

Part III

Reducing Vulnerability

Chapter 5

Strengthening National Defence Capability

The need for a multi-dimensional approach

5.1 Although security is an absolute concept, governments necessarily have to accept that in practice it can be achieved only in relative or partial terms, determined by the conditions limiting each nation's capabilities. This means that they are compelled to rely, in varying degrees, on a strategy of deterrence whereby each nation seeks to demonstrate to others that the military and political price of any attempted attack either on its territory or its sovereign status is likely to be too high. Deterrence is normally discussed in the purely military context. However, since it was our view that the concept of security had a multi-dimensional character, it is necessary to conceive of deterrence strategy in a similar manner.

5.2 From the earlier discussion on their vulnerability, it is evident that compared with other nations, most small states possess only a minimal deterrent capacity in virtually all spheres. They thus require substantial assistance not just initially to acquire vital self-help techniques but semi-permanent support provided both on a bilateral basis and multilaterally through institutions like the United Nations and the Commonwealth. In addition, we believe small states should recognise the enormous value of sustained and sharply focused effort to foster programmes of political and technical co-operation with other small states in the same geopolitical grouping.

5.3 A wide range of options are available to small states to deter the different kinds of threats to which they may be subject. We have explored most of the possibilities which seem at least theoretically desirable, though on closer scrutiny some of them turn out to involve hidden drawbacks or else to be politically impracticable in present circumstances.

5.4 Although virtually all the options we recommend would require some measure of positive support from other members of the international community, we believe that the initiatives must inevitably be taken, and the decisions made, by the small states themselves. Small states can easily find their sovereignty jeopardised through dependence upon advice on their security problems from other countries, agencies or even individuals. Effective security cannot be established principally on the basis of external support or intervention. While external assistance can play a useful role in reducing the vulnerability of small states, it is provident to regard such assistance as supplementary.

5.5 The range of measures are presented in Chapter 9 for action by the international community as a whole, in order to discharge its obligation to assist in safeguarding the security of its smaller member states. A clear demonstration by small states of their determination to do what they can to promote their own security will encourage the world community more readily to assume its obligations towards them.

5.6 It is our conviction that any satisfactory approach to tackling the problem of small states' security requires a series of complementary measures relating to all the key aspects of security-building, to be initiated at the national, regional and international levels.

CAPACITY TO MEET SECURITY NEEDS

5.7 Perhaps the most basic element in shaping the security policy of a state is its ability to analyse its interests and security problems, and readiness to use its resources to the greatest effect to uphold national and international security. A nation's security must begin in the minds of its citizens. Exclusive reliance on external advice and assistance can eventually have shortcomings apart from being to the detriment of developing their own expertise and capabilities. Every state, no matter how small, must assess its own interests and how to protect them. Small states should not use size to avoid the responsibilities of sovereignty—they should make the most effective use of their possibilities within their limited resources. A nation which takes security seriously not only feels more confident but is in fact better equipped to cope with international hazards. Many small states can do more for themselves than has been recognised so far. Small does not necessarily mean helpless.

National defence security establishment

5.8 Given their scarce resources and the many demands on them, small states need to be circumspect in deciding on the scale and range of a national security establishment. While for most Third World states the

minimum goal is a military apparatus appropriate to the defence needs, small states cannot always achieve this, particularly as many of them are island states and none of them can possibly afford really adequate maritime or air protection. In practice the goal therefore becomes development and maintenance of a satisfactory level of comparative deterrent capacity.

5.9 Setting that level poses a difficult question for small states. Some indeed feel that no regular full-time military establishment is necessary, e.g. most small Pacific islands. The decision is necessarily tied to the assessment of the national interest and, as with all states, small states have to determine, within their limitations and with due account being taken of the international environment, what defence establishment is needed.

5.10 Since the United Nations came into being there have been few external attempts to take over a small state by force, this is not only because they are rarely the objects of political ambition but also probably because of the location of some islands. It would, therefore, be judicious for small states to bolster their security by taking those steps which would increase the disadvantages for an attacker and thus discourage adventurers.

Security costs

5.11 The cost of an appropriate and relevant security establishment is normally a strain on the economy of a small state since few are as fortunately endowed as, say, Brunei. Where a security establishment pre-empts an exclusive share of resources, development suffers and this could have untoward domestic effects which could even impact adversely on security. The size of the security budget obviously requires careful decision, and there is no rule of thumb as to the appropriate level in each case. To be over-ambitious may enlarge economic vulnerability as well as raise suspicion among neighbours. It may even be counter-productive in internal security terms. As a consequence for small states there is a strong case for restricting the military establishments to a minimum.

5.12 In practice, small states' domestic security establishments have ranged from a conventional police force, for example in Kiribati, through a more usual combination of a police force, a small army and a coastal patrol as in Fiji, to a many-layered system as in Guyana, which has a police force, a sizeable army, a large paramilitary force, national service units, plus small marine and air arms.

5.13 The national security establishment covers not only the forces associated with territorial defence but all services which contribute to the

maintenance of law and order internally and externally. It would include military and paramilitary forces, the coast guard, the police, intelligence services, specialist units for fisheries protection and, in some cases, the customs.

5.14 Once the national security forces are decided upon, they must be established with as high a level of training and equipment as is appropriate and maintained with a high level of motivation and morale. Paramilitary skills would appear to be suited to the needs of most small states. It is also important that the military be disciplined and able to win public esteem; the latter is encouraged if members of the security forces, whose combat skills will rarely be required, engage in public works and community service.

5.15 The Group is of the view that, for small states, security forces should be as multi-purpose as possible and not just limited to conventional military or police roles. Thus they should be employed to carry out a diversity of functions including disaster and famine relief operations. A flexible force is especially important when a state only has a police service which might well be given paramilitary training. Where a maritime service is needed, this should, apart from having a function *vis-à-vis* political threats, be capable of dealing with smuggling, piracy, drug and arms trafficking, and of undertaking monitoring and surveillance of EEZs e.g. protection of off-shore installations, and prevention of illegal fishing and sea-bed mining.

5.16 Apart from professional forces, a few small states have exercised the option of having self-defence forces composed of citizens volunteering for part-time service. The training of ordinary citizens in the defensive use of arms, may not appeal to many small states but for those whose history, national cohesion and circumstances make it appropriate, it provides a useful additional safeguard if it has wide popular acceptance. There are many approaches to the creation of a military reserve and all require a firm political will plus organisational ability, but the very exercise itself brings benefits of discipline and enhanced administrative capacity to the society. Such reserves can be drawn from the traditional part-time militia or the newer types of national youth services or from short-term conscripts, depending on the perceived needs of the individual countries.

5.17 These citizen forces or volunteer reserves are advocated as being particularly useful as back-up to the regular forces and their ability to make life uncomfortable for an occupying force can be of considerable deterrent value if their numbers are significant and morale is high. A particular advantage in countries with very small populations is that

reserves can include an older age group than the regular military. Their training might also be, to some extent, multi-purpose. With such reserve forces, the regular force can be kept down to a smaller number than otherwise. Citizen forces can also be useful as a countervailing factor in an informal balancing system within the security network designed to prevent any one sector becoming all powerful.

DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER STATES

5.18 When discussing approaches to enhancing security from military attack, the three regional colloquia tended to reach rather different conclusions, which reflected their different geopolitical circumstances in the three regions. In the South Pacific, for example, where no such attacks have so far occurred, the risk of external attack was rated low and no immediate need for formal region-wide defence arrangements was felt. By contrast, the small states in Southern Africa had an acute sense of being under a permanent threat to their security from a single source, namely South Africa. Their chief concern at the meeting was however with the need to persuade the major Western powers to bring coercive pressure to bear on the Republic rather than with action they could themselves undertake. In the Caribbean, on the other hand, there was both a high level of threat perception and a greater willingness to contemplate the possibility of consolidating the collective defence arrangements.

5.19 Despite such differing attitudes, the Group felt it would be valuable to examine the full range of the different types of security arrangements which might theoretically seem to be available to small states.

(i) Bilateral arrangements

5.20 In the era of decolonisation it might perhaps have been expected that the colonial powers would have sought to establish defence pacts, or other perhaps less formal arrangements, with their territories which were emerging into independence. In general, though, this has not been the course that Britain itself has chosen. As a consequence only a very few of the Commonwealth small states have continued to be protected by the security umbrella formerly provided by them as dependencies.

5.21 It would therefore be true to say that the majority found themselves in a security vacuum, though in the South Pacific this was partially filled by initiatives on the part of Australia and New Zealand to set up regional co-operation programmes aimed at delivering general defence aid and technical assistance in the military sphere.

5.22 The relative merits and drawbacks of small states entering into formal bilateral defence arrangements with a major power—not necessarily from within the Commonwealth—were considered at length in the Group, bearing in mind that some of the states had already adopted this option. In particular we recognised the fact that in the past many foreign powers sought a quid pro quo in the form of permission to establish military or related facilities. We felt that the decision by a small state to host such facilities could sometimes have a disturbing impact on the other states in the region and on the domestic situation in the host state itself. On the other hand we appreciate that small states might have no choice but to offer an inducement of this nature, and that in certain instances the people themselves see the permanent military presence of a larger power as reassuring evidence that their security will be adequately safeguarded against an attack from a predatory neighbour. Belize, whose Government had specifically asked for a continuing British military presence after independence in order to deter Guatemala from trying to make good its territorial claim by force, is a case in point.

5.23 We felt, therefore, that it is necessary to distinguish between defence arrangements which are primarily intended to serve the interest of a foreign power and those that are genuinely initiated at the request of a small state for its own protection. Nevertheless we agreed that bilateral defence arrangements involving a foreign power, with or without a requirement for base installations, can have inherent dangers not only for the sovereignty of the small state directly concerned but also for the security of neighbouring states throughout the region. For this reason, although we fully accept that every independent nation has the sovereign right to enter into such arrangements, it is not a choice that we can unreservedly advocate. Instead we see this as an option of the last resort to be exercised only when a small state is under a real military threat from an identifiable enemy. Even in these circumstances we feel that the governments of small states should carefully weigh the possible repercussions within their region when reaching their decision.

5.24 Another type of arrangement for deterring military attack is a close political association with a neighbouring power which then looks after most of the small state's external affairs as well as its security needs. This was the option that was exercised prior to World War II by five established European micro-states—Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Holy See. In the post World War II era it has been chosen by two Commonwealth countries at the time of becoming self-governing, Cook Islands and Niue, which both entered into association with New Zealand. Outside the Commonwealth, Guam is an example of a small state opting for this solution, through association with the United States.

5.25 The difficulty here is that the exercise of this option appears in all cases to have been accompanied by an acceptance by the small country concerned of virtual, albeit self-imposed, exclusion from formal political participation in the international community. Although many of these countries are members of selected bodies within the United Nations system, none of them has sought membership of the United Nations itself. It seems doubtful whether this degree of political withdrawal would be regarded as desirable by those states that have already enjoyed several years of independence, and clearly indicated their wish to participate in the international community as fully as their capacities permit. It could however be a suitable option for consideration by some of the remaining small colonial territories that might be offered independence in the foreseeable future. Its practicable viability, though, necessarily depends on the willingness either of the former colonial power or of a friendly regional power, preferably one with which the territory has already established a fruitful working relationship, to enter into such an association agreement.

(ii) Special multilateral arrangements

5.26 The possibility of some small states seeking a formal neutrality status guaranteed through a treaty with a number of major powers, on the Swiss and Austrian models, was also considered. But while such treaties appear to have been highly effective in both these instances, it should not be forgotten that several European neutrality treaties concluded before World War II proved to be worthless when Hitler's Germany simply decided it was no longer convenient to abide by what until then had been regarded as a mutually beneficial 'hands-off' agreement it had signed with the other major powers in the region. Thus Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway and Denmark all in turn became occupied countries. Switzerland and Sweden were the only two nations to survive the war with their neutrality intact and almost certainly there were special strategic reasons to account for this. Austria furthermore appears to be the one example of a neutrality agreement having been concluded in the post World War II era. Again this is very much a special case since the agreement was built into the 1955 Austrian State Treaty and was seen principally as a means of allowing the four World War II allies occupying the territory of their former enemy to withdraw and the nation itself to resume its status as a member of the international community.

5.27 Since neutrality treaties are usually founded on the mutual self-interest principle, it is only realistic to question whether major powers today would have sufficient incentive to enter into such agreements with much smaller states, many of them in a comparatively isolated location. At this period when both super powers are continually expanding the geographical reach of their respective military presence,

there certainly could be some advantage to each of them in concluding agreements ensuring that the more remotely located small states do not allow their territory to be used as a base by the other. But novel agreements of this nature would require a willingness on their part to embark on a phase of political detente that is not evident at the moment. It is also not clear whether, were such neutrality agreements to be guaranteed by the super powers, they would necessarily safeguard the small state concerned from attack by, say, a larger regional power not party to the agreement.

5.28 A more viable related alternative might be for small states to consider formally declaring their own neutrality status and seeking to have this at least officially recognised by neighbouring countries, if there were no possibility of having it underwritten in an actual agreement. This was the course that Malta, for example, chose after the British military presence was withdrawn at its own request from its territory in 1979, and its neutrality declaration has indeed been duly recognised not only by the neighbouring states but also by the Conference on Security Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). While it cannot be contended that recognition alone provides adequate safeguards against possible attack, it could serve as a useful deterrent, particularly if it is acknowledged at the regional institutional level. In the later section on political action at the United Nations we discuss the prospects for official recognition of such declarations by the Security Council.

(iii) Regional arrangements

5.29 Theoretically at least it might be thought helpful for small states to consider trying to join one of the regional defence pacts that have already been established by larger nations. At the present time five pacts of this nature exist in regions applicable to Commonwealth members: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Western Europe, established in 1949; the tripartite ANZUS Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States dating from 1951; the Five Power Defence Agreement set up in 1971 comprising Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore; the earliest, the 1947 Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, popularly known as the Rio Pact, which is currently composed of the United States, 19 Latin American states and two Caribbean states; and the mutual security arrangements provided for in 1981 under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

5.30 Their chief drawback is that the primary objective of all these arrangements is to serve as an instrument of collective defence against a common enemy, mainly though not always consistently identifiable within the cold war or East-West context; with the exception of the Rio Pact, they contain no provisions for safeguarding the security of one

member country from aggression by another member country. As such they would seem to have limited relevance to the immediate security needs of very small states. Moreover, the existing members of these pacts would be unwilling to contemplate admitting tiny countries that are unable to make a significant military contribution, especially if they also lack a similar political commitment against the common enemy. The exception is again the Rio Pact, where terms specifically provide for accession of any country that later becomes a member of the OAS. As it happens, though, the majority of Caribbean states have so far declined the option of joining the Rio Pact principally because of solidarity with Guyana and Belize in their exclusion from the OAS.

5.31 On the other hand in regions where small states form a distinctive geopolitical group, it might well be appropriate for them to consider establishing their own regional security pacts, as the members of the OECS have done in the Caribbean. When established in 1981 the Organisation contained provision for initiating future collective security arrangements, which came into force the following year. We do not feel it necessary to recapitulate the history of the Grenada episode or to pass judgement on the merits or demerits of how the arrangements worked in that event. What is relevant for our purpose is to use the OECS experience in order to assess the potential value of similar collective security arrangements for other groups of small states.

5.32 It seems self evident that such security defence pacts, especially if they are restricted to the mini- or micro-states, could not by themselves muster adequate forces or materiel to create an effective military deterrent against aggression from a larger external power. But they could undoubtedly perform a practical role in countering attempted military or paramilitary incursions into member states, or other types of security threat, emanating from non-governmental external sources.

5.33 We are aware, from the deliberations of the colloquia, that there are differences of view on the need for small states to establish their own collective security arrangements. This is an issue which the states of each region will obviously have to decide for themselves. We ourselves wish merely to draw attention to some of the advantages of the political spin-off from pacts of this nature. One of the principal benefits is that these arrangements could provide an institutional structure for formalising procedures for requesting within the framework of international law or accepted international practice such financial or military assistance as the member countries may agree to seek at a moment of crisis, either from a major power or from an international body like the United Nations or the Commonwealth.

5.34 If used in this manner, regional collective security arrangements could immediately acquire a much enhanced overall deterrent capacity,

sufficient to make a would-be aggressor at least pause for a second thought. As a consequence, the individual countries would be in a position to pursue their relationships with the rest of the international community with much greater confidence. The establishment of security arrangements would, moreover, give a boost to the general drive towards the more intensive regional co-operation we have been consistently advocating in respect of those geographical areas where this is a practical possibility. At the same time, we feel we should stress the caveat that the option of introducing regional defence arrangements should only be taken up by groups of states that are essentially 'like-minded', have an appreciation of each other's special individual interests and are prepared to exercise mutual restraint in the conduct of their interrelationships.

INFORMATION NETWORKS

5.35 For effective government and general development, small states need to have the widest possible range of relevant internal, regional and international information. An efficient information service is crucial and it is the view of the Group that this is an area where regional co-operation and international linkages including international organisations, governmental and non-governmental, could make a significant contribution. We also note the concern in the regional colloquia which led to a call on governments to discourage politically inspired misinformation activities which are against the interests of small and fragile states, and an appeal to the Commonwealth Press Union (CPU) about the concern of Commonwealth states over the adverse effects on vulnerable small states of the often insensitive and irresponsible reporting of the media.

5.36 Some measures which could be considered are the establishment of regional networks, documentation centres, data banks and other facilities for collecting and disseminating information; and increased governmental and international support—financial, technical and training—for the development of regional media facilities, like the Caribbean News Agency (CANA), the Pan-African News Agency (PANA). We advocate increased use of a range of information material already available at the United Nations and the Commonwealth Secretariat. We also note here the following suggestion from one of the regional colloquia: the wish that the possibilities should be explored of developing a service unit at the Commonwealth Secretariat to facilitate, specifically for small states, an exchange of information across regions. It would seem however that small states' difficulties, in this regard, could perhaps be adequately and more cost-effectively met through the development of bilateral information exchange arrangements between member countries.

(i) Security information

5.37 Small states should have access to a wide variety of information on development and views relating to security issues. They cannot form policies without wide and detailed knowledge. They must see to the development of their own internal information systems, particularly via their police and other organs of government such as immigration authorities. They must also develop regular systems for the procurement and analysis of information from abroad, particularly of a diplomatic and military nature, but they should not be wholly or largely dependent on information from any one external source. They must build up information networks and study how to assess the significance from their own points of view of what they learn. While some of the information required will be sensitive and classified, states can benefit greatly from the mass of publicly available information if they know where to look and how to marshal what they find. Their diplomacy and foreign representation should be designed with these requirements in mind. Small states within the Commonwealth should be encouraged to develop information exchange relationships with other Commonwealth members, not least so that they do not become too dependent on information which derives from one or the other of the super powers and can thereby more easily raise fears of external manipulation. Of course Commonwealth co-operation in itself does not remove the danger of external manipulation but at least there is a basis of commonality of interest and confidence between Commonwealth members which serves to reduce such risks considerably.

5.38 Any government requires professional security policy advisers, spanning the fields of foreign, defence, economic and general internal policies. They must understand the broad range of current international issues as well as the more traditional elements of security. They are frequently civilian because their responsibilities are broader than those normally associated with military aspects of security, but in special circumstances the military may be the only source of such advisers. It matters less where advisers are located within the governmental structure than that they should be people of high calibre, trained broadly and flexibly, so that they may advance along a developing career path which is bound to take them at various stages into other areas of government service. Some small states may have separate foreign and defence ministries while others may not. In some, the most appropriate location for these advisers will be within the office of the Head of Government. In others, it is more appropriate that they should be in a cabinet office, foreign ministry or, more rarely, defence ministry. Location depends largely on which minister or ministers bear real responsibility for overall security policy. In most cases, the number of persons involved in the provision of high-level advice on security policy will be quite small, ranging from one or two to no more than a dozen.

5.39 Because of the importance of security issues and the scarcity of really good advisers, states should be careful to develop the most efficient organisational structure to harness their services. It is all too easy to employ advisers ineffectively, particularly by attempting to imitate the bureaucratic structure of large states. The advisers themselves should be diverse in their capabilities, partly because small states cannot afford much specialisation and partly because the advisers will need to work in other fields from time to time in order to have a full working career in government service. They must have a realistic sense of the extent and limitations of their own knowledge and experience, and familiarity with the best sources of supplementary advice and assistance. They must also be aware of the dangers of politicisation, particularly in the internal security context, and make a conscious effort to remain apolitical.

(ii) Intelligence gathering

5.40 Every state, large or small, requires intelligence information for its own security. It is particularly important for small states located near a super power or in the traditional sphere of influence of a large regional state as, in some cases, crises tend to come frequently in such areas, e.g. in the Caribbean. Small states have to be very selective in the way in which they use their own meagre intelligence resources but, because of their relative impotence in terms of military power, their needs for intelligence are perhaps even greater than those of larger powers in relative terms. The consequences of ignorance of an intended coup or even major criminal activity can include serious loss of life, widespread suffering and administrative chaos, both for the individual small state primarily concerned and for its regional partners.

5.41 Information processing and analysis has been greatly facilitated by the development of computer systems but small state governments may be reluctant to enter this field if they do not appreciate that relatively simple electronic systems can improve their capabilities. The vast array of systems available provides options which could be afforded even by the smallest state. Analysis cannot depend wholly upon electronic means, of course, and where manpower resources permit, special training should be devoted to improving analytical techniques and skills in the fields of both public and intelligence information. Small states should be assisted in the process of analysis by regional and wider international organisations. Countries which are able to work together on a basis of confidence should develop systems for exchanging information and assessments.

(iii) Regional co-operation

5.42 It is only sensible that small states, like large, should co-operate in the employment of their intelligence resources, working principally with

other friendly small and medium powers with common security interests. Almost invariably these other partners will be neighbours, or at least in the same region. The establishment of regional intelligence networks is an important step towards the consolidation of both regional and national security for small states.

5.43 Such networks should not attempt to be supra-national to any significant degree or they will forfeit the confidence of the governments on which they depend. They may, in special circumstances, be given wider powers than simply serving as a meeting of national intelligence representatives but generally they cannot function effectively without being under the firm political control of the national governments forming the network.

5.44 The types of information with which such regional networks will be concerned are essentially threefold: information on the activities and policies of external actors, both national and sub-national, with implications for the region; information on international relations, both official and unofficial, within the region; and information on internal problems of member states of the region which have broader implications for either the region at large or some part of it.

5.45 The principal means of collecting such information should be wholly in the hands of the national governments. Some intelligence may be received from extra-regional sources, but it must always be evaluated carefully, even sceptically in bilateral circumstances, to guard against external attempts to manipulate regional policies by controlling the flow of information to the governments of the region. Even pooled regional intelligence must be treated with some caution for similar reasons but the consequences of regional disapproval in cases of misuse of information provide some deterrence against blatant manipulation of intelligence by any one regional state or sub-group of such states.

5.46 Regional co-operation can assist in the gathering of intelligence through a local division of labour, utilising special national resources, experience and aptitudes for the common good. States on the periphery of a region are likely to have a particular capacity for providing intelligence on relevant extra-regional activities. Centrally located states may have a better contact within the region as a whole. Island states should be able to contribute information on their maritime environments. A division of labour may be struck simply to make the task affordable in financial terms and feasible in terms of human and other resources.

5.47 The sources of relevant intelligence for regional networks include publicly available information and analysis, the very collection of which is a major and specialised business. Other sources will be private

governmental information, whether clandestinely derived or not, and confidential commercial and financial information such as on the activities and practices of multinational corporations. Also important will be the routine collection of intelligence on regional maritime activities, especially fisheries, smuggling, illegal immigration and commercial use of the sea-bed. The centralised information system developed for fisheries information in the South Pacific, based at Honiara, is an outstanding example of what can be achieved. Surveillance of air and land movements and of the movements of individuals who could pose a security threat will also be important to the region as a whole.

5.48 The means of analysis of intelligence are generally best left in the hands of national governments, but regional initiatives will be desirable where national resources are insufficient or where there is a special regional interest in some matter which is of only slight immediate interest to some individual national governments. Regional analysis can be implemented by special conferences on priority topics and by regular liaison visits, made either bilaterally or multilaterally.

5.49 The means of distribution may best be provided by a regional agency or secretariat, particularly in the case of routine, non-urgent intelligence. A regional distribution system should not pose any threat to the sovereign rights of constituent regional states in the way that regional collection and analysis agencies might. Nonetheless such a system would need to be carefully planned and subjected to firm political oversight by the national governments of the region.

5.50 Regional intelligence networks will have their problems, both in policy and operational terms. They will require judicious and sensitive management and they cannot function at all without being founded on a basis of regional trust. But, despite the pitfalls, they can play a uniquely effective role in promoting regional security and in strengthening regional co-operation generally. It is a poor sort of region which cannot conduct some intelligence co-operation. It will almost certainly be an insecure one, vulnerable to the ever-present pressures of external powers and agencies.

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING

5.51 There is a considerable role for external assistance to enhance the self-reliant defence efforts of a small state provided it does not cause a disproportionate military imbalance within the region. Apart from meeting training and intelligence needs the major areas for external assistance lie in the provision of security related technical assistance and

of the necessary 'hardware'. We are conscious that defence co-operation is a politically sensitive area and urge states to be very careful about the agreements they make. Caution is particularly necessary in respect of agreements with states whose ideological position on foreign policy is likely to cause regional disharmony. Bilateral assistance can be particularly relevant in helping to provide equipment, logistics facilities and infrastructure and can be crucial in maritime matters where equipment is particularly costly.¹

5.52 Where practicable, the secondment of metropolitan military police or other security personnel to local forces for actual service should be severely restricted in numbers and in term. In rare cases, as in Brunei, this is done on a significant scale but the circumstances would have to be very special and the receiving state quite wealthy unless the arrangement is paid for by the donor, which itself would be a problematic situation. The Group is not convinced that the security services provided by commercial agencies are a credible option save on a minor scale.

5.53 At the bilateral and multilateral level there is wide scope and the need for external co-operation in non-military areas such as smuggling and surveillance of the seas. The recent joint operations by the United States and The Bahamas re. drug control in The Bahamas is an example of what can be done, although we must reiterate that caution should be exercised in entering into such agreements bilaterally, if the activity is of security importance to the larger state.

5.54 At the Commonwealth level, we note that the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation (CFTC) cannot at present fund projects directly related to security, but feel that there is a merit in the suggestion from one of the regional colloquia that the position should be reviewed particularly in respect of training and of consultancy on security needs. Security is a basic requirement for national development and the link should be appreciated by the Fund. We feel, for instance, that such a link is overlooked when, as in one case cited, approval was given for a tourism adviser but not for a proposal related to the security needs of the tourism project.

5.55 Technical and administrative efficiency is particularly relevant in areas directly related to political and military security and thus the training function is of paramount importance for small states with limited resources. The training requirements would vary, of course, according to the type of security establishment. Apart from military and paramilitary skills there is need for training in multipurpose functions such as disaster

¹ Adequate patrol of a maritime zone would require both aircraft and sea vessels capable of surveillance up to 200 nautical miles and fast armed craft for interception and arrests.

relief, famine operations, smuggling, drug and arms trafficking, and the monitoring and surveillance of EEZs. In respect of the latter we would like to endorse the training recommendations of the Secretariat Report on Ocean Management² to which we earlier referred. The Training Programmes on the Management and Conservation of Marine Resources for civil servants from developing countries, organised by the International Ocean Institute in Malta and Canada and supported by the CFTC, should also be mentioned in this context. There is thus a great need for help from external sources. Assistance, particularly from the metropolitan and larger countries of the Commonwealth, would also be required for the training of security advisers and the intelligence services.

5.56 The provision of such training is an obvious area where larger powers, and the Commonwealth can assist. While it should necessarily include both the secondment of metropolitan experts to small states and the exposure of small states' personnel to the institutions and establishments of larger states, the development of local training institutions for the police, perhaps at the regional level, is desirable. Training in security related skills is also an area for regional co-operation as has recently been demonstrated in the Caribbean where the forces of the OECS states have been undergoing an upgrading of their skills, on the ground in the region, through the assistance of friendly powers. A considerable amount of bilateral military and police training is conducted in the Commonwealth and we urge that this be continued and expanded as required. In this connection we are mindful of the comment at one of the colloquia that in security matters, if there is to be training by outsiders, preference should be given to nationals from countries with the democratic tradition, characteristic of the Commonwealth, of the non-political role of the military.

² See Ocean Management: a Regional Perspective The Prospects for Commonwealth Maritime Co-operation in Asia and the Pacific: Commonwealth Secretariat 1984.