

Chapter 7

Post-Brexit Trade with Small Developing Countries: Making it Development-Friendly

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7.1 Introduction

On 19 June 2017, almost one year after the Brexit referendum, the UK and the EU formally began negotiations under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to terminate the UK's membership of the EU.² With the UK having been a EU member for more than four decades, this decision is likely to have considerable political and economic implications for the UK, Europe and affected third countries around the world.

The EU is the UK's largest trading partner, representing about half of its world trade in goods and services. With the withdrawal negotiations now underway, a major priority for the UK is to secure a favourable post-Brexit trade deal with Europe to avoid major disruptions to trade and value chains. In this regard, the government's 2017 Brexit White Paper directs the UK to leave the Single Market and seek a new strategic partnership with the EU, including an ambitious and comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) and a new customs agreement (UK Government, 2017). However, it will be extremely challenging to conclude such an agreement during the two-year timeframe, especially given the sequencing of the negotiations that start with settling the UK's rights and obligations as a departing EU member state.³ Since a future EU–UK trade deal is unlikely to be signed by March 2019 when the UK intends to exit the EU, the parties may need to consider transitional measures to avoid higher most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs and services restrictions under the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Soobramanien and Razzaque, 2017).

Since the UK's priorities are to secure a comprehensive trade deal with Europe and negotiate FTAs with the fastest growing and most dynamic economies in the world (UK Government, 2017), there is the risk that the interests and concerns of most developing countries, especially the world's poorest nations, could be crowded out. The UK is the world's fifth largest economy and a significant participant in world trade, so the economic fallout from Brexit will have implications for many developing countries. The main transmission channels through which these countries' growth and development prospects will be affected include trade, investment, remittances, aid and development finance (Casero and Ruta, 2016; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016a, 2016b; Hove and Wakeford, 2016; Mendez-Parra et al., 2016). While the UK may have little control over the indirect trade effects of Brexit—such as the depreciation of the pound—the government can consider implementing specific policy measures to avoid direct trade disruptions from higher tariffs or increased trade costs (e.g. compliance with new product standards). Even though overall trade

levels may not be significant, several small developing countries depend heavily on the UK market for their exports—from beef and bananas to sugar and rum. For these reasons, the implications of Brexit for the trade and development prospects of the Commonwealth's 28 small developing country members requires greater attention.⁴

This chapter explores the implications of Brexit for these small developing countries' trade and proposes some policy options for the UK to design a development-friendly trading regime. Small states are among the most open and trade dependent economies in the world. Their vulnerability to external shocks like Brexit is exacerbated by a range of unique and inherent trade challenges, which include, among others, small population sizes and domestic markets; highly concentrated exports, which preference erosion has disproportionately affected; and excessive trade costs arising from poor transport infrastructure and geographical remoteness from markets. Indeed, their trade costs are, on average, estimated to be at least 50 per cent higher than those for developing countries as a whole (Razzaque and Keane, 2015). Despite the rapid growth of developing countries' share in global trade, small states' share continues to decline as their dependence on trade to drive growth and development increases, especially to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (Soobramanien and Gosset, 2015).


The chapter first provides an overview of trade between the UK and small developing countries. It then highlights the latter's trade and development concerns about Brexit, and finally offers some policy options to minimise any trade disruptions arising from possible post-Brexit trade policy shifts and strengthen future trade linkages. With Article 50 now triggered and the Brexit process underway, small developing countries need to be reassured that their market access to the UK post-Brexit will be just as favourable as existing arrangements.

7.2 Trade between the UK and Commonwealth small developing countries

Overall trade between the UK and Commonwealth small developing countries is small, representing about 6.5 per cent of overall UK–Commonwealth trade in 2015. Total merchandise trade flows between the UK and small developing countries has almost doubled over the past 15 years, from about US\$4.2 billion in 2000 to \$7.8 billion in 2014 (Figure 7.1). However, in 2015 this trade contracted significantly to \$5.9 billion, partly reflecting the effects of the global trade slowdown. Given the small size of these developing countries, productive and supply capacity constraints and their dependence on imported goods, the trade balance has consistently been in the UK's favour. Within this group of small developing countries, Botswana is the largest exporter to the UK, selling goods (mainly beef and diamonds) worth \$3.1 billion in 2015. At the other extreme are two Pacific small island developing states (SIDS), Kiribati and Tuvalu, which exported a mere \$1.7 million and \$116,000, respectively, to the UK in 2015.

Although trade levels are low, and the UK is not a dominant EU importer in most instances, some small developing countries do rely heavily on the UK market.

Figure 7.1 Small developing countries’ total trade with the UK, 2000–2015



Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UNCTADStat


Botswana, for example, sends more than half of its total world exports to the UK (Figure 7.2). Another four small developing countries send over 10 per cent of their world exports to the UK: Belize (22.7 per cent), Seychelles (19.3 per cent), Mauritius (13.1 per cent) and Saint Lucia (10.8 per cent). There are also instances of members whose overall market share is not big but that have some sectoral exports that are critically dependent on the UK. These countries are the most exposed to Brexit-related shocks, especially lower export earnings due to a weaker pound and possible trade disruptions if the UK’s post-Brexit trade regime for developing countries is not as generous as the EU’s current arrangements.

Despite its relatively low share compared with the overall EU market, the UK is an important export destination for several small developing countries. For two small island states, Saint Lucia and Tuvalu, the UK absorbs more than 70 per cent of their EU exports (Table 7.1). This includes almost all of Saint Lucia’s banana exports. Belize and Fiji source about two-thirds of their European export receipts from the UK alone, while the UK takes about half of Brunei’s EU exports. The UK is also the largest importer of sugar into the EU. It buys more than 80 per cent of Belize’s sugar exports and over 70 per cent of Fiji’s. Fiji’s sugar exports to the UK, which occur through a direct contract between the Fiji Sugar Corporation and Tate & Lyle Sugars in London, account for a significant 95 per cent of Fiji’s UK export earnings.

7.3 Brexit concerns for small developing countries

The EU and the UK are important trade, investment and development cooperation partners for many small developing countries. The economic fallout of Brexit will differ among countries depending on their individual trade relations and development partnerships with the EU and the UK, and their level of economic

Figure 7.2 UK share of small developing countries' goods exports to the world (%), 2013–2015 average



Note: The figure does not show countries with shares of less than 1 per cent

Source: UNCTADStat

diversification, competitiveness and supply capacities, among others. Brexit may affect small developing countries indirectly, including through a weaker pound and the economic performance of the UK and Europe, and directly through possible trade disruptions arising from higher tariffs or increased trade costs.

Table 7.1 Importance of the UK market for small developing country goods exports, 2013–2015 average

% of EU imports going to UK	Country
More than 70%	Saint Lucia, Tuvalu*
Between 60% and 70%	Belize, Fiji
Between 50% and 60%	Brunei Darussalam*
Between 40% and 50%	Botswana, Samoa*, Seychelles, Vanuatu
Between 30% and 40%	Guyana, Nauru*
Between 20% and 30%	Dominica, Jamaica, Mauritius, Solomon Islands
Between 10% and 20%	Barbados, Papua New Guinea
Up to 10%	Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Grenada, Kiribati, Lesotho, Namibia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago

Note: * Share of the EU market may be influenced by exports of just a few high-value products over this period

Source: Eurostat COMEXT

7.3.1 Lower purchasing power from a weaker pound

Since the 23 June 2016 referendum, the pound has depreciated by between 10 and 20 per cent. There are two scenarios for this exchange rate effect on small developing countries: a sustained depreciation of the pound in the short to medium term and possible stabilisation in the medium to long term post-Brexit.

In the short to medium term, the lower value of the pound translates into reduced earnings from exports to the UK, decreased remittances sent by people working in the UK to their countries of origin and a lower value of UK aid received by beneficiary countries. For example, a 10 per cent sustained reduction in the pound means the 28 Commonwealth small developing countries will have about US\$645 million less in purchasing power out of their foreign exchange earnings, which will reduce their capacity to import goods and services that are vital for their growth and development. In terms of absolute value, Botswana is the most affected small developing country, potentially foregoing close to \$450 million out of its combined exports to and remittances and aid received from the UK. The second worst affected small developing country is Mauritius, with potential loss of purchasing power to the tune of just over \$43 million. Two Caribbean SIDS, Jamaica (\$37.8 million) and Trinidad and Tobago (35.1 million), also stand to lose substantially.

In the medium to long term, the pound may stabilise post-Brexit. Under this scenario, greater pound stability would limit the current income losses incurred by small developing countries that export to the UK or depend on the UK for aid and remittances.

7.3.2 Impact on UK and EU economic performance

The economic consequences of leaving the EU will depend on what policies the UK adopts post-Brexit, especially for trade, investment, immigration and regulation. Various modelling exercises and projections have been undertaken to quantify the impact of Brexit on the UK and EU. For example, one study of the 'static' effects on trade of the UK leaving the Single Market finds that all EU countries lose income post-Brexit; in the longer dynamic run, the costs of Brexit could be three times larger than those in the static analysis.⁵ Lower economic growth in the UK and EU could have a chilling effect on demand for goods and services produced by developing countries. Small developing countries exported just under US\$10 billion of goods to the EU in 2015, of which about \$1.4 billion (or about 14 per cent) was destined for the UK. With regard to services, the Caribbean tourism sector could especially be affected by lower household income and greater caution around consumer spending. Given that UK travellers are reported to spend seven times more than the average tourist in the Caribbean (Global News Matters Caribbean Research, 2016), the magnitude of this shock may be significant for certain countries. UK arrivals are most important for Barbados; second most important for Saint Lucia; and third most important for St Kitts and Nevis (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016a).

The UK is the world's fifth largest economy, generating trade flows of US\$1.6 trillion (almost 4 per cent of world trade in goods and services in 2015). The UK's withdrawal

from the Single Market could impact on UK, EU and world trade, especially since the Eurozone is still recovering from the 2008 global financial crisis. Weaker growth in Europe will also hamper trade flows from other country groups. This is especially so since global trade growth has slowed alarmingly in recent years, a situation that has persisted for an unprecedentedly long time. In 2016, world trade volume expanded by only 1.9 per cent; this is compared with average growth of about 6 per cent over the almost three decades (1980–2007) prior to the crisis. In this context, Brexit presents an additional shock to an already vulnerable world economy and global trading system, with implications for developing countries.

7.3.3 Maintaining market access in the UK

Currently, three types of EU preferential arrangements govern the UK's bilateral trade with the 28 Commonwealth small developing countries. Five of the Commonwealth small states—Kiribati, Lesotho, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu—are least developed countries (LDCs) and hence benefit from the EU's non-reciprocal Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme. Most of the other small developing countries have signed regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU (Table 7.2). The EPAs provide duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access for all developing country signatories under reciprocal arrangements that also require African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries to open up their markets to the EU, albeit with longer transitional periods.⁶ Nauru benefits from tariff preferences under

Table 7.2 Commonwealth small developing countries in EPAs

Region	Status	Small developing country parties
Caribbean	Signed; ratification ongoing; provisional application (except Haiti)	Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago
Pacific Islands	Provisional application of Interim Partnership Agreement by Papua New Guinea and Fiji; Comprehensive EPA negotiations suspended for three years	Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
Eastern and Southern Africa	Provisional application by Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe; ongoing negotiations with other parties	Mauritius, Seychelles
Southern African Development Community	Ratified by all Southern African Customs Union (SACU) members and Mozambique; provisional implementation	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland

Source: Authors' summary as at June 2017

the EU's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Tonga⁷ and Brunei are the only small developing countries that trade with the UK and EU on WTO MFN terms. An EU–Brunei Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is in the process of being negotiated; this covers a range of political and economic areas and is regarded as a forerunner to FTA negotiations.

Once the UK formally exits the EU, all rights and obligations under these various agreements will cease to apply and the UK will devise its own trade policy to supersede the EU's common commercial policy. As highlighted above, most small developing countries enjoy DFQF access into the UK market under the EBA scheme or a regional EPA. In the absence of equivalent treatment post-Brexit, two challenges could arise.

First, certain products of export interest to small developing countries could face higher MFN tariffs in the UK market. Based on average annual EU imports in 2013–2015, small developing countries could pay additional annual import duties of around US\$113 million.⁸ In absolute terms, Mauritius may have to pay the largest import duties (about \$51.5 million), followed by Seychelles at \$32.3 million. Countries like Papua New Guinea, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland and Jamaica would also be affected. However, proportional to current exports, Seychelles would take the biggest hit, with 23.4 per cent of its exports attracting additional duties.

Second, higher MFN duties would expose many small developing countries to greater competition in niche sectors in the UK market, including bananas, processed fish (e.g. canned tuna) and sugar, particularly from other larger developing countries. For example, without EPA-equivalent preferential treatment, Belize and Saint Lucia would face greater competition from more cost-effective banana suppliers in, for example, Latin America.

7.4 Post-Brexit UK trade policy options

To ensure continuity and avoid disruptions, the Brexit White Paper proposes a Great Repeal Act (GRA), which will immediately convert the entire EU *acquis*—including its trade regime—into UK law, 'wherever practical and appropriate.'⁹ This means the UK will continue to unilaterally implement all its obligations under existing trade preference schemes, including EBA, GSP and EPAs. This rollover of preferences will be a transitional measure until the UK and its partners can conclude WTO-compatible trading arrangements. However, there are potential WTO risks if continuing the status quo without a formal waiver.¹⁰ There may also be other possibilities for framing and shaping the UK's future trading arrangements.

7.4.1 Ensuring undisrupted market access for LDCs

There are five LDCs among the Commonwealth small developing countries. However, the UK has a long-standing commitment to support all the poorest countries, as reaffirmed in the Department for International Development's new Economic Development Strategy (DFID, 2017). Post-Brexit, the UK could devise its own unilateral GSP scheme, like the EU's EBA. The UK can, however, make its trade

regime more development-friendly by incorporating simple and less restrictive rules of origin (RoO) provisions. The current EU RoO provisions are quite complex, while there are instances of more flexible options used by other countries.¹¹ Another area of potential improvement could involve exploring possibilities of offering certain trade preferences in services, in line with the agreed LDC Waiver under the WTO.

7.4.2 Trade preferences for developing countries

While an EBA-type arrangement for LDCs is relatively straightforward, options for offering trade preferences to non-LDC developing countries need to be carefully considered. The EU and ACP countries have considered the FTA route in the form of EPAs to exchange trade preferences. These reciprocal arrangements conform to WTO rules that set the provisions for forming FTAs. One key issue is whether the UK can accede separately to existing EPAs¹² or install EPA replicas where ACP countries have signed deals with the EU.¹³ While some of the existing EPAs (e.g. SADC EPA and CARIFORUM EPA) could provide ready frameworks for new bilateral agreements with the UK, this could also reopen negotiations on many contentious issues, possibly dragging the process out for years.

The UK could also consider offering a new unilateral GSP scheme to ACP countries, which would be comparable to market access provisions contained in the EPAs. There are WTO requirements for the GSP schemes but the guidelines are quite broad and could potentially accommodate a suitable design. If required, the UK could also request waivers to grant non-reciprocal preferences. There are precedents for such arrangements: the USA has obtained WTO waivers for its trade preference initiatives with the Caribbean (i.e. the Caribbean Basin Initiative) and Africa (i.e. the African Growth and Opportunity Act IV, extended to 2025). This option would avoid the need for difficult negotiations with ACP countries at this stage, while ensuring the continuity of their preferential treatment. Once these short- to medium-term transitional arrangements are in place to provide policy continuity and avoid trade disruptions, one medium- to long-term option is to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with the ACP regions or sub-regions, possibly drawing on the EPA frameworks. However, it is imperative that the UK avoids a repetition of the controversial EPA experience.

7.4.3 Addressing non-tariff barriers

One key challenge for many ACP exporters is compliance with the high standards and regulations required for access to the EU market. This especially affects their exports of tropical fruit, vegetables, meat and other food products. In the short term, to ensure continuity and avoid disruptions, the GRA intends to convert most of the EU's trade-related standards into UK domestic regulations. However, ACP suppliers feel that some of these regulations are unnecessarily onerous and even protectionist, and should be reviewed. For example, Swaziland's citrus exports to the EU have been impaired by stringent sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards for citrus black spot, losing market share to Spanish farmers as a result.

Post-Brexit, the UK could consider changing specific standards and developing its own set of domestic regulations in accordance with international science and rules.

Since the UK is not a citrus producer and relies on food imports, there may be a case for greater flexibility and for rescinding some EU measures regarded as unfair or protectionist by ACP producers, if this does not jeopardise plant health and food safety. For other goods imports, the UK and the EU could consider some harmonisation of standards or mutual recognition of certification procedures, which would reduce ACP trade costs by requiring 'one-time only' compliance and certification. There may also be an important role for the UK's future Aid for Trade programme in setting up conformity assessment infrastructure (e.g. testing laboratories) and providing training in small developing countries.

7.5 Post-Brexit trading arrangements and the Commonwealth

There has been some interest in the role of the Commonwealth in post-Brexit trading arrangements. Although not a trading bloc, such factors as historical ties, familiar administrative and legal systems, the use of largely one language, English, as the means of communicating with foreign partners and large and dynamic diasporas have contributed to strong trade relationships among members. Since 2000, intra-Commonwealth trade in goods and services has tripled to more than US\$600 billion. There is also econometric evidence that, when both bilateral partners are Commonwealth members, they tend to trade, on average, 20 per cent more and generate 10 per cent more foreign direct investment flows than otherwise. This so-called 'Commonwealth effect' or 'advantage' would imply bilateral trading costs between Commonwealth partners are, on average, 19 percentage points lower compared with other country pairs (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2015).

There also exist tremendous untapped trading opportunities within the Commonwealth, and—according to one estimate—even without being a trading bloc, intra-Commonwealth trade could expand to reach US\$1.3 trillion to \$1.9 trillion over the next 15 years. For example, considering all the products small developing countries export to the EU, a total of 1,348 items, currently worth just under \$90 million, are destined for the UK market only.¹⁴ About 98 of these products individually generate export revenues of at least \$100,000 (Table 7.3). Jamaica has the highest number of such products, at 19, followed by Vanuatu with 9 products and Papua New Guinea with 7. Three countries—all SIDS—have only one product worth more than \$100,000 that only the UK imports into Europe.

Some of these exporters compete successfully without relying on any trade preferences. These are the products where EU MFN tariffs are already at zero. Vanuatu has 16 products that also earn just over half its UK export earnings; it is followed by Samoa, which generates 28 per cent of its total exports from five products. Post-Brexit, close attention should be provided in assessing the trade potential of these items as well as any policy support measures needed for their development. Channelling of investments into these sectors and helping develop productive and supply capacities in small developing countries can trigger and sustain trade response. Since ACP countries that have signed the EPAs already receive 100 per cent duty-free access in the UK market, any increase in exports is likely to be in new products only. For

Table 7.3 98 products exported to the UK market alone and generating export revenues of at least US\$100,000

Country	No. of products with export values at least \$100,000 and the UK constitutes 100% of EU imports	Total value (US\$ million) of these products (2013–2015 average)
Jamaica	19	23.45
Vanuatu	9	3.83
Papua New Guinea	7	1.96
Brunei	6	13.87
Seychelles	6	1.7
The Bahamas	5	6.34
Belize	5	1.13
Saint Lucia	4	8.77
Guyana	4	6.35
Barbados	3	1.52
Swaziland	3	1.36
Trinidad and Tobago	3	1.27
Botswana	3	0.66
Samoa	3	0.47
Lesotho	3	0.35
Namibia	2	0.9
Dominica	2	0.8
Mauritius	2	0.62
Solomon Islands	2	0.58
Tuvalu	2	0.5
Grenada	2	0.28
St Vincent and the Grenadines	1	0.74
Fiji	1	0.7
St Kitts and Nevis	1	0.14

Source: Authors' summary using Eurostat COMEXT and UNCTAD TRAINS database

example, under a possible UK-CARIFORUM FTA, Jamaica can potentially increase its exports in new products by 33 per cent, although this is unrelated to the FTA (Bandeled and Banga, 2017).

The analysis here has been limited to goods trade as the data on bilateral services trade at a disaggregated level are currently not available for most Commonwealth small developing countries. Nevertheless, given the prominence of services sectors in the national economies and exports of many countries, including small states, the trade potential here should also be high.

7.6 Conclusion

The UK's commitment to promoting trade and development is indisputable. It has always recognised and championed the special needs and challenges facing such country groups as the LDCs, Sub-Saharan Africa and small states. It is one of the few high-income countries to achieve the international target of providing 0.7 per

cent of its GDP as official development assistance. The UK is also a strong advocate and a leading donor of Aid for Trade as a means of helping developing countries with supply-side capacity-building. The UK has contributed over US\$1 billion a year to help developing countries and LDCs boost their regional and world trade. The UK Department for International Development's Economic Development Strategy prioritises and seeks to strengthen the UK's approach to Aid for Trade (DFID, 2017). Post-Brexit, it is crucial that the UK continues its bilateral trade and development cooperation with capacity-constrained small developing countries.

With the Brexit negotiations now formally underway, small developing countries need to be reassured that their market access to the UK after the two years of withdrawal negotiations from the EU will be just as favourable as existing arrangements. Given Brexit-related uncertainties, such reassurances of trade continuity are imperative for investment decisions and future planning.

Notes

- 1 The author acknowledges the valuable data assistance of Poorvi Goel.
- 2 Brexit is the result of a June 2016 referendum in which 52 per cent of eligible UK voters favoured leaving the EU. On 29 March 2017, the UK triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, formally commencing the 'Brexit' process that will see the UK leave the EU after a two-year period of withdrawal negotiations. Withdrawal from the EU is a right under Article 50 of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty—'Any member state may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.'
- 3 The two-year period for the withdrawal negotiations may only be extended with the unanimous agreement of the EU27 (union members, excluding the UK).
- 4 The Commonwealth has 30 small states, following the withdrawal of Maldives. However, Malta and Cyprus are classified as developed countries.
- 5 The overall gross domestic product (GDP) fall in the UK is £26–55 billion, about twice as big as the £12–28 billion income loss in the rest of the EU combined (Dhingra et al., 2016).
- 6 The exception is South Africa, which does not obtain full DFQF access to the EU market under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA. The EU continues to provide the other members of the SADC EPA Group better access to its market than it offers South Africa. Nevertheless, the region-wide SADC EPA still improves South Africa's market access when compared to its bilateral Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, signed in 1999.
- 7 Tonga has been graduated from GSP since 1 January 2017.
- 8 These products are defined at the EU's Combined Nomenclature (CN) 8-digit code.
- 9 The Great Repeal Act will repeal the European Communities Act (1972) on Brexit+1.
- 10 The EU has used various Market Access Regulations to provide such access for some ACP countries since 2007, pending the signing and ratification of the EPAs.
- 11 While the EU's RoO often require process transformations (e.g., in the case of apparels), clothing items have to be domestically produced, from imported fabrics, in the recipient countries. On the other hand, countries such as Australia and Canada require recipient countries to add just 25 per cent local value for goods to qualify for duty-free access.
- 12 The EPAs do not have any built-in clauses to cover accepting new European members (e.g. UK post-Brexit), although all is possible politically.
- 13 The EPAs are 'mixed agreements' that require signature and ratification by all the EU member states. They are mixed agreements because they contain provisions on member state actions on development financing.
- 14 Average for EU imports over the period 2013–2015. These products are defined at the CN 8-digit code. CN is the EU's classification of goods, which meets requirements in terms of external trade statistics (both intra- and extra-Community) and customs tariffs.

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