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The Role of EPAs in Supporting Services Reform in Africa[1]

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Introduction

This chapter discusses the issue of opening up to trade in services. It argues that this is a crucial policy issue for Africa and one that could be deepened in the context of the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) that African countries are currently negotiating with the European Union. The goods-only interim agreements that have been negotiated so far are unlikely to have a strong impact on development so the opportunity to negotiate appropriately designed provisions on trade in services could have more important trade impacts. Nevertheless, implementing a clear strategy for trade in services, to exploit opportunities for new dynamic exports and to drive efficiency in the provision of services to domestic consumers, should not be dependent on signing EPAs. We discuss ways in which EPAs could be designed to support the development of services sectors in Africa but recognise that EPAs may not be the most appropriate way to pursue services reform for all African countries.

Trade in services offers enormous opportunities for African countries to diversify their exports, pursue new opportunities for dynamic growth, increase investment and promote efficiency, and widen access to services in the domestic economy. In most countries, services are now the dominant part of the economy and have been the main source of employment growth in the past decade. Reducing the cost, raising the quality and increasing access to key backbone services, such as telecommunications, electricity, and business services, can have economy-wide impacts, since these services are often inputs into most productive activities, including manufacturing. A range of other services, including health, education, water and sanitation, are crucial to poverty reduction and for improving the quality of life of the population as a whole.

Trade policy plays a very important role in determining the nature of competition in domestic services sectors. Countries that place restrictions on foreign services providers may limit access to the most efficient suppliers and the best technologies. This, in turn, will deny producers and consumers throughout the economy access to low cost services or to the types of services that are most appropriate for their needs.

Similarly restrictions in overseas markets can act as a constraint on the development of services exports for which the country has a comparative advantage. Despite the importance of services and trade in services, few countries in Africa have defined a trade strategy for them.

However, liberalising trade in services can be more complex than liberalising trade in goods and may require considerable technical capacity, which is often lacking in Africa. This is because many services sectors need to be regulated to ensure that they operate efficiently in the face of market failures (for example, natural monopolies or where there are information asymmetries). Failing to do so may lead to significant sub-optimal outcomes and compromise legitimate public policy objectives regarding low-cost access to key services. Opening up to trade in the absence of appropriate regulations may not necessarily increase trade or generate gains.

It is therefore important to co-ordinate services trade liberalisation with regulatory reform. The challenge is to combine trade reform with the implementation of good regulations so as to allow the country to achieve its public policy objectives. There is no strict sequencing that demands regulatory reform must precede trade opening or vice versa. The available evidence shows the importance of ensuring competition in the market. For example, in telecommunications performance has been stronger when the introduction of competition has preceded the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Many countries in Africa have benefited enormously from opening up in mobile telephony. Trade opening can also be a driver of regulatory reform. In some cases it may be necessary to pursue trade liberalisation to undermine a blockage on regulatory reform when incumbent producers capture regulators. In many sectors regulation has to be linked to technology and opening up to trade and investment will often bring new and more advanced technologies, which will require a re-appraisal of the current regulatory approach.

In other cases, opening up to trade may not be the key constraint to the development of the sector and regulatory reform or improvement in the business climate may be necessary to permit investment or cross-border trade to take place. For example, some countries in Africa banned the use of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services, which is crucial for the development of business process outsourcing (BPO) services (BPO). Opening up in this sector without addressing the regulatory constraint (the ban) would have little impact on service delivery. A recent World Bank study[2] shows that there are considerable opportunities for cross-border mobile banking, yet a number of countries in Africa do not have in place a regulatory framework to facilitate such trade. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo the concept of electronic money has not yet been defined in law and regulations concerning anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism requirements relating to such banking are not yet in place.

Trade liberalisation and regulation of services sectors

Openness to trade can be an effective mechanism for increasing competition in services sectors. Competition is essential for increasing efficiency in the services sectors to achieve lower priced and better quality services. Competition pushes service suppliers to reduce waste, improve management and reduce operating costs. Competition then forces suppliers to pass on these cost savings to consumers in the form of lower prices. Competition also forces firms to innovate and to look for new and better products that are more closely aligned with the needs and demands of their consumers. Thus competition increases the range, variety and quality of services in the market. Finally, competition undermines costly rent-seeking activities whereby incumbent firms spend resources on lobbying officials for policies that will protect them rather than concentrating on increasing efficiency and quality.

A range of empirical studies[3] has shown that openness to trade in services, such as telecommunications and finance, is associated with greater efficiency and faster growth. In addition, trade liberalisation of services has positive impacts on trade in goods and allows developing countries to better exploit their comparative advantages in labour-intensive manufacturing. The gains from services liberalisation are likely to be larger than those from goods liberalisation and the adjustment costs that arise from service sector reforms may be lower than those arising from reducing protection of goods. This is because the dominant mode of cross-border supply in many services sectors is through commercial presence (Mode 3), which ensures services will continue to be produced locally.

While the benefits of liberalising trade in services are compelling, it can bring risks and potential costs that may require appropriate government intervention. This arises because of the need to regulate many services sectors to overcome market failures giving rise to concerns about both efficiency and equity. For example, when imports of services through commercial presence are liberalised, it is important that foreign entry leads to more competition and improved services, not merely to a transfer of ownership from a state monopoly to a private one or from a national monopoly to a foreign one. Reforms to establish an appropriate regulatory framework may need to precede the opening up of the sector concerned. The reforms should set the rules of the game for new investors by establishing appropriate competition and pricing rules for foreign investors in services, service and access requirements when relevant, and adequate oversight and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Regulation is often a complex activity and regulators need to be able to assess the impact of regulatory decisions on relevant industry outcomes. The capacity of the regulator will be an important determinant of the nature, quality and impact of regulation. Many African countries lack the capacity to design and effectively implement appropriate regulations. Hence, technical assistance will be required to raise the capacity to design and implement appropriate regulations for services. Undertaking this simultaneously across a wide range of services will not be feasible in many countries in Africa given the human and technical resources required for successful regulation. Weak capacity of the regulator can also lead to regulatory capture, where the incumbent service provider(s) exerts undue influence on regulators and manages to stifle attempts at reform. Moreover, existing regulatory agencies may have little or no incentive to reform unilaterally. In these cases, trade liberalisation may be useful to undermine regulatory capture and catalyse the reform of regulatory agencies.

Trade opening may need to be carefully co-ordinated with regulatory reform. Policy-makers in Africa face the challenge of getting an appropriate balance between the extent to which progressive regulatory reform initiatives exploit opportunities for external liberalisation to increase competition and bring new investment, technologies and skills, and the degree to which trade agreements can be leveraged to drive reform where progress has become bogged down. Since regulation is linked to technology and openness to trade is a source of new technologies it is important that flexible approaches to regulatory reform and trade opening are adopted. Inherently, this suggests a sector-by-sector approach in which countries first target services sectors that are priorities for their development. It also emphasises the importance of local capacity to design and implement effective reform strategies and the need for openness, transparency and participation in discussions and decisions concerning the regulation of services. The situation is likely to vary across countries putting strong weight on flexibility in trade policy negotiations for individual countries in Africa to pursue their service sector and regulatory priorities.

Co-ordinating trade liberalisation and regulatory reform does not necessarily entail deregulation but rather putting in place appropriate regulation; that is regulation that more effectively achieves public policy objectives while ensuring efficiently produced low-cost services. Tools and procedures can be put in place to assist policy-makers to assess whether existing or new regulation will achieve the sector-specific public policy objectives while contributing to competitive market outcomes. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles on key market-oriented and trade and investment friendly regulation and the APEC–OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform could provide further guidance on how to undertake such a combined assessment of regulatory and competition policies, and market openness policies. More specifically, the process of capacity building could be co-ordinated with the increasing use of regulatory impact analysis to provide for an open, transparent and effective mechanism for the review of regulatory measures and their implementation.

Putting in place an appropriate regulatory framework can also be important in enabling firms to exploit export opportunities. For example, regulations that encourage competitive and well-functioning domestic services sectors can provide the basis for penetration of overseas markets by domestic suppliers. In Kenya, reform of the regulation of telecommunications that permitted firms to have their own satellite disk to connect to the internet and removed a previous ban on the use of VoIP services was critical in allowing the export of call centre services to the global market. Again, introducing the key elements of good regulatory practice is likely to be important so that transparency and openness in the design and implementation of regulations takes into account a broad range of interests, including producers that have a potential to export as well as those focused on serving the domestic market.

It may also be necessary to put in place mechanisms to ensure that social objectives regarding access to key services are not compromised by trade reform. The challenge is to achieve an appropriate balance between greater competition by improving market access for foreign providers and achieving public policy objectives. A particular concern is that increasing competition and liberalising services will lead to a deterioration in the provision of services to the poorest or less populated areas because these are the least profitable to serve. This may arise if new competitors in formerly monopolised sectors compete away monopoly profits that were previously used to cross-subsidise unprofitable provision of services to poorer areas or regions.

There is a range of market-based mechanisms that governments can use to ensure the provision of key services to poorer or under populated areas in a competitive environment. For example, the government can use an auction to attract the most efficient provider. Subsidised service can be financed by instituting a small tax on services and auctioning off the revenue to companies willing to provide services to the poor. The advantage of this approach is that a market determines who the providers will be.

Improvements in the general investment climate may be required to complement trade opening and regulatory reform. In many services sectors commercial presence through foreign direct investment is the key mode of supply. But removing restrictions on foreign direct investment may do little to encourage new inflows if there is a general climate of hostility to new investment. Countries in Africa, such as Mauritius, that have made substantial efforts to improve the investment climate have seen substantial inflows of foreign investment into services sectors. Similarly, foreign investment into Rwanda has grown enormously following reforms of the business climate that made the country the top global reformer in the World Bank's Doing Business Report 2009.[4]

Implementing trade liberalisation in services

To be able to effectively plan trade liberalisation and negotiate agreements on trade in services bilaterally, regionally or at the multilateral level it is essential for policy-makers and negotiators to have extensive information on the nature of regulation and trade restrictions in all of the sectors that are subject to discussion. Detailed information is needed about both the measures in overseas markets that constrain exports in sectors where the country has offensive interests as well as measures affecting the access and treatment of foreign services suppliers in the domestic market. In many African countries, as well as other developing countries, comprehensive data on services sectors are not available, and they typically face great difficulties in effectively participating in trade negotiations on services.



Figure 3.1. Restrictiveness of applied services trade policies by region
Notes: Regional abbreviations: GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council; SAR – South Asia; EAP – East Asia and Pacific; MENA – Middle East and North Africa; AFR – Sub-Saharan Africa; LAC – Latin America and Caribbean; ECA – Europe and Central Asia; OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Source: Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009) [5]

To begin to address the shortage of data on applied policies governing trade in services in developing countries, the World Bank has recently carried out a survey to assess applied (actual) trade policies in five services sectors – financial services (banking and insurance), telecommunications, retail distribution, maritime transport and professional services. The survey was conducted in 78 developing and transition countries and 24 developed countries in 2007 and 2008. The resulting policy summaries, presented in Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009),[6] cover only explicit market access and national treatment barriers plus discriminatory regulatory measures in the five sectors. Twenty-two African countries are considered in the analysis.[7] No systematic data on restrictions on trade in services are available for those African countries not covered by the survey.

The resulting index ranges from 0 if there are no restrictions to 100 for closed economies. The results show that, on average, African countries have relatively liberal services trade policies (Figure 3.1). For these African countries, the overall restrictiveness index of applied services polices is just above the world average and



Figure 3.2. Services Trade Restrictiveness Index for African Countries
Source: Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009)[8]

lower than the restrictiveness index in all other developing country regions except for Eastern Europe and Latin America.

There is, however, considerable variation across countries in Africa (Figure 3.2). For example, Madagascar and Mauritius have very open policies towards trade in services with a value of the restrictiveness considerably below the world average and also below the average for OECD countries. On the other hand, the value of the index for Ethiopia is the highest score of any country in the sample. Only 7 of the 22 African countries have an overall services restrictiveness index that exceeds the world average.

In contrast with their relatively liberal actual policies, the policy commitments of the 22 African countries in the Uruguay Round and their commitment offers in the Doha Round are extremely limited. Several of the African countries covered by the Bank's survey did not submit Doha offers. For those countries that did submit Doha offers the improvement over their Uruguay commitments are often minimal. In the case of Africa, the gap between applied policies and WTO/GATS services liberalisation commitments and offers is the largest in any region (Figure 3.3).



Figure 3.3. Restrictiveness of Uruguay Round policy commitments on liberalising trade in services, Doha Round commitment offers and actual policy by region
Note: Where a country did not make a Doha offer, the sector index reflects the Uruguay round commitments. Twenty-one African countries are considered in the Africa group: Ethiopia is excluded since it is not a WTO member.
Source: Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009)[9]

A more comprehensive indicator of GATS commitments in Africa is provided by the World Bank's World Trade Indicators,[10] which covers commitments by 35 sub-Saharan African countries and all GATS sub-sectors. As summarised in Figure 3.4, these data confirm that on average African countries have made a relatively small number of



Figure 3.4. Index of GATS commitments
Notes: The index measures the extent of GATS commitments for all 155 services sub-sectors as classified by the GATS and in the four modes of services delivery. The index ranges from 0 (unbound or no commitments) to 100 (completely liberalised), with an intermediate value of 50 for partial commitments. A simple average of the sub-sectoral indexes was used to generate aggregate sectoral indexes. The overall GATS commitment index is a simple average of the sectoral indexes.
Source: World Trade Indicators

commitments compared to OECD countries. In general, developing countries as a group have been reticent to make commitments in services under the GATS. So Africa is similar to other developing regions in this respect.

Thus, to some extent, many countries in Africa have liberalised trade in services with most of this having been implemented unilaterally. With the exception of tourism, countries in Africa have tended not to make commitments under the GATS. Countries in Africa will need to carefully assess whether further reform of applied trade policies is necessary to achieve objectives regarding investment and competition in services sectors, or whether the more pressing need is for reform of domestic regulations and domestic regulatory capacity or attention to constraints in the investment climate. This assessment needs to be undertaken on a sector-by-sector basis.

International trade agreements can support governments that wish to implement services reforms but are opposed by powerful vested interests. Such agreements can help break domestic deadlocks by improving market access for the country's exporters and mobilising export groups to support the reform effort. Trade agreements can also provide a mechanism for overcoming domestic resistance to desirable reforms by locking in the commitment to reform and enhancing the credibility of the reform process. Evidence suggests that the GATS may not provide a strong commitment mechanism for small developing countries.

Regional approaches to services reform can bring particular benefits from exploitation of economies of scale, appropriate management of cross-border public goods, co-operation and co-ordination that leads to better regulations and pooling of technical skills to overcome capacity constraints that afflict regulation at the national level. Regional agreements can provide for deeper integration than agreements with rich countries or at the WTO through regulatory co-operation with neighbours who have markets with comparable demand and supply conditions and similar regulatory preferences and capacities. For example, in professional services, the mutual recognition of qualifications that is often necessary to make effective openness to temporary movement of workers can be more easily pursued with neighbouring countries than with countries at higher levels of income. Harmonising standards with neighbours for such services will tend to be more appropriate than harmonising with the standards of rich countries.

In general, the greatest gains from liberalising trade in services will arise when access is provided to all suppliers on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis. By so doing a country gives its consumers and produces access to the best service providers in the world. Sequencing preferential liberalisation of trade in services before broader MFN liberalisation can have adverse long-term consequences by handing a first-mover advantage to a less efficient supplier that a subsequent increase in openness cannot dislodge or force to become more efficient. Starting liberalisation at the regional level may be justified if there are important learning effects that local firms have not been able to exploit due to the small size of national markets or restrictive national regulatory regimes that have inhibited opportunities for growth. Preferential regional liberalisation may then allow regional service providers to emerge in Africa that are then able to compete effectively when MFN liberalisation is implemented. Liberalising first on a regional basis may also allow regulators to gain experience before full opening is implemented. Hence it is important to carefully assess the potential costs and benefits of proceeding with preferential regional liberalisation. Countries should also look for ways to make binding commitments to ensure that there is subsequent MFN liberalisation.

Trade and regulatory reform of services in Africa and EPAs

An economic partnership agreement with the EU is one of a number of options that African countries have to support co-ordinated trade and regulatory reform of services. African countries can pursue the option of services EPAs whether they have signed an interim EPA or not. There is no legal obligation under the WTO for the African countries to include services in a trade agreement with the EU. Hence, unlike the interim agreements, which were often concluded so as to maintain trade relations for goods between the African countries and the EU, there is no such necessity for services. However, there is no guarantee that a services EPA will necessarily support pro-development outcomes in services. An EPA is one mechanism that African countries can use to support services reform. There are other options, including unilateral liberalisation, bilateral agreements, regional integration with other African countries and the multilateral GATS process. These are not exclusive and can be pursued with or without an EPA.

The main impacts of a services EPA with the EU would come from locking in openness to trade, providing sound precedents for regulation in key sectors, co-operation on competition policy and support for regional integration. Analysis of the CARIFORUM EPA (Chapter 5) suggests that an EPA could be a mechanism for locking in existing levels of openness to enhance the credibility of reform and to provide a signal to investors of the stability of the current policy stance on services. The CARIFORUM EPA also defines frameworks for the regulation of a number of specific services sectors, such as finance and telecommunications, which could provide a basis for increasing the quality and credibility of regulations in Africa. In other sectors in which Africa has offensive export interests, such as tourism and IT related services, commitments on regulations that go beyond the GATS could provide important precedents for future regional and multilateral trade agreements. Provisions in the CARIFORUM EPA for co-operation between competition authorities, especially the specific commitments in tourism, could be useful in disciplining anti-competitive behaviour by EU firms in African markets and in allowing African firms to effectively compete in vertically integrated production chains. Regional regulatory co-operation and a regional preference clause could be useful for advancing regional integration in services in Africa. Putting in place structures for dialogue on mutual recognition at the EPA level may facilitate progress at the regional level.

However, an EPA is unlikely to offer much in terms of improved access for African countries to the EU market, especially for temporary movement of unskilled workers. The CARIFORUM EPA contains provisions for expanding employment of temporary service providers in the EU. But this applies to professionals – business services providers, contractual service suppliers and independents – and does not address the issue of temporary movement of unskilled workers. Greater temporary access to the EU for unskilled workers, for example through carefully crafted and managed sub-contracting schemes, would have a significant economic impact in Africa. Unless the EU institutes a significant opening to temporary movement of unskilled workers, services reform will have to be driven by African countries seeking to reform their domestic services sectors.

The current GATS-style negotiation of reciprocal commitments under the EPA has given insufficient attention and resources for improving regulatory policies and strengthening regulatory institutions. Lack of attention to concerns over regulation and the ability to regulate has constrained effective participation in negotiations. Regulators will respond to substantive arguments for reform while GATS-style mercantilist bargaining over market access per se will be of little importance. This entails the need for careful analysis of the economic benefits as well as the wider consequences of reform, and the involvement of key stakeholders in discussions of regulatory reform.

A sector-by-sector approach to co-ordinated regulatory and trade reforms is likely to be the most effective approach for African countries. For countries with limited capacity to negotiate and regulate services a focus on priority services sectors from a development perspective (in most countries these are likely to include transportation, telecommunications, electricity, finance, and business services) is likely to be more effective than a broad but shallow preferential trade agreement that involves negotiations across all sectors and modes of supply.

Regulatory and MFN trade reforms in Africa need to be supported with technical and financial assistance. Such assistance should be targeted at those factors with the greatest impact on performance in the market and not solely at market access and national treatment considerations and the preparation of GATS-type schedules of commitments – it should not be directly linked to the signing of an EPA. Assistance should be available to all African countries that wish to reform their services sectors, whether they sign an EPA or not. A fund for services trade reform in Africa that would allocate resources according to need and consultants according to expertise would be the most appropriate vehicle for providing technical assistance and building capacity. With regard to an EPA, resources from this fund could be available to raise capacities in priority sectors to support implementation of commitments on trade openness and on regulation and hence enhancing the credibility of the locking in of trade openness and regulatory reform. One way to organise and co-ordinate such support could be through a dedicated forum (hosted where applicable in sector specific international organisations), independent of specific trade negotiations. It should provide for the application of economic and regulatory impact analysis, discussion of good practices and effective institutional structures. Such a forum would have to encapsulate that for services reform one size does often not fit all and that reforms and appropriate regulatory structures will often tend to be country specific.

Recommendations

For countries in Africa, drawing upon available sources of financial support and technical assistance:

- Define a strategy for trade in services that is integrated into the national development plan through the following activities: improving the collection and dissemination of more and better data on service sectors and trade in services; creating awareness and facilitating a dialogue among various stakeholders about the potential impact of services trade liberalisation and reform; and identifying priority sectors where greater competition, foreign investment and new technology can drive efficiency and growth. The strategy should include a committee for services trade and regulatory reform to champion open and transparent approaches to regulation and trade opening, and to oversee the use of regulatory impact analysis.
- In the priority domestic services sectors implement a trade and regulatory audit to identify the main constraints to competition and investment. For instance, insufficient openness to trade and investment, lack of credibility of existing openness, inappropriate regulations, insufficient capacity to implement a sound regulatory framework, a hostile investment climate and so on.
- In priority export sectors assess the need for improvements in the regulatory regime to support competitiveness and mobilise an export supporting approach in relevant line ministries and institutions such as the export promotion agency.
- Identify if, and how, unilateral reforms and trade agreements at the regional, EPA and multilateral level can be used to alleviate the constraints that are identified for the priority sectors and support the process of trade and regulatory reform. Explore opportunities for co-operation with the EU outside of a formal broad services agreement, for example, with regard to co-operation between competition authorities.
- Pursue more actively opportunities for regional co-operation and deeper integration of services in priority sectors of mutual interest with regional partners.

With regard to the EPAs:

- The EU and African countries should consider a more flexible approach to the EPAs that reflects the diversity of capacities and priorities across African countries. The focus should not be on a bilateral deal between the EU and regional blocks in Africa for the preferential opening of services sectors based upon a GATS type schedule, but rather a country-based co-operative approach to remove the constraints to the development of the sectors identified as priorities by African countries. For example, if requested by an African country or group of countries, the EU could work with these countries to facilitate co-operation between competition authorities. This could be provided even in the absence of a formal comprehensive EPA agreement. Similarly the EU could look at opportunities for mutual recognition of qualifications that are not predicated on signing a formal EPA agreement.
- The African countries and the EU should adopt an approach to services reform that enshrines a sector-by-sector approach to co-ordinated trade and regulatory reform rather than a broad but shallow GATS type negotiation in which priority sectors for reform are defined by each country consistent with national development plans.
- The EU should support African countries in pursuing openness to trade in services primarily through MFN liberalisation especially in infrastructure sectors where preferential opening may have long-term adverse implications.
- The EU should work with other donors and international institutions to make adequate technical assistance available to all reforming countries in Africa from a fund that is independently managed and delink the provision of such funding from negotiations and agreement on an EPA. Such a fund could organise financial resources and expertise around key services sectors for Africa. Suggestions would include telecommunications, tourism, transport, finance and business services.

Notes

1. This chapter is a summary version of a recent World Bank report by Paul Brenton (2010) entitled, *Africa's Trade in Services and Economic Partnership Agreements*. Nora Dihel, Larry Hinkle and Nicholas Strychacz also contributed to the production of that report. The work has been funded by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development supported by the governments of Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The views expressed here are solely those of the author and not necessarily the views of the funders, the World Bank Group or its Executive Directors.
2. World Bank (2009). *Trade in Financial Services: Mobile Banking in Southern Africa*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

3. For a review see Hoekman, B and A Mattoo (2008). ‘Services Trade and Growth’. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4461. The World Bank.
4. Download at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2009
5. Gootiiz, B. and A. Mattoo (2009). ‘Services in Doha: What’s on the Table?’. *Journal of World Trade,* 43.
6. Ibid.
7. Botswana, Cameroon, Cõte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8. Gootiiz, B and A Mattoo (2009). ‘Services in Doha: What’s on the Table?’ *Journal of World Trade,* 43.
9. Ibid.
10. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/0,,contentMDK:22421950~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:239071,00.html