

## Chapter 2 : Lead Papers

### 2.1 EMPLOYMENT OF YOUTH WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO POLICY ISSUES

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#### Introduction

When adults discuss youth, it is often in terms of a paternalistic "do to them" orientation. As adults and parents we agree that you must be:

- (i) Prepared to be useful citizens who identify fully with adult values and aspirations, however outdated some of these might be. Inculcating discipline and work values are themes which are gaining support.
- (ii) Given leadership training "as leaders of tomorrow", although we know that not many will be.
- (iii) Involved in economic and social development of their communities. Some programmes aim at involving youth collectively others individually.

However, from the above limited orientations it will be seen that the overriding theme is "preparing the individual for future activities which are gainful to him, his community and nation". As a human resource, the fitting of an individual into an activity niche which, in addition to supplying his material wants, reinforces his ego and at the same time becomes a service to his society is what we will define as *employment*.

Unemployment, therefore, will be defined as the lack of means to earn a living including joblessness, underemployment and the accompanying frustration and deprivation. In discussing this theme, we will use the United Nations definition of youth as populations between the ages of 14 years and 25 years. In most African countries, the population between 0-24 years accounts for up to 60 per cent, 14-25 years about 30 per cent of the total populations.

Among this youth group

|          |                                  |
|----------|----------------------------------|
| 1 - 2%   | enter University every year      |
| 10 - 20% | enter High Schools every year    |
| 50 - 60% | enter Primary Schools every year |
| 40 - 50% | never go to school               |

The dropouts rate from 1st year of schooling is between 5-10 per cent.

#### The Problem

Since the late 1960's, unemployment has become a dominant theme in discussion and analysis of underdevelopment. On one side, increased life

expectancy has sharply increased rates of growth of population and therefore labour force. In contrast, the more dynamic sectors of the economy are generating few jobs relative to the rapid supply of labour force. In consequence, means to earn regular and higher levels of income are restricted to a minority of the total labour force and those who do not have access to the means are becoming poorer.

The problem of unemployment of youth is even more critical owing to the fact that youth as defined by economic planners implies potential labour force and not a serious problem group. However, their problem has in the past few years been widely articulated. Given below are country by country evaluations of youth unemployment, presented at a recent international conference on employment for permanent secretaries in planning ministries and senior labour officials in Africa.

a. Mauritius

(Data from Ministry of Employment 1973.  
Data supplied by Deputy Controller, Employment Service,  
Ministry of Employment)

In June 1972, unemployment in the population aged 15 years and over stood at 16 per cent of the total labour force of approx. 325,000. However, over 80 per cent of the unemployment was among persons aged between 15-24 years of whom 90 per cent were seeking jobs for the first time. Unemployment was highest in the 15-19 age group, with 55 per cent unemployed, followed by 20-24 age group with 26 per cent unemployed. Among the male population aged 25 and over, the level of unemployment was only 5 per cent of the total labour force. Over the period of 1962-72, the labour force increased by 28 per cent whilst employment grew by just over 17 per cent over the decade.

b. Kenya

(Data from the Kenya ILO Employment Report on  
Employment, Income and Equality, ILO, Geneva 1972)

The analysis of the unemployment problem distinguishes three forms, two of which have direct bearing on youth unemployment. The first form is the open urban unemployment problem (joblessness). This problem is related to the imbalance between rural-to-urban population inflow pushing urban population growth up to 10 per cent p.a. and the rate of urban wage creation (2.7%). Most of the urban unemployment is concentrated among the youth where for Nairobi 72 per cent of the unemployed are between 16 and 24 years of age.

The second form of unemployment is the problem of school-leavers. Total Form IV (12 years) leavers jumped from 6,000 in 1965 to 13,000 in 1968 and 19,000 in 1970. However, Form IV leavers have a higher chance of obtaining a job compared with the 180,000 primary school leavers (7 years) in 1968/69, 80 per cent who could not be absorbed in wage employment.

The least known form of unemployment, rural under-employment, is perhaps the major headache of tomorrow. Rural unemployment is characterized

by extremely low and fluctuating incomes (under £20) and affects over 500,000 Kenyan youths<sup>1</sup>.

c. Sudan

(Data from Ministry of Labour 1973. Supplied by  
Acting Controller, Manpower Division, Labour  
Department)

With a population of 15.7 million, growing at the rate of 2.9 per cent (1970), Sudan has 44 per cent of its population under 15 years and only 37 per cent of the population economically active. The 1964-68 household sample survey estimated that about 9.5 per cent, 7.5 per cent and 1.4 per cent of the labour force was unemployed in the urban, semi-urban, and rural areas respectively (about 88,000 persons).

Within the rural areas, the unemployment problem takes the form of underemployment of the agricultural and nomadic labour force. The nomadic peoples, accounting for 15 per cent of the population, pose special problems as they move seasonally from one region to another in search of water and pasture, or escaping diseases.

d. Botswana

(Data from Ministry of Finance and Development  
Planning 1973)

It is estimated that 50 per cent of school-age children attend primary schools. Of these, only 15 per cent manage to go to secondary schools and post primary training. The 50 per cent who never go to school mostly follow the occupations of their fathers tilling the soil and tending cattle or occasionally going to work in the mines of South Africa. It is estimated that by 1976, about 6,000 primary school leavers will be thrown into the labour market with no hope for most of them of ever finding any kind of wage employment. Out of a total labour force of 300,000, modern sector employment accounts for about 50,000; and the unemployed are the uneducated and young primary school leavers.

e. Nigeria

(Ministry of Planning and also Federal Public Service  
Commission)

The national overall rate of open unemployment was estimated by the 1966-67 Manpower Secretariat Survey to be 1.7 per cent of the labour force - 0.5 per cent and 8 per cent for urban and rural areas respectively. About 20 per cent of the agricultural work force and 18 per cent of non-agricultural workers were regarded as being underemployed. Most of the unemployed were young.

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1 Note that 36 per cent of Kenya's population of 12.9 million is between 0-9 years. 820,000 rural households are estimated to be below \$60 p.a. income level. 330,000 households have an income below £20. This will include estimated 594,000 youths between 10-24 age group.

## Summary

1. The above data, including that of Ethiopia, Tanzania and Sierra-Leone, indicate that unemployment is a high priority problem and that 70 - 80 per cent of the unemployed are between 15-24 years old. The problem of unemployment therefore ought to be a major concern of youth ministries. When one takes into additional account the attendant social welfare problems of unemployment, and the fact that youth are never an obvious concern of ministries of economic planning, it is clear that youth departments ought to develop competence in employment creation. One way of doing this within existing frameworks is to bias youth programmes so that their long term goals for youth are closely related with existing or potential economic opportunities for sustained self employment. As we will see later, planning a 2-year paramilitary youth programme with overemphasis on youth performance within the two years and almost total indifference to what happens after leaving the programme is seriously being questioned.

2. The data indicates that economic planners see the overall national unemployment problem as arising from the ever-growing flood of school leavers, and continued under-development of rural areas relative to urban areas. Youth programmes which address themselves to the employment issue will increasingly be expected to cater for the school leavers and choose curricula which fit them for employment within the rural areas. This implies that youth programmes will:

- (i) Have to pre-empt the function of education in creating aspirations and work values.
- (ii) Carry out pre-programme market surveys to estimate the capacity of rural areas to absorb programme graduates and perhaps link youth programmes to on-going rural development efforts.
- (iii) Push for overall educational reform in favour of functional education at lower levels and the reform of national wage systems where formal education is rewarded disproportionately highly relative to technical skills at the craftsman level.
- (iv) In addition, support proposals for a progressive development and wages policy in favour of rural areas relative to urban areas.

3. The analysis of the economic, social and psychological deprivation arising from a state of continued unemployment as indicated by Professor Gutkind in his essay "The Energy of Despair" pinpoints critical welfare problems among the youth which fall squarely on your shoulders. Frustration, apathy, self-hate, aggression, disillusionment, all leading to practical social problems, are well documented in any statistics on increasing crime, suicide, perversion, idleness, drunkenness etc.

## Critical Policy Factors in Youth Unemployment

### 1. Control of production resources

In her essay on the economics of backwardness, Mary Douglas exposes the problem of "delayed bachelorhood" in the Kasai Province of Congo. She argues that in this society a young man acquires rights to use land, possess livestock, utilize household tools for his own purposes only after he gets married. In this society where old men control property, young men never marry until about 30 years of age when parents are willing to pay bridewealth. She argues that this systematic deprivation of the means to earn a living deprives the society of perhaps the most active population group. Old men are poor in entrepreneurship, and often strive to retain the status quo and this leads to economic stagnation.

The issues raised above are very real in most African societies where entry into the production economy is preceded by rites, initiation ceremonies, symbolic offerings or simply rites of passage. This will tend to be more the case for half of the 40 per cent of the youth who never receive any schooling at all in Botswana and Kenya respectively. It, therefore, affects a very large proportion of the population group we are discussing in this conference.

Customary laws governing succession, acquisition and control of farm household resources are at variance with western European concepts of "who owns what?" Legal research in East Africa indicates that customary control of land for example is vested in a community, village, clan, lineage, household and individual adults. Control of land by illiterate youth is very limited. Yet at the same time these youth are the least inclined to migrate into urban areas since access to jobs in urban areas is open only to the educated as indicated earlier. The results are varied. In Kenya one reads in the press about the special mania of youth to beat up old men, increasing rural crime, assault on near kin by youth, restlessness and continuous idleness, drunkenness of youth etc.

Youth programmes should aim at developing the structures for this population segment by:

- (i) Establishing avenues for early entry into the production economy through some legal specifications of partnerships with parents or family business or other rural non-farm business.
- (ii) Designing easy graduation from youth programmes into effective income earning activities. This will affect graduates of agricultural youth programmes such as the poultry keeping and agricultural programmes of the Kenya Village Polytechnics, the Sudanese Vocational and Home Craft programmes, and most youth programmes for girls which are home centred.

2. Access to jobs and training facilities for educated and non-educated youth.

Given limited job opportunities, the process of selection into a job is increasingly determined by education. ILO statistics indicate that the chance of obtaining a job between those who have reached the primary terminal standard VII and those who have moved to secondary school, a difference of one year, is about 160 per cent.

Given that the educated obtain jobs, these educated control to a great extent the informal entry into jobs through urban kinship and neighbourhood networks as shown on the next page.

It will be seen that in the majority of cases the work was obtained through friends or relatives, most of which probably involved nepotism or corruption. The labour exchange served only 7 per cent and the higher percentage is due to only one centre (Thika).

The above suggests a near monopoly of access to jobs by educated youth as indeed is confirmed by vocational training statistics for university graduates, Form IV Leavers, primary school leavers and the uneducated in most African countries. The diagram (page 10) gives the case for Kenya.

From the diagram and other facts one can conclude that:

- (i) The existing youth organisations in Kenya are concentrating their services to a small sector of young people - the school going population.
- (ii) Most of the programmes are not sufficiently geared or relevant to the current needs of our Kenyan youths. Some are inherited from another era and culture.
- (iii) The national education system does not sufficiently prepare the young people for the life they are to live, bearing in mind that only 20-25 per cent will enter paid employment or the modern sector of society.

There is, therefore, a need for a national educational curriculum aimed at equipping the school leaver with the necessary tools for use at the different stages of breaking from the formal educational pipeline to prepare the young person to cope with the struggle in building his own personality and contributing to national development.

This calls for an urgent need for coordination of:

- (a) formal education curriculum;
- (b) technical training;
- (c) voluntary organisations' youth programmes; and
- (d) government youth services.

DISTRIBUTION OF METHODS USED BY THE MEN IN EACH URBAN CENTRE  
IN OBTAINING THEIR FIRST JOB - % AGE

| METHOD USED              | U R B A N C E N T R E |         |       |        |         |       |         |      | TOTAL |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|---------|-------|--------|---------|-------|---------|------|-------|
|                          | NAIROBI               | MOMBASA | ISUMU | IAKURU | ELDORET | THIKA | NANYUKI | YERI |       |
| Friend or Relative       | 35.3                  | 33.5    | 50.4  | 38.8   | 34.6    | 30.9  | 48.0    | 42.4 | 37.6  |
| Newspaper                | 6.4                   | 5.9     | 10.8  | 1.5    | 1.9     | 6.2   | 6.0     | 3.6  | 6.0   |
| Labour Exchange          | 4.8                   | 4.3     | 8.5   | 3.0    | 1.9     | 33.3  | 8.0     | 2.4  | 7.0   |
| Radio                    | 0.3                   | -       | -     | 1.5    | -       | -     | -       | -    | -     |
| Heard of job & applied   | 15.2                  | 21.6    | 10.8  | 4.5    | 3.9     | 9.9   | -       | 7.2  | 13.3  |
| Other Methods            | 18.2                  | 19.7    | 9.3   | 16.4   | 17.3    | 13.5  | 34.0    | 32.5 | 18.8  |
| Started his own Business | 5.1                   | 3.2     | -     | -      | -       | -     | 2.0     | 4.9  | 2.9   |
| Still Unemployed         | 14.1                  | 11.8    | 9.3   | 32.8   | 40.4    | 6.2   | 2.0     | 7.2  | 13.8  |
| No response              | 0.6                   | -       | 0.9   | 1.5    | -       | -     | -       | -    | 0.4   |
|                          | 100                   | 100     | 100   | 100    | 100     | 100   | 100     | 100  | 100   |

Source: Henry Rempel, Labour Migration into Urban Centres and Urban Unemployment in Kenya, 1970 (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis)



We note too the systematic and deliberate neglect of the 40 per cent who never go to school or drop out early in a decade where internationally there is a growing concern with the lower 40 per cent of our populations. This needs serious review.

### 3. Alleviating rural to urban migration

The critical problem of urban unemployment is related to the increase in urban population at a higher rate than the rate of job creation. This as we saw earlier is related to rural to urban migration 80 per cent of which is attributed to educated youth. Among the hypotheses explaining selective rural to urban migration of youth are those developed by Tanzania, relating this drift to the irrelevant formal educational curriculum which creates youth aspirations which cannot be met by rural communities. The growth of a white collar mentality of rural youth, accompanied by the growth of urban centres with higher incomes and amenities is seen to cause a dynamic flow of school leavers towards the bright lights. Professor Walter Elkan, (1970) and Caroline Hutton (1969) see this explanation as reinforced by another one which relates migration to the presence of kinsmen in towns or other social networks. Income differences between urban and rural areas where urban incomes of households may be twice those of rural households of similar status, even after correcting for urban cost of living, is another widely accepted explanation. The growth of population pressure in rural areas leading to landlessness and hence total uprooting of families from rural areas is again an explanation which might gain momentum.

Given that school leavers are therefore choosy about jobs, where they are located, whether they are manual, their social prestige, and given parental expectations and hence pressure that youth leave rural areas and obtain urban jobs, it is not surprising that school leavers are willing to spend 6-9 months each looking for an urban job. They appear to have a high tolerance for insults from clerks and the relatives they live with. They often go hungry, semi-naked. They are willing to attend any impromptu political meeting; are first on the scene of an accident. It is obvious that this state of affairs is growing in geometric proportions all over Africa.

Predictably enough this too has been a major preoccupation of youth departments. Most of their programmes have aimed at arresting this drift. But are the programmes designed to effectively achieve this goal? First, the programmes cater for a very limited population. The Kenyan National Youth Service for example caters for only 2-4 per cent of the Kenya's school leavers every year. The village polytechnic programme and youth centres programmes cater for 8-10 per cent, an extremely significant input. Given that only 20 per cent of the entrants into the labour market obtain wage employment, we still have over 65 per cent of the school leavers unaccounted for.

The limitation of youth programmes in terms of scope is further confounded by their short term nature and poor anticipation of their long term employment potential. On one hand, training hundreds of masons without careful market studies runs the risks of over-supply, and, on the other hand, most training activities have no relevance to the requirements of either the rural economy or even the urban economy, especially given the limited purchasing power of rural areas and the dominance of international standards

in the urban market.

The requirements of trade test certificates and the view by youth trainees that such training is a useful prelude to a more substantial urban job makes a review of the role of youth training programmes in arresting rural-to-urban migration urgent.

#### CASE STUDY OF SOME EXISTING STRATEGIES FOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING OF YOUTH

##### 1. Incomes and wages strategy

Most African countries, including Tanzania, Mauritius, Botswana and Kenya agreed that to control the cost of labour would reduce the search by the most active sectors for capital intensive techniques. They would move towards more labour intensive techniques, lead to fair distribution of national income and hold down costs and prices of goods.

In Botswana, they argue that in their case where the economy is faced with an acute demand for skilled manpower of all kinds, to let the market determine incomes (wages) is suicidal. Incomes would rapidly go up with a resultant increase in wage costs, and employers would tend to use more capital intensive measures. The government has set up a National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council composed of government officials, and Trade Union representatives to plan a wage policy.

In Kenya, the instrument for implementing a similar policy is the Kenya Industrial Court which controls wage awards by keeping a careful eye on wage costs.

However, the effects on youth employment of a wage control or increase are difficult to predict. Evidence indicates that employment is sensitive to changes in labour costs in occupations and industries where wages are already relatively low. The most well known examples are unskilled labourers in agriculture, building and construction, and domestic services. These occupations are not the ones to which youth most aspire. Therefore, unless there is a general levelling out of wage differentials between low-paid and high-paid employees, such a strategy is not likely to affect youth unemployment significantly.

##### 2. Labour intensive rural works

Most countries in Africa often resort to labour intensive reconstruction works to alleviate the problem of school leaver unemployment. They resort to rural works of all kinds - roads, water development, food storage facilities. The idea is to adapt construction to conditions where engineers could use increasing numbers of local unskilled school leavers or unemployed youth. But such programmes suffer from cost increases because unskilled labour becomes cumbersome, slow and undermines efficiency. The failure to devise appropriate technology for labour intensive rural works is perhaps the most fundamental factor in the lack of success of such programmes.

Frantz Fanon is very clear that unless construction technology is adapted in terms of ideas, scale and activities to local conditions and capabilities of the target unemployed group, "nothing is possible". He writes:

"If the building of a bridge does not enrich the awareness of those who work on it, then that bridge ought not to be built and the citizens can go on swimming across the river or going by boat. The bridge should not be "parachuted down" from above, it should not be imposed.... Certainly, there may well be need of engineers and architects; but the local party leaders should be always present.. so that the new techniques can make their way into the cerebral desert of the citizen, so that the bridge in whole or in part can be taken up and conceived, and the responsibility for it assumed by the citizen. In this way, and in this way only, everything is possible". (See Fanon "The Wretched of the Earth" Penguin Books 1967).

### 3. Rural development

It has been agreed that the most direct way of arresting rural to urban migration is by increasing the attractiveness of rural areas by:

- (i) Increasing rural incomes and thereby reducing the rural-urban income gap.
- (ii) Increasing welfare and services such as sports, cinema facilities and amenities such as clean water, roads, lighting etc.
- (iii) Reducing the menial aspect of rural labour by selective mechanization which increases the retention of school leavers in rural employment.
- (iv) Reducing the fluctuations of rural incomes and rural subsistence food supply. This has been found to be a significant factor in spontaneous immigration.
- (v) Increasing job opportunities outside agriculture e.g. rural industrialisation.

These strategies span the concern of various Ministries; and to achieve maximum benefits, the programmes have to be integrated. Lack of simple models of how one integrates diverse action programmes and the very slow rate of growth of rural areas in spite of energetic campaigns make this approach still a non-starter.

### 4. Sponsorship of self-employment programme

Self-employment might be sponsored through the extension and support services of the Rural Industrial Development Centres; also through support of informal sector activities such as apprenticeship, ownership and

management of urban retail trade kiosks, and further through support of services such as repair works for low income groups e.g. welding of domestic utensils.

#### 5. Vocational training

Many planners believe that given the conservativeness of formal educational systems, the adaptation of education systems to meet current socio-economic conditions in developing countries will have to be through out-of-school programmes. In Kenya this approach encompasses functional literacy programmes, youth centres, village polytechnics and other informal club programmes such as young farmers clubs, 4-K Clubs and permanent work camps such as the Kenya Voluntary Development Association.

By 1971, Kenya had 180 youth centres catering for approximately 16,300 youth. At present, there are about 75 village polytechnics training 5,000 youth in masonry, carpentry, tailoring, tinsmith, elementary book-keeping, sign writing, poultry keeping and various forms of agricultural courses. It is estimated that by the end of 1978, over 25,000 youths will have been trained in the programme. By the end of 1978, it is projected there will be 250 village polytechnic centres costing the government £228,000 per year.

Kenya is constantly reviewing these programmes as it is recognized that:

- (i) Most of the graduates treat the programme as the path towards a trade certificate and their rural activities as a temporary prelude to a more substantial urban job e.g. in private sector, government, etc.
- (ii) Graduates face problems in obtaining markets or job contracts. There are new programmes such as the Rural Industrial Development programmes sponsoring self employed craftsmen which increase the market programme and a careful meshing of the programmes is required.
- (iii) Most graduates lack capital after graduating e.g. tools, sheds, raw materials; and a follow-up programme to ease graduates into viable programmes is indicated.

Similar experiences have been experienced by the Botswana Brigade Movement.

The Botswana Brigades started as an effort to train craftsmen (builders and carpenters) that were needed in the construction of the famous Swaneng Hill School, a school which was built mostly by its students. Further brigades trained primary school leavers who could not continue studies or find any kind of employment.

Brigades are not just another secondary school or another vocational training institution. Their emphasis is on cost-covering; and they combine production with training. The farmers, builders, handicrafts and industrial brigades have since been recognised to have potential for creating employment. Indeed, brigades have since been recognised to have potential for creating employment. Indeed, brigades have transformed the villages and areas in which they are based. Between them the brigades employ between 4,000 and 5,000 people.

Moves are now underway to coordinate and strengthen the brigade movement. Initially it was thought that brigade graduates would create self employment in the rural areas by forming cooperatives and small construction units. This has proved difficult because of the shortage of capital and the lack of managerial skills. Most brigade graduates have gone to the urban areas to take up employment with construction companies. This is undesirable because we have vocational skills by the modern sector.

#### Summary - Issues in planning youth programmes with a bias towards education

The choice of a programme strategy is based on a very clear diagnosis of the problem we wish to alleviate. Diagnosis is the process of identifying the factors which "cause" the problem, and ascertaining the actual dimensions of the problem precedes the determination of what technique to use to what end.

It is clear from our analysis of youth unemployment that:

(i) Youth form 80 per cent of the rural to urban migrants and the majority of the urban unemployed. That a critical strategy of youth programmes will continue to be an attempt to alleviate and perhaps eliminate rural to urban drift of school leavers. This implies that youth planners will need to study and hold dialogue with educators and rural development planners to identify to what extent their programmes can be made complementary to one another, mutually reinforcing and goal specific. Obviously, this is an enormous task.

(ii) The strong bias towards increasing access to jobs by the educated youth was clearly outlined. Continued sponsoring of projects which recruit from school leavers is supported by very many practical issues such as problems of training illiterates, employer preferences, speed in learning, discipline and the political need to remove the more articulate educated youth from the streets. However, this solves only half of our problem and responds to only half of the mandate of youth ministries.

(iii) The problem of illiterate youth can be seen as arising from rural and urban poverty, underdevelopment of rural regions and certain groups in society. This problem should be thrown into the development arena in the same way as the problem of women - as a problem of a very significant population whose solution must be the goal of more than one Ministry.

In the meantime, however, a very careful assessment of the rationale and goals of youth programmes to specifically include illiterate youth, must be undertaken.

(iv) Legal studies to change and/or enact legislation to introduce early entry by youth into the control of production resources such as land, oxen, livestock, water, tools, family labour, and capital should be undertaken as a matter of urgency. Such a change would make certain programmes such as young farmers clubs, farm enterprise, specific projects, and even courses such as accounting and book-keeping much more meaningful in the long run.

(v) Evaluation

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## 2.2 AFRICAN HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL SERVICE

by

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### Introduction

The major pre-occupation of the peoples and governments of Africa today, is how to transform their predominantly rural economies into modern developed nations in the shortest time possible. Most of the indicators of modernisation and development compiled for less developed and developed countries show that African countries rank by and large at the bottom of the scale of modernisation and development. The need to accelerate the pace of development in Africa is therefore more urgent than ever. One of the most important reasons for the relatively low level of development in Africa, is the low level of human resources development in the continent. African governments have realised in the main, the need to accelerate the rate of human resources development, as a means of accelerating their programmes of development. The need for accelerating programmes of human resources development is all the greater when one considers more recent conceptualisations of development. Leading scholars of development now see human resources development not merely as an input into the development process but as the very aim of development. In this view, development is seen as a process of developing the nation's human resources and ensuring that the resources are utilised fully in the world of work, with due allowance of course, for leisure.

In this paper, we shall discuss the rate of human resources development in Commonwealth African countries since 1960. Although human resources development can be conceived as the process of increasing the knowledge, skills and health of a nation's population, we shall concentrate in this paper only on the development of the knowledge and skills of the population in order to limit the scope of our discussion. The development of the knowledge and skills of the population takes place in the context of formal and non-formal educational systems. Accordingly, we shall discuss efforts and achievements of African governments in the field of formal education. We shall also comment briefly on non-formal educational programmes and achievements. Finally, we shall relate developments in the formal and non-formal education system to programmes and policies of national service in some of the African countries. Our aim will be to determine the contributions national service programmes can make to more rapid development of our human resources as well as the effective utilisation of the human resources. We have shown above that the development and effective utilisation of human resources can be seen as the very aim of development. Accordingly, our discussion is closely linked with the quest for accelerated development which we have shown to be the present major pre-occupation of African governments.

## Rapid Growth of Formal Educational Systems

We have already indicated that the level of human resources development in Africa is among the lowest in the world. Adult literacy rates for most of the countries in which we are interested, are about 20 per cent or less. The governments, faced with the gigantic task of increasing literacy rates for the adult population, have chosen to place greater emphasis on the education of the youth through the expansion of formal education, particularly primary education.

### Primary Education

There has been a very rapid increase in primary education since 1960 in most Commonwealth African countries. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, some countries have recorded very rapid increases. For example, primary school enrolments in Ghana almost tripled between 1960 and 1970. In Gambia and Botswana, enrolments more than doubled between 1960 and 1970. In Kenya, Zambia and Sierra-Leone, enrolment almost doubled in the 1960 - 1970 period. Enrolment increases have not been more modest in Nigeria, Uganda, and Lesotho, while Malawi seems to have recorded an absolute decline during the decade of the 1960's.

Despite the rapid growth of enrolments in primary schools, quite a large number of countries have not achieved universality in terms of enrolment rates. For example, although universality has been attained in Nigeria's Southern States, the Northern States, by and large, have enrolment rates below 50 per cent. In the Second National Development Plan of Nigeria, 1970/74, the target was to raise enrolment rates to about 50 per cent by 1974/75. In Kenya, only in the central province is enrolment close to 100 per cent. Accordingly, most Commonwealth countries still have to increase enrolment rates substantially before universality in enrolment can be attained. Towards this end Nigeria has decided to launch a programme of universal free primary education in 1976 with the programme becoming compulsory by 1979.

Although African countries are still striving to attain universality in primary school enrolments, the growth in primary school enrolments achieved so far are already causing major employment problems. Even in the early 1960's, Archibald Callaway found that unemployment among primary school leavers had reached serious proportions.<sup>4</sup> With further acceleration in enrolment recorded since the early 1960's, the situation has worsened, especially in areas where employment rates approach 100 per cent. In a more recent study,<sup>5</sup> we found that in Western Nigeria, 40.7 per cent of primary school leavers were without employment nine months after leaving school. It can be expected that the unemployment problem among primary school leavers will worsen, as African governments adopt programmes of universal primary education, unless drastic corrective measures are taken by African governments.

One of the reasons given for the school leaver unemployment problem is that products of primary schools do not have marketable skills and are therefore unemployable. It is argued further that the curriculum of primary schools is unrelated to the environment in which the vast majority of the primary school leavers must live and work. Considerable attention is being given to curriculum reform in an attempt to vocationalise it and<sup>22</sup>.

TABLE 1  
ENROLMENT PER 10,000 OF POPULATION (PRIMARY)

| Country      | Population<br>1960 (Millions) | Enrolments<br>per 10,000<br>pop. 1960 | Population<br>1970 (Millions) | Enrolments<br>per 10,000<br>pop. 1970 |
|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Ghana        | 6.7                           | 722                                   | 9.03                          | 1572                                  |
| Kenya        | 7.1                           | 1,226                                 | 11.24                         | 1270                                  |
| Malawi       | 2.9                           | (1964) 1,246                          | 4.43                          | 801                                   |
| Nigeria      | 35.1                          | 791                                   | 55.07                         | 638                                   |
| Sierra-Leone | 2.4                           | 383                                   | 2.6                           | 600                                   |
| Zambia       | 2.5                           | (1964) 1,461                          | 4.3                           | 1616                                  |
| Uganda       | 6.7                           | 795                                   | 9.8                           | 724                                   |
| Tanzania     | 9.3                           | -                                     | 13.1                          | -                                     |
| Botswana     | 0.3                           | 1,074                                 | 0.6                           | 1,383                                 |
| Gambia       | 0.3                           | 255                                   | 0.4                           | 429                                   |
| Lesotho      | 0.7                           | 1,945                                 | 1.04                          | 1,764                                 |

SOURCE: UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks 1966-72 (New York)

TABLE 2  
ENROLMENT IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS

| Country      | 1960                      | 1968      | 1970              | Absolute Increase<br>1960-70 (%) |
|--------------|---------------------------|-----------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| Ghana        | 483,425                   | 1,281,003 | 1,419,838         | 65.96                            |
| Kenya        | 870,448                   | 1,209,608 | 1,427,589         | 46.04                            |
| Malawi       | 286,753 <sup>(1965)</sup> | 333,876   | 355,004           | 19.23                            |
| Nigeria      | 2,775,938                 | -         | 3,515,827         | 21.05                            |
| Sierra-Leone | 91,895                    | 136,824   | 155,967           | 41.08                            |
| Gambia       | 365,237 <sup>(1964)</sup> | -         | 694,670           | 47.43                            |
| Uganda       | 532,918                   | 632,162   | 709,708<br>(1969) | 24.91                            |
| Tanzania     | -                         | -         | -                 | -                                |
| Botswana     | 32,225                    | 78,963    | 83,002            | 61.18                            |
| Gambia       | 7,663                     | -         | 17,140            | 55.30                            |
| Lesotho      | 136,143                   | 179,386   | 183,395           | 25.77                            |

SOURCE: UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks, 1966-72 (New York)

TABLE 3

## ENROLMENT: SECONDARY SCHOOLS

| Country      | 1960                    | 1968    | 1970                     | Absolute Increase<br>1960-1970 |
|--------------|-------------------------|---------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Ghana        | 70,066                  | -       | 99,299                   | 41.62                          |
| Kenya        | 21,369                  | 109,867 | 137,008                  | 541.16                         |
| Malawi       | 9,825 <sup>(1964)</sup> | 10,904  | 11,727                   | 19.36                          |
| Nigeria      | 111,868                 | -       | 356,565                  | 218.71                         |
| Sierra-Leone | 8,753                   | 23,979  | 30,760                   | 251.43                         |
| Zambia       | 8,981                   | -       | 55,566                   | 518.71                         |
| Uganda       | 31,285                  | 39,456  | 43,925 <sup>(1969)</sup> | 40.41                          |
| Tanzania     | -                       | -       | -                        | -                              |
| Botswana     | 642                     | 3,213   | 5,197                    | 709.51                         |
| Gambia       | 1,954                   | -       | 5,468                    | 179.84                         |
| Lesotho      | 1,836                   | -       | 7,373                    | 301.58                         |

SOURCE: UNESCO, New York: Statistical Year Books, 1966-72

TABLE 4

## ENROLMENTS PER 10,000 POPULATION: SECONDARY SCHOOLS

| Country      | Population<br>1960<br>(Millions) | Enrolments<br>per 10,000<br>(1960) | Population<br>1970<br>(Millions) | Enrolments<br>per 10,000<br>(1970) |
|--------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Ghana        | 6.7                              | 253.83                             | 9.03                             | 109.97                             |
| Kenya        | 7.1                              | 30.10                              | 11.24                            | 121.90                             |
| Malawi       | 2.9                              | -                                  | 4.43                             | 26.48                              |
| Nigeria      | 35.1                             | 31.88                              | 55.07                            | 64.75                              |
| Sierra-Leone | 2.4                              | 36.47                              | 2.60                             | 118.31                             |
| Zambia       | 2.5                              | -                                  | 4.03                             | 129.23                             |
| Uganda       | 6.7                              | 46.70                              | 9.08                             | -                                  |
| Tanzania     | 9.3                              | -                                  | 13.01                            | -                                  |
| Botswana     | 0.3                              | 21.40                              | 0.06                             | 86.82                              |
| Gambia       | 0.3                              | 65.14                              | 0.04                             | 136.70                             |
| Lesotho      | 0.7                              | 26.23                              | 1.04                             | 70.90                              |

SOURCE: UNESCO, New York: Statistical Year Books, 1966-72

make primary education more functional. However, it is too early to be optimistic that these reforms will be effectively implemented and that even when well implemented they will lead to the solution of the school leaver unemployment problem. However, an urgent effective solution must be found to the school leaver unemployment problem. This is to avoid the loss of considerable investment that has been put into the development of human resources at this level. It is known that there can be a loss of literacy acquired in school if school leavers remain unemployed for a very long period. What is more, employment itself provides valuable learning experiences and further development of human resources. We shall discuss at a later stage the contribution which National Service could make to the solution of school leaver unemployment problems.

### Secondary Education

The progress made by Commonwealth African countries in expanding enrolment in secondary schools has been quite phenomenal when compared with primary school enrolments. In most of the countries, enrolments at least tripled in the decade of the 1960's. In Kenya, which had the highest rate of increase, enrolments increased almost 7 times between 1960 and 1970 (See Tables 3 and 4). This rapid increase in secondary education is essential in order to provide more places for the increased number of children leaving the primary school. In spite of the rapid increases in enrolment in most countries, less than 30 per cent of school leavers have access to secondary education. Enrolment rates in secondary schools are less than 25 per cent for most African countries and in a few they are less than 10 per cent. This contrasts sharply with rates of almost 100 per cent in developed countries. The point, however, is not that African countries should aim at 100 per cent enrolment rates now (the economy cannot absorb secondary school graduates at that enrolment rate) but to demonstrate the underdevelopment of our human resources. Graduates of secondary schools constitute the mainstay of manpower resources of most countries. However, the effective contribution of these graduates depend on their prospects for employment.

Despite the relatively low rate of enrolment in secondary schools in most African countries, some recent studies indicate that the rapid expansion of secondary school enrolment in the past decade has led to the emergence or accentuation of unemployment problems among graduates of secondary schools. It has been argued that one of the reasons for the increase in unemployment is the irrelevance of curricula in secondary schools. Proposals have been presented for comprehensive secondary schools as a way out. However, it is too early to determine the extent to which these reforms will contribute to the solution of the unemployment problem. The unemployment of secondary school graduates may be due not so much to insufficiency of jobs but to poor allocation of these scarce resources between sectors, say, teaching and government administration, rural and urban areas, or between states. In many African countries, there is a shortage of qualified teachers for primary schools in rural areas, while there is unemployment of secondary school graduates who are looking for clerical jobs.

Until the problem of optimal allocation of secondary school graduates is solved, there could be a brake on national development, because expansion of secondary education may be curtailed for fear of increasing unemployment if secondary schools are rapidly expanded. We shall discuss later the extent to which national service can contribute to a more optimal deployment of secondary school graduates and the further development of human resources at this level.

## University Education

Development of human resources at the university level is of critical importance to national development. Universities provide the managers of the development enterprise. Development can be retarded as a result of lack of leadership, if output of the universities is inadequate. Realising the importance of university education, African governments placed great emphasis on the expansion of university education in the 1960's and since then. In Nigeria, for example, three new universities will have been established in the 1960's, and five more universities will have been established by 1980 bringing the total number of universities to ten. Enrolments increased from 1,978 in 1960 to 14,402 in 1970. By 1980, enrolment in first degree courses alone will increase further to 53,000. In Ghana, university enrolments increased from 1,051 in 1960 to 5,426 in 1970: while in Kenya, enrolment skyrocketed from 339 in 1960 to 4,969 with the upgrading of the Royal College, Nairobi to full university status as the University of Nairobi. While other countries may not have recorded such rapid increases in enrolment as in Kenya, most of them tripled their enrolments between 1960 and 1970. See Tables 5 and 6.

Although African countries have recorded these rapid increases in enrolment it can be asserted that their universities still do not produce enough graduates to meet their needs. Even in a country like Nigeria with five universities which have been producing graduates since 1965, there is still a problem of shortages of university graduates<sup>7</sup>. Although there had been some fears of graduate unemployment in Nigeria, a careful analysis shows that such fears have been unfounded. We have just completed a study<sup>8</sup> which shows that fears of graduate unemployment are groundless - and that in fact there will be a substantial shortfall of graduates (7,070) between the output of graduates from Nigerian universities and the national needs during the Third National Development Plan 1975-1980. The modern private sector of most African countries is still dominated by expatriate personnel not so much because they provide foreign capital but because they provide technical know-how that these countries cannot provide. Accordingly, a major aspect of human resources development in Africa is the more rapid expansion of university education especially in the scientific, technological and engineering fields.

While there may be overall shortages of university personnel, there also may be imbalances in the distribution and deployment of university graduates in many African countries. University graduates on the whole prefer to conglomerate in urban centres. As a result high-level manpower may be particularly scarce in the rural areas. Accordingly, the stimulus to development required in these areas is lacking, resulting in poorer development of human resources in the rural areas. In a country like Nigeria, some states (the Southern States) are relatively well endowed with university graduates, while other states (the Northern States) are poorly supplied. This sometimes leads to the phenomenon of graduate unemployment among some southern graduates while there are jobs for them in Northern Nigeria. It is essential that if African countries are to derive maximum returns from their investment on human resources development at university levels, policies and programmes must be developed to utilise the few university graduates to the fullest. National Service may have a role to play. This will be examined later.

TABLE 5

## ENROLMENT IN UNIVERSITIES

| Country      | 1960       | 1968  | 1970         | Absolute Increase<br>1960-1970 (%) |
|--------------|------------|-------|--------------|------------------------------------|
| Ghana        | 1,051      | 5,669 | 5,426        | 416                                |
| Kenya        | 339        | 4,967 | 4,969        | 1,366                              |
| Malawi       | 436 (1965) | 788   | 929          | 113                                |
| Nigeria      | 1,978      | -     | 14,402       | 628                                |
| Sierra-Leone | 348        | 762   | 1,121        | 222                                |
| Zambia       | 347 (1966) | -     | 1,466        | 34.00                              |
| Uganda       | 951        | 2,494 | 2,496 (1969) | 163                                |
| Tanzania     | N.A.       | N.A.  | N.A.         | N.A.                               |
| Botswana     | N.A.       | N.A.  | N.A.         | N.A.                               |
| Gambia       | N.A.       | N.A.  | N.A.         | N.A.                               |
| Lesotho      | 167        | 384   | 402          | 141                                |

SOURCE: UNESCO Statistical Year Books (New York) 1966-72  
N.A. = Not Available

TABLE 6

## ENROLMENT PER 10,000 OF POPULATION (UNIVERSITIES)

| Country      | Population<br>1960<br>(Millions) | Enrolments<br>per 10,000<br>pop. (1960) | Population<br>1970<br>(Millions) | Enrolments<br>per 10,000<br>pop. (1970) |
|--------------|----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|---|
| Ghana        | 6.7                              | 1.57                                    | 9.03                             | 6.01                                    |
| Kenya        | 7.1                              | 0.48                                    | 11.24                            | 4.42                                    |
| Malawi       | 2.9                              | 1.51                                    | 4.43                             | 2.10                                    |
| Nigeria      | 35.1                             | 0.57                                    | 55.07                            | 2.62                                    |
| Sierra-Leone | 2.4                              | 1.45                                    | 2.6                              | 4.32                                    |
| Zambia       | 2.5                              | 1.39                                    | 4.3                              | 3.41                                    |
| Uganda       | 6.7                              | 1.42                                    | 9.8                              | 2.55                                    |
| Tanzania     | 9.3                              | N.A.                                    | 13.1                             | N.A.                                    |
| Botswana     | 0.3                              | N.A.                                    | 0.6                              | N.A.                                    |
| Gambia       | 0.3                              | N.A.                                    | 0.4                              | N.A.                                    |
| Lesotho      | 0.7                              | 2.39                                    | 1.04                             | 3.87                                    |

SOURCE: UNESCO Statistical Year Books 1961-72  
N.A. = Not Available.

## Non-Formal Education

We have discussed so far the development of human resources within the context of expanding formal school systems. However, a wide range of educational activities take place outside the formal school system, which nonetheless lead to formation of knowledge and the creation of skills. It is the educational and training activities outside the formal schools, especially of an organised nature, that we refer to as non-formal educational activities. There is a very wide range of non-formal educational activities. These can be broadly classified into 3 categories. The first category relates to non-formal education activities that prepare people for initial employment. The second category relates to non-formal educational activities which lead to the upgrading of the skills and knowledge of those who are already employed. The third category of activities may not be directly related to the world of work. It deals more with broader issues such as the creation of greater political awareness, nationalism, the appreciation of culture, and the inculcation of individual or national discipline.

A wide range of non-formal educational activities have been launched in different African countries. In a relatively recent study we surveyed the more imaginative and successful programmes in different African countries. What was of particular interest in the pre-employment programmes is that they should have low cost technologies and that the training of the youths should be closely linked to effective demand of nearby labour markets in terms of skills being created. Famous examples of such schemes are the village polytechnics of Kenya, and the Brigade Movement of Botswana, and the Farm Institutes of Kano State, Nigeria. The Village Polytechnics are essentially small training centres located in rural areas for the purpose of providing school leavers with training applicable to local rural self employment. The Brigade Movement in Botswana is also geared to the provision of skills to young people relevant for the production of goods in demand in rural Botswana. The Farm Institutes of Kano State are a low cost training programme meant to prepare school leavers for farming in their own communities.

Of particular interest in the skills upgrading non-formal educational activities is the vocational Improvement Centres of Northern Nigeria. Basically the programme calls for use of existing facilities and personnel to train people with some vocational skills to a more professional level. In the third category of non-formal educational programmes was our study of the Citizenship and Leadership Training Centre, Lagos. The main focus here was training the participants to assume a greater sense of social responsibility and leadership.

However, a general feature of most of the non-formal education projects we studied was that they were sponsored by private voluntary organisations, and as such were very limited in their scope. Enrolment in such projects was generally low, ranging from 10 to 60 students in most cases; and only in a few cases did enrolment exceed 100 or attain levels as high as 1,000. It is difficult to enumerate completely the number of non-formal education projects in each country and estimate the total population being influenced or total resources being invested in these projects. However, our general conclusion was that the non-formal education projects were reaching only a tiny proportion of the relevant population that needed help. For example, non-formal education projects have not reached the bulk of primary school leavers to provide them with relevant skills that will make

them employable or increase their chances for self-employment. Accordingly, despite non-formal education projects for out-of-school youth, unemployment among school leavers remains a serious problem in all Commonwealth African countries. Similarly, we can observe that non-formal education projects as currently operated have not made a major impact on the employment problems facing secondary school graduates in Africa. The contribution of non-formal education towards creating high-level manpower in the face of inadequate output of graduates from universities, has similarly been limited. We can conclude that as currently operated non-formal education projects have not made a major impact on solving Africa's problem of accelerated human resources development. We have, however, identified the potential contribution that non-formal education can make towards solving the human resources development problem; and "until the number of effective programmes can be greatly increased, non-formal education in Africa will continue to be limited to what we have called 'micro-solutions to macro-problems'<sup>10</sup>"

#### The Contribution of National Service Programmes

We have seen that rapid expansion of primary schools or further projected expansion of them has raised and will continue to raise serious problems not only for full utilisation of human resources but for further human resources development. We have also demonstrated that non-formal education projects as currently operated are not making the kind of impact needed to significantly alleviate the problem of school leaver unemployment. The scale of non-formal education programmes, however, can be substantially increased to cope with the problem at hand. Only the government has enough resources to increase non-formal educational projects to a level where they can begin to make a major contribution to the problem of human resources development and utilisation among the youth. The question to be answered is how best can the government intervene to increase the scale of non-formal education.

One way in which this can be done is through the introduction of National Service Schemes for youth. The Kenya National Youth Service is a good example of a scheme of National Service. The scheme provides general education through courses offered in English, Mathematics, Science, Civics, History and Geography. Basic training is also offered in physical education, health science and care of personal equipment. Vocational training is given in such subjects as masonry, carpentry, motor maintenance and repair, secretarial work, accountancy, and store-keeping. The scheme also inculcates a very high sense of discipline in the Youth Service members. Enrolment is voluntary and over 2,000 graduates are turned out annually after two years of service.

The ideal type of National Service programme suitable for each country will vary depending on the specific circumstances of each country. It is hoped, however, that each country's programme would find ways of offering training at low cost through intensive use of existing facilities and personnel and by emphasizing techniques which can be implemented at low cost. Furthermore, given the magnitude of the youth unemployment problem it is desirable that the National Service Scheme should be conducted on a large enough scale to make a major inroad into the unemployment problem. While stressing the role of National Service Schemes in developing the human resources of our youth, National Service Schemes can also make valuable contributions towards a more effective deployment of graduates from secondary

schools and institutions of high learning such as the universities. Furthermore, National Service Schemes can help to inculcate in these youths ideas about nationalism, national integration and self discipline.

- (a) removal of several thousands of unemployed persons (age 14-23) from the labour market, to sublimate their energy and talent into more socially desirable channels;
- (b) provision of pre-vocational and vocational training in agricultural and industry-oriented skills;
- (c) channelling the talents and energies of youth for national service in a spirit of community responsibility;
- (d) promotion of an all-round education for youth physically, intellectually and morally, particularly to engender a healthy attitude to work and play.

When the scheme came to be implemented in 1973, it was limited to university graduates only. The period of service is one year. We do not have enough information now to evaluate the success of the scheme so far. A systematic study of the scheme needs to be done. Fragmentary evidence suggests, however, that the scheme has succeeded to some extent in increasing the geographical mobility of Nigerian university graduates. Accordingly, the scheme has contributed to a fuller utilisation of our high level manpower as well as further development of our high-level manpower resources. It is expected that the training and experience gained in the National Youth Service Corps would increase the effectiveness of the graduates. To the extent that many of the corpsmen were employed in teaching, they contributed to developing human resources in areas which previously had no graduate teachers. The National Service Corps is expected to play a major role in implementing Nigeria's programme of Universal Free Primary Education. National Youth Service for graduates of secondary schools and institutions of higher learning helps not only in developing further the knowledge and skills of these graduates but also increasing their national awareness, discipline and overall effectiveness. Accordingly, it should be beneficial to African countries who have not already done so, to consider introducing National Service programmes for graduates of all levels of education.

The resources required to implement a scheme of National Service for graduates of all levels of education would be considerable. African governments are already making considerable efforts in formal education. Expenditure on formal education has increased considerably since 1960 and constitutes a significant percentage of the total budget (See Table 7). Most African governments have, however, made only a modest contribution to non-formal education. The productivity of investment in formal education is considerably reduced because the complementary investment required in non-formal education has not been made. It is, therefore, necessary that African governments should put every priority on implementing schemes of National Service for graduates from all levels of education.

### Conclusion

In this paper, we have tried to emphasize that the rapid development of human resources in Africa is essential not only as a means to accelerated

development, but also an end of development. We have demonstrated that African governments have made substantial progress in increasing their formal education systems. However, the rapid expansion of formal school systems has led to problems of unemployment among graduates of primary and secondary schools. At the university level, we found that the output of graduates was inadequate to cope with demands. We have shown further that non-formal education projects have not been operated at a level to reduce significantly the problem created by the formal education systems. Towards a solution of these problems we have recommended that African governments introduce a scheme of national service for graduates of all levels of education. To implement this scheme, it is necessary that technical assistance be offered by the more developed countries to African countries; for the greatest impediment in the path of implementation is more likely to be shortages in manpower needed to operate the schemes, rather than shortage of funds.

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TABLE 7  
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET

| COUNTRY      | 1960  | 1961  | 1962  | 1963  | 1964  | 1965  | 1966  | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  | 1971  | 1972  | 1973 |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| Ghana        | 11.01 | 13.36 | 14.58 | 18.85 | 19.24 | 13.10 | 22.01 | 22.69 | 22.62 | 21.40 | 19.55 | 20.30 | 20.35 | N.A. |
| Kenya        | 15.09 | 16.59 | 16.82 | 14.75 | 14.10 | 10.65 | 9.99  | 9.78  | 12.60 | 12.67 | 15.37 | 20.89 | 20.33 | N.A. |
| Malawi       | 8.89  | 14.15 | 11.73 | 16.20 | 15.93 | 13.50 | 14.00 | 15.00 | 14.29 | 16.77 | 15.14 | 13.19 | 12.23 | N.A. |
| Nigeria      | 28.25 | 25.98 | 25.25 | 30.21 | 23.51 | 21.70 | 17.94 | 21.42 | 13.34 | 14.19 | 19.81 | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A. |
| Sierra-Leone | -     | -     | 12.23 | 7.31  | 9.05  | 10.59 | 13.08 | 14.57 | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A. |
| Zambia       | 11.73 | 13.45 | 13.34 | 16.67 | 12.37 | 15.78 | 15.79 | 14.61 | 11.79 | 13.27 | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A. |
| Uganda       | 19.00 | 18.58 | 20.50 | 12.71 | 14.71 | 13.95 | 10.22 | 13.00 | 12.59 | 24.90 | 19.41 | 18.57 | N.A.  | N.A. |
| Tanzania     | 16.73 | 16.04 | 19.30 | 17.44 | 15.49 | 15.36 | 14.39 | 17.70 | 13.58 | 13.12 | 13.55 | 14.96 | 14.23 | N.A. |
| Botswana     | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A.  | N.A. |
| Gambia       | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "    |
| Lesotho      | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "     | "    |

SOURCE: UNESCO, New York, Statistical Year Books 1966- 1972  
N.A. = Not Available

2.3 AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE:  
PITFALLS IN PAST AND PRESENT  
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

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Introduction

A good starting point for such a discussion is to give a brief outline of the structural characteristics of African economies (i.e. Africa, South of the Sahara). This does not impart any degree of homogeneity to African economies nor does it underestimate the importance of individual peculiarities. For as Paul Baran rightly puts it, "..... in attempting to comprehend the laws of motion of both the advanced and the backward parts of the capitalist world, it is possible, and indeed mandatory, to abstract from the peculiarities of the individual cases and to concentrate on their essential common characteristics. In fact, no scientific work is conceivable if this method is not to be applied;...abstraction from the secondary attributes of phenomenon and concentration on its basic scaffolding have always been the primary tools of all analytical effort". So that while it cannot be denied that no two countries face identical problems in their process of development, one can hardly sustain the argument that countries at a similar stage in their development do not face problems of much the same kind and hence do not find themselves in similar circumstances. Hence in this discussion, emphasis will be put on the general case, but only occasionally making reference to the particular case for purposes of illustration. Also at the risk of sounding rather too parochial, in disciplinary terms, I intend to concentrate on economic development, or, more precisely under-development, bearing in mind the fact that development has social, cultural and political ramifications.

African countries fall within the group of countries often described in economic literature as underdeveloped, because of their common characteristics in the following areas.

1. Low per capita income in relation to the advanced industrialised countries of the West. In 1971 of the 34 independent African countries south of the Sahara, 17 were described as hard core least developed countries with real per capita income of less than \$100; ten had incomes between \$100 and \$200; and six between \$200 and \$300. Only Gabon had a per capita income of around \$450 in real terms. If we use the arbitrary yardstick of \$500 per capita income as an indication of non-underdevelopment, then it is clear from these figures that all African countries south of the Sahara (except South Africa and Rhodesia) are underdeveloped. While not under-emphasizing the conceptual and statistical problems involved in the calculation of the national income, these figures can be taken as a rough guide to the poverty of African countries.

2. Dependence on Agriculture: African countries are predominantly agricultural in the sense that:

- (a) a large proportion of income is generated in the agricultural sector;
- (b) a large percentage of the active labour force is employed in agriculture;
- (c) agriculture accounts for a disproportionate share of the total export earnings. Here, agriculture is defined to incorporate livestock, fishing and forestry. With regard to this dependence on agriculture, there are some exceptions to (a) and (c), but (b) is true of all African economies.

For example, in 1970 in Liberia, Gabon and Zambia, over 30 per cent of income was generated in the mining sector while the share of agriculture in all these countries was less than 20 per cent. Also, in the Congo, the share of commerce exceeded that of agriculture. Of all the remaining African countries, the share of agriculture exceeds any other sector, ranging from 20 per cent in Senegal to over 70 per cent in Burundi. Percentage of labour force in agriculture ranges from 42 per cent in Liberia to over 60 per cent in Malagasy, with the percentage for remaining African countries lying between 60 - 80 per cent. Compare this with 5 per cent in the U.S., 12 per cent in Canada and 7 per cent in Britain. With regard to the sectoral origin of export receipt, the most disturbing feature is not only that a large share of it comes from agriculture but also that this share is limited to one or two major crops or agricultural products. Examples are the following:

In 1970, 83.8 per cent of Gambia's export receipts came from groundnuts and groundnut oil; in Ghana 73.2 per cent from cocoa and timber; in the Ivory Coast 55.8 per cent from coffee and timber; and in Mali 73.2 per cent from cotton and live animals. There are, however, some selected African countries e.g. Sierra-Leone, Gabon, Rwanda and Zaire, the bulk of whose export receipts came from the extractive industries.

African economies are very heavily export oriented. In quantitative terms this means that the ratio of export receipts to the national income is high. This export orientedness of African economies boils down to the exploitation of natural resources to increase exports and obtain tax revenue for social services and directly productive investment. There is no African country where this ratio by 1970 was less than 25 per cent as compared for example with 4 per cent in the U.S.

These structural characteristics constitute the basic weakness of these economies and militate against their effective development.

Low per capita income, it has been argued, does not make room for savings and hence investment. It is widely believed that African economies are too poor to have actual or potential surplus available for investment and that the only way out is to resort to long-term borrowing from abroad.

According to Paul Baran "Actual economic surplus - i.e. the difference between a society's actual current output and its actual consumption - has been generated in all socio-economic formations, and while its size and structure have markedly differed from one phase of development to another, its existence has characterised all of recorded history". It is Baran's thesis that actual economic surplus exists in all countries though its size may differ at different points in history. There is no precedent in logic or history to suggest that African countries are an exception to this general observation. It is the use to which this actual surplus is put that partly explains our inability to break loose from the vicious circle of poverty; for instead of channelling it into productive investment, it is wasted in maintaining expensive military machines, corrupt and inefficient political administrations and a very cumbersome civil administrative apparatus. "The realization of the potential surplus", to quote Baran once more, - i.e. the difference between the output that could be produced in a given natural and technological environment .... and what might be regarded as essential consumption - presupposes a more or less drastic reorganisation of the production and distribution of the social output and implies far-reaching changes in the structure of society". Mass mobilization of labour, mass participation in production and agrarian reforms, including a carefully thought out programme of collectivisation in agriculture are positive moves in the size of the actual surplus and channelling it into productive investment.

The line of argument which pays little attention to the mobilization of the actual and potential surplus lays emphasis on aid as an escape route from the poverty of African countries. The essence of economic development is the increase in the savings or investment component of income which in turn makes for further increase in income. In a closed economy, the limit to development is set by the proportion of income saved and invested. If a primary producing country sets out to industrialize without external assistance, it has to divert part of its resources from the production for current consumption into the production of exports which will enable it to purchase the requisite capital equipment for development. One way of looking at external aid, in the context of underdevelopment, is to view it as an addition to the small amount of resources devoted to investment; it can only be complementary to and not a substitute for internal savings. Given the supply rigidities inherent in African Economies, the inflow of external aid without corresponding internal savings is apt to generate inflation and seriously undermine their competitive positions on the world market - and this is especially true where the aid is channelled mainly into social and economic infra-structure. Thus the extent to which foreign aid can be utilized to advantage depends upon the discrepancy between domestic savings and investment (here investment is defined broadly to incorporate the flow of external aid).

At a certain high level of savings, however, foreign exchange earnings might become a bottleneck to development. It has not been possible to estimate the savings-income ratios for all African countries but if we make the plausible assumption that in quite a good number of them the savings-income ratio ( $S/Y$ ) is high enough to permit the inflow of aid without the consequent inflation, why do some economists still argue against reliance on aid in Africa?

It must be emphasized here that the argument is not against aid per se but rather against aid as presently constituted. If aid consists exclusively of outright grants, then the argument against aid will be applicable only to the countries with very low savings-income ratio. But unfortunately, this component of total foreign aid to Africa is very insignificant; the bulk of aid to Africa consists not in outright grants but in loans from Western sources carrying commercial rates of interest of not less than 5 per cent. The service and amortization charges on such aid usually compromise the development objectives of the recipient countries. Ghana's experience with aid between 1960 and 1971 is a case in point. One dangerous aspect of this kind of aid is that it is tied to the donor country which may not, and invariably is not, necessarily the least cost producer of the equipment being supplied to the recipient country. The net result of this is that, the recipient country gets in terms of equipment something less than the face value of the aid and on top of that is required to pay a commercial rate of interest on it.

Again, empirical studies have shown that the flow of aid to Africa falls far short of the loss in foreign exchange arising from the declining trend in the prices of export items. So that if it were possible to arrest the declining tendency in the prices of our exports, the advantage which will accrue in terms of foreign exchange earnings will more than compensate for the loss in aid. In addition, African countries will have a greater measure of freedom to purchase from the cheapest sources. The surest way to achieving such an objective is to diversify our trade outlets and progressively reduce our undue dependence on our traditional trained partners.

#### Dependence on Agriculture and Export Orientation

It has been suggested above that heavy dependence on agriculture in its present form is a weakness. Here the dependence on agriculture merges with the dependence on foreign trade since our foreign trade items, i.e. exports are mainly agricultural products. There is nothing wrong with export - orientedness per se but when it is based on an inefficient agriculture, there is everything wrong with it. What are the limitations of this kind of export - orientedness?

1. Theoretical and policy oriented studies have shown that within the next two decades the rate of growth of export earnings from raw materials cannot exceed three to four per cent per annum. This is because of the fall in demand arising from the following developments:

- (a) Certain trends in the industrialized capitalist countries of the West who are Africa's major trading partners; for example in these countries the demand for most primary products does not increase in per capita income; also the production of artificial substitutes - the result of technological changes in the industrialized countries - is partly accountable for the slackening in the demand for primary products; changes in the economic structure of developed countries from the predominance of light

to heavy industry lead to reduced dependence on tropical raw materials.

- (b) Certain policy measures in the industrialised countries hinder increased exports from primary producing countries. Among such measures are subsidization of domestic raw materials and heavy import duty and tariffs against raw materials from developing countries.

2. A certain limitation of export - orientedness of African countries has to do with lack of flexibility in an economy dependent on raw materials. For example, when the price of cocoa falls on the world market, it is not possible in the short medium term to move resources out of cocoa into other lines of production.

3. The third limitation has to do with the concept of linkages - both forward and backward - i.e. the export industry does not generate enough domestic demand for investment.

Lastly, an examination on the direction of our exports provides yet another weakness. The main buyers of African exports are the advanced capitalist countries of Europe, North America and Japan. The instability and the unplanned nature of the capitalist markets, coupled with the competitive efforts of other primary producers to increase their output in the face of a slow increase in world demand render the dependence on primary products extremely dangerous.

It is clear that the continued dependence of African economies on the production of raw materials for export is detrimental to the long-term development of these economies. Thus any development policy that promotes the exploitation of natural resources to increase exports and obtain tax revenue for current and development expenditure is not a viable long-term policy. This is just what the association with the EEC is bound to promote; and one hopes that the African policy-makers association with the ACP endeavours in that direction are aware of the implications of their recommendations.

In the light of these problems what are the options open to Africa? What possible solutions can we think of? It sounds ridiculous to attempt to solve Africa's economic problems in a single lecture. Consequently, we shall not attempt to suggest solutions. It is a much more fruitful and rewarding exercise to draw some vital lessons from the experience of one or two countries, which have managed to break loose from their poverty under 20th Century conditions. Here emphasis will be put on China; and the areas of discussion will centre on productivity in agriculture, technology and attitude to planning.

Taking agricultural productivity generally, it cannot be denied that it is very low however we look at it - i.e. either as yield per acre or yield per man. With the small peasant holdings predominant in most parts of Africa, mechanization is not possible in the short run. In the long run the only way to raise productivity is outright mechanization of agriculture.

In the short run, following the Chinese example, certain non-capital-absorbing organisational changes can be introduced to improve productivity while the necessary institutional basis for mechanization is laid. In the Chinese case, the collectivization of agriculture opened the way for the introduction of mechanization. Through the collectivization programme the Chinese transformed the predominantly peasant agriculture sector into a very efficient productive apparatus with an inbuilt mechanism for fair distribution. The remarkable feature of the Chinese programme is that collectivization was used mainly by persuasion, education, and example, rather than by coercion. Of course, intransigent peasants - usually among the expropriated - who sought to sabotage the programme were promptly dealt with in the appropriate way. Another interesting feature of the programme was that it was not a new introduction into China.

Mutual aid teams had been a permanent feature of Chinese agriculture so that Chinese communists seized upon this ancient practice, modernized and refined it to a much more efficient machinery. While we do not advocate a full scale importation of Chinese institutional practice into Africa, the lesson from it is unmistakable i.e. "prevalent dogmas with respect to the peasant's fanatical attachment to his parcel or parcels of mechanization need to be drastically re-examined in the light of the Chinese experience".

In sharp contrast to this pattern, certain administrations in Africa encourage politicians, high civil servants, army personnel, university lecturers etc. to go into large scale farming by offering them huge loans on very liberal terms; while this may solve the food problem in the short and medium terms and perhaps in the long term, it introduces a very dangerous distributive element into the productive structure of agriculture in Africa. That is, this policy, if pushed too far, is likely to reduce the peasant farmer to a wage earner and create something akin to the latifundia system in Latin America. The end product of this is that conditions are created which lead to social revolution.

Secondly, there is something to learn about the place of technology in development. Various authors have sought to explain the Chinese success story in terms of the "technological leap" and the "model effect". By the first, it is argued that the very technological backwardness of China constitutes a factor in her success. For before the Chinese embarked on the process of industrialization her backwardness and the existence of a pool of technological knowledge in the advanced countries, especially the U.S.S.R., constituted a happy confluence of circumstances for her development, the implication being that they did not have to waste any time groping for new technology. By the "model effect", it is also argued that the experience of Soviet Russia offered an enormous guide to the Chinese in building socialism. Pushed to their logical absurdity, these arguments would seem to establish a positive correlative between the extent of backwardness and the time dimension required for development. While not denying, in very general terms, the validity of these arguments, one is inclined to think that they grossly underestimate the ability of the Chinese to adapt Western technology to their particular circumstances. This is a lesson of vital importance to the developing African countries as well as to all those who favour wholesale importation of foreign technology. The Chinese appear to have made so much success out of adapting Western technology that,

at the moment, it is being suggested in unexpected circles - e.g. the World Bank - that the developing countries have a lot to gain by studying the Chinese model carefully.

Thirdly, it has often been asserted that owing to lack of statistics, developing countries are incapable of deriving much benefit from the type of comprehensive physical planning of inputs and outputs practised in the centrally planned economies; Chinese's experiment with long term physical planning in the early '50's' and the framework in which such planning becomes meaningful - i.e. extensive state control of the crucial sectors of the economy - are relevant. In Africa today, planning has been reduced to ad hoc decision-making and far too much emphasis is placed on financial rather than physical input and output.

Finally, the Chinese experience demonstrates that industrialization is not a question of merely equipping a country with technical gadgets. What was once said of early 20th Century Chinese intellectuals may be applicable to most African leaders and policy-makers: that industrialization is just a matter of "importing a vast flow of physical machinery and foreign technologists to turn on the switch at the right moment, leaving, otherwise intact, an institutional fabric which was patently breaking under the accumulated stresses and strains of the past century". On the contrary, it involves a radical reorganization of the economic, social and political status quo. It is a sad commentary on economic policy-making in Africa particularly that it has been woefully apologetic, seeking marginal rather than structural changes. The ceteris paribus clause in economic thinking has been taken far too seriously and unless we adopt a dynamic approach to the problems of development - accepting disruptions here and there as a necessary and inevitable development towards progress - as well as an interdisciplinary approach to economic policy making, I am afraid our efforts to develop will come to naught.

## 2.4 A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF NATIONAL SERVICE PROGRAMMES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

by

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### Introduction

In the many papers presented last week, and the discussions that followed, it became quite clear, that there was no consensus on the meaning we attach to terms like youth, Youth Programmes and National Service. Yet this lack of consensus did not prevent us from feeling that we were discussing the same problems, the same issues and the same categories of people.

This seminar is a manifestation of a common concern about current and future conditions of life, and living, of a significant proportion of our peoples. We recognise that their future is indeed the future of our respective peoples and nations. This fact underlies the importance of this seminar. All of us come from countries where the proportion of young people below 25 years is more than 50 per cent and sometimes even as high as 60 per cent. Any programmes concerned with their present and future well-being are significant at least to that extent.

Although the United Nations has adopted a definition of youth that covers people usually between 15-25 years, we know that most programmes concerned with or involving youth cover a much larger group. Certain national programmes spell out the requisite age group, and these may extend up to 35 or even 45. In practice, however, the leadership of many so-called youth organisations have no age limits!

### What is a Youth Programme?

What then is a Youth Programme? A comprehensive interpretation will embrace a wide range of activities and includes:

- (a) socialisation processes concerned with inculcating in young people the social values, attitudes, practices, habits and general culture of their communities;
- (b) education and training - both formal and informal for acquiring requisite knowledge and skill in their communities;
- (c) activities concerned with health and welfare; and moral and spiritual well-being;
- (d) recreation, adventure etc., to tap excess youthful energies and prepare them to face life's challenges;

- (e) job training and job placement;
- (f) citizenship training - to make them responsible and loyal citizens;
- (g) preparedness for possible national emergencies.

This list is not exhaustive. But it covers the total preparation of young people to cope with the task of living and surviving in their physical and social environment. Obviously no youth programmes can take on all of these tasks. Some of these are considered so important that they are taken care of as separate national concerns. Education and health are in this category. Nor are these preparatory activities necessarily confined to youth.

In practice, youth programmes tend to assume residual functions taking on those activities not otherwise taken care of by government departments or making up short-comings in the formal preparation of youth for life in the society. In particular, the conventional youth organisations have concentrated on programmes for training and selecting future leaders, or simply programmes to keep young people occupied and out of mischief. The programmes still carry a hang over from youth programmes in developed countries where the youth play a somewhat different role.

These approaches to youth programmes are now changing. There is growing awareness that these conventional activities are too restrictive and fail to appreciate both the needs of youth in general and their potential to contribute more immediately to the national development effort in Third World countries.

#### Coverage of Youth Programmes

The conventional youth organisations, derived as they were from Europe and particularly Britain, usually catered mainly for literate youth, and even then for a minority of such youth in towns. Such organisations as the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Red Cross, seldom penetrated to rural areas. Even today only a small fraction of young people are enrolled in any of these youth organisations. The programmes either do not get to them, or they cannot afford membership fees, uniforms etc. In many cases, the programmes are not responsive to their needs and their circumstances.

#### The Character of Youth Programmes

Youth Programmes in Africa usually seek to meet one or more of the following needs of young people:

- (a) provision of facilities for leisure-time activities like sports, singing, play-acting and games, dancing etc;
- (b) provision of opportunities for training in citizenship and national service;

(c) provision of training to improve employment potential.

Many have high moral and civic intentions. But analysis of their day to day programmes do not always bear witness to these lofty intentions. Of course, the inculcation of virtues through various activities is always difficult and the result cannot be easily assessed. It is assumed that if the programmes are run properly then the moral objectives will somehow be achieved.

The shift in emphasis in many youth programmes in Third World countries towards national service and participation in development, though laudable, is not without serious problems. In community development, rural development, or general national development, the need to co-operate and co-ordinate activities with other organisations voluntary and parastatal usually raises administrative and organisational problems. Few countries have been able to resolve satisfactorily the problems that arise with trying to achieve both horizontal and vertical co-ordination. The various government departments and private organisations may have other priorities which can hold up progress and cause much frustration. At the local level, power struggles and departmental jealousies can jeopardise worthwhile projects.

By their very nature, it is not possible to restrict youth programmes to one Department or even Ministry. The Ministries of Education, Health, Social Welfare, Agriculture, Labour - to name a few - all have programmes for youth that may lead to duplication of effort and sometimes competition. Some of this is inevitable. But a clearly defined national youth policy and a set of declared priorities may help resolve some of the likely conflicts between Departments. But these should be subject to review to avoid rigidity and intransigence.

A major failing with many youth programmes is that they are simply planned for the youth. Their participation in the conception and planning of the programmes is seldom invited. Sometimes some may be brought in for cosmetic effect. But it is necessary to ensure their participation at both the planning and implementation stages. If young people sometimes appear not to be interested in programmes designed for them, some thought should be spared to find out the reasons instead of using some of the stereotype explanations - that they are lazy, never do well, selfish, can't be bothered, etc. There is a level at which most young people can be reached. Often the truth is that we do not know enough about young people - their problems, their aspirations, their hopes, their interpretation of events, and their perceptions. We tend to judge them by the values of yesterday, even when talking about the future. To be able to function effectively, in planning youth programmes, youth leaders themselves need to be adequately trained and informed about the systems and structures within which they operate.

However, there is ample evidence that when programmes catch the interest and imagination of young people their enthusiasm is boundless. Thus, the potential to mobilise young people for national development projects is great. But unless such projects are well organised and their objectives clearly stated, there is a danger of misusing the energies and enthusiasm of youth and getting them disillusioned. **This has been known**

to happen.

A nagging problem of youth organisations concerns the leadership. In Africa, in particular, leaders are reluctant to give way to younger ones, and seek to convert their organisations into private fiefs. Unless leaders learn to train their successors and hand over gracefully at the appropriate moments, the unfortunate notion will be reinforced that positions of leadership are for keeps. This has been one of the major threats to democracy in Africa. There is great need to set a good example to youth in the youth organisations.

### National Service Programmes

National Service Programmes are now in fashion. They are not entirely new in conception in that services from citizens are used for particular public emergencies like war, famine, national disasters, etc. But the modern framework of national service may owe a great deal to the idea of military service. In the many Commonwealth countries which have it, national service has taken many forms: some are compulsory, para-military, obviously sacrificial, while others are voluntary, and the sacrificial element in it less prominent. Some national service schemes are restricted to post-graduate students, as in Nigeria and Ghana; while others are open to a wider public as in Zambia and Kenya. These many differences are reflected in the country statements submitted.

What is the philosophy behind National Service Schemes? Out of the many aims and objectives declared, two main ones stand out:

- (a) to expose the youth to the idea of sacrificial service to the nation;
- (b) to expose youth to some kind of discipline-moral physical and political.

It cannot be said that these aims are all being fulfilled. By their very nature, moral and social values are not easy to inculcate. But there is a danger of mere ritualism, of passing people through a system with little concern for the purpose to be served.

National Service Schemes are supremely suited for developing task forces for national work whether remedial or developmental. New initiatives are required to make much wider use of them. Apart from ad hoc projects, there is the possibility to use the scheme for on-going or long-term work, e.g. for hospital social service as in India among university students, or for road-building projects as in Kenya.

There may be a point in using National Service Schemes to expose young people to areas of activity and people they will not normally meet in their future jobs or occupations, apart from using it to expose people to different aspects of their future occupations.

The effective use of a task force has much to do with the development of an esprit de corps. For this purpose, camping of National Service Scheme members for a period while undergoing basic orientation

is desirable. Again, it is necessary to develop a feeling of sacrificing for the nation by not over-remunerating National Servicemen. However, care should be taken not to make the scheme seem merely punitive - "just to teach the young some sense" and force some meaningless discipline on them.

Ideally, a National Service Scheme should be more open, and admit as many youths as possible for a reasonable period of time, say 12-24 months. It should have a variety of programmes that will be suitable for boys as well as girls, and both literate and illiterate youth. Such expansion can be very expensive not only in terms of money but operational personnel. But the potential to make National Service Schemes self-supporting is there and must be explored.

A fear that some may have, is that National Service Schemes can be abused. Much will depend on how they are organised. If their governing bodies are representative and their programmes are flexible without being unduly ad hoc, this danger can be obviated. Partisan political control and direction of National Service Schemes can be both a help and a hindrance. Where the Party enjoys wide confidence and support, it can mobilise considerable support for National Service Scheme programmes. In many countries, this is doubtful. A non-partisan approach to a National Service Scheme is probably best for ensuring that all sections of youth feel free to participate fully in the youth programmes.

#### Youth and National Development

At the time of independence, most African countries took it for granted that change and progress were assured, and that economic development will make possible a rapid rise in the standard of living for the majority of people. That dream is now fast receding. The First Development Decade only registered modest increases in G.D.P. for most African countries. Certain assumptions had been made about development and plans had been based on these assumptions. The cycle of poverty it was believed could be broken by massive injections of foreign capital in the form of aid and loans. Educational expansion would enhance the value of the human capital and raise productivity. But the anticipated changes did not take place. It was thought that cultural factors had something to do with the poor results. Some have blamed the slow progress on the lack of intermediate technology.

More recently, the view seems to be gaining ground that the persisting poverty of the Third World is a direct consequence of the in-built unequal exchange implied in the system of economic relations between the central and the peripheral economies, between the industrialised and the non-industrialised countries.

This is not the place to enter into the details of these arguments. But these past and persisting failures in development must be borne in mind in any programmes to commit young people to development activities.

What is really at stake? Will youthful energy and enthusiasm alone be sufficient to transform the society, or do we need to review our development strategies and objectives?

My personal conviction is that within the present framework of international economic relations, and given the existing patterns of expenditure and life-styles, Third World countries have little hope of an economic break-through (apart from the relatively under populated oil rich countries). The gap between rich and poor countries will widen; so will the gap between rich and poor within most of our countries.

Against the background of the earlier presentations at this seminar on problems of Youth Employment and Human Resource Development, the future of youth in Third World countries, and Africa in particular is bleak. The greatest problem facing young people today is how to get meaningful and gainful employment. It calls for a re-definition of the meaning of development, a revision of needs and the means for satisfying these within the framework of local resources and productivity. It is a task that calls for far-reaching political, economic and social arrangements within the society. Youth are the best change agents and clients. Small beginnings can be made to experiment with such new approaches to living styles, and then these can be elaborated to embrace the total society. If action is not initiated early along such lines, the social situation of masses of youth in Africa and other Third World countries will only get worse, and we shall be faced with deep discontent and unmanageable protests.

One major way of alleviating unemployment is to make use of non-formal educational processes, like apprenticeship, to train illiterate and semi-literate youth to find a living in the rural areas especially, but also in the marginal urban zones. Schemes like the Kenya Village Polytechnics, the Afienya Institute and the Indian Youth Centres - have much potential in this regard. They need to be diversified and utilised on a nationwide basis. They will not replace formal schools. But half a loaf is better than none. Moreover costs per capita are low for such training programmes and the returns in productivity, even if it is only 20 per cent higher, is still better, cumulatively, for a nation than a 100 per cent rise in productivity for the few people passing through expensive and formal institutions.

Whatever is done in Youth Programmes or National Service Schemes, the need for some quick and meaningful results is paramount - not only to keep the youth committed, but to convince funding agencies that there is real work and progress coming out of all the investment in funds and energy.