusually high or low ratings for the individual entity ratings of themselves, even though there are wide variations between entities, as analysed above.

The following quotes from respondents to issues relating to Step 1 provide a useful illustration of key issues:

My organisation sponsored members of the board to attend ... conferences that included topics on ERM. The board members' exposure to discussion on ERM was instrumental to gaining buy-in of the board and senior management.


Failing to link [our] organisation's risks to a national risk co-ordination body was a negative.

Starting [our] ERM without strongly linking it to the organisation's strategic objectives, but rather doing so from the departmental objectives, was in my view a negative case on our part.

14.4 Case study insights on the ERM journey: Step 2 – Organising and planning for a PS-ERM ecosystem

Table 14.6 presents the overall responses for Stage 2 across all countries, by anonymised organisation code representing 15 entities. The analysis by country only is shown in Table 14.8. The entities represent a mix of central government ministries, state-owned enterprises and autonomous agencies. The rationale supporting the decision to invite a mix of entities was explained in the discussion on the sampling method in section 4.2.3 (Volume 1). The actual mix in individual countries depended on the voluntary response to invitations

Figure 14.4. Case Study - Combined Step 2 Rating by Gender



to participate in the research. The actual number (52) of individuals responding for each organisation is analysed in Table 14.4, above. The benefits of having multiple responses per organisation were outlined in the previous section 14.3. Table 14.13, below, shows that we had a gender split of roughly 70 per cent males and 30 per cent females. Figure 14.4 suggests that female respondents were on average more positive on their organisation's performance for Step 2, with an average rating at the modest median of 3.0 (which was the same rating for Step 1). Males, however, were decidedly downbeat, with an average rating of 2.6 (much more pessimistic than Step 1, which was rated 3.6). Overall, the ratings for Step 2 suggest that there is significant room for improvement in its contribution to a successful PS-ERM.

As shown in Table 14.7, the five questions mapped to Step 2 related to considerations of the adequacy of human competences for the delivery of PS-ERM (Questions 5.22 and 5.23); the overall congruence of practices within each organisation with the expectations of the ToC, outlined in Section 4.1.3 (Part 1) – Question 5.10; the effectiveness of the communication of the objectives and design of the PS-ERM – Question 5.24; and the extent to which a pilot test contributed to this step of the implementation (Question 5.25).

At 2.8, the overall rating for this step is below the median, in decidedly pessimistic territory. This compares poorly with the modest but positive result for Step 1, with an average 3.4 – as shown in Table 14.12, below. All elements considered in this step are rated on average below the median, with the pilot test receiving the most concern at 2.5. Indeed, the human competences questions (5.22 and 5.23) were rated much more pessimistically by males at 2.4 and 2.5 respectively, with the overall

Table 14.6. Case study analysis of closed questions on Step 2 – Organising and planning, by country and by organisation code

Organisation	Identifying Code	Country	Q5.10	Q5.22	Q5.23	Q5.24	Q5.25	Combined Step 2 rating	Standard deviation	Upper bound	Lower bound
Central Government Ministry 1	MGB01	Botswana	2.9	2.1	2.1	2.6	2.8	2.5	0.4	2.9	2.1
Central Government Ministry 2	MGB02	Botswana	3.0	1.7	1.7	1.3	2.0	1.9	0.6	2.6	1.3
Central Government Ministry 3	MGB03	Botswana	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.4	0.6	2.0	0.9
State-owned Enterprise	SEBO1	Botswana	2.0	2.5	2.5	1.5	2.0	2.1	0.4	2.5	1.7
Autonomous Agency	AAES1	Eswatini	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	2.5	3.5	0.7	4.2	2.8
State-owned Enterprise	SEES1	Eswatini	2.0	1.5	2.0	3.0	1.0	1.9	0.7	2.6	1.2
State-owned Enterprise	SEGH1	Ghana	3.7	4.0	4.7	4.0	2.0	3.7	1	4.7	2.7
Autonomous Agency	AAKE1	Kenya	3.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.4	0.9	3.3	1.5
Autonomous Agency	AASL1	Sierra Leone	2.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	2.8	0.8	3.6	2.0
Central Government Ministry 1	MGSL1	Sierra Leone	3.2	3.8	3.8	2.2	3.8	3.4	0.7	4.1	2.6
State-owned Enterprise	SESL1	Sierra Leone	3.0	3.8	3.3	2.8	2.8	3.1	0.4	3.5	2.7
Autonomous Agency 1	AATG1	The Gambia	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.3	0.2	4.4	4.1
Autonomous Agency 2	AATG2	The Gambia	3.4	2.6	2.8	4.0	3.8	3.3	0.6	3.9	2.7
Central Government Ministry 1	MGTG1	The Gambia	4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.6	0.9	3.5	1.7
Central Government Ministry 2	MGTG2	The Gambia	1.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.6	0.9	3.5	1.7

Highlighted figures are in the top quintile of responses on a scale from 1 to 5, i.e., they are between 4 and 5 inclusive.

Table 14.7. Short Descriptions for the Closed Questions mapped to Step 2

Closed Question from Engagement 5	Short description	All Entity Average
5.25 To what extent was your entity ERM implementation supported (or is expected to be supported) by a well-planned pilot test that increases the chances of successful implementation?	Pilot	2.5
5.22 To what extent is your entity ERM supported by strong human competences in the Risk Unit?	Risk Unit Competences	2.7
5.10 To what extent did/does your ERM implementation plan have features consistent with the above outline?	ToC congruence (section 4.1.3 – Volume 1)	2.8
5.24 To what extent are your entity ERM Strategy policies and processes understandable and a practical basis for action?	PS-ERM Understandability	2.8
5.23 To what extent is your entity ERM supported by strong human competences in the management and governance functions?	Governance Competences	2.9
Overall Average		2.8

averages increased by slightly more positive views from females. As these first two steps are vital foundations for subsequent success, the results suggest significant scope for enhancement of the effectiveness of PS-ERMs.

When we reflect on the human competences (Questions 5.22 and 5.23), 50 per cent of the 30 averages in Table 14.6, are rated below the median of 3.0, indicating a concern that significant enhancement in training and skills is required. Just under a quarter of responses (23%) are in the confident top scale (4 and above) and 27 per cent are in the modestly positive range from 3 to 3.9. For Botswana, there was a uniform agreement across all entities that

greater results can be secured through improved investment in competences. It should be noted that Botswana provided the highest number of individual respondents, which improves the degree to which we can be satisfied that the views expressed are truly reflective of reality. It should also be considered that minimum expectations for competences can validly vary between entities and between countries.

The two entities from Eswatini show a mixed picture of their assessment of their human competences. The SOE is in Botswana territory, with averages below the median. The autonomous agency is in robustly confident mood, with both ratings in the highest scale (above 4). Table 14.4 shows that both



Figure 14.5. Case studies – Combined Step 2 average rating by country

Figure 14.6. Case Studies – Combined Step 2 average rating by type of organisation

organisations had two individuals contributing to the case study.

The Ghana SOE had three individual contributors and the average assessment of human competencies was strongly positive, above 4.0, in the top scale. The Kenya autonomous agency was relatively pessimistic in its ratings, with both elements rated at or below the median of 3.0. Indeed, 5.22 relating to the empowering of the Risk Unit was clearly concerning at a rating of 1.0. Sierra Leone's three entities were fairly consistent in their views of their human capacities for ERM. All the six ratings were at or above the median of 3.0, including one robustly confident 4.0 rating of the ERM governance competency of the autonomous agency. The four Gambian entities, like their Eswatini counterparts, present a mixed outcome. Three entities are clustered together, with their human capacity ratings at or below the median of

3.0. Indeed, one ministry gives both elements a rating of 2.0. However, one autonomous agency is a clear outlier, with strong confidence in the contribution of its human competences to its Risk Unit and to its governance.

Question 5.10 on the overall congruence with the ToC for Step 1 is possibly the most important as it requires a comprehensive assessment. Its 15 responses reasonably resemble the 'bell curve' of the statistical 'normal' distribution, with one rating of 1 (7%), five ratings of 2 (33%), seven ratings of 3 (47%) and two ratings of 4 (13%). This provides a total of 40 per cent below the median of 3.0 (the human competences above had 50% in this relatively downbeat range). This shows a still significant proportion that can benefit from improved PS-ERM implementation practices.

Table 14.8. Case study analysis of closed questions on Step 2 - organising and planning – by country

Your Country of Residence?	Q5.10	Q5.22	Q5.23	Q5.24	Q5.25	Combined Group 2 Indicator
Ghana	3.7	4.0	4.7	4.0	2.0	3.7
The Gambia	3.6	3.2	3.3	3.7	3.8	3.5
Sierra Leone	3.0	3.7	3.6	2.5	3.3	3.2
Eswatini	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.5	1.8	2.7
Kenya	3.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.4
Botswana	2.8	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.3

The Gambia presents an intriguing picture. As would be expected, the autonomous agency that rated its human competences highly took one of the two top rating (4 and above) on this overall measure. However, a ministry that was very concerned about its human capacities (both rated 2), was strongly bullish on the overall measure, at 4.0. This was unexpected and inconsistent. The Gambia monopolised the '4s' for this overall measure, as no other country rated it in the top scale. The second Gambian ministry rated themselves at overall '1', which is far below its human competency ratings of 3 – suggesting scope for better utilisation of its people through enhanced ERM implementation processes.

For the other countries and their entities, the number that rated themselves below the median of 3.0, at six entities, just exceeded those with modest optimism, who rated themselves at or above 3.0 but less than top scale 4.0.

Question 5.24 on the understandability of ERM strategies, policies and processes was an important indicator of good communication practice. People cannot succeed in what they do not really understand. Its 15 responses form a less perfect, but still recognisable, 'bell curve', with two ratings of 1 (13%), five ratings of 2 (33%), four ratings of 3 (27%) and four ratings of 4 (27%). This provides a total of 46 per cent below the median of 3.0 (similar to the human competences above, which had 50% in this relatively downbeat range). This shows, again, a significant proportion that can benefit from improved PS-ERM implementation habits.

Again, it is worth starting with The Gambia, which has two of the four '4' ratings. As expected, the autonomous agency ref 1 is consistent in its high assessment of its ERM practices. It is joined by the other autonomous agency (ref 2), which is also bullish about its comprehension of its ERM strategy, policies and processes. The Ghana SOE, which has also sustained a generally high self-assessment, again features with a top scale '4'. It is also joined by an Eswatini autonomous agency, which similarly has generally found its practices congruent with the ToC.

Question 5.25 on the effective use of a pilot test attracted only one top ranked rating in the '4' range, again from the Gambian autonomous agency AATG1. The 15 responses to Question 5.25 form

a more recognisable 'bell curve', with two ratings of 1 (13%), eight ratings of 2 (53%), four ratings of 3 (27%) and one rating of 4 (7%). This provides a total of 66 per cent (two-thirds) below the median of 3.0. This is the highest proportion in this relatively pessimistic range. This shows, evidently, a major proportion that may benefit from improved PS-ERM implementation habits. It should be noted that the Ghana entity, although it rated itself an average '2' on this metric, expressed the following view that there may be circumstances where it is possible to execute a successful implementation without a pilot:

In my opinion, the pilot implementation approach may not be the best option across all organizations. For smaller institutions, a full roll-out strategy could be implemented with effective stakeholder engagement.
(Stakeholder, SEGH1)

Other useful (anonymised) comments from other stakeholders on Step 2 included:

The risk officers appointed do not have the required skill set and competencies.

[We experienced a] lack of interest in the implementation of ERM by piloted departments.

14.5 Case Study Insights on the ERM Journey: Step 3 – Operating a PS-ERM ecosystem

Table 14.10 shows the 13 questions mapped to Step 3 (Step 1 had two and Step 2 had five questions) related to the practical effect of ERM on the entity and on national strategy (four questions shaded green); the adequacy of the scope of the ERM (two questions shaded mauve); the overall effect of ERM on the organisation's efficiency and effectiveness (four questions shaded rust); the extent of the implementation of ERM (one question shaded orange); and the quality assurance of ERM (two questions shaded yellow).

At 3.0, the overall rating for this step in Table 14.9 is just at the median, indicating much room for growth in the practice of PS-ERM. This is broadly the same territory as Step 2 (average 2.8) and below the modest but positive result for Step 1, with an average 3.4, as shown in Table 14.12. Figure 14.10

Table 14.9. Case study analysis of closed questions on Step 3 – Operating a PS-ERM ecosystem, by country and by organisation code

Organisation	Identifying Code	Country	5A	5.4	5.16	5.17	5.18	5.19	5.20	5.21	5.26	5.27	5.28	5.29	5.30	Combined Step 3 Rating	Standard deviation	Upper bound	Lower bound
State-owned Enterprise	SEBO1	Botswana	2.0	3.0	1.5	3.5	3.0	2.5	4.5	2.0	2.0	3.5	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.7	0.8	3.5	1.8
Central Government Ministry 3	MGB03	Botswana	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.4	1.7	0.8
Central Government Ministry 2	MGB02	Botswana	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.7	1.7	2.7	1.3	1.0	1.7	1.3	1.9	0.5	2.4	1.4
Central Government Ministry 1	MGB01	Botswana	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.5	3.0	2.3	2.4	2.3	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.5	0.3	2.9	2.2
State-owned Enterprise	SEES1	Eswatini	3.0	2.5	2.0	3.5	1.5	2.0	1.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	2.5	2.5	1.5	2.4	0.8	3.2	1.6
Autonomous Agency	AAES1	Eswatini	2.5	4.0	2.0	4.0	2.5	3.5	4.5	3.5	3.5	3.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.2	0.8	3.9	2.4
State-owned Enterprise	SEGH1	Ghana	3.0	4.3	2.3	4.3	3.5	4.7	3.7	3.3	4.7	2.0	2.7	4.0	3.3	3.5	0.9	4.4	2.7
Autonomous Agency	AAKE1	Kenya	5.0	4.0	1.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	4.0	3.5	1.4	4.9	2.1
State-owned Enterprise	SESL1	Sierra Leone	3.0	3.3	2.8	3.3	3.0	3.8	3.5	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.8	3.0	0.4	3.4	2.6
Central Government Ministry	MGSL1	Sierra Leone	3.7	4.3	3.5	4.2	2.4	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.5	4.5	2.8	3.7	3.0	3.3	0.7	4.0	2.6
Autonomous Agency	AASL1	Sierra Leone	4.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.5	0.8	4.2	2.7
Central Government Ministry 2	MGTG2	The Gambia	4.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	0.6	3.6	2.3
Central Government Ministry 1	MGTG1	The Gambia	1.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	1.0	2.0	3.8	1.5	5.2	2.3
Autonomous Agency 2	AATG2	The Gambia	3.2	3.4	3.2	4.2	3.8	3.6	3.0	4.2	3.6	2.6	3.8	2.8	3.2	3.4	0.5	3.9	2.9
Autonomous Agency 1	AATG1	The Gambia	3.5	3.5	3.3	4.0	4.5	3.8	3.5	3.5	4.3	2.8	4.0	4.3	3.3	3.7	0.5	4.2	3.2

Highlighted figures are in the top quintile of responses on a scale from 1 to 5, i.e., they are between 4 and 5 inclusive.


shows that of the 13 questions contributing to this step, 9 (70%) are at or below the median of 3.0. As shown in Figure 14.7, there is a clear perception gap between female and male contributors to the case study. The 30 per cent female cohort is, at an

average 2.6, markedly more concerned than the males, who are at an admittedly modest average of 3.1.

Table 14.10. Short descriptions for the closed questions mapped to Step 3

Closed question from Engagement 5	Short description	All entity average
5.17 To what extent does your entity ERM provide relevant and timely risk information for decision-making on your organisation's strategy, directly or indirectly, to its most senior governance levels?	ERM Strategy	3.7
5.20 To what extent does your entity ERM see the Risk Unit as the risk management owners?	Abdication to Risk Unit	3.3
5.19 To what extent does your entity ERM have the maintenance of a risk register as its primary focus?	Register focus	3.2
5.4 To what extent does your entity manage 'enterprise risks' (i.e., the full range of exposures to governance, strategy, people, funding, business-specific etc. risks and opportunities) and to what extent do you primarily manage business-specific 'operational' risks such as credit risks of a bank?	Scope	3.1
5.21 To what extent is your entity ERM supported by trust and confidence between staff, management, the board of directors and/or political stakeholders?	Entity Trust	3.0
5.26 To what extent has your entity ERM implementation been fully implemented (or has sensible plans for full implementation) throughout your organisation?	Full Implementation	3.0
5A To what extent is your organisation so engaged in 'firefighting', so that it never has enough time to plan and think ahead?	Effectiveness	2.9
5.18 To what extent does your entity ERM provide relevant and timely information for decision-making on both positive opportunities, as well as negative events?	Scope	2.9
5.27 To what extent has your entity ERM implementation made provisions for, or has been subjected to, autonomous review by your internal audit function that is free from conflicts of interest?	Independent Internal Audit	2.8
5.29 To what extent does your entity ERM capture all the negative and positive risks (from governance risks to operational risks and everything in between) to which your organisation is exposed, on a timely basis, before they become a serious problem?	Risk/Opportunity Identification	2.8
5.28 To what extent has your entity ERM implementation made provisions for, or has been subjected to, external review by an independent expert from outside your organisation?	External Review	2.7
5.30 To what extent does your organisation act on time to manage and satisfactorily reduce the impact of risks that have been identified by your ERM system?	Risk Mitigation	2.7
5.16 To what extent does your entity ERM provide relevant and timely risk information for decision-making on the National Development Strategy, directly or indirectly, to the national cabinet?	NDS strategy	2.5
Average		3.0

Figure 14.7. Case study – Combined Step 3 rating by gender



The contribution of PS-ERM to the NDS receives the most concern, at an overall average of 2.5. However, its contribution to the entity ERM strategy is the highest rated, at an average 3.7. This suggests that the design of PS-ERM would benefit from greater central co-ordination, if the benefits to national development are to be fully realised.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the critical importance of acting on time to identified risks and opportunities. So, it is very concerning that the timely identification of risks and opportunities is the third lowest rated at 2.8, while acting on identified risks and opportunities is joint second lowest rated at 2.7.

Question 5A is perhaps the most critical question of all, for it assesses the practical operating environment of the surveyed entities. After all, ERM is about moving from a reactive posture to a proactive one; that is, if there is an effective ERM in place, 'firefighting' (which is inherently reactive) should be the exception and not the norm. It is

noteworthy that the response to this question is a modest median of 3.0, overall – indicating much room for improvement. Perhaps, this is partly explained by the equally modest rating of 3.0 given to the assessment of organisational trust (Question 5.21); the 2.9 rating given to the responsiveness of implemented ERMs to both positive and negative risks (Question 5.18); the 3.1 rating of the extent to which ERMs are truly 'enterprise' in their scope of risk types (Question 5.4); the possibility of the wrong treatment of a risk register as a goal in itself and not as a means to the end of decision support (Question 5.19, rated 3.2); and the risk of management seeing risk as the business of the Risk Unit, instead of an everyday decision tool that concerns everyone (Question 5.20, rated 3.3).

We now consider, in greater depth, the questions that address the impact of PS-ERM on the case study organisations' efficiency and effectiveness (four questions shaded rust including the critical Q5A) by reference to Table 14.9. Its 60 responses form a rough 'bell curve', with 10 ratings of 1 (17%), 15 ratings of 2 (25%), 22 ratings of 3 (37%) and 13 ratings of 4 (22%). This provides a total of 42 per cent below the median of 3, a significant proportion in decidedly downbeat territory. In terms of top scale ratings, the 13 identified included four top ratings from the Kenya AAKE1, four from the Sierra Leone AASL1 (both autonomous agencies), and one each from five other entities, i.e., Ghana's SEGH1 and the four Gambian entities. This gives seven entities which assessed themselves with at least one top scale rating; that is, 47 per cent of the full cohort of 15 entities.

Figure 14.8. Case studies – Combined Step 3 average rating by country





Figure 14.9. Case studies – Combined Step 3 average rating by organisation code

When we focus on the defining Question 5A of the group – i.e., the extent to which ‘firefighting’ still exists in the organisations – the top scale group shrinks to three (20 per cent) of the full cohort of 15; that is, Kenya’s AAKE1, Sierra Leone’s AASL1 and The Gambia’s MGTG2. They may provide valuable insights for other organisations to enhance their PS-ERM effectiveness. These three entities each had one person contributing to their case study, as shown in Table 14.4. By contrast, Botswana’s MGB01 had 16 contributors to its modest Q5A rating of 3.1 and its overall Step 3 rating of 2.5. The overall Step 3 ratings of AAKE1, AASL1 and MGTG2 were 3.5, 3.5 and 2.9, respectively, in Figure 14.9. It is noteworthy, that The Gambia’s MGTG1 rates itself a 1 on the critical Question 5A, but offers the highest overall rating for Step 3 at 3.8. This appears to be internally inconsistent for MGTG1.

The entity and national strategy composite indicator has four questions shaded green (Table 14.10). Its 60 responses form a skewed distribution, with the skew towards the higher ratings of 3 and 4. The composite has 5 ratings of 1 (9%), 17 ratings of 2 (28%), 21 ratings of 3 (35%) and 17 ratings of 4 or above (28%). This provides a total of 37 per cent (roughly one-third) below the median of 3.0, which is a lower but still significant proportion in downbeat territory. In terms of top scale ratings above 4.0, the 17 identified included four top ratings from The Gambia MGTG1, three top ratings from the Kenya AAKE1, two from the Eswatini AAES1, two from the Ghana SEGH1,

two from the Sierra Leone AASL1, and one each from Botswana SEBO1, Sierra Leone MGSL1, The Gambia AATG1 and The Gambia AATG2. This gives nine entities which assessed themselves with at least one top scale rating, i.e., 60 per cent of the full cohort of 15 entities.

There are two ‘key’ questions within this group, i.e., Question 5.16 on the link to the National Development Strategy (NDS) and Question 5.17 on the link to the entity strategy.

With the exception of Botswana’s SEBO1, eight of the nine entities with top scale ratings also rate their ERM alignment to the entity strategy at 4.0 or above. SEBO1 rated themselves a modest 3.5. However, only one entity, out of this group of nine, rated its link with the NDS at 4.0 or above; i.e., The Gambia’s MGTG1, which rated itself at 4.0. Among the other eight entities, the link to the NDS included a rating of 1.0 (Kenya’s AAKE1), 1.5 from Botswana’s SEBO1, a rating of 2 from Eswatini’s AAES1 and a rating of 2.3 from Ghana’s SEGH1. The other four entities (two from The Gambia and two from Sierra Leone) rated themselves between 3.0 and 3.5 for alignment to the NDS. There is clearly significant room for systemic improvement of the focus of PS-ERM on its ultimate value of service to national development.

The adequacy of the scope of impact of the PS-ERM has two questions in Table 14.10 shaded mauve. Its 30 responses contribute to the two questions with four ratings of 1 (13%), eight ratings

Table 14.11. Case study analysis of closed questions on Step 3 – Operating a PS-ERM ecosystem, by country

Your Country of Residence?	Q5A	Q5.4	Q5.16	Q5.17	Q5.18	Q5.19	Q5.20	Q5.21	Q5.26	Q5.27	Q5.28	Q5.29	Q5.30	Combined Group 3 Indicator
Kenya	5.0	4.0	1.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	4.0	3.5
Ghana	3.0	4.3	2.3	4.3	3.5	4.7	3.7	3.3	4.7	2.0	2.7	4.0	3.3	3.5
The Gambia	3.2	3.4	3.3	4.1	4.0	3.6	3.4	3.8	3.8	2.9	3.9	3.2	3.1	3.5
Sierra Leone	3.5	3.7	3.2	3.8	2.7	3.2	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.8	2.8	3.2	3.0	3.2
Eswatini	2.8	3.3	2.0	3.8	2.0	2.8	3.0	2.8	3.3	3.5	2.3	2.8	2.3	2.8
Botswana	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.5	3.0	2.1	2.3	2.2	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.4

of 2 (27%), ten ratings of 3 (33%) and eight ratings of 4 or above (27%). This provides a total of 40 per cent below the median of 3.0, which is still a significant proportion in pessimistic territory. Two entities stand out with top scale (>4) ratings on both questions, i.e., Kenya's AAKE1 and The Gambia's MGTG1.

The stage of implementation of ERM has one question in Table 14.10 shaded **orange**. Three entities give themselves top tier ratings for their plans for implementation given the ToC or that they have sound plans to attain full implementation. These are Ghana's SEGH1, The Gambia's MGTG1 and The Gambia's AATG1.

The quality assurance of ERM has two questions shaded **yellow**, on which The Gambia's MGTG1 again rates itself highly on both metrics, as does Sierra Leone's AASL1.

In conclusion, the 15 entities had an average 'combined' rating for Step 3 that ranged from 1.2 for Botswana's MGBO1 to 3.7 for The Gambia's AATG1. No entity had a combined rating at 4.0 or above. Two entities had combined averages in the '1' ratings range (13%), while four were in the '2' range (27%) and nine were in the '3' range (60%). Consequently, 40% were below the median of 3.0, but 60 per cent were above that median. There is undoubtedly scope for growth, but the foundations for such growth appear to be in place.

Useful insights from stakeholders on Step 3 include:

[We now discuss] budget[s] on sectoral base to avoid duplication of activities and programs within the same sector.

Duplication of functions to or by various establishments...without clear cut of limitation is a challenge that [our ministry] is currently facing. Thus, ineffective co-ordination of activities, policies and strategies and programmes within and between [our ministry] and other [public sector] establishments... is an order of the day. This gives a lot of problems to [our ministry]. [A] Plan is ongoing to write and secure cabinet paper on this matter so that [certain key] matters are solely [our ministry's] responsibility.

14.6 Implications of the case study insights for Steps 1 to 3

The median rating (of a maximum 5) is 3. Table 14.12 summarises the dashboard insights from preceding sections. With the exception of the country average for Step 1 (which is skewed upwards by an unusually high rating from the sole Kenya case study participant), all averages cluster around the median. This is broadly consistent with the findings of the large-scale survey, which indicates that there is significant room for improvement of the effectiveness of PS-ERM in all countries. The case study data provides the additional insight that the challenges span all stages of the implementation process and that the Theory of Change (ToC) may provide a sound framework for enhancement of implementation outcomes.

Figure 14.10 displays the information in Table 14.12 in a graphical format. It should be recalled that the ratings are the individual perceptions of the participants. Further, some organisations provided a higher number of individual respondents, which improves the degree to which we can be satisfied that the views expressed are truly reflective of reality – see Table 14.12. It should also be noted that minimum expectations for the practical manifestations of the ToC, and the related questions of this research, can validly vary between entities and between countries. An old management adage is that 'a problem is a deviation from a standard'. Consequently, the fact that some respondents generally rate their compliance with the ToC as being low, may be the result of higher minimum expectations of themselves. Although it is useful to make comparisons across countries, the potential effect of differences in minimum self-expectations between individuals, organisations and countries should be kept in mind.

We now reflect on the implications of the content analysis carried out on the 'open' questions of the case study. The design of the analysis was outlined in Section 14.2, Table 14.12. These questions invited narrative responses from the individual contributors, which have been analysed using content analysis techniques. The content analysis sought to identify the underlying theme within each narrative contributed by a respondent. That theme was then classified using the classification

Table 14.12. Average ratings for the three steps by organisation type and by country

Organisa- tion	Country	Combined Group 1 Indicator	Combined Group 2 Indicator	Combined Group 3 Indicator	Average per Organisation
MGB03	Botswana	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.4
MGB02	Botswana	2.5	1.9	1.9	2.1
SEBO1	Botswana	2.5	2.1	2.7	2.4
MGB01	Botswana	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.7
SEES1	Eswatini	3.8	1.9	2.4	2.7
MGTG2	The Gambia	3.0	2.6	2.9	2.8
SESL1	Sierra Leone	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.0
AASL1	Sierra Leone	3.5	2.8	3.5	3.3
MGTG1	The Gambia	3.5	2.6	3.8	3.3
AAES1	Eswatini	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.4
AATG2	The Gambia	3.7	3.3	3.4	3.5
MGSL1	Sierra Leone	4.2	3.4	3.3	3.6
SEGH1	Ghana	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.6
AAKE1	Kenya	5.0	2.4	3.5	3.6
AATG1	The Gambia	4.4	4.3	3.7	4.1
Average per Step		3.4	2.8	3.0	3.0

Figure 14.10. Case study – Steps 1 to 3 ratings by organisation code




Table 14.13. Gender analysis for all persons responding to the case studies

Gender	No of persons	%
Female	16	31%
Male	36	69%
Grand Total	52	100%

scheme of Table 14.2. Note that the classification scheme was developed from issues arising from the large-scale survey (LSS), documented in Parts 2 to 7 of this research. This provides a link between the emergent lessons from the LSS to this case study volume.

The number of incidences of each classification type was counted. For example, Table 14.15 shows that there were 39 instances of narratives that related to PS-ERM system structures that are favourable to successful PS-ERM for Step

1, the feasibility stage of implementation. Table 14.17 shows that there were 16 instances of narratives that suggested governance issues that pose negative risks to the Step 3, the stage of actually operating a PS-ERM. For Tables 14.15 and 14.16, the top seven classification types are shown, together with a sub-total. The total number of narratives that were classified is shown below the sub-total and the percentage of the grand total that is contributed by the top seven classifications is computed. This shows that the top seven classifications for Table 14.16 contributed 78 per cent of the total of 213 narratives that were classified. For Table 14.17, data are shown for the top four classifications, which contribute 59 per cent of the total of 105 narratives contributed by respondents.

The recognition of positive PS-ERM strategies, policies and processes practices (code SS+) that are consistent with the ToC is the top mentioned

Table 14.14. Case study – Assessment of the stage of their entity PS-ERM by individual contributors

Step No	Step description	No. of persons	%
1	Getting Started – Feasibility	14	27%
2	Organising and Planning for ERM	19	37%
3	Operating an ERM system	16	31%
x	None of the above – not started	3	6%
	Grand Total	52	100%

Table 14.15. Content analysis for Step 1

Description (Step 1)	Code	Group Total
System Structures (+ve)	SS+	39
System Structures (-ve)	SS-	31
Human Capacity (+ve)	HC+	27
Governance (-ve)	GV-	19
Culture Alienation	CA	18
Human Capacity (-ve)	HC-	17
Culture Trust	CT	15
Sub-total		166
Grand total items		213
Sub-total to Grand total %		78%

Table 14.16. Content analysis for Step 2

Description (Step 2)	Code	Grand Total
System Structures (+ve)	SS+	46
System Structures (-ve)	SS-	42
Human Capacity (+ve)	HC+	16
Culture Alienation	CA	16
Culture Trust	CT	14
Human Capacity (-ve)	HC-	12
Governance (-ve)	GV-	11
Sub-total		157
Grand total items		198
Sub-total to Grand Total %		79%

Table 14.17. Content analysis for Step 3

Description	Code	Grand Total
System Structures (-ve)	SS-	21
Governance (-ve)	GV-	16
System Structures (+ve)	SS+	13
Key Risk Indicators (+ve)	KR+	12
Sub-total		62
Grand total items		105
Sub-total to Grand total %		59%

item for Steps 1 and 2. However, weak (SS-) features dominate Step 3. This suggests that the conversion of plans into a sound operating PS-ERM is a challenge. It is noteworthy that negative entity governance practices (GV-) feature in the top considerations of all steps, but that they rise to second highest in number by Stage 3. This suggests that there may be a need for stronger entity and political awareness and leadership of PS-ERM, if it is to realise its potential for enhancing the attainment of national and entity strategies and related development outcomes.

The governance challenges may also be related to negative organisational culture features (CA), which exceed the instances of positive cultural attributes (CT) in Steps 1 and 2. Organisational culture is often configured by the dominant forces in an entity – those charged with governance and leadership. This may reinforce the need to engage with the leadership cadre to secure adequate commitment to the PS-ERM.

Indeed, where this leadership commitment has been secured, in one organisation, the following comment was made by a respondent:

Effective stakeholder engagements and awareness creation throughout the organization facilitated the creation of a risk-aware culture. For example, a Risk Management Development Committee comprising members from all departments was appointed to develop the ERM system. This facilitated acceptance and ownership of the process by all departments.

Another good governance practice worth noting was:

Reporting to the Board quarterly on ERM activities since inception facilitated guidance of the Board during the establishment phase and decision making during the implementation phase.

An example of a poor practice that should be avoided was:

The risk management processes were not integrated with decision-making processes at the beginning. Risk owners therefore considered the risk management processes as additional responsibilities separate from the decision-making processes.

Another structural weakness often noted was:

Risk Management is currently done by Internal Audit Department which is also required to provide assurance on the same, hence the Audit of ERM will need to be outsourced.

The critical role of political leadership is highlighted by this comment:

Ministry of Finance, who are the Policy sponsors, have not fully committed to implementation of ERM in the sense that it is still proving difficult to mobilise ERM structures in the Division and get them to carry out ERM activities. As a result, there are no risk registers.

The importance of allocating appropriate responsibilities and accountabilities was highlighted here:

Assigning accountability for delivery of risk management to director internal audit and not to heads of ministries and departments.

The risk posed to PS-ERM by political changes in leadership is emphasised here:

The New [entity head] still not providing time for revitalisation of the Enterprises Risk Management Committee, which he should chair.

To conclude, this example of sound leadership practice is worth noting:

The Board Chairman reports on ERM in the [entity's] annual reports. This sets the tone for ERM practices in [my entity].

The Executive Highlights on page 232 suggests an overall conclusion on the findings of these Country Case Studies.

15. Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

15.1 Introduction

Drawing on the Theory of Change (ToC; Section 4.2, Part 1) and the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the study, the following research questions were defined.

The contribution of the questions of the large-scale survey research Engagements 1 to 4 is detailed within Parts 2 to 7 (Chapters 8 to 13); while the contribution of the organisational case studies (research Engagement 5) is detailed in Part 8 (Chapter 14).

We also identified PS-ERM implementation as a longitudinal process that can be analysed with a three-step process flow:

- Step 1 – Getting Started, the Feasibility Stage;
- Step 2 – Organising and Planning for a PS-ERM ecosystem;
- Step 3 – Operating a PS-ERM ecosystem

The lessons learnt and recommendations from the research are mapped, below, to the related implementation step and the respective research question. The matters arising are intended to provide a reference guide for Commonwealth member countries to consider when planning, introducing and operating their PS-ERM systems.

Perhaps the greatest insight offered is the importance of 'beginning with the end in mind', that is, developing a deep understanding, at the start of the implementation, of the key features of a successful PS-ERM system, as identified in the Theory of Change and as confirmed by the research findings. Then, PS-ERM change agents should work back from that vision to the current status, developing a practical assessment of the positive and negative risks that must be managed as they seek to change the current PS-ERM state to their desired future PS-ERM state.

The same principle applies to those member countries who have already commenced their PS-ERM implementation. The recommendations of this research should be used to guide the re-engineering, where necessary, of their PS-ERM process. Again, this re-engineering must start by 'beginning with the end in mind'.

In the interaction with the six Country Steering Groups for the research, an enthusiasm was detected for the potential contribution of PS-ERM to the improvement of governance and strategy outcomes at the level of the individual entity, as well as at the national level. Perhaps, this was accentuated by the research coinciding with one of the greatest risk events in history – the COVID-19 pandemic. Steering groups actively engaged in

Research question	Short reference
1. To what extent has there been an application, in ERM design and in practice, of the dual service of the national cabinet (in its oversight of the National Development Strategy) and the leadership of state entities (in its oversight of the entity's long-term plan)? (<i>Source</i> : research consultant/public sector ERM ToC)	Driving Strategy and Performance
2. To what extent is the wider national operating environment congruent with the values, beliefs and practices that facilitate the optimal operation of a public sector ERM? (<i>Source</i> : research consultant/public sector ERM ToC)	Congruent Culture
3. To what extent has there been an application, in practice, of an enterprise-wide approach in the state planning, implementation, reporting, monitoring and review processes? (<i>Source</i> : ToR)	Enterprise-wide
4. To what degree have key institutions of government (including but not limited to the supreme audit institution and legislature) been involved in the ERM process during the initiation, training, implementation and rollout across government? (<i>Source</i> : ToR)	Participation
5. To what extent do case studies show early gains in governance and public financial management, particularly risk management decision-making, resulting from the introduction and roll of the ERM, in achieving the strategic objectives of government? (<i>Source</i> : ToR)	Early Gains

the direction and control of the research and took ownership of the same. They displayed an impressive candour about the challenges that they must overcome to deliver a well-functioning PS-ERM ecosystem in their countries.

By mobilising a very impressive number of stakeholders to engage with this combined research and capacity building, they have increased the general awareness and understanding of PS-ERM in their respective countries. It should be easier for the Steering Groups to promote the implementation of the recommendations arising out of this research.

It was observed that the technical assistance and international experience sharing facilitated by the Commonwealth Secretariat was highly valued by both the recipients of assistance and by those countries that had contributed experts to international experience sharing. This 'South-South' knowledge exchange was meaningful for its provision of insights into the

opportunities and downside risks of comparable operating environments.

When the evidence of the research is compared to the ToC, 16 lessons have been learnt that are summarised below. These lessons are consistent with the expectations of the ToC and with the insights of the global literature. In that sense, the research findings do not provide new insights. However, they do provide evidence from the context of countries that have not featured prominently as the sources of primary research in the global literature. Consequently, this research provides context-specific information that speaks to the reality of these countries and organisations. It is hoped that this relationship to the research will provide a basis for action on the lessons learnt and the related recommendations. Together with the 'win/win' design of the research, it is anticipated that it could deliver a meaningful contribution to the enthusiasm with which PS-ERM is welcomed in the participating countries.

15.2 Lessons learnt and recommendations

#	Description of lesson learnt	Supporting evidence	Research question	Implementation step	Research source
1.	ERM is more than a risk register. It demands more than taking stock of all the risks within an entity. It includes culturally driven practices to actively reduce negative risks and to harness positive opportunities.	Question 4.14 checked for 'register-thinking' and the presence of information silos. It demands pervasive risk thinking within a risk-aware entity culture. At 2.78, the six-country average is in downbeat territory. In general, successful ERM is not feasible where there are barriers to the efficient and timely flow of information to those parties who need to know and act upon such information.	Driving Strategy and Performance Congruent Culture Enterprise-wide	Step 3 – The operation of a PS-ERM cannot be effective with 'register-culture' and risk silos	Theory of Change – Part 1 country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 5
2.	PS-ERM should not be seen as a separate function or department. It should be an ingrained and reflex habit of top governance, senior management and all staff that provides an instinctive reference for planning, controlling and decision-making.	See remarks on Question 4.14 referenced in #1 above and on Question 4.5 referenced in #5 below.	Driving Strategy and Performance	Step 1 – Applying the ToC principle of 'begin with the end in mind'	Theory of Change – Part 1 country studies – Part 8
3.	Adequate human competences are the 'base camp' for successful public sector erm	Research suggested that the basic cognitive competences required were in place in all countries. They need to be reinforced with ERM-specific knowledge and skills as a core competence for all staff and governance levels.	Driving Strategy and Performance	Step 1 – Ensuring adequate recruitment, training and development	Theory of Change – Part 1 country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 3
4.	Organisational and societal trust within an enabling culture is 'mission critical' for ERM	Responses to the 'anomie' measures of alienation suggests that the successful implementation of public sector ERM must include a conscious element that seeks to address social cynicism and to improve the sense of collective purpose of public sector staff. There was significant room for improvement in all countries.	Congruent Culture	Step 1 – Dissonant values, preferences and habits will deter the collaboration that is essential to ERM. Trust is the lubricant of the ERM engine	Theory of Change – Part 1 country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 4

(Continued)

15.2 Lessons learnt and recommendations

#	Description of lesson learnt	Supporting evidence	Research question	Implementation step	Research source
5.	Public sector entities should strive to create a 'risk-aware' culture, where employees at all levels identify and communicate risks for evaluation and action. They need risk champions who encourage the identification of risks within each unit and who are motivated to elevate identified risks to leadership.	Responses to Question 4.5 suggests that current ERM implementation efforts may focus too much on 'systems and processes' (e.g., development and maintenance of a risk register) and not adequately on PS-ERM as 'an attitude of mind' that then influences the use of processes to attain agreed risk management goals.	Congruent Culture	Step 3 – The operation of a PS-ERM cannot be effective in the absence of a 'risk-aware' culture	Theory of Change – Part 1 country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 4
6.	Public sector ERM must be a decision-support mechanism – organisations must be confident in their use of information and communication technologies. They should have the management ability to use technology to capture enterprise risk information, allow their sensible screening and evaluation, and to track the response and reduction of risks to acceptable levels. Available technology should allow timely and better decisions on how to manage these risks.	The six-country average of technological adoption (Question 4.6) was quite downbeat. There is clearly a lot of room for improvement of the deployment of risk information systems by using information technology.	Driving Strategy and Performance	Step 2 – The use of technology tools should be drive tested during the planning and pilot testing phase	Country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 5

(Continued)

15.2 Lessons learnt and recommendations

#	Description of lesson learnt	Supporting evidence	Research question	Implementation step	Research source
7.	PS-ERM should be more than internal control and/or audit. It should also impact strategy setting, governance, communicating with stakeholders and measuring performance. Its principles should apply at all levels of the entity and across all functions through evident 'risk awareness' and 'risk-based problem solving'.	At 2.9.1, the six-country average for the Q4.9 that measured the use of ERM in strategy is well into pessimistic territory, below the median. Strategy is arguably the most important deployment of ERM. The tools to secure this improvement are not overly demanding. Thus, this may offer a 'low hanging fruit' to demonstrate the value of ERM and risk thinking.	Driving Strategy and Performance Congruent Culture Early Gains Enterprise-wide	Step 1 – The integrated approach to ERM must be built into the design in Step 1 and practised at Step 3	Country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 5 Case studies: Part 8
8.	ERM should not be viewed as a checklist. It is a way of thinking using a set of principles for problem prevention and solving; it is a system of monitoring, learning and improving performance.	Question 2.2 checked for the existence of a 'firefighting' culture among respondents, which would indicate a reactive set of relationships that can be improved by the 'proactive' integrated thinking demanded by ERM. The six-country average (at 3.30) suggests significant scope for improvement. The six-country average (roughly 3.5) for Question 4.2, which checked the ability of organisations to learn from experience, was broadly consistent, as was the average 3.1 response on the Question 4.5 enquiry on the existence of a risk-aware culture.	Driving Strategy and Performance Congruent Culture Enterprise-wide	Step 1 – The integrated approach to ERM must be built into the design in Step 1 and practised at Step 3	Country large-scale surveys – Volumes 2 to 7 – sub-section 4 Case studies: Volume 8

(Continued)

15.2 Lessons learnt and recommendations

#	Description of lesson learnt	Supporting evidence	Research question	Implementation step	Research source
9.	ERM is useful for entities of any type, sector or size. Risk and uncertainty are pervasive in the public sector as much as in any other sector.	Questions 2.1 and 4.1 enquired about the reception of introductory articles on ERM and governance that were originally created for a private sector audience. A six-country average of 4.4 and 4.2, respectively, indicated a very high level of comprehension in the public sector respondents. Questions 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 included public sector-specific illustrations of use of ERM in public sector governance, by the British War Cabinet in WW1, and the COVID-19 pandemic respectively. The governance average of 3.0 was pessimistic; the average of 2.8 for the use of risk to inform decision-making by the national cabinet was more pessimistic; the average of 2.1 for the use of risk information to mitigate COVID-19 was yet more downbeat.	Driving Strategy and Performance Congruent Culture Enterprise-wide Participation	Step 1 – The battle for the hearts and minds of key stakeholders (from the cabinet to SOEs to local government) must be won in Step 1 if success is to be secured in Step 3	Country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub section 5 Case studies: Part 8
10.	The effective integration of PS-ERM and public financial management (PFM) has room for significant improvement.	Budgetary control, within PFM and a well-defined strategy, is arguably the second most important use of PS-ERM for decision-making and control. The six-country average for Question 4.10 barely makes the median rating of 3.0, indicating relatively low confidence among respondents in the integration of risk and budgetary control within PFM.	Driving Strategy and Performance Congruent Culture Enterprise-wide Participation	Step 1 – the battle for the hearts and minds of key stakeholders (from the cabinet to SOEs to local government) must be won in Step 1 if success is to be secured in Step 3	Country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 5 Case studies: Part 8

(Continued)

15.2 Lessons learnt and recommendations

#	Description of lesson learnt	Supporting evidence	Research question	Implementation step	Research source
11.	Time that is well invested in Step 1 in the battle for the hearts and minds of key stakeholders (from the national cabinet to MDAs to SOEs to local government) will contribute significantly to success in Step 3.	ERM requires trust and commitment from all stakeholders, especially those at the top who set the tone for the culture that must 'lubricate the engine' of ERM. A critical goal of Step 1 must be to secure this commitment to change.	Congruent Culture Participation	Step 1	Cross-cutting Case studies: Part 8
12.	PS-ERM has 2 masters: the public sector exists to provide common effort to the attainment of societal goals, which is often described in a National Development Strategy (NDS). As the public sector is a federation of MDAs, SOEs and LGAs, it requires the management of intermediate organisational strategies through entity-based ERMs. Consequently, an effective PS-ERM must service both the needs of component entities and the demands of the national cabinet for the risk-informed direction and control of the NDS.	The six-country average of 2.8 for Question 4.17 indicates significant room for improvement in this essential element of PS-ERM to service decision-making by the national cabinet. At 2.91, the six-country average for Q4.9 is also well into pessimistic territory, regarding the use of PS-ERM to aid decisions on individual entity strategy.	Driving Strategy and Performance Enterprise-wide Participation	Step 1 – the dual service of national and entity strategies by PS-ERM must be built into the design in Step 1 and practised at Step 3	Country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 5 Case studies: Part 8

(Continued)

15.2 Lessons learnt and recommendations

#	Description of lesson learnt	Supporting evidence	Research question	Implementation step	Research source
13.	Risk intelligent entities can be identified by the extent to which they use key risk indicators (KRIs). KRIs are a tool of risk thinking that exists within a risk-aware culture. They give an early warning of future performance challenges and thus are an important trigger of proactive PS-ERM. KRIs are usually best when they identify broad principles and behavioural phenomena at the individual and group levels. Consequently, their effective use tends to demand higher individual cognitive and teamwork skills, within a suitably trusting context. The capable deployment of KRIs is arguably the most demanding element of ERM and may be a feature of the highest-performing team cultures and entities.	Given this expectation, it is not surprising that the six-country average for Question 4.13 is among the lowest of the research, at 2.6. Only two countries rate themselves (just) above the modest median of 3.0. All countries are fairly tightly clustered, suggesting that the data for the countries with low sample sizes may be reflective of a wider reality in those countries.	Driving Strategy and Performance Congruent Culture Enterprise-wide	Steps 1 and 2 – The attitudes of open constructive thinking and related competences needed for the development of a KRI receptive culture must be secured in these early steps if they are to be practised at Step 3; the 'tone at the top' will be mission critical	Theory of Change – Part 1 Country large-scale surveys – Parts 2 to 7 – sub-section 5 Case studies: Part 8
14.	The pilot implementation approach may not be the best option across all organisations. For smaller institutions, a full roll-out strategy could be implemented with effective stakeholder engagement.	This reflection was from a case study contributor whose entity has been a source of successful international experience sharing by the Commonwealth Secretariat. This insight is ONLY relevant to the implementation of ERM in a single entity. It does not apply when planning the rollout of PS-ERM across the public sector as a whole. Pilots will remain essential to large-scale implementations.	Congruent Culture Participation	Step 2	Case studies: Part 8

(Continued)

15.2 Lessons learnt and recommendations

#	Description of lesson learnt	Supporting evidence	Research question	Implementation step	Research source
15.	Paper into practice: the conversion of sophisticated ERM strategies, policies and frameworks in Steps 1 and 2 into a sound operating PS-ERM in Step 3 may be a challenge.	'Open' questions of the case study invited narrative responses from the individual contributors. Content analysis sought to identify the underlying theme within each narrative contributed by a respondent. That theme was then classified using a classification scheme developed from issues arising from the large-scale survey (LSS) – giving a link between the emergent lessons from the LSS to the case study findings. The open questions identified positive PS-ERM strategies, policies, processes and practices as the top mentioned classified item for the preparatory Steps 1 and 2. However, weak features of this same classification dominate Step 3, when the PS-ERM is actually in operation.	Congruent Culture Participation	There may be a need to prioritise practical utility, comprehension and top-level commitment to plans at Steps 1 and 2 over sophisticated presentations	Case studies: Part 8
16.	Leadership example is critical – within entities and at the level of political governance, who have the authority to hire and fire entity leaders.	In the case study open questions, negative entity governance practices feature in the top considerations of all steps, but they rise to second highest in number by Step 3. This suggests that there may be a need for stronger entity and political awareness and leadership of PS-ERM, if it is to realise its potential for enhancing the attainment of national and entity strategies and related development outcomes. This may also be related to negative organisational culture features, which exceed the instances of positive cultural attributes in Steps 1 and 2. Organisational culture is often configured by the dominant forces in an entity – those charged with governance and leadership. This may reinforce the need to engage with the leadership cadre to secure adequate commitment to the PS-ERM.	Congruent Culture Participation	Step 1 – The battle for the hearts and minds of key stakeholders (from the cabinet to SOEs to local government) must be won in Step 1 if success is to be secured in Step 3	Case studies: Part 8

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
Annex A. Template for Inaugural Meetings



Agenda for Inaugural Meetings with National Stakeholders


Ref	Description	Timing	Led by:
1.	Introduction: To the assignment and the ERM expert	5 mins	Mr Augustus Cole, Commonwealth Secretariat
2.	Approach: Delivering a constructive and productive partnership of purpose	5 mins	Dr Omodele Jones, ERM expert
3.	Expectations: the perspective of country stakeholders	5 mins	National Stakeholder
4.	Implementation: Timelines and deliverables	5 mins	Dr Omodele Jones, ERM expert
5.	Any Other Business	10 mins	Open
	Total	30 mins	

Figure A1. Approach: Delivering a constructive and productive partnership of purpose.



Key: ToR-Terms of Reference; CW-Commonwealth Secretariat; ERM-Enterprise Risk Management; CN-Concept Note; MoU -Memorandum of Understanding; NS-National Stakeholder(s)

Figure A2. Implementation: Timelines and deliverables. To be delivered by Dr Omodele Jones, ERM Expert



Annex B. ToR for Steering Group

The members of the Steering Group:

1. Will be the principal liaison contacts for the facilitator and will be the first to be consulted on the progress of implementation actions.
 2. Will provide support to the facilitator in the invitation of stakeholders to register online and the participation of stakeholders in workshops, focus group discussions and key informant interviews.
 3. Will be the points of request for information that the facilitator may need for this assignment.
 4. Will provide a source of formal and informal feedback on draft reports submitted by the facilitator before and/or after subsequent out-reach to wider stakeholders.
 5. May be requested to be the subjects of individual key informant interviews with the facilitator, to provide context and insight to the study at one or more points in time during its conduct.
 6. May be requested to participate in national and/or multi-country focus group discussions involving members of the Steering Group to provide context and insights to the study at one or more points in time during its conduct.
 7. Will be added to a WhatsApp group for ease of communication.
- Nominees should register as members of the Steering Group on this webpage: <https://www.governancequalityratings.com/csermsteering>



Botswana



Ghana



Sierra Leone



Eswatini



Kenya



The Gambia

Annex C. Steering Group Members and Study Team

Botswana



1. Ms Chazha Matsheka

Deputy Director

Internal Audit

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development



2. Mr Joseph Letlhogonolo Phalalo

Director

Occupational Health and Safety

Government of Botswana



3. Ms Tshireletso Mandu Kgosidiile

Senior Manager – Corporate Services

Ministry of Mineral Resources

Green Technology and Energy Security

Eswatini



1. Ms Zodwa Ngwenya

Director

Internal Audit Office



2. Ms Nompumelelo Nkambule

Senior Internal Auditor

Internal Audit Office



3. Mr Selby Sukati

Principal Internal Auditor

Internal Audit Office



Ghana



1. Dr Eric Oduro Osae

Director-General

Internal Audit Agency



2. Mr Richard Ntim

Chief Internal Auditor

Ghana Grid Company



3. Mr Nathan Yankey

Director (Operations)

Internal Audit Agency



Kenya



1. Mr Amos Kilonzi

Deputy Director

Kenya Urban Roads Authority

2. Mr Daniel Nyaga

Deputy Internal Auditor General

The National Treasury and Planning



Sierra Leone



1. Mr Alhaji Bangura

Deputy Director
Ministry of Finance



2. Mr Abdulai Samura

Assistant Director
Internal Audit
Ministry of Finance



3. Mr Alfred Demby

Assistant Director
PFM Reforms
Ministry of Finance



The Gambia



1. Mr Basiru Cham

Senior Internal Auditor
Directorate Of Internal Audit
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs




2. Mr Modou Marega

Internal Auditor
Internal Audit Directorate
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs



3. Mr Modou Seesay (Observer)

Director-General
Internal Audit Directorate
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs



4. Ms Ndey Ancha Dubois

Financial Analyst
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

Commonwealth Secretariat



The Commonwealth

1. **Mr Augustus Cole**

Adviser, Public Financial Management
Governance and Peace Division
Commonwealth Secretariat



2. **Ms Jacqueline Johnson**

Programme Officer
Governance and Peace Division
Commonwealth Secretariat



Study Team

1. Dr Omodele Jones

Lead Researcher



2. Mr Sola Mahoney

Facilitator



3. Mr Valentine Musa

Executive Assistant



Annex D. Concept Note and Memorandum of Understanding for ERM Africa Study

Key	UN – United Nations	SDG - Sustainable Development Goal	ERM – Enterprise Risk Management	EROM – Enterprise Risk and Opportunity Management	M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation
	NDS – National Development Strategy	MDA – Ministries, departments and agencies	SoE – State-owned enterprise	LGA – Local government authority	

Figure D1. Outline of the ERM study report



The report will produce a separate chapter comprising between 6,000 and 8,000 words for each country. Each chapter will include, but will not be limited to:

1. Background information on governance and risk management in the country of focus.
2. Methodology adopted by each country in introducing Enterprise Risk Management. This will include information on the legal and regulatory framework for ERM and other related documents.
3. The application, in practice, of an enterprise-wide approach in the state planning, implementation, reporting, monitoring and review processes.
4. The degree to which key institutions of government (including but not limited to the supreme audit institution and legislature) have been involved in the ERM process during the initiation, training, implementation and rollout across government.
5. Case studies of early gains in governance and public financial management, particularly risk management decision-making, resulting from the introduction and rollout of the ERM, in achieving the strategic objectives of government.
6. Lessons learnt and how such lessons can be applied elsewhere across the Commonwealth.

Figure D2. The study process



With carefully designed questions, the Stakeholder Parliament approach provides a powerful insight into strategic and tactical risks and opportunities encountered in the implementation of an ERM system. We will, in consultation with the Steering Group, invite the widest possible range of public sector participants from MDAs, SOEs and LGAs. Primary national stakeholders will be encouraged to register all staff and directors for the consultation. Other stakeholders will be requested to register a cross-section of senior political, administration and technical team members.

To improve the response rate to the questionnaires, they will be administered in online country

workshops that will also include presentations by staff of the primary national stakeholder on key features of the public sector ERM. In our experience, this approach can lead to dramatically increased response rates to questionnaires and can significantly increase stakeholder awareness of the potential benefits of a well-functioning ERM system.

This approach will be adapted to cope with the challenges posed by countries with weaker internet connectivity.

Annex E. Suggested key features of a well-functioning public sector ERM system

This reflects an outline of common stakeholder expectations of a well-functioning ERM system as a reference point for the study, as agreed by the Steering Group on 4 March 2021

An effective public sector ERM will inform timely decisions and actions on the NDS, which in turn should have been influenced, in its formation, by the strategic goals of devolved local governance, the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.


It will have a central surveillance/monitoring and evaluation function that will be able to scan the ERM indicators of all public sector entities for their relevance to central and/or devolved priorities for decision-making and control. That surveillance function will be an integral contributor to key policy-makers in political and administrative governance.

State entities, including devolved governance, will have surveillance/monitoring and evaluation functions of their entity ERM that will be embedded within the decision-making of entity governance. They will have alert mechanisms for priority negative risks and positive opportunities that require the attention of the central state ERM surveillance function.

Strong ERMs will focus equally on the harnessing of opportunities as well as the mitigation of negative risks. To be respected by key decision-makers, the ERM/EROM should reflect the performance needs of the entity and should be seen as adding value to decision-making and control. The existence of a risk register will NOT, on its own, be evidence of a well-functioning ERM.

A Critical Success Factor of an ERM will be the cultural congruence between the public-

Figure E1. Suggested key features of a well-functioning public sector ERM system



service interests of the entity and the private interests of key decision-makers. Strong public sector ERMs will be associated with conditions of societal trust between the governed and the governors.

Other negative implementation risks will include the efficiency, agility and effectiveness of entity strategies, policies, processes and systems. The human competencies of entity stakeholders will also influence their willingness and/or capacity to operate a well-functioning ERM system.

Memorandum of Understanding

This Memorandum of Understanding ('MoU') hereinafter referred to as the 'Memorandum', expands on the contractual agreement between the Commonwealth Secretariat ('the Secretariat') and Dr Omodele R N Jones, contracted individual expert ('ORNJ').

Whereas ORNJ has been contracted by the Commonwealth Secretariat to perform a study on the role of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as a Strategic Tool in Improving Governance: A Case Study of Commonwealth Africa, including Botswana, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra

Leone and The Gambia, herein represented by participating state representatives (PSRs) collectively referred to as 'the Parties'.

Purpose and Scope

The Terms of Reference for the study remains the principal engagement instrument for the assignment. The Memorandum recognises that the Parties have agreed to execute their respective responsibilities within the guidelines as documented within this Memorandum. This Memorandum is of moral authority only and does not form a contract of any manner or form between the Parties. It is an informal document that does not require signature by the parties and which derives its authority from the verbal agreement of the meeting of the Steering Group of 4 March 2021.

Responsibilities and Obligations of the Parties

Timeline

This Memorandum is effective between the parties for the period of ORNJ's contract for this assignment with the Secretariat.

End of MoU.

Table E1

Ref	Principle	Agreed application within this Memorandum	Responsible Party
a)	Learning and accountability	The study process and report should promote learning and encourage internal accountability for implementing the study recommendations. At the internal level, the study process should help the PSR to <u>reflect on itself and on its institutional development rather than passing judgment on its performance</u>. The study must be distinguished from an evaluation process in both language and tone. The study process and report cannot be a learning tool if no one knows about it or if it is not subsequently used to inform capacity development, strategic planning, culture change or organisational development. The MoU formalises the commitment of ORNJ to the study process, and that of the PSR to co-operating with the process and to learning and accountability through follow-up and implementation of the study report and its recommendations as deemed acceptable by the PSRs.	PSR/ORNJ
b)	Learning and accountability	The study process shall be a partnership between the Parties with the intention of a productive and constructive study that serves the national sustainable development interests of the participating countries and which shall provide a valuable reference for other countries in the design and implementation of their public sector enterprise risk management systems.	ORNJ/PSR
c)	Partnership	The study process shall engage with and involve the widest possible range of senior political, administrative and technical personnel of public sector entities in the study, giving due consideration to the informed views of all persons across organisational hierarchies.	ORNJ/PSR/Secretariat
d)	Pluralism, inclusion and participation	ORNJ commits to respecting the confidentiality of feedback given by stakeholders. They shall be offered anonymity of responses wherever such anonymity is feasible and does not detract from the quality of the study. No stakeholder shall be recognised in the study report without their express permission.	PSR/ORNJ
e)	Confidentiality	<i>How the study process is conducted:</i> All stakeholders shall be informed in a timely manner about the process and what it will mean for them. They should be given notice and time for focus groups, meetings and appropriate access to information technology to complete the questionnaires.	ORNJ
f)	Transparency	The research will be designed to take account of context specific threats and opportunities to the successful implementation of public sector ERM.	PSR/ORNJ/Secretariat
g)	Sensitivity to context and regional specificity	The research will consider the implications of the COVID 19 pandemic on the relevance and evolution of public sector ERM.	ORNJ
h)	Sensitivity to context and regional specificity	The importance of ownership of the study process is reiterated in this Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), to ensure common understandings of the advantages, risks and challenges of the study, and to set out the mutual behavioural expectations of the PSRs and ORNJ.	ORNJ
i)	PSR ownership	ORNJ independently undertakes the study. The PSRs and Secretariat receive and comment on draft study reports, as well as on the final study report. All stakeholder comments shall be reflected in the study report in a manner that does not compromise the communication of the independent professional and constructive judgement and conclusions of ORNJ. The Secretariat shall provide quality assurance of the process and output in accordance with the terms of reference for the assignment.	ORNJ/PSR/Secretariat
j)	Consultant independence	The contractual Terms of Reference shall serve as a source of confirmation of the appropriate use of ORNJ's independent professional and constructive judgement and conclusions. The express decision of the Secretariat shall be binding on all parties.	ORNJ/PSR/Secretariat
k)	Consultant independence	The Secretariat will have full control over the release of the final study report.	Commonwealth Secretariat
l)	Secretariat ownership		

Annex F. Questionnaire (Summary) for Registration of Stakeholder (administered on Google Forms)

Stakeholder Registration – Enterprise Risk Management as a Strategic Tool in Improving Governance: A Case Study of Commonwealth Africa

Welcome! You have been identified as a stakeholder for the public sector enterprise risk management (ERM) system of your country. You are invited to register in order to participate in this important six-country study of the implementation of ERM in Africa.

The Governance and Peace Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat ('the Secretariat') is supporting member countries in introducing ERM in government Ministries, Departments and Agencies. The objective is to facilitate improved decision-making in the implementation of National Development Objectives and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The Secretariat has now engaged international expert, Dr Omodele Jones, to undertake a 'Lessons Learnt' study on the introduction of ERM in six African member countries. The study will consider the ERM methodology adopted, implementation experiences and strategic contributions that have been delivered by ERM. The six countries are:

- Botswana
- Eswatini
- Ghana
- Kenya
- Sierra Leone
- The Gambia

Dr Jones will be organising a series of consultative online workshops, surveys and meetings. Your participation will be invaluable to a successful study. Success should provide insights that will strengthen the resilience of member countries in an increasingly uncertain and challenging world.

Thank you for your registration, which will also provide you with access to online information resources to allow you to monitor the progress and results of the study.

Augustus Cole

Adviser, Public Financial Management

*Governance and Peace Directorate
Commonwealth Secretariat
London*

Information required for registration

Your information will be strictly confidential and will only be used for the purposes of this ERM 'Lessons Learnt' study.

- A. Your First Name?
- B. Your Last Name?
- C. Your Job Title?
- D. Which of these best describes your role?
- E. The name of your organisation?
- F. Which of these best describes your organisation?
- G. Does your organisation have an enterprise risk management system in place or in progress?
- H. Your Email?

I. Your WhatsApp (it will greatly ease communication)?

J. Your gender?

K. Your Country of Residence?

End of Registration!

Thank you for your time! We look forward to a successful collaboration with you!



Botswana



Ghana



Sierra Leone



Eswatini



Kenya



The Gambia

Annex G. Letter of Registration – Stakeholder Registration

ERM Coordinator

Eswatini

4 March 2021

Dear Sir/Madam,

Stakeholder Registration – Enterprise Risk Management as a Strategic Tool in Improving Governance: A Case Study of Commonwealth Africa

Thank you for your recent participation in the inaugural meeting. As discussed, my first step is the registration of stakeholders for their consultation in the process. I propose to commence with the consultation of representatives of the full spectrum of public sector stakeholders including:

- Ministries
- Departments
- Agencies
- State Owned Enterprises
- Local Governments

Preferably, the representations should include senior political, administrative and technical heads as well as a selection of other management and supervisory cadres. I have attached an invitation as an annex to this letter. Please share widely as there is no restriction on registration.

Please do not hesitate to let me know if you require any clarification.

Yours faithfully,

Dr Omodele R N Jones

DBA (Heriot-Watt) MSc Strategy (Heriot-Watt) BA (Essex) FCA (UK)

Lead Facilitator

ojones@governancequalityratings.com

Invitation: Stakeholder Registration – Enterprise Risk Management as a Strategic Tool in Improving Governance: A Case Study of Commonwealth Africa

You have been identified as a stakeholder for the public sector enterprise risk management (ERM) system of Eswatini. You are invited to register in order to participate in this important six-country study of the implementation of ERM in Africa.

The Governance and Peace Directorate of the Commonwealth Secretariat ('the Secretariat') is supporting member countries in introducing ERM in government ministries, departments and agencies. The objective is to facilitate improved decision-making in the implementation of National Development Objectives and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The Secretariat has now engaged international expert, Dr Omodele Jones, to undertake a 'Lessons Learnt' study on the introduction of ERM in six African member countries. The study will consider the ERM methodology adopted, implementation experiences and strategic contributions that have been delivered by ERM.

The six countries are:

- Botswana
- Eswatini
- Ghana
- Kenya
- Sierra Leone
- The Gambia

Dr Jones will be organising a series of consultative online workshops, surveys and meetings. Your participation will be invaluable to a successful study. Success should provide insights that will strengthen the resilience of member countries in an increasingly uncertain and challenging world.

Your registration will also provide you with access to online information resources to allow you to monitor the progress and results of the study. To register preferably by 20 March, please access the following web page:

<https://www.governancequalityratings.com/csermregister>



Botswana



Ghana



Sierra Leone



Eswatini



Kenya



The Gambia

Annex H. ICSPs

Terms of Reference – Country Support Persons

1. To establish contact with the members of the assignment Steering Group.
2. To collaborate with the Steering Group members in contacting sector stakeholders to register as stakeholders using the online registration form established for the purpose. This will require action in March.
3. To collaborate with the Steering Group members to encourage registered stakeholders to participate in online workshops, surveys and meetings in due course. This is likely to require action in March/early April.
4. It is expected that the tasks 1 to 3 will require telephone, email and WhatsApp action with very limited physical contact. The Lead Facilitator should be copied on all email correspondence and a register of actions should be maintained in Excel and submitted to him by 1700hrs GMT each Friday.

Botswana

Mr Sekgele Lesedi



Eswatini

Ms Natasha Zengeni



Ghana

Mr Charles Gbagbo



Kenya

Ms Evelyn Wanjiru Njoroge



Sierra Leone

Mr Bowenson Phillips



The Gambia

Mr Valentine Musa



Commonwealth Secretariat

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United Kingdom

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The Commonwealth