Chapter 1

PLURALISM

(i) Introduction

During the first part of the Seminar, consideration was given to the dimensions of pluralism, the theoretical framework within which various elements could be examined and the constraints imposed by pluralism on nation-building.

Lead papers were presented by Professor L.E. Braithwaite, Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, and Mr. O. Napier, formerly Minister of Law Reform in Northern Ireland. In the presentation of his paper, which is reproduced in section (ii) below, Professor Braithwaite reviewed the existing literature on pluralism and made reference to some of the new dimensions which appear to be emerging in newly independent countries. Mr. Napier, whose paper is also reproduced in the next section, drew on the situation in Northern Ireland and dealt specifically with pluralism as manifested in a community overtly divided along lines of religious affiliation.

Following discussions in plenary session after each presentation, groups of participants met for more intensive consideration of the principal issues. Subsequent to their reporting a joint session was held at which an attempt was made to draw together the various matters on which there had been exchange of views and experiences. These issues are summarised in section (iii) which follows the lead papers.

(ii) Lead Papers

SOME ASPECTS OF PLURALISM

by
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The concept of pluralism has, in later years, become fashionable in sociological and anthropological circles. We have become attuned to hearing the term "plural society" and the concept of pluralism used in the broad sociological sense. However, it is wise to remember that the first use of the term "pluralism" in social science was political rather than sociological, although it in fact pointed towards the problems inherent in its sociological use.

Pluralism in political science was used by those who in analysis, or in ethnical bias, wished to deny the authoritative power of the state and

the concept of its unlimited sovereignty and preferred to see authority as essentially deriving out of multiple sources of power. With the growth of doctrines of centralised planning and regulation by the state, doctrines of pluralism in political science seem to be far less popular than they used to be. But the use of the concept points directly towards the problem of the sharing and dispersal of power which is at the heart of our sociological concern. The issue as to whether the political pluralism arising from the social pluralism is a desirable thing and whether this leads to the desirable effects that the political plurists envisaged from the dispersion of power - these are things that we will have to examine.

In more recent times concepts of pluralism have been used in three different ways which are of direct concern to us. In the first place we shall examine the viewpoint of Boeke who wrote the initial and penetrating analysis of the Dutch East Indies using the concept of "dual economy" and "dual society". Secondly, we should examine the writing of J.S. Furnivall on the plural society as a wider colonial problem or as a problem created by western imperialism. Thirdly, we shall look particularly at the work of M.G. Smith who sought to extend and refine the concepts of Furnivall with special relevance to the West Indies. Of these writers, I find Furnivall the most stimulating and penetrating but they all add a point of view and depth to the analysis of pluralism.

Boeke was primarily concerned with making a dividing line between the Western-penetrative modern sector of the economy and that where traditional ethnical and cultural values held sway. In the one the work ethic, "rational" economic activity and the pursuit of profit were dominant. In the other the motivations to work and "rational" economic activity had not such hold Other more important cultural values - religious, ritualistic, kinship-oriented and community-oriented values - controlled the situation. The economies, in fact, corresponded to different value systems. Here the concept of the dual economy - still largely in use by economists - came to be subsumed under the problems of the dual society.

This simplistic conception of Boeke, concerned as it was with Western penetration on the one hand and the traditional native cultures on the other, was broadened and developed by Furnivall.

The problem as Furnivall saw it was more complex. Not only was native society penetrated, it was in a sense transformed. And in many instances with the economic life of Western civilization "imperialism" had brought about not merely a simple penetration but many and diverse peoples living together within a common economic and political framework. The problem was not merely a simple one of Western penetration on the one hand and native culture on the other. The common far-flung economic ties brought many and diverse peoples together.

To cite an example which Furnivall did not really use because he was concerned with the people of the Far East, the West Indies, particularly Guyana, Trinidad and Surinam, in a sense fit very well into the problems of the plural society. But in the West Indies these problems are hardly problems of "native peoples" who have for the most part died out, or in modern terminology been "liquidated". Furnivall, writing at a time when there was a steady march towards self-government and self-determination, was concerned with what would happen to these multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies that had been created by Western imperialism.

Western imperialism had created a framework in which there were political units of groups with widely differing values. What seemed to hold them together were on the one hand the imperial political framework which was visibly being transformed and on the other the common economic system. In Furnivall's work the various ethnic groups met and mingled in the market place but they did not mix. Their social and cultural life was separately organised and in many respects the basic values important to the individuals of the various ethnic groups were highly diverse.

What would happen, Furnivall asked, if the basic political imperial framework was withdrawn and the peoples of the emerging political units left to rule themselves? The problem as he saw it was a lack of common will. Political units would emerge that did not have the social and cultural consensus to be politically viable.

In a sense Furnivall was pointing to a much bigger problem than the problem of island communities. The problem was exemplified most by what have come to be called plantation societies, societies in which the economic life of production brought far-flung peoples together to labour for the profit of the Western entrepreneur.

But the problem was even wider than that and subsumed nearly all the societies dominated by imperialism which did not form natural political units. A good way of formulating the problem is that suggested by the anthropologist Wagley. He stated that what we were really talking about when we spoke of the "plural society" was of nations in the making.

Historically, of course, nations have largely developed in Western Europe under a common administrative framework. Indeed, the writer Kahlen has (in "Man the Measure") defined the nation as a folk-structure that emerges after the breakdown of an imperial structure.

There is much truth in this point of view, but the long slow centuries-old process by which the nations of the West were formed has been denied to many that have emerged under the new imperial framework.

Even in the old nations, as Furnivall rightly observed, there are to be observed problems of pluralism. So that he was forced to make a distinction between "plural societies", in which the pluralistic feature dominated, and other societies which merely possessed "pluralistic features".

The former group of "nations in the making" were lacking the consensus which made political independence meaningful. The tragedies of India, splitting India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; the trials of Nigeria with secessive Biafra; the history of Malaysia etc. - all these go to prove the perceptiveness of Furnivall and the great extent and importance of the problem which exercised his mind.

This concept of the plural society was used widely - Furnivall never pretended to be a scientist - by writers who were referring to the multi-racial, multi-cultural systems that had been created by imperialism. The West Indies, Rhodesia, etc. were sometimes referred to as plural societies because of their multi-racial and in some cases multi-cultural character.

But M. G. Smith seized on it as a characteristic feature of the West Indies and a valid way of looking at the West Indies not only historically, but contemporaneously. He accentuated certain features of Furnivall's analysis and was guilty of treating "the plural society" not as a convenient truth of analysis but as a thing in itself with characteristic features attributed to it. In particular he showed the hierarchic nature of the stratified system in the West Indies which was so largely identified with race and consequently he treated the "Whites", the "Browns" and the "Blacks" not as belonging to one society with a common system of stratification but as separate societies in the same way that the Indians, Chinese and Malays could be conceived as belonging to separate societies.

Whatever the merits of this approach it tended to focus attention away from Furnivall's main problem which in terms of the West Indies would be more closely identified with Surinam, Guyana and Trinidad. M. G. Smith also accentuated the use of force in the absence of consensus as the factor keeping plural societies together. This, in my view, over-emphasis on the use of force has obscured some of the real psychological and social values which help, albeit weakly, the "plural society" to live together under imperialism, and it obscures some of the main forces at work (again somewhat weakly), urging these towards unity and consensus. If the so-called plural societies are to have any future, this future must rest not merely on an identification of its weaknesses but of its strengths as well. It is only in this way that we can find a base upon which to build.

The pattern of the "plural society", the lack of a common will and of a national consensus lie right at the heart of the problems of development - and by development we refer not merely to economic but to social and cultural development as well.

Whereas economic development took place in the West by a process of relatively slow accretion due to private enterprise and initiative and private endeavour, in the under-developed world the process has to be altogether different.

In the first place, thrust for economic development comes from the political initiative of Western-educated elites that wish to rescue their countries from their backwardness. It is the collective health of the nation rather than the profit of the private individual that is their major concern. In the second place, the initiative to develop, taken up in the first place largely by an elite, has been taken up by the masses. In the third place the masses are becoming even more populous. The spread of scientific control of disease has led to an upsurge of population growth all over the developing world. It is not only that the masses are alive to the issues of development and pressing their demands: the quantitative pressure is also increasing. And in the fourth place the growth of communication of all sorts brings new pressure and new demands upon the governments of all the developing countries.

Development, therefore, to be successful has largely to be centrally directed, politically acceptable and concerned with a sense of great and immediate urgency. In order to achieve development under these conditions many things are necessary. But it is clear that one of the things that is most desirable is a great deal of social consensus, that can lead to the viability of a strong central government. If power becomes too dispersed and lacking in concentration there is a failure. In development, or if

development does take place, its gain tends to be dissipated rather than to lay the base for further advance.

With too much social division, decisions are postponed or avoided if they might lead to conflict, and if decisions are made in a partisan fashion, they lead to intensive conflict. Moreover, if divisions are too sharp or too great, a great deal of the attention of the government and the scarce resources of the country have to be devoted to the maintenance of order and the provision of internal security. The problems of divisions of race and cultural and linguistic problems can be difficult enough in a developed country; in the under-developed country they assume tragic proportions.

Before we consider some of the specific issues of development as they affect pluralism, perhaps we should consider some issues of pluralism, and those that specifically seem to influence island communities.

First, there are the external relations of the plural society. When there are ethnic groups of similar background in neighbouring countries, political divisions become complex and international. Islands at least do not have common borders; perhaps, like the Irish, they should thank God for the sea around them (protecting them from the British). Of course, island communities are not immune to international influences, but these influences tend to be muted, except where there is close geographical proximity to related ethnic communities.

Island communities tend to be small as compared to continental nations. This has the effect both of limiting horizons and of softening tensions and antagonisms. Because of their smallness of size and geographic limitations, population growth tends to hit island communities particularly severely. The demographic balance in these communities between the various ethnic groups is particularly important.

Granted the great urge to development in these island communities, how does the prospect for development affect them? It would be dangerous to indulge in facile generalization. But there are visible certain patterns of development and proposed development appearing throughout the third world. Basically the policy that seems predominant and, in the circumstances for island communities, also inevitable, is the three-pronged drive - (i) tourism, (ii) industrialization and (iii) rationalization of agriculture.

Most of the island communities are blessed with sunshine and beaches, and tourism seems a natural road to development. But tourism has certain disadvantages for the plural society. It adds to the racial problem, since most tourists are white, coming from the affluent countries whose citizens are rich enough to tour. The larger the influx of tourists, the more the racial problem tends to be exacerbated. The issue of ownership and control of the land and the beaches becomes critical. Local nationalism and dignity asserts itself against the foreigners. The logical extension of a successful tourist development programme can be seen in the island of St. Thomas, where the visiting tourist population at any point of time outnumbers the local population. The price of tourist development may come to be the loss of natural resources and national and ethnic identity and integrity.

Similarly, the small island communities cannot for the most part raise the capital, furnish the transport or the expert know-how for

industrialization. Hence the standard pattern appears to be one of industrialization by invitation. This can lead again to a further influx of foreigners, a not altogether pleasant prospect to behold.

Rationalization of agriculture is the only area which is perhaps susceptible to completely local control. But given the limitation of availability of land in most instances and the population problem, rationalization of agriculture and its development does not appear to be in itself a solution to the islands' developmental problems.

Since emigration seems largely ruled out as a solution to the problem, it seems clear that the island communities must learn to live together and the human dimension in development is of considerable importance. Unless they learn to reconcile ethnic identity with national consciousness, to subordinate the limited loyalty to the larger whole, the future of these communities appears dim indeed.

It is the task of the youth to free themselves as far as possible from traditional prejudice and to forge a new outlook. Since in the expanding populations the youth form the majority and are therefore a significant part of the population, it is the quality of youth leadership that will determine the development of these island communities.

A VIEW OF PLURALISM

by
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I am not an academic. I am not a trained sociologist nor an economist. But I am involved in politics in a plural society where past failures with problems have ledto almost total inter-community alienation and a great deal of violence and murder. Perhaps I can be forgiven for thinking that the problems imposed by pluralism are far more urgent and far more serious than either national or international politics is prepared to admit.

What is a plural society? It is merely a society in which two or more self-defined communities consider themselves to be fundamentally different from each other. Such countries may have differences of language, race, religion or culture which can be identified by an outsider. But this is not necessarily so. Plural societies exist where the differences between the communities are either indistinguishable or extremely minor when viewed by an outsider. The real test is not an objective one of how different the communities within the society appear to be but rather of how different the communities think they are. Their attitudes towards themselves and towards each other and the existence of any common ground or common identity is more important than the fact that there are different religious faiths, different colours, different ethnic backgrounds or different languages spoken. These extremes may reveal the presence of separate self-identifying communities but not necessarily so.

In Northern Ireland there are few, if any, external differences between the two communities. The people are basically of similar ethnic stock. They speak the same language, namely English. They are all Christian, at least nominally. Their culture and everyday way of life are very similar although both communities consider that they have separate cultures. Their surnames are generally no reliable guide as to which country they belong. Yet they feel themselves to be different and distinct and they form two communities which are to a large degree mutually antagonistic.

Northern Ireland may appear now to be a very extreme case after 1,100 have been murdered in the name of religion or politics in the last four years.

I have no intention of dwelling on Northern Ireland and I have no intention of mentioning any other island community within the Commonwealth. What I must say, however, is that most of the learned and apparently well researched works about Northern Ireland seem to ask most of the urgent questions and get most of the wrong answers. I must therefore ask the questions "How much do we really know about the phenomenon of pluralism in different societies? Has any real research been done and have we really considered the problems involved in such research? Do you believe for one moment that if a stranger comes into our island society and starts asking people about their most basic beliefs that he will get true and accurate answers?"

I now want to try and look at how separatism is maintained and why.

There are a few societies where separation is enforced by law and its maintenance is part of government policy. The clearest example is South Africa where the full force of the law is used to prevent assimilation of the communities. In that country, the political policy of apartheid presupposes that it is neither possible nor desirable to allow any degree of assimilation.

In considering South Africa, we are inclined to assume that if the laws preventing assimilation did not exist, assimilation would take place. This certainly does not follow. Societies where there is no law against assimilation have often provided their own mechanisms. Again let us look at Northern Ireland.

In most countries every citizen is considered under the legal system to have equal rights. The law makes no attempt directly or indirectly to prevent assimilation. But in some societies the communities themselves provide their own mechanisms which are at least as effective, if not more so, because they carry with them the weight of public opinion. I would like to outline a few of them as they are typical of every plural society which is resisting integration and they underline the enormous difficulties of achieving integration; they include education, sport, housing ghettoes and employment.

The maintenance of divisions in pluralistic societies

When people from two or more cultural backgrounds find themselves for the first time living together on one island, it is not surprising that they are acutely aware of their differences. In itself, difference, whether

of culture, race, religion or language, is neither a good thing nor a bad thing - it is just a fact. What does create difficulties, however, is the tension which inevitably arises between the communities. It is worth discussing why such tension arises and why it is maintained.

It seems to me that where rigid inter-community divisions are maintained in a society, the feeling within each community of the inherent superiority of its own culture, colour or faith is artificially maintained by the use of two methods. The first is to establish maximum ignorance about the beliefs of other communities. The second is to import to your own cultural differences a superiority over all others. The greater the threat to our own community, the greater superiority is assigned to our own cultural beliefs, and the more intolerant we become of all others. The extreme religious intolerance of the Inquisition in Europe was the result of the threat of Islam and Protestantism to Catholic Europe. The Penal Laws against Catholics in the 16th and 17th Centuries in England were a response to the Counter-Reformation and French and Spanish political power. A feeling of insecurity breeds intolerance and creates the closed and introverted community.

The maintenance of divisions within societies is, therefore, due to communal insecurity resulting from a feeling of continual exploitation or the threat of exploitation. It is only when this feeling or threat is removed that inter-community toleration will replace tension and violence.

Continuing exploitation

Human communities are not totally irrational. You will seldom find a continuous feeling of exploitation by one community with respect to another, unless there is a factual basis for that belief, unless there is in fact exploitation. The feeling of exploitation will not be removed until the causes are themselves tackled and eradicated. This sounds easy - all you have to do is identify the facts of exploitation and begin to eradicate them. But there are two major problems.

The first is that any reforms are likely to take time to implement. But once you start, the demand to proceed more quickly becomes an almost irresistible pressure to proceed faster than the society is able. The promulgation of a programme to eradicate injustices or exploitation imposes enormous difficulties and strains, with the exploited community demanding that everything be put right overnight. How well any society is able to commence this exercise depends very largely on the nature of its political institutions.

The second factor is related to the first. Where the exploitation has been in the field of political power, reform means removing some power from one community and handing it over to another. Where it is economic, it means redefining economic priorities to give a greater share to the exploited and a lesser share to the exploiters. However fair these redivisions may be, they are unlikely to be universally popular with those who have to give up something which they previously enjoyed. Even a millionaire does not like giving up part of his wealth to keep fed the starving, even if he theoretically agrees that it is the right thing to do. When I use the word exploitation I do not use it in any pejorative sense. I do not imply a deliberate policy to discriminate. I am describing only a factual situation which can be objectively tested.

So the practical difficulties in removing the causes for a feeling of exploitation are formidable in the extreme.

The threat

It is not only a feeling of exploitation that creates community tension. There is also the feeling that another community threatens to exploit you even if at present your community is exploiting it. In Northern Ireland, for example, the Protestant community feels threatened by the existence of an Irish Catholic majority on the whole island and the identification of Northern Ireland Catholics with that majority. I presume that in Cyprus both Greek and Turkish Cypriots feel the same kind of external threat.

There is another threat which can exist and which is not in itself external. Where a dominant community realises either consciously or subconsciously that it is discriminating against another community or communities it will be afraid to relax its grip on the grounds that the previous action may be reciprocated.

There is no hope of eradicating community tensions unless the factual existence of the threat itself is removed. I believe in effect that the methods which should be employed for eradicating the feeling of exploitation and the feeling of threat are exactly the same.

The method of moving forward

In the pluralist island society, the objective must be to create a feeling of common identity which transcends the previous community divisions, but does not necessarily obliterate cultural, language, ethnic or religious differences. It simply creates a bridge over them. The problem is that you cannot create this feeling of common identity just by declaring it to be so. Independence is not in itself a cure-all and it can in fact make intercommunal problems more difficult as well as more simple to solve. What is needed is a combined approach which not only continually emphasises the common identity as a reality by eradicating the feelings or injustices or insecurity which have maintained the exclusiveness of separate communities.

I intend to examine briefly those problems in the economic, political, language and cultural fields and suggest certain mechanisms which can be used to break down tension. These cannot be looked at as separate compartments because in many ways they are inter-related.

Many island societies represented here have been able to give a sense of common identity and equal citizenship to all the major communities. They have been able to do so by giving people from all countries a real feeling of being equal citizens of new countries. That does not mean that the problems of pluralism are over, but simply that they have got over the first hurdle.

I would like to concentrate briefly on two of the basic ingredients. The first is political power and the second is economic development.

Where in any society the major political parties are inter-community in membership and voting strength, the problems of political power will tend to be based on economic issues rather than pluralist issues. Where political parties are based on the separate communities and by the state's constitution or by agreement between them it is agreed that they will share

power, the exercise of power is unlikely to be divisive on an intercommunity basis. But where politics is based on a separate country and the majority party insists on governing by itself a dangerous situation exists. It may not explode. But it is more likely that in the course of time those communities permanently excluded from the exercise of political power will become more and more distrustful and less and less prepared to be governed. In that situation it requires only a spark to set off major violence.

If the minority communities, as well as being excluded from political power, are in addition the economically less prosperous sections of society, then in my view catastrophe is as near a certainty as it is possible to forecast.

Democracy

Most of us are believers in democracy. But if by democracy you mean parliamentary elections based on the Westminster voting system of single member constituencies and majority party government, to many island societies such democracy is not relevant. What is required is a voting system which is clearly seen to reflect the number of votes cast to the number of seats won - a system of proportional representation and the involvement of all the major communities in policy-making and administration. The traditional institutions of government may require to be drastically changed to deal with pluralist reaction.

I have no answers. I have tried to indicate some of the problems in the hope that answers will evolve. I do not want to be depressing but I believe that problems of pluralism will grow in the world in the next twenty years rather than diminish. As I have already pointed out there do not need to be enormous differences of race, religion, colour or ethnic origin to create pluralism. It is the self-identification of one group as being separate or different which is the test. Whether those differences are rather attractive cultural diversities or whether they create major tension and violence depends in the ultimate on how politicians handle them. And most politicians will not face a situation until it blows up in their face. By that time the harm has been done.

At present Britain is a pluralist society. So too are all the major developed countries of Western Europe. Immigrant labour from Europe, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean has poured in because their services were needed. In a state of world recession the services of many would not be needed. Unemployment amongst the indigenous population is almost certain to increase into community tensions. But the problem does not end there. First generation immigrants may not want to play a full part in the life of the new country but their children almost certainly will.

The Commonwealth is an amazing institution. It wields no power. It threatens no one. In an economic sense it is not particularly valuable to be a member. Yet peoples from every continent, of every colour, of virtually every faith and of enormous cultural and ethnic differences belong to it. And that membership gives them a common bond with each other which is of critical importance in the modern world. The influence which the Commonwealth could have as a vehicle for helping to solve problems like pluralism, not simply within our own societies but throughout the world, could be absolutely enormous. But we have not really tried to do it. What I would now hope is that this Seminar on pluralism will be the start of a programme of research which will then be put to use in solving our own island problems and then more ambitiously in producing patterns which point the way to other parts of the world.

(iii) Summary of discussions

1. In reviewing the historical processes which led to the development of non-homogeneous societies, the seminar noted that in most cases the starting point had been the penetration of native communities by western entrepreneurs and the resulting dualism in terms of society and economy.

2. Plantation economies imposed by imperial powers had given rise to the importation of labour from a variety of countries into societies which were already dual, thus increasing the number of different groups and widening their spread in terms of race, religion, culture and language.

3. Within the native value systems divisions developed along racial, cultural and religious lines. These divisions, however, did not assume large proportions for, even where political units were based on such divisions, the different groups were held together by an imperial political framework and a common economic system.

4. It was noted that while the different communities "met and mingled in the market place, they did not mix".

5. For as long as a colonial power dominated a plural society which had developed along these lines, a certain unifying bond existed among the communities based on their identification as a subject society. The withdrawal of the imperialists brought about disintegration, a resurgence of divisiveness and a lack of common will and consensus.

6. A nation has been defined as the folk-structure which emerges following the breakdown of imperialist control. The difficulties of creating such a structure in situations in which separate groups co-exist, while holding firmly to their traditions, were recognised.

7. While in many countries the history of the plurality of the society can be traced along the lines discussed, it was held not to be true in others. In addition, several new dimensions of pluralism related to factors other than race, religion and culture are appearing in some countries. In some cases the new divisions are based on levels of education and externally oriented frames of reference. In others the very fact of independence has caused internal conflict. It was anticipated that further divisions would be created by immigration which had taken place over the last thirty years in, for instance, Britain and other Western European countries.

8. The geographical situation of island countries was believed to be significant, especially when strong links existed between one community and a large neighbouring country. The problems arising from pluralism were likely to be exacerbated by such external relations, even where, though the links were not strong, overtures were being made to an overseas nation.

9. In considering the influence of short-term emigration, it was recognised that if strong links existed, for instance, in terms of ethnicity, between the visitor and the country visited, reinforcement of cultural values could, in cases of widespread visits, enhance further the national divisions.

10. It was noted that large scale emigration could, if not equally spread among the varying groups, produce a marked change on the basic demographic balance and the overall social structure.

11. Where cleavages among groups coincide with different economic levels the situation is exacerbated. In most cases of this kind the differences tend to be perceived as having their foundation in racial, religious or cultural discrimination, though the fundamental cause may be wholly economic.

12. The coincidence of cleavages with other factors, e.g. provision of social welfare, housing, rural/urban distribution, can also produce increased problems.

13. In times of economic recession tensions are exacerbated further and conflict may ensue as the threat perceived by one group of another is intensified.

14. Diversion of material and other resources in attempts to placate a frustrated group can increase resentment on the part of other groups and may at the same time not be in the best economic interests of the country.

15. Attempts to assimilate or even integrate the varying groups are thwarted by deeply held prejudices and the prevalence of racial or ethnic stereotypes. It was felt that, while differences of race and ethnicity posed the most intractable problems, some progress might be made in the areas of language and cultural styles, which were regarded as more open criteria. Within the area of religion, a degree of mutual respect existed and tolerance was usually practised. In other areas, however, mistrust was the general rule.

16. If attention is deliberately focused on the strengths of pluralism rather than its weaknesses, pluralism may provide some motive force for progress towards nationhood. It was generally realised, however, that social divisions consume resources on account of the need for a "lowest common denominator" approach.

17. It was agreed that while the maximum degree of integration was desirable it was unrealistic to expect this to be achieved. It was, however, possible through increased awareness of the differences with respect to culture to widen cultural values. It was noted that elements of some cultures were incompatible with the notion of democracy and the freedom of the individual. In such cases there was need for some concessions to be made if a society was to be wholly democratic.

18. The problems of pluralism can be exacerbated by a highly developed tourist trade especially where tourists come largely from the more developed, white countries. The need for awareness of potential problems was recognised, particularly in so far as the issues of land ownership, use of beaches and fishing rights were concerned. Another problem created by tourism was the tendency towards service to foreigners rather than to self-development, and the corrupting effects on cultures and people. The pressures on governments to increase capital income and foreign investment were nevertheless recognised.

19. It was anticipated that the second decade of independence could in many countries bring increased cleavages owing to the gaps which tend to be appearing between aspirations and achievement.

20. It was recognised that equitable economic advance among the groups within a society might lead to a blurring of stratification by race or religion

by the development of stratification by socio-economic class. While a cross-community development of this kind might appear desirable, the new stratification might give rise to problems of another order.

21. It was the general view that legislation, though not of itself guaranteeing advance, would assist. Public opinion supported by appropriate legislation was also regarded as significant. The need for public political education was seen as critical, especially in relation to perceptions of exploitation and privilege.

22. It was agreed that the law should reflect the composite values of the society rather than be determined along the lines of the majority's values system. In most legal codes special provision was made for different religious practices in terms of marriage and this was acceptable. In some countries laws relating to land ownership differed among the groups, thus increasing inter-group tensions.

23. It was recognised that, while the law itself might be fundamentally just to all groups, in many instances the administration of the law could be discriminatory.

24. It was generally agreed that compensatory mechanisms directed towards assisting minority groups were necessary. The dangers of backlash following the introduction of ill-conceived procedures were however recognised and the need for caution noted.

25. Consideration was also given to concepts of democracy, voting systems and constitutional provisions giving recognition to minority rights and privileges.

26. The need for new approaches to be adopted towards the sharing of political power and participation in decision-making was seen as a crucial factor in the drive towards national unity.

27. In considering features which assist in unifying the separate groups, it was felt that major contributions were made by a national language, food, dress and festivals. Where a number of languages were spoken within one country, the easier acceptability of adopting as a national language a neutral, external language, usually inherited from colonial rulers, was appreciated.

28. Consideration was given to the need for the development of a national sense of belonging and a common will. There was conviction that the most powerful influence towards the goal of national integration was education, by means of both its content and its orientation.

29. It was recognised that education provided on a segmented community basis is likely to foster group differences rather than to assist integration. It was also recognised, however, that integrated schooling, which in most countries is based on highly competitive western models, could in some cases give rise to increased inter-group tensions.

30. While many participants believed secular education to be of greater assistance in integration and the development of a national consciousness, it was felt that religious affiliations need not be sacrified in the process.

31. The role of the ecumenical movement in fostering understanding and respect among different religious groups was recognised.

32. While the media have tended to highlight differences among groups, recognition was given to the potential role of the media in propagating and nurturing fledgling efforts towards nationalism and social integration. Possible approaches suggested were information bulletins, public educational programmes aimed at increasing inter-group respect and entertainment programmes based on local folk cultural presentations.

33. It was considered desirable for control of the media to rest with an inter-communal board. In the case of newspapers which emanated from separate groups, differences could be further sharpened. It was noted that in some countries governments censored material which was likely to incite disharmony.

34. Consideration was given to the contribution which young people could make towards integration through the media, particularly by bringing attention to the difficulties faced by minority groups.

35. It was agreed that, since in many cases divisions of race and religion coincided with economic levels, an essential factor in easing the problems arising was equal opportunity in education and employment. The need for advance to be based on merit rather than group affiliation was emphasised.

36. In considering the contribution which young people could make towards the goal of social integration, proposals were made for cross-cultural, cross-racial, and cross-religious agencies to undertake multi-group projects in the fields of social welfare, education and recreation. The first essentials were deemed to be the recognition of problem areas and the planning of suitable projects. The need for government assistance was emphasised.