

PART ONE

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: ITS ROLE AND FUNCTIONS

CHAPTER 1

World Trade Organization: forum for negotiations, dispute settlement and trade policy reviews

Summary of the main rules

One of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round is the strengthening of the institutional mechanism for enforcing the rules and the commitments assumed by countries through the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

WTO is an umbrella organization responsible for the surveillance of the implementation of:

- *GATT and its associate agreements,*
- *GATS,*
- *The Agreement on TRIPS, and*
- *WTO's other legal instruments.*

The organization provides a forum for continuous negotiations among its member countries for the further liberalization of trade in goods and services

and for negotiations on other trade-related issues that may be selected for the development of rules and disciplines.

In addition, it carries out periodic reviews of the trade policies of individual member countries. The organization is also responsible for settling trade disputes among its member countries on the basis of the rules of its legal instruments.

By 25 October 1995, WTO had 110 members.

I. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: ITS OBJECTIVES, FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE

1. Objectives and mandate of WTO

The WTO is the umbrella organization responsible for overseeing the implementation of all the multilateral and plurilateral agreements that have been negotiated in the Uruguay Round and those that will be negotiated in the future. Its basic objectives are similar to those of GATT, which has ceased to exist as a separate institution and has become part of WTO. These objectives have been expanded to give WTO a mandate to deal with trade in services. Furthermore, they clarify that, in promoting economic development through the expansion of trade, adequate attention has to be given to protecting and preserving the environment.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Preamble

Box 1

OBJECTIVES OF THE WTO

In its preamble, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization reiterates the objectives of GATT. These are: raising standards of living and incomes, ensuring full employment, expanding production and trade, and optimal use of the world's resources. The preamble extends these objectives to services and makes them more precise:

- It introduces the idea of "sustainable development" in relation to the optimal use of the world's resources, and the need to protect and preserve the environment in a manner consistent with various levels of national economic development.
- It recognizes that there is a need for positive efforts to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a better share of the growth in international trade.

2. Functions of WTO

The Agreement establishing WTO provides that it should perform the following four functions:

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| WTO Agreement, Article III, 1 | ☐ First, it shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation of the Uruguay Round legal instruments and of any new agreements that may be negotiated in the future. |
| WTO Agreement, Article III, 2 | ☐ Second, it shall provide a forum for further negotiations among member countries on matters covered by the agreements as well as on new issues falling within its mandate. |
| WTO Agreement, Article III, 3 | ☐ Third, it shall be responsible for the settlement of differences and disputes among its member countries. |
| WTO Agreement, Article III, 4 | ☐ Fourth, it shall be responsible for carrying out periodic reviews of the trade policies of its member countries. |

3. Structure of WTO

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|------------------------------|---|
| WTO Agreement, Article IV, 1 | <p>The apex WTO body responsible for decision-making is the Ministerial Conference. It is expected to meet every two years. The first WTO Ministerial Conference is scheduled to be held in Singapore before the end of 1996.</p> |
| WTO Agreement, Article IV, 2 | <p>During the two years between meetings, the functions of the Conference are performed by the General Council.</p> |
| WTO Agreement, Article IV, 3 | <p>The General Council meets as a Dispute Settlement Body when it considers complaints and takes necessary steps to settle disputes between member countries. It is also responsible for carrying out</p> |

WTO Agreement, Article IV, 5 reviews of the trade policies of individual countries on the basis of the reports prepared by the WTO secretariat.

The General Council is assisted in its work by the:

- WTO Agreement, Article IV, 5
- Council for Trade in Goods, which oversees the implementation and operation of GATT 1994 and its associate agreements;
 - Council for Trade in Services, which oversees the implementation and operation of GATS; and
 - Council for TRIPS which oversees the operation of the Agreement on TRIPS.

Annex I to this chapter presents a chart on the organizational structure of WTO. It also indicates the various committees established by the WTO Agreement itself and the other committees that have been established for detailed work at the operational level under the various associate agreements.

3.1 Decision-making process

WTO Agreement, Article IX, 1 The Agreement stipulates that WTO shall continue the GATT practice of decision-making by *consensus*. Consensus is deemed to have been reached when, at the time a decision is being taken, not a single member country voices opposition to its adoption. When a consensus is not possible, the WTO Agreement provides for decision by majority vote, with each country having one vote.² The special voting requirements for the interpretation and amendment of provisions are listed in box 2.

² Unlike IMF and other organizations, WTO does not have a *weighted voting* system, under which some countries have right to more votes than others.

Box 2**SPECIAL VOTING REQUIREMENTS**

The Agreement lays down different voting requirements for decisions in the following cases:

- The interpretation of the provisions of any of the agreements requires a three-fourths majority. [WTO Agreement, Article IX, 2]
- Amendments generally require a two-thirds majority. However, amendments to: [WTO Agreement, Article X:1, 2]
 - The provisions in the WTO Agreement on amendments and decision-making;
 - MFN provisions in GATT 1994, GATS and the TRIPS agreement
 will take effect only upon acceptance by all members.
- Requests for a temporary *waiver* by any member country from its WTO obligations require a three-fourths majority. [WTO Agreement, Article IX, 2]

Despite these provisions, decisions on all important policy matters (like launching negotiations in areas not so far covered by the WTO legal instruments) are expected to continue to be taken by consensus. The rule of consensus prevents “tyranny of the majority” particularly where a sizeable section of opinion strongly opposes the decision being taken.

3.2 The Secretariat

WTO Agreement, Article VI, 1

WTO is located at Geneva in Switzerland. It is headed by a Director-General. The current Director-General, Mr Renato Ruggiero, who took office on 1 May 1995, has been elected for a period of four years. There are four Deputy Directors-General, who assist him in the operational work. They are appointed by him, in consultation with member countries.

WTO Agreement, Article VI, 3

WTO Agreement, Article VI, 4

The WTO secretariat has a staff of 450 of varying nationalities.³ In performing their duties, the Director-General and his staff are expected not to “seek or accept any instructions from any government or any other authority external to the WTO” and thus maintain the international character of the secretariat.

3.3 Membership

WTO Agreement, Article XI

By 25 October 1995, 110 countries had joined WTO. GATT member countries that have not so far acceded to WTO can do so during the transitional period of two years from 1 January 1995.

WTO Agreement, Article XIV

Final Act, para. 5

WTO Agreement, Article XII
Decision on the Acceptance of
and Accession to the Agree-
ment Establishing the WTO

Countries that are at present not GATT members can become members of WTO by negotiating for accession. In such negotiations, they have to agree to take steps to bring their national legislation in conformity with the rules of the multilateral agreements. In addition they have to make commitments to reduce tariffs and modify their regulations so as to provide improved access for foreign goods and services. These commitments are often referred to as the price of the “entry ticket” entitling the acceding country to benefit on an MFN basis from all tariff reductions and other commitments undertaken by member countries in the past.

Annex II to this chapter lists the Members of WTO as of 25 October 1995.

3 On its establishment on 1 January 1995, WTO absorbed all the staff of GATT.

II. WTO AS A FORUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS

4. Continuous negotiation

WTO Agreement, Article III, 2

WTO is expected to bring to an end the GATT practice of holding negotiations in periodic rounds and to provide a forum for negotiations on a continuous basis. The Final Act itself contains an agenda for such negotiations (see annex III to this chapter).

GATS, Article X

GATS, Article XV

This agenda first requires WTO members to complete the unfinished business of the Uruguay Round. For example, negotiations are to continue up to 30 June 1996 on certain service sectors. GATS further provides that negotiations should be held early for the elaboration of rules on emergency safeguards and the use of subsidies in the area of trade in services.

Second, a number of WTO agreements themselves require regular review of specific provisions and/or of the entire agreement itself.

Agreement on Agriculture,
Article 20; Article 1(f)

GATS, Article XIX

Third, several WTO agreements contain commitments to launch new negotiations after a period, to build on the results achieved in the Uruguay Round. Thus, further negotiations must be initiated by 1 January 2000 in two critical areas: agriculture, to continue the reform process begun in the Uruguay Round, and services, to promote additional liberalization of trade.

Fourth, the WTO agenda will continue to expand to include new problems and issues that are encountered in trade relations among countries. Al-

Decision on Trade and Environment

ready at the Marrakesh meeting, the Ministers, while adopting the Uruguay Round results, decided to establish a Committee on Trade and Environment. The preparatory work which the Committee is doing at present may provide a basis for a decision at the 1996 Ministerial Conference to launch negotiations in this area.

Finally, new subjects are being proposed for inclusion in the agenda for negotiations in WTO. The United States and some other developed countries, for instance, had proposed at the Marrakesh meeting that the link between trade and labour standards should be included in the work programme. This was not done because of the opposition of developing countries, which feared that developed countries could use alleged abuses of workers' rights as a rationale for protectionist measures. In the coming months, particularly before the 1996 Ministerial Conference, fresh efforts will be made to secure the inclusion of this item in the agenda for negotiations. Among the other items being proposed for coverage are foreign direct investment and the related question of competition policy.

III. WTO SYSTEM FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

5. General

For a multilateral trading system to function properly and without friction, it is not enough to have an agreed set of rules. The rules have to be supplemented by other rules giving countries the right of

redress when infringements occur and for settling their differences and disputes. Developing a strong multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, which would remove some of the weaknesses of the earlier GATT system, was thus one of the most critical objectives of the Uruguay Round talks.

6. Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)

WTO Agreement, Article III, 3
WTO Agreement, Article IV, 3

Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU)

The WTO Agreement provides for a common system of rules and procedures applicable to disputes arising under any of its legal instruments. The main responsibility for administering these rules and procedures lies with the General Council, which as noted in earlier, acts as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).

7. Importance of consultations and conciliation

DSU, Article 4

One of the important principles which these procedures lay down is that a dispute should be brought to DSB by the government of a member country for settlement only after efforts to settle it through consultations on a bilateral basis have failed. The procedures also provide that, in order to reach mutually acceptable solutions, the two parties may request the Director-General or any other person to use his or her good offices to conciliate and mediate between them.

DSU, Article 5

Only when consultations or efforts at conciliation have not produced the desired results within 60 days may the complaining party request DSB formally to commence the dispute settlement mechanism by establishing a *panel* to examine the com-

DSU, Article 5.4

DSU, Article 6

plaint.⁴ In order to expedite the settlement of disputes and to ensure that the establishment of a panel is not delayed by the country against whom a complaint is made, the procedures require DSB to establish the panel, when requested by the complaining country, unless there is a consensus against the establishment of such a panel.

DSU, Article 8

DSU, Article 8.5

DSU, Article 8.4

DSU, Article 12.8

DSU, Article 11

8. Panels

A panel normally consists of three persons, unless parties to the dispute agree that it should have five persons. The names of the persons to be appointed to the panel are proposed by the WTO secretariat from the list maintained by it of governmental and non-governmental experts. The persons in the list are well-qualified senior officials of member countries, members of their delegations to WTO, senior officials who have worked in the secretariat, and persons who have taught international trade law or policy. The panels are required to submit to DSB within a period of six to nine months reports containing their recommendations after making *an objective assessment* of the facts of the case and of the conformity of the measures complained about with the relevant provisions of the legal instruments.

9. Appellate body

The establishment of an appellate body — a kind of court of appeal — is a new addition to the dispute settlement system. The body consists of seven persons of recognized authority, with expertise

⁴ The procedures recognize that the parties may in certain cases by mutual consent agree to refer the dispute to arbitration. However, they provide that, in such cases, the award shall be binding on the parties and that it should be reported to DSB.

DSU, Article 17.2

in law, international trade and the subjects covered by the various agreements. They should be unaffiliated to any government. Of the seven, only three persons will be called to serve in any one case. The appeal can be made by any one of the parties to the dispute. The report of the appellate board, which will be confined to issues of law in the panel report and the legal interpretations developed by it, has to be submitted to DSB within a period of 60 to 90 days.

DSU, Article 17.5

10. Consideration of the reports by DSB

DSU, Article 20

The report of the panel or of the appellate body, where one of the parties has appealed against the panel's report, is submitted to DSB for appropriate recommendations, decisions and rulings. In order to ensure prompt settlement of disputes, it is provided that the period "from the date of the establishment of the panel by the DSB" and the date "when it considers the panel or appellate report" should not exceed nine months when the panel report is not appealed and 12 months when it is appealed.

DSU, Article 21

11. Implementation of the reports

The procedures visualize that the reports of the panels may be implemented by the parties in the three ways described below.

DSU, Article 21.1

11.1 Compliance

DSU, Article 21.3

First, the procedures emphasize that the party which is in breach of obligations must promptly comply with the recommendations of the panel or appellate body. If it is not possible for the party to implement the recommendations immediately, DSB may on request grant it a reasonable period for implementation.

DSU, Article 22

11.2 Provision of compensation

Second, where the party which is in breach does not comply within a reasonable period, the party that has invoked the dispute settlement procedure may request for compensation. Alternatively, the party in breach of the obligations may itself offer to pay compensation.

11.3 Authorization of retaliatory action

DSU, Article 22.2 ff.

Third, where the party in breach fails to comply and refuses to provide compensation, the aggrieved party may request DSB to authorize it to take retaliatory action *by suspending concessions or other obligations* under the agreements that would hurt the trade of the former country. In simple language this means that, where the party is for instance in breach of its obligations under GATT or under one of its associate agreements, the aggrieved party may be authorized by DSB to raise tariffs on products which it imports from the party in breach; the trade in such products should be approximately equal to that affected by the measures complained about.

DSU, Article 22.3

The rules provide that such retaliatory actions shall be authorized by DSB as far as possible in the same sectors of GATT, GATS or the Agreement on TRIPS in which the panel or appellate body has found violation. However, where it considers that this is not possible, it can authorize retaliation under other sectors of the same agreement. Only in rare cases and as a last resort can DSB authorize retaliation across agreements, i.e. imposition of higher tariffs on goods for breach of an obligation under GATS or the Agreement on TRIPS.

The provision of compensation and authorization by DSB of retaliatory measures are, however,

DSU, Article 2

temporary measures. The ultimate solution is for the country which is in breach of the obligation to implement the recommendations. The rules require DSB to keep such cases under review to secure their full implementation.

IV. TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM (TPRM)

12. General

WTO Agreement, Article III

Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), A

In addition to providing a mechanism for settling disputes, WTO acts as a forum for the periodic review of the trade policies of member countries. The objectives of these reviews are twofold. First, they aim at finding out how far the countries are following the disciplines of, and commitments made, under the multilateral agreements (and, where applicable, under the plurilateral agreements). By carrying out such reviews periodically, WTO acts as a watchdog to ensure that its rules are carried out and thus contributes to the prevention of trade friction. The provisions establishing the review mechanism, however, clarify that it is not intended to serve as a basis for enforcement of obligations; nor should such reviews be used for the settlement of disputes. The second equally important objective of these reviews is to provide greater transparency and understanding of the trade policies and practices of member countries.

TPRM, B

TPRM, C.ii

13. Periodicity of reviews

The frequency with which such reviews are carried out depends on the share of the individual member countries in world trade. The top four are

to be examined every two years: at the moment these are the European Union (counted as one), the United States, Japan and Canada. The next 16 are to be reviewed every four years, and the rest every six, except that longer intervals may be fixed for least developed countries.

TPRM, C.v

The basis for the review is provided by:

- ❑ A full report prepared by the Member whose trade policy is being reviewed; and
- ❑ The report prepared by the secretariat on its own responsibility, taking into account the information provided by the Member and other information, including that obtained during visits to the country.

TPRM, C.i

The reviews are carried out by the General Council, which for the purpose of such reviews acts as Trade Policy Review Body. The country report and the reports prepared by the secretariat, together with the minutes on the discussions, are published promptly after the review.

TPRM, C.vi

V. IMPLICATIONS

Business persons are often sceptical of the benefits they can derive from the strengthened multilateral rules and the institutional framework for their enforcement resulting from the establishment of WTO. After all, they argue, it is the governments and not they which participate in WTO negotiations and discussions. Furthermore, WTO meetings are closed to the general public and the business community becomes aware of what is happening in these discussions only through press reports.

The main reason for this scepticism is, however, the lack of knowledge of the general public and the business community of how the system works in practice. It is true that only governmental representatives participate in trade negotiations. It is also true that meetings of the various committees, established to ensure national enforcement of the rules agreed by countries at the international level, are attended only by governmental representatives. Again, when an exporting enterprise encounters a problem in selling to a foreign market, it cannot bring the complaint direct to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body; this is the prerogative of governments.

14. WTO-related consultations

14.1 Mechanism for consultations between governments and the private sector

Governments, however, do not act in isolation. In most developed countries and a large number of developing countries, formal institutional mechanisms have been established for consultations with industries and their associations, chambers of commerce and other trade associations on issues discussed in WTO. In these consultations, governments seek to obtain the views of the business community on:

- ☐ The policy approaches they should adopt on the specific issues under negotiation;
- ☐ The stand they should take on proposals made for the inclusion of new subjects in the agenda for negotiations (e.g. development of disciplines similar to that of GATT and GATS on foreign direct investment).

The mechanism also provides an opportunity for industries and businesses to raise any problems they may be confronting in their target export markets because of the measures taken by governments of importing countries. In fact, most of the complaints brought by governments to WTO emanate from specific problems and issues raised by affected industries in their consultations with these governments. Box 3 illustrates how in practice it is only when the exporting industry brings to the notice of the government the problems and difficulties it is facing in foreign markets that the government is able to take up the matter for discussion in WTO.

In developing countries where such a mechanism for consultations does not exist, it will be necessary to develop it. In countries where it does, it may be necessary to improve it to ensure that different business interests are adequately represented and able to bring to the notice of their governments the problems they encounter abroad.

14.2 Influence of associations of industries and chambers of commerce

In addition to participating in consultations arranged by governments, industries and trade enterprises in developed countries make known their concerns and views on subjects under negotiation in WTO by holding discussions under the auspices of chambers of commerce or federations of industries. Furthermore, pressure groups try to ensure that their sectoral interests are adequately taken into account by their governments when specific issues are discussed at the international level. The reports on these

Box 3**THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIES AND THEIR ASSOCIATIONS
IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES**

Recently an ambassador from a country which had a case before the Dispute Settlement Body made the following statement in reply to a question from a journalist as to how it was decided to bring the matter to WTO:

"The petrochemical industry brought the problem to our notice and furnished us with the information on the restrictive licensing procedure which the importing country had introduced. We requested our commercial representative to check the facts and obtain more detailed information on regulations. When we were satisfied on the basis of the information provided by the affected industry and the report received from our commercial representative that there was a violation of the rules by the importing country, we decided to invoke the dispute settlement procedures by requesting the importing country for bilateral consultations. When we found that these bilateral consultations were not resulting in solutions, we decided to request the Dispute Settlement Body for the appointment of a panel."

Almost all, if not all, disputes brought to GATT in the past were the result of information provided by industries or their associations to their governments on breach of rules by the country with which they were trading. This will continue to be so for disputes brought before WTO. The ability of industries and their associations to raise such problems with their governments will depend to a large extent on their knowledge of the rules of the system. This further emphasizes the need for the business community to keep well informed of existing rules and of the rules that are being developed in new areas.

It is important to note that only a few of the problems raised by governments under dispute settlement procedures, at the instance of their industries, result in the establishment of panels. A significant number of them are settled through bilateral consultations.

discussions are widely publicized to influence public opinion in favour of the groups' views. The reports are also used to lobby members of national legislatures to ensure that governments ultimately adopt policy approaches to negotiations in WTO which adequately reflect their views and concerns.

For instance, the basic groundwork on a number of subjects in the agenda for the Uruguay Round negotiations was carried out by associations of industries and trade. The detailed studies prepared by national and international federations of industries on the implications of the trade in counterfeit goods were to influence the governments of developed countries in pressing for inclusion of this item in the agenda, ultimately leading to the Agreement on TRIPS. Again, the genesis of the Agreement on TRIMs can be traced to the studies prepared by organizations of industries and other research institutes on the adverse implications for trade of the local content and export performance requirements imposed on foreign investors. Many of the proposals for improved rules in the Agreement on Anti-dumping Practices originated from the problems and concerns expressed by industries to their governments.

The interest taken by associations of industries does not end with suggesting subjects for inclusion in negotiations. In most cases they closely follow developments in these negotiations, and make their views known to their governments when they consider that the proposed new rules would not be to their benefit. In the Uruguay Round, for instance, the final outcome of the negotiations on textiles was greatly influenced by the pressures exerted by textile lobbies on the governments of the importing developed countries. It is well known that the Uruguay Round negotiations were held in abeyance for over two years because of the pressures brought to bear on the governments of some countries by agricultural lobbies, which considered that they would be adversely affected by the liberalization proposals under discussion.

Trade and industry associations must continue to follow WTO's ongoing work on the implementation of the rules of the various agreements and the sectoral negotiations that are under way in the service sector.

In most developing countries, however, chambers of commerce and trade associations have not so far shown an active interest in the subjects discussed in international organizations like WTO. This in the past was partly due to the fact that, until a few years ago, a number of these countries were pursuing import substitution policies. Consequently they focused mainly on domestic policy issues. With the shift to policies promoting export-oriented growth, these associations are becoming increasingly conscious of their members' need to become familiar with the WTO legal system and of their own need to pay more active attention to WTO's ongoing work. Many of them require assistance in improving their understanding of the system's substantive and procedural rules. International organizations could assist such associations by holding for the benefit of their members:

- ❑ General seminars on the WTO legal system; and
- ❑ Workshops on rules applicable to specific areas, such as mandatory standards and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, customs valuation, subsidies, countervailing and anti-dumping measures, and intellectual property rights.

14.3 Effective utilization of the trade information available in WTO

One of the other less publicized advantages to the business person of the WTO system arises

from the increasing availability at the WTO secretariat of information on national legislation and rules in the foreign trade sector. Almost all WTO agreements require member countries to notify the WTO secretariat of national legislation, rules and regulations in the subject areas covered by them. The secretariat is expected to bring out in the coming years compendiums of, for instance, the rules of different countries in such areas as customs valuation or the levy of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.

In addition, valuable information on products is available in the country reports prepared for consultations with individual countries under the trade policy review mechanism. This information should be useful to enterprises exporting or considering the export of specific products. By studying the report on consultations with a particular country, it may be possible for an exporter to obtain information on the tariffs, mandatory standards and other regulations that are applicable to specific products or product groups in his or her target market. Although these reports are published, they are rarely mentioned in the national business journals of developing countries.

14.4 Summing up

To sum up, the ability of business persons to benefit from the improved institutional framework that has resulted from the Uruguay Round will depend greatly on:


- ❑ Their knowledge of the trade rules and of the rights which these give as well as the obligations they impose.

- ❑ Their knowledge of the new opportunities for trade that have been created by the liberalization commitments undertaken by countries during the negotiations.
- ❑ The initiative they show in bringing to the notice of their governments their problems in selling to international markets so that their governments can raise the issues in appropriate WTO forums and, if necessary, invoke WTO's dispute settlement procedures.

Parts Two to Five of this Guide explain the rules of the system, the new opportunities that have been created as well as the challenges which business enterprises may encounter in both domestic and foreign markets as a result of the liberalization of trade.

ANNEX I

How the WTO works



Source: WTO secretariat.

ANNEX II

WTO membership (As of 25 October 1995)

The following 110 Governments have accepted the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and their membership in the World Trade Organization is effective as of the dates indicated:

Government	Entry into force/ Membership	Government	Entry into force/ Membership
Antigua and Barbuda	1 January 1995	Denmark	1 January 1995
Argentina	1 January 1995	Djibouti	31 May 1995
Australia	1 January 1995	Dominica	1 January 1995
Austria	1 January 1995	Dominican Republic	9 March 1995
Bahrain	1 January 1995	Egypt	30 June 1995
Bangladesh	1 January 1995	El Salvador	7 May 1995
Barbados	1 January 1995	European Community	1 January 1995
Belgium	1 January 1995	Finland	1 January 1995
Belize	1 January 1995	France	1 January 1995
Bolivia	13 September 1995	Gabon	1 January 1995
Botswana	31 May 1995	Germany	1 January 1995
Brazil	1 January 1995	Ghana	1 January 1995
Brunei Darussalam	1 January 1995	Greece	1 January 1995
Burkina Faso	3 June 1995	Guatemala	21 July 1995
Burundi	23 July 1995	Guinea Bissau	31 May 1995
Canada	1 January 1995	Guinea, Rep. of	25 October 1995
Central African Republic	31 May 1995	Guyana	1 January 1995
Chile	1 January 1995	Honduras	1 January 1995
Colombia	30 April 1995	Hong Kong	1 January 1995
Costa Rica	1 January 1995	Hungary	1 January 1995
Côte d'Ivoire	1 January 1995	Iceland	1 January 1995
Cuba	20 April 1995	India	1 January 1995
Cyprus	30 July 1995	Indonesia	1 January 1995
Czech Republic	1 January 1995	Ireland	1 January 1995

Government	Entry into force/ Membership	Government	Entry into force/ Membership
Israel	21 April 1995	Poland	1 July 1995
Italy	1 January 1995	Portugal	1 January 1995
Jamaica	9 March 1995	Romania	1 January 1995
Japan	1 January 1995	Saint Lucia	1 January 1995
Kenya	1 January 1995	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines	1 January 1995
Korea	1 January 1995	Senegal	1 January 1995
Kuwait	1 January 1995	Sierra Leone	23 July 1995
Lesotho	31 May 1995	Singapore	1 January 1995
Liechtenstein	1 September 1995	Slovak Republic	1 January 1995
Luxembourg	1 January 1995	Slovenia	30 July 1995
Macau	1 January 1995	South Africa	1 January 1995
Malawi	31 May 1995	Spain	1 January 1995
Malaysia	1 January 1995	Sri Lanka	1 January 1995
Maldives	31 May 1995	Suriname	1 January 1995
Mali	31 May 1995	Swaziland	1 January 1995
Malta	1 January 1995	Sweden	1 January 1995
Mauritania	31 May 1995	Switzerland	1 July 1995
Mauritius	1 January 1995	Tanzania	1 January 1995
Mexico	1 January 1995	Thailand	1 January 1995
Morocco	1 January 1995	Togo	31 May 1995
Mozambique	26 August 1995	Trinidad and Tobago	1 March 1995
Myanmar	1 January 1995	Tunisia	29 March 1995
Namibia	1 January 1995	Turkey	26 March 1995
New Zealand	1 January 1995	Uganda	1 January 1995
Nicaragua	3 September 1995	United Kingdom	1 January 1995
Nigeria	1 January 1995	United States	1 January 1995
Norway	1 January 1995	Uruguay	1 January 1995
Pakistan	1 January 1995	Venezuela	1 January 1995
Paraguay	1 January 1995	Zambia	1 January 1995
Peru	1 January 1995	Zimbabwe	3 March 1995
Philippines	1 January 1995		

ANNEX III

Timetable for further WTO negotiations

DATE		ITEM
1995	1 January	WTO enters into force
	30 June	Deadline for negotiations on financial services and on movement of natural persons
1996	1 January	Agreement on Government Procurement enters into force
	30 April	Deadline for negotiations on basic telecommunications services
	30 June	Review of operation of provisions on R & D subsidies
	30 June	Deadline for negotiations on maritime services
1997	1 January	Start of negotiations on government procurement of services
	1 January	First review of provisions on preshipment inspection (reviews every three years thereafter)
	1 January	First review of TRIPS section on geographical indications
	31 December	Deadline for negotiations on emergency safeguards for services
1988	1 January	Examine standard of review for anti-dumping disputes, and consider its application to countervailing cases
	1 January	First review of operation and implementation of provisions on technical barriers (reviews are to be held every three years thereafter)
	1 January	Deadline for report with recommendation from the Working Party on Trade in Services and the Environment on modifications of GATS Article XIV (general exceptions)

	1 January	Review of operation and implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary provisions (further reviews to be held as need arises)
1999	1 January	Start negotiations on further improvement of the Agreement on Government Procurement (extension of coverage)
	1 January	Deadline for review of provision on patent or <i>sui generis</i> protection of plant varieties
	1 January	Deadline for review of dispute settlement rules and procedures
	30 June	Start review of provisions on serious prejudice and non-actionable subsidies
2000	1 January	Start first round of negotiations on progressive liberalization of services (new negotiations to increase the general level of specific commitments)
	1 January	Review of Article II (MFN) exemptions
	1 January	Launch new negotiations to continue reform process in agriculture
2000	1 January	First review of TRIPS agreement, reviews to be held every two years thereafter
	1 January	Deadline for review of TRIMs agreement and consideration of whether to complement it with provisions on investment and competition policy
	1 January	Review of interpretation of the rules on modification and withdrawal of concessions
	1 January	Deadline for appraisal of Trade Policy Review Mechanism
	Unspecified	Negotiations on increased protection for geographical indications for wines and spirits
	Unspecified	Subsidies in services