Introduction

In recent years a growing number of undergraduate and postgraduate degree programmes in Commonwealth universities have been concerned with one or more aspects of Third World development. In some cases this involves the inclusion of two or three optional courses within the scope of a more general degree, whilst in others the whole focus of the programme is explicitly on development studies.

The topics covered in such courses are diverse, and might include economic theory, rural development, project appraisal, urbanisation, development administration, health planning, education, international trade, public finance, regional planning or agricultural extension.

The teaching of these topics involves a wide range of disciplines : economics, sociology, political science, history, anthropology, social psychology, geography and mathematics. This breadth is reflected in the university departments which offer such courses. In the U.K. alone development related courses are to found in Departments of Public Administration, International Relations, Management Studies, Urban Design and Regional Planning, Agriculture, Humanities and Social Sciences, Economics and Politics, Agricultural Economics, and Business Studies.

Such diversity raises a number of questions and issues: in what sense are all these courses considered to be development studies? Do they have common theoretical or methodological approaches? Given that they tend not to be technical, nor generally come from the applied sciences, in what ways are they relevant to the contemporary problems faced by the Third World? Are they 'for' development, or only 'about' development? And if the latter, does this in any way diminish their importance in the curriculum of the 1980s?

In trying to answer these questions it is useful to trace some of the philosophical and theoretical roots of development studies, for here particularly the dialectical relationship between academic study and the reality it attempts to explain is a lively and rapidly changing one. Individual disciplines generally have their own readily identifiable history and pedigree; this is less evidently so in the case of development studies.

The Roots of Development

The publication of Adam Smith's 'Wealth of Nations' in 1776 serves as a convenient historical starting point for an analysis of the roots of development studies. It was during the Scottish Enlightenment that attention was first focused on development as a subject in its own right. Smith delineated four stages of development: hunting and gathering, pastoralism, settled agriculture, and commerce. This is an early example of a development theory of unilinear progression, with the notion of stages through which a society passes, each stage being seen as implicitly higher and more advanced than the previous one.

But Smith's theories, and those of the founding fathers of European social science, were not formed in a vacuum. The theories of the evolutionary sociologists and the political economists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were articulated in the context of radical social and economic change in Europe. The Industrial Revolution and the growth of capitalism gave birth to various intellectual traditions which offered conflicting explanations of these changes. The ideas of Darwin, Ricardo, Malthus, Saint Simon and especially Marx were of particular influence. Most of all, it was the development of capitalism that was central to economic thought in the hundred years following publication of Adam Smith's book.

The Industrial Revolution brought about fundamental changes in the economic structure of European society. As the flourishing capitalist system succeeded in transforming living standards, the concept of development faded from view as social scientists came to grips with aspects of the new reality. It was not to surface again until the late 1940s.

European industrialisation

Meanwhile, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the impetus of industrialisation began to spread to other parts of the world. It enabled Western Europe to establish control over an unprecedented international economic system. International trade flourished and the dynamics of the capitalist system penetrated into two new types of territory:

Firstly, relatively uninhabited areas like Australia, Canada and America, which were rich in natural resource endowment with immense possibilities for agricultural and subsequently industrial development.

Secondly, traders spearheaded the incursion into previously settled territories in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Colonies were established in order to guarantee the supply of key commodities, cheap and regular imports of which were needed to fuel the manufacturing momentum of the industrialising West.

The main aim of the colonial administration was to gain control and maintain stability of the areas where economic and occasionally political expedience dictated. They were not concerned with the causes of poverty, malnutrition and ill-health of the indigenous people and did not encourage research into a state of affairs which it suited their interests to perpetuate.

Whilst the economists of the time largely ignored the early colonies as a potential area of research, cultural anthropologists did become interested in the customs and habits of the local people. Their perspective was a static one, however: they were interested in culture rather than social change. The comparatively primitive living conditions were viewed as being inevitable, if not immutable. After all, the inhabitants had evidently survived such conditions over a long period of time. Documentation of rites and religions was the order of the day.

In the early nineteenth century the colonial perspective accorded with the attitude to social and political change which was inherent in the theories of Keynes, which were becoming increasingly influential in the inter-war period. Economic growth was seen as the dominant factor determining other forms of societal change, and economic stability was a necessary pre-condition for such changes.

The post-war period

However the advent of World War II fundamentally disrupted the established international political and economic system. The emergence of the Soviet Union and the U.S. as significant and powerful actors on the international stage coincided with the gradual break-up of the colonial structure.

Newly independent national governments were under pressure to achieve economic advancement from increasingly educated and articulate elites. The international tensions of the Cold War made the fate of colonial and ex-colonial territories important matters for Western foreign policy. Communist domination was to be countered at all costs, particularly in view of the potential damage to the industrialised West which a loss of access to raw materials and commodities would bring about.

These profound changes were reflected internationally at the institional level. In 1945 the United Nations was seen as the instrument which would replace global management by empires whilst enabling a handful of nations - notably Russia, Britain and the U.S. - to retain their international hegemony. Formalised technical cooperation between the major powers would be supplemented by collective control over strategic areas such as education, health, shipping, science, trade and finance.

By 1950 this system of rationalised imperialism was in ruins. There was a new, if somewhat uneasy, detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Decolonisation brought with it the gradual decline in power of Britain and France, whose roles had been so critical in the industrialisation process of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Three definite groupings emerged: the industrialised West; the Soviet Union and the Eastern powers; and the nations of South East Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which together formed the so-called Third World.

The pressure for rapid economic change at the national level in the Third World was mirrored at the international level by the collective clamour for justice in the various multi-lateral development institutions which were established - the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later known as the World Bank), and in the UN agencies such as UNESCO and later the UNDP and UNCTAD.

The 1950s : A time for growth

The early 1950s saw the emergence of a new basis for relations between these three political groupings. But underlying this structure was a more fundamental polarity: the industrialised, developed countries of the North, and the non-industrialised, underdeveloped countries of the South.

Many of the countries of the South were still colonies, and all were linked economically, politically and culturally to one of the industrialised nations, to whom they exported raw materials and primary commodities. The Great Depression, World War II, decolonisation and the Cold War had changed the international and national power structures. The elites of the new Third World governments had been exposed to Western culture, education and living conditions. Often their goal in government became the attainment of similar levels of prosperity in their own countries. Development was seen as the transitional process by which this would be achieved. This conceptualisation was actively promoted by the U.S. as a foreign policy instrument, especially in the context of the Cold War.

Development thus became associated with (and subsequently defined and measured by) economic growth. By 1950 most of the major economic problems of the developed countries such as unemployment and absolute poverty had been solved. There was an optimistic and widespread belief that the centuries which it had taken Western Europe to reach its current level of prosperity could be short-cut by a few years of rapid economic growth. And if the solution was an economic one, economics was clearly the discipline which would master-mind the transition.

As economists turned their attention to development planning, different theories emerged. Most were based around the central imperative of economic growth. Some specified stages of growth as Smith had done 175 years earlier, with 'backward' countries going through specified changes until they reached the take-off point, which would be followed by sustained economic growth. The simplicity of such theories was attractive and the policy prescriptions for achieving them seemed to be equally clear. All that was needed was sufficient quantities of aid, capital, technology and investment funds.

Since the developed countries had high per capita incomes, with full employment, welfare states and political democracy, improving the national income was thought to bring about an improvement in income and associated benefits for the Third World.

And if development was equated with economic growth, then according to Keynesian theory this could be measured by the national income. Reducing the complexities of development to a single yardstick was popular with politicians and helped legitimate donor-recipient relationships by facilitating the notion of growth targets and plans. From the early 1950s, developed country economists helped Third World governments to produce ambitious Three or Five Year Plans. These included target rates of overall or per capita income growth and focused on key variables like savings, investment, consumption, imports and exports to assess their viability. The UN set growth rate targets of 5%, so that development might be seen to be taking place. The gap between the rich and the poor world would be narrowed in the not too distant future.

National growth would be achieved by centralised economic planning and an emphasis on industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation. Internal capital accumulation would be assisted by inflows of foreign capital and technology, and the cumulative effects of this growth would trickle down to the rural areas. Insofar as notions of political democracy, income equality or other distributive implications of economic growth were considered, they were assumed to flow inevitably in the latter's wake.

The 1960s : Second thoughts

In the early 1960s, it was clear that this vision was not being realised. Economic theories and methods had proved inadequate in the formulation of development policy. Western theories and methodologies which had been evolved in unique conditions were transferred to radically new and different circumstances, and their application was simply inappropriate. Perhaps this was inevitable: logically all theories must start with some philosophical and analytical preconceptions. Since economic theory was so firmly rooted in the Western European experience, both its transfer and its irrelevance could have been foreseen.

Some basic assumptions had not held good. The heavily empirical approach of gathering data and collecting aggregate statistics on employment, savings, investment and output assumed near-perfect market conditions with readily quantifiable demand, supply and price profiles. But the markets were grossly imperfect or non-existent. The economists had left out many of the equally important non-economic factors - both human and institutional.

The application of neo-classical economic theory and Keynesian macroeconomics was only relevant to small areas of the Third World, mainly manufacturing or export-oriented sectors, and to cities rather than the rural areas where 70 - 80% of the population actually lived. The gap between rich and poor countries was, if anything, becoming wider.

In concentrating on national income accounting, savings ratios and capital-output coefficients, the economists had over-simplified the concept of development. The complexity of development problems was gradually realised and it was acknowledged that increases in national income alone were not the solution.

In particular the emphasis on using national income data as indicators of development masked the distributive aspects of growth policies. The dangers of relying on aggregate data were highlighted by studies that showed that in some Third World countries where per capita income was increasing the gap between the rich and poor was actually growing wider. Growth of the national income was in some cases contributing to greater poverty. It became clear that the benefits of growth were being differentially distributed between regions, classes and ethnic groups. New policy initiatives were called for.

On the theoretical front the recognition that economic aspects of development did not constitute the whole picture brought in other disciplines - sociology, geography, political science, history and social anthropology, reflecting a more complex, interdependent analysis of development. This also implied a shift from a quantitative to a more qualitative approach.

The UN declared that the 1960s would be the 'Decade of Development' The old growth-oriented models continued, with the addition of welfare and egalitarian considerations. The idea of planning development had not been as successful as had been hoped. Countries such as India had evidenced few notable improvements. There was some room for optimism, mainly in oil-rich countries or those with labour-intensive output exports, such as Taiwan and Korea. But fast growth sometimes led to political repression as elites struggled to control the masses and maintain or increase their own share of the benefits.

Towards the mid-1960s the rate of the post-war boom showed signs of declining. Finance flows from industrialised to Third World countries were not going well. The quantity and quality of aid was insufficient or inappropriate. The panacea of industrialisation was not working. Such economic growth as there had been in the Third World was not accompanied by the necessary structural reforms which might have maintained the growth momentum and distributed some of the benefits more equally.

The US formed its Alliance for Progress, making aid for Third World countries dependent on good performances in areas such as land reform, fiscal reform, and planning which widened the access of the masses to better health and educational facilities. But new structural problems had arisen. The emergence of the US in the 1950s as a capitalist superpower had transformed the international economic system built up by Britain and Western Europe in the nineteenth century.

The large expansion in overseas investment by the US resulted in a period of extensive growth of transnational corporations. The focus of international economic power shifted towards the transnational industrial elites at the centre and the modernising elites at the periphery. The corporations extracted the capital surplus from profitable sectors in the Third World and tended to create technological dependency. Benefits rarely accrued to the masses in the form of wages since the mode of production was typically capital-intensive. Infrastructural development (roads, communications etc.,) was nominal and so the state rarely benefited either, although some members of the elite reaped rewards. In spite of the Bretton Woods agreements, which represented a major institutional attempts to regulate the international monetary system, the exploitation of the Third World by the industrialised countries continued.

Another major effort aimed at offsetting some of the worsening trends in the Third World was the Green Revolution, initiated in the late 1960s. With the development of new, high yielding variety seeds for rice it was hoped that national food production would be increased and costly food imports reduced. Additionally, by the creation of a delivery system of the necessary inputs such as water, fertilizer and credit, it was anticipated that there would be some re-distribution of benefits to landless labourers, small farmers and the rural poor generally. Whilst yields improved dramatically, the more powerful rural landowners appropriated a disproportionate amount of the inputs and benefits, increasing the gap between the rich and poor.

The decade culminated with the publication of the Pearson Report in 1968. The report had been initiated by the World Bank to review the development assistance efforts of the 1950s and 1960s and make recommendations for future policies towards the Third World. Interestingly, terminological diplomacy had changed towards categorisation of the Third World as 'developing' countries, rather than 'backward' or 'underdeveloped'. Pearson recommended the establishment of target growth rates and reductions of rich country trade barriers. The report called for a resource transfer of 1% of GNP from rich to poor countries. Even at the time, it was evident that the Commission had seriously understated the magnitude of the problems.

Industrialisation had created a new dependency. Planning as a technocratic tool was only useful given the political will to implement the necessary changes. Global integration had led to increased exploitation by the transnational corporations.

The end of the 1960s signalled the end of the post-war boom and the decline of the US hegemony, largely due to its inability to keep up with the growth of productivity of Western Europe (except Britain) and Japan. The final abandonment of Keynesian expansionism was to be followed by the rise of monetarist policies.

The implications for the social sciences were equally gloomy. Orthodox economic theory had failed to solve the new problems. The transfer of neo-classical economic theory to countries for which they had not been designed had proved to be inappropriate.

Ironically, one of the major challenges to Western thought came from the Third World itself. In the mid-1960s Latin American thinking had undergone a radical change, culminating in the emergence of theories of underdevelopment and dependency. The process which Western academics had termed 'development' was seen by the Latin American theorists as a process of 'underdevelopment', a continuing exploitation and weakening of the Third World's position. International capitalism was seen as the mechanism for international economic, social and political change, with those at the core (the rich, industrialised countries) determining the fate of those at the periphery - the Third World.

The core-periphery relationship was seen as being characterised by the extraction of a capital surplus from the periphery to the core through such agents as transnational corporations, and the creation of a technological (inter alia) dependency of the periphery on the core. Much empirical evidence supported this theory, especially in light of the post-war internationalisation of production, the growth of the transnationals, the increased movement of capital and the international migration of labour.

It was argued that the uni-disciplinary use of economics by most Western theorists had resulted in a static, functionalist paradigm of the world, in contrast to the reality of modern capitalism, which was constantly changing through technological innovation and other means.

The necessity for a multi-disciplinary approach with a more dynamic perspective was clearly evident.

The 1970s : Basic needs and a new international economic order

Disappointed with the small advances of the 1960s, the UN renewed its commitment by designating the 1970s as the "Second Development Decade'. In spite of overall economic growth in many parts of the Third World, unemployment and underemployment were increasing, particularly in urban areas. Income growth was highly concentrated and income inequality was increasing. Transnational corporations were taking over the most dynamic areas of Third World industrial activities and there was growing foreign control of Third World industry. Capital-intensive innovations were continuously introduced, leading to rural-urban migration and rural stagnation. Increasing urban unemployment and social polarisation led to more emphasis on social policies aimed at the poor.

The situation became increasingly dramatic: Third World government expenditure was increasing and income was declining, with rapid population growth, internal inflation and balance of payments problems. The need to control inflation, limit imports and expand exports, combined with the need to control the urban poor and repress rural uprisings, led in many countries to severely deflationary policies and the establishment of authoritarian regimes.

The 1973 oil price rises dismissed any lingering hopes that a growing international economy backed by purposive support for the Third World would bring about any significant advances in the latter's position. Capitalist governments no longer felt that they had the resources for large aid programmes. Bilateral and multilateral aid contributions were either held level or begun to decline in real terms. In the Third World energy, fertilizer and food prices increased unremittingly.

By 1975 the gap between rich and poor countries was getting bigger. Overall economic growth had occurred, but the rich were getting richer and the poor poorer. The international monetary system was in disarray, with the new phenomenon of stagflation an additional setback.

There was growing pessimism in the West about the viability of comprehensive policy interventions in the Third World, and this was reflected in several important shifts of emphasis: from the organised to the unorganised sector; from industrial to agricultural projects; from large scale, technologically sophisticated projects to smaller, more appropriate ones; from centralised direction to decentralised initiatives; from urban to rural development; from the accumulation of fixed capital to the development of human skills.

Policy debate was divided. The reformists still believed that the old technocratic system could be made to work, but with an increased welfare function and greater participation of the people. Based on conventional development thinking, the cry was for a 'New International Economic Order'.

The fundamentalists, on the other hand, called for a redefinition of development with greater emphasis on the human factor and the need for self-determination and self-reliance. The old capital-intensive development projects of the 1950s and 1960s were deemed inappropriate; expensive schools and hospitals in the rural areas were not reaching out to the vast majority in the rural villages. New projects should be focussing on meeting the basic needs of the majority.

A 'Basic Needs' policy was formally adopted by the UN, specifying minimum requirements in terms of food, shelter and clothing, as well as access to basic services such as health, transport, sanitation and education.

Towards the end of the 1970s the old notion of rich countries as models for development was being abandoned. Further oil price rises made it clear that the American lifestyle of excess consumerism in the 1960s was not going to spread globally. There were second thoughts about the quality of life within rich countries and various aspects of contemporary life came under public attack from within. The environmental lobby had drawn attention to the strains on our finite planetary resources. Evidently there were limits to growth.

The concept of an increasingly interdependent world and a global ecological and economic system confronted social science with new problems. Transnational corporations were threatening the sovereignty of nation states. The sense of theoretical crisis was evident in some of the 1970 speeches of the head of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, with an uneasy fusion of underdevelopment and more conventional approaches reflected in his discussions of poverty, dependency and basic needs. All this illuminated the inadequacy of traditional social science approaches and heralded the need for new thinking.

The 1980s: Mutual interests and the North-South dialogue

In the 1980s calls for a 'New International Economic Order', 'Basic Needs' and 'Collective Self-Reliance' grow dimmer as the sense of global crisis deepens. The international recession has fostered a new mood of economic nationalism in the North. Protectionist trade and tariff barriers are appearing. Cuts in public expenditure have resulted in much reduced bilateral and multilateral aid support. There is a decline in the feeling and expression of internationalism.

The keynote of the early 1980s is global interdependence, a theme which pervaded the Brandt report on North-South issues, arguably the most important contribution to development of the decade. Priority areas were identified, such as food, energy, trade and finance. The impetus for the North to collaborate with the South on these and other issues reflected the new realism of recession - mutual interests would provide the motivation.

The political momentum of the Brandt report has continued for longer than perhaps even the authors imagined. Commonwealth and other international summits have been held in Ottawa, Mexico, Melbourne and India. Yet no real progress has been made and the possibility of any fundamental and lasting initiatives looks remote.

The crisis of the world economy precludes meaningful trade and aid concessions. Globally inflation is high, output is down, and unemployment has increased to unprecedented levels and is predicted to rise further. The rate of international trade is declining and the roles of the IMF and World Bank have diminished. Multilateral support on energy for the South has not yet been forthcoming. Gradually the Third World is being forced to abandon its rhetoric of pleas in the UN for a more just international economic order.

The economic position of most Third World countries has deteriorated in the past 15 years. In a world where 25% of the global population consume 75% of the world's products and raw materials it is difficult to see, global disaster apart, how this situation will change significantly in the coming 15 years.

Definitions of Development

> 'The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned.' (D. Seers, 'The Meaning of Development', Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1969).

> 'In the final analysis, development is left as a complex process, the assessment of which must involve substantial normative elements. It is generally accepted that material progress constitutes a very important aspect of that process, especially at very low levels of consumption. However, at no stage is this seen as the sole determinant.' (Bienefeld and Godfrey, in D. Seers (ed), 'Courses on Development at Graduate Level in Britain', Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1980).

> 'With such a spread of disciplines and so many viewpoints represented it would not be possible to say that there is a unified approach so far as the definition or theory of development is concerned. A common theme which does exist however is that we believe that no single discipline is likely to encompass adequately the study of development, and that for this purpose interdisciplinary co-operation is necessary'. (Leeson, ibid).

> '... the articulation of the economy resulting in economic growth. ... a study of those economic, political and social arrangements which assist or hinder this process.' (Palmier, ibid).

These definitions of development are all offered by current teachers of development studies in Britain. Whilst they do not represent a consensus in any sense, nor even reflect the full range of potential definitions, there are certain common strands which are evident.

Firstly, all world agree that development is a normative concept, impossible to define in any absolute sense. Definitions, whether by governments or individuals, inevitably involve value judgements, and as such are determined by the ideological and other persuasions of those making the definitions.

Secondly, the association of development with economic growth alone has generally been abandoned. Additional recurring themes are political democracy, participation of the people, income equality and the satisfaction of basic needs in terms of nutrition, housing, employment and access to health and education facilities.

Thirdly, it will be seen that most general economic and political theories contain explicit or implicit notions of development, insofar as a desired end-state for society is put forward and the means to achieve it articulated, for example neo-Ricardian and neo-Marxist theories.

Fourthly, this broadening perspective now involves other disciplines besides economics, notably political science, sociology, history, geography and anthropology. But this is more than the collective pooling of different disciplinary resources. Since a country's economy, policy and society are inextricably interlinked, a multi-disciplinary approach is called for, which attempts to perceive the complexity of the process in a genuinely synthetic way.

Fifthly, the concept of development is no longer a static one, but now incorporates the concept of a process of social, economic, political and cultural change. This implies a historical perspective, as well as the negation of the narrowly technocratic approaches which have dominated the previous 25 years.

Sixthly, countries of the Third World need to be studied in ways which are relevant to their reality. Theories and methods developed in other cultures may be inappropriate when transferred to different places and times.

Finally, development problems cannot be studied only within the boundaries of a given society. The interdependence of the global economic system necessitates at the least a comparative approach, and preferably an attempt to locate the society and specify all the links within the wider international system.

There are clearly other lessons to learn from the past and future events will make their own demands on the social sciences. To the extent that any definition implies a desire to improve the conditions of the majority of the world's population, it is much to be hoped that both theories and courses are more responsive to their real needs.

Development Studies Courses in the 1980s

The courses which follow display a healthy and necessary plurality in their approaches to development problems. Given the way in which the subject has grown, it is perhaps inevitable (if unfortunate) that such a large proportion of the courses are offered in the richer countries of the Commonwealth. Nonetheless it is encouraging to note that the number of courses offered in Britain alone have doubled during the past four years.

It has been suggested above that such courses are distinguished by a variety of factors - they tend to be multi-disciplinary, have a cross-cultural, comparative perspective, and are problem and policy-oriented.

But perhaps the most frequent questions about development studies courses concern their relevance to contemporary development and their potential contribution to solving development problems.

Taking the question of relevance first, an interesting point to consider is whether theories precede reality or vice versa. In some cases this is simply a matter for empirical study, but in others it is difficult to disentangle chronologically the ideas and explanations about social phenomena from the reality itself. Some argue that we only understand reality after it has passed, with a theory lag of many years, while others justify the predictive power of certain theories and claim that there is a probability of particular events happening which implies our ability to influence and alter them.

Either way it is almost inevitable that the content of formal courses will lag behind the findings of theoretical and empirical research, and this is all too evident from some of the courses which follow. The heavy emphasis on economic growth, the wide spread of uni-disciplinary approaches and a static vision of development suggest that this lag might be as long as 15 years. However, the encouraging growth of development courses might well cut this down substantially, since there is no doubt that interest in development has increased significantly in Commonwealth educational institutions in recent years.

In particular it is to be hoped that the number of undergraduate courses dealing with development will increase, so that students taking post-graduate degrees will have a firm base of prior understanding to build on.

The tension between courses which seek to train practitioners of development and those which study the process of development is not necessarily contradictory. The former may have a more immediate, practical application, but the latter's empirical research can yield important results.

The view that development studies courses should contribute to solving development problems is not unreasonable and many of the courses listed do make a practical contribution.

Clearly there is a spectrum of courses, ranging from the more applied, technical courses which we generally associate with training, to more non-vocational courses normally associated with academic study. At the latter end of the spectrum such courses only contribute to development in the sense that they make students more aware of the problems involved and the range of options - technical and ideological - open to them as solutions. Since many of the students will ultimately occupy positions of responsibility in Third World governments or UN agencies, it is clearly beneficial for them to have some idea about different administrative and economic policy alternatives.

Perceptions may vary as to what route should best be taken by rich and poor countries alike in order to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of the Third World masses, but there are firmly and widely-held beliefs that these goals must be achieved. In the context of a deteriorating international situation the need for co-operation is stronger than ever.

Perhaps there will not only be a growth of development studies courses in the future, but also increased co-operation on teaching and research facilities between fellow members of the Commonwealth with a common goal to pursue.