

# Chapter 11

## Recommendations

The various measures advocated in Part III of our Report are set out below as formal recommendations. They are arranged in terms of the three levels at which they would be implemented: national, regional and international. However, since this is a study requested by Commonwealth Heads of Government, the recommendations specifically for Commonwealth action are presented separately from the other international measures. For ease of reference the measures within each group have as far as possible been organised under headings that reflect the main subject areas covered in Part III (Chapters 5-9); and the numbers in square brackets indicate the paragraphs where the proposals are discussed. The recommendations are numbered in a straight sequence, starting from No. 1 under the section on National Policies and Measures and ending with No. 79 under the Commonwealth section.

### **1. NATIONAL POLICIES AND MEASURES**

#### **A. Strengthening National Defence Capability**

1. Small states should aim at establishing multipurpose and flexibly structured security forces, able to carry out a diversity of functions including development projects and disaster relief. Primary emphasis should be given to paramilitary skills. Governments should recognise the need for appropriate equipment and a high level of motivation and morale [5.13-5.15].
2. Well trained citizen forces or voluntary reserves could serve as a useful back-up to the regular security forces and increase the capacity to deter external territorial threats [5.16-5.17].

3. Governments should recognise the necessity of training and using professional security advisers spanning the fields of foreign, defence, economic and general internal policies, and of developing efficient organisational structures to harness their services [5.38-5.39].
4. Small states contemplating bilateral security arrangements with a larger power should give due weight to their regional implications and possible adverse political impact before reaching a decision, particularly if the larger power seeks base facilities. In general, formal defence arrangements with a larger power should be seen as an option to be exercised only where a small state is under a military threat from an identifiable enemy [5.23].
5. Where appropriate, small states could consider formally declaring a status of neutrality consistent with international law and seeking to have it officially recognised, at least by neighbouring countries and possibly also by the Security Council [5.28; and see also No. 45 below].
6. There is a considerable role for external assistance in enhancing the self-reliant defence efforts of small states. The major areas for such assistance are training, intelligence, costly equipment (particularly in maritime areas), logistics facilities and infrastructure. Although bilateral technical assistance poses less risk than bilateral defence arrangements, care should be taken to avoid arousing suspicion within the region, and over-militarisation [5.51].
7. Immediate steps should be taken by small states to improve their access to a wide variety of information on developments and views affecting national security interests and to introduce or upgrade regular systems for the procurement and analysis of information from abroad, particularly of a diplomatic and security nature [5.37].
8. Small states could make much greater use of information available at the United Nations and its agencies, as well as in the Commonwealth Secretariat. They should also endeavour to develop or upgrade information exchange relations with other Commonwealth member countries [5.36].
9. While improvement of intelligence data and analysis is essential, small states have, of necessity, to be very selective in using their own meagre intelligence resources; emphasis should therefore be placed on regional co-operation [5.40; and see also under Section II below].
10. Small states also stand to benefit considerably from bilateral arrangements with regional partners or other friendly states for exchange of intelligence [5.41].

## **B. Underpinning Economic Growth**

11. Economic diversification could greatly help to reduce economic weakness and insecurity, and should be an important objective of small states [6.5-6.6].

12. Difficulties of economic diversification should not be allowed to encourage over-concentration on 'softer' development options and deter efforts to secure more stable and sturdy economic development. The latter will require high standards of administration and management to make the best use of limited economic opportunities and to avoid the pitfalls of sanctions associated with foreign investment [6.6-6.7].

13. Transnational corporations could assist the economic development of small states which must, however, be helped to overcome their weakness in dealing with these corporations [6.9].

14. A vigorous indigenous private sector can, in appropriate cases, contribute directly and through joint ventures, to self-reliant development and to reducing the dangers from transnational corporations [6.10].

15. A special effort is needed to develop indigenous technological capacity, not only to improve research and development, but also to assess and adapt imported technologies [6.11].

16. Small states, even when densely populated, could increase food and other agricultural production through intensive cultivation assisted by land reform and technical support. Food production, tourism and other service industries and manufacturing could add to traditional exports and provide scope for diversified development [6.12].

17. Small states should be outward-looking in their development policies, even though this increases exposure to external influences. Rapid, stable and self-reliant development can only be achieved through skilful exploitation of internal and external economic opportunities [6.13].

18. In marine development, small states should give priority to: drafting of national legislation covering all uses of ocean space, including the declaration of their EEZs; integration of the marine sector into the general development strategy; establishment of an administrative structure for marine development [6.24].

## **C. Promoting Internal Cohesion**

19. Small states should constantly pursue policies aimed at engendering confidence in public institutions and fostering active involvement in the

democratic process. Specific measures should be taken, where necessary, to improve parliamentary procedures and to provide research and administrative assistance for members of parliament [7.5].

20. Measures in the human rights area could include: encouragement or development of non-governmental institutions [7.8]; fostering freedom of expression through the development of independent media [7.9]; and provision of constitutional safeguards for the protection of human rights and an independent judiciary [7.11].

21. Given their limited human resources, small states need to develop an administration staffed by personnel who are skilled in more than one task relating to development management [7.16].

22. While they must remain open to new influences and techniques and retain the capacity to innovate, small states should nevertheless continue to protect their national identity and core values [7.17].

#### **D. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Management**

23. It is vital for a small state to formulate co-ordinated foreign policy objectives and strategies that take fully into account the implications of being a tiny entity in the international arena. They should develop positive techniques of diplomacy to compensate for their limitations, including occasional judicious use of bold initiatives [8.15; specific pointers for consideration are set out in 8.16-8.20].

24. Small states belonging to the same geopolitical group should appreciate that co-ordination of foreign policy can assist them to maximise modest national diplomatic resources and provide a useful source of political support. Where they share a common view on certain foreign policy issues, it could also be advantageous for them to have regular consultations, formally or informally, to consider the desirability of establishing a co-ordinated position [8.21-8.24].

25. Since small states can maintain overseas missions only in a handful of countries, careful judgement is required in deciding on which states to focus. Full advantage must also be taken of membership of intergovernmental bodies, both regional and transregional, which provide a valuable alternative means of fostering bilateral relationships. Location of suitably skilled diplomatic personnel in posts advantageous to gathering information relevant to the national interest is of considerable value [8.3-8.5].

26. Small states should consider the advantage of playing an active and constructive role within the United Nations [8.12-8.14]. States confronted

by a specific security threat from another country should appreciate that immediate recourse to the Security Council can sometimes help in warding off aggression [8.11]. They can also seek, through a systematic use of Assembly procedures and its subsidiary bodies, to mobilise majority support from the United Nations membership, including some of the major powers [8.9].

27. Small states should plan their participation in international activities on a highly selective basis, focusing essentially on issues closely related to their national interests [8.19].

## **E. Training Needs**

28. It is recommended that small states adopt a more systematic policy of seeking training assistance for national/civil service personnel in the various areas of action identified in the Report as essential for reducing their vulnerability. These are:

- (i) paramilitary skills, disaster and famine relief, operations to counter smuggling, drugs and arms trafficking, and the monitoring and surveillance of EEZs [5.55-5.56, 6.6-6.7, 9.48-9.49];
- (ii) information and intelligence gathering and analysis [5.41];
- (iii) public administration and management [7.30-7.31];
- (iv) the skills required to promote the smooth functioning of the parliamentary and legal system as well as the effective promotion of human rights [7.29];
- (v) the development of the media, including news agencies [7.9, 7.29];
- (vi) the use of technology applicable in the relevant economic sectors, including industrial and agricultural development [6.10-6.11];
- (vii) ocean management [5.55];
- (viii) the techniques of diplomacy and negotiation, both bilateral and multilateral levels [8.25]; attention is drawn to the need for studies to provide guidelines in the conduct of diplomacy for small states [8.31];
- (ix) the skills for dealing with foreign commercial enterprises, as well as for negotiating contractual arrangements [6.7-6.9].

29. Greater use should be made, not only at the bilateral level but also at the regional and transregional levels, of the diversity of established sources within the Commonwealth for providing training and assistance in all these spheres.

## **II. REGIONAL INITIATIVES**

### **A. Strengthening National Defence Capability**

30. Where small states form a distinctive geopolitical group it might be appropriate for them to consider establishing their own regional security arrangements. These could also provide an institutional structure for formalising requests for assistance, either from a larger power or from an international organisation, at moments of crisis [5.31-5.34; and see also No. 75 below].

31. To assist small states' access to vital information affecting their security interests and improve their capacity for information analysis, two initiatives are recommended:

- (i) establishment of regional facilities—e.g. data banks, documentation centres, news agencies and other media outlets—for collecting and disseminating relevant publicly available information [5.36].
- (ii) establishment of regional intelligence networks to provide a routine flow of information on external developments with important regional implications, on significant intraregional developments, and on the internal problems of the constituent states which could affect at least some neighbouring small countries. In island states regions the network should also be envisaged as a source for intelligence on activities such as fishing, smuggling, illegal immigration and the commercial use of the sea-bed. While distribution of intelligence information could be carried out through a regional centre or agency, the means of analysing this material should remain in the hands of the individual governments [5.42-5.50].

### **B. Underpinning Economic Growth**

32. Regional co-operation remains of special significance for small states' efforts to expand economic opportunities and reduce weakness in external economic relations [6.14].

33. Apart from expanding trade opportunities, regional co-operation could support national efforts to improve infrastructure and develop productive enterprises. Areas in which regional co-operation requires support from the Commonwealth and other external agencies include: surveillance and development of marine resources, disaster preparedness and relief, higher education, research and development, sharing scarce and expensive skills and expertise, transport and development banking [6.15].

34. In utilising and protecting the marine environment, developing marine science and facilitating the transfer of marine technology, small island states should seek assistance to establish regional centres to support these activities and also endeavour to relate them to the Regional Seas Programme contained in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention [6.25-6.26].

35. Creation of regional fishing enterprises is recommended as a means of helping individual states to meet the challenge of the distant-water fishing fleets of the industrialised countries [6.26].

### **C. Promoting Internal Cohesion**

36. Where practicable small states should seek to strengthen democratic and human rights practices through regional mechanisms such as election commissions and service commissions for key judicial, administrative and security posts. They might also contemplate voluntary recourse to regional and/or Commonwealth observers at particular elections and encourage the activities of relevant regional and international NGOs [7.4].

37. If the constituent countries so desire, regional parliaments could be established as an instrument contributing to harmony and stability and giving impetus to general co-operation [7.28].

38. The establishment of regional human rights courts or commissions is recommended for consideration [7.6-7.7].

39. Small states should co-operate in schemes for the regional pooling of experts, e.g. auditors, legal draftsmen, specialist surgeons, etc. Freedom of regional movement and flexible conditions of work would facilitate such schemes [7.26].

### **D. Training Assistance Arrangements**

40. Establishment of regional training centres in the various specialised skills, including management and developmental administration, required

by the small states within a particular region is strongly recommended [7.29-7.31].

### **E. Regional Consultations on Security**

41. Informal regional colloquia on national and international security questions, attended by governmental and non-governmental representatives and organised at, say, two-yearly intervals, could be extremely helpful. Procedures for these meetings could be drawn up in consultation with the Commonwealth Secretariat which could also assist with their organisation [7.21].

42. Regional consultations between officials should also be held on a regular basis to exchange information and views on developments affecting security in the area and on common problems. Some of these consultations might usefully include officials from non-Commonwealth neighbouring countries. The Commonwealth Secretariat could help in arranging them [9.55].

## **III. ACTION AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL**

### **A. Political Measures at the United Nations**

43. Wherever possible small states should utilise the facilities of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, as well as other appropriate international bodies in pursuit of their security needs. However, governments need to give urgent consideration to how best to support proposals currently under discussion at the United Nations to strengthen its capacity to maintain peace and security [9.4-9.8].

44. Whatever the outcome of these discussions the Secretary-General should, in any event, play a more active role in the spirit of Article 99 of the United Nations Charter. In particular he should, in cases of incipient and low-level security threats, consider responding positively to a request from a state, feeling itself under military threat from another state, for a mission to its territory. When it is not politically feasible for him to despatch such missions, he could at least send a personal representative or an official of the United Nations Secretariat to obtain a firsthand assessment of the situation [9.9-9.13].

45. The Security Council should consider giving official recognition to formal declarations of neutrality status which any small state may individually seek to register with it [9.14, and No. 5 above].

46. As an initial step towards establishing a special unit within the Secretariat to assist small member states, an official should be appointed to monitor developments in the United Nations affecting their interests. The relevant departments within the Secretariat should also be instructed to consider developing special programmes for small states [9.15].

## **B. International Economic Policies**

47. The international community has a special obligation to provide an external environment which could assist small states in promoting self-reliant and stable development and in strengthening their economic independence. That environment does not now exist and the situation is being made worse by the current difficulties experienced in multilateral co-operation. Renewed commitment and support for multilateral co-operation would greatly assist in the adoption of specific international measures. Areas of special importance to small states are: trade liberalisation; official flows from multilateral and bilateral sources, in particular concessional flows; technical co-operation; balance of payments support, including export earnings stabilisation; disaster preparedness and relief [9.21-9.27].

48. The provision of special support for small states should be approached pragmatically through securing better international recognition of their problems and needs and through categorisation of small states, formally or informally, in specific areas as the need arises [9.24-9.25].

49. ECOSOC should review as early as possible the criteria for inclusion of countries in the Least Developed category to take account of the special structural and developmental problems of small states [9.28].

50. Bilateral aid agencies should continue to recognise the special needs of small states for concessional capital. Multilateral provision is of special importance and international financial institutions must pay greater attention to these needs [9.29-9.30].

51. The World Bank should adopt more flexible criteria for graduating small states from its lending, especially from IDA. No small states should be graduated from IDA unless there is assurance of adequate access to alternative sources of finance. Transitional arrangements might be required to prevent adverse effects from an abrupt end to IDA lending [9.33-9.35].

52. The IFC should significantly extend its support to smaller projects. It should also assist regional and national development banks to expand

their operations in this area. The latter should do more to provide venture capital for small projects [9.36-9.37].

53. The IMF should review the functioning of its Compensatory Financing Facility to improve its effectiveness in stabilising foreign exchange earnings, giving special attention to the needs of small states [9.40-9.41].

54. The agreement to establish a Common Fund for commodity price stabilisation should be implemented as early as possible. Its modalities should reflect the special interest of small states [9.43].

55. Small states should be freed from all limitations that apply to their access under the Generalised System of Preferences, and exempted from all organised marketing arrangements and voluntary export restraints. Small states should be excluded from the export restrictions adopted in any renewed MFA [9.44-9.45].

56. The Codes of Conduct on relations between transnational corporations and host countries, which are under negotiation, are of special interest to small states and should be established early [9.38].

57. Increased international assistance should be given to small states to improve their vetting procedures and negotiating capacity in dealing with foreign business ventures [9.39].

58. International arrangements on disaster preparedness and relief measures should be considerably improved. Greater international assistance should be provided to strengthen national efforts; regional efforts should be encouraged and supported [9.48-9.49].

59. International institutions should be more supportive of regional co-operation arrangements involving small states [6.15-6.17].

#### **IV. THE COMMONWEALTH CONTRIBUTION**

Mindful of the fact that the Secretariat has already initiated an extensive programme of assistance to small states in many spheres, we are of the view that the Commonwealth is especially well placed to take practical measures to help small states in promoting their security interests as well. The programme already encompasses a wide spectrum of support in the political, economic and social fields, and an expansion of the Secretariat's activities in these areas would contribute significantly to reducing small states' vulnerability. Small states' security problems and

objectives should, however, be kept constantly in mind when formulating new projects or considering how best to respond to requests for assistance from their governments. The present programme can be adapted by making a more focused use of the existing institutions and procedures. There is also a need for additional assistance at the bilateral level, but, again, in many instances this will be largely a matter of building on existing aid and co-operation arrangements.

#### **A. Extending the use of Commonwealth structures**

60. The Secretary-General has been in an excellent position personally to contribute to the general promotion of small states' security interests and we would urge that he continues this role through quiet diplomacy on an on-going basis [9.57].

61. He has also been able to contribute to the resolution of disputes involving member countries. In furtherance of this role, with regard to a security crisis arising for a small member state, the Secretary-General might consider it advisable to initiate immediate consultations with that state and with the other member states in the region in order to determine whether there is any wish for pan-Commonwealth action. In certain circumstances it might also be appropriate for him to despatch a team at the request of a small state feeling itself under an external threat to its security [9.58].

62. Special meetings of small states specifically on economic and financial matters should be arranged when the occasion warrants. They would be particularly helpful if organised in preparation for upcoming major international negotiating conferences, and would assist the Secretariat in trying to ensure that small states' interests are adequately represented at these fora [9.56].

63. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation should be enabled to respond to requests from small states for training assistance and consultancy services for projects of practical relevance to their security problems. As the Fund's terms of reference preclude it from financing projects directly concerned with national security, we recommend that these be revised with a view to removing the restriction entirely, or at least in the case of the smaller member countries [5.54; 9.52].

64. Additional resources should be provided to enable the Commercial Crime Unit of the Secretariat to meet the increasing demand for its services, mainly from small states [9.68].

65. Small states general training needs are listed in No. 28. These should be noted by the Secretariat/CFTC with a view to augmenting the training programmes where appropriate.

66. Member countries could likewise review the list of training needs in order to determine the level and type of additional training assistance they feel they are in a position to offer, either by expanding existing programmes or by offering new ones as may be appropriate.

67. In the sphere specifically of military, paramilitary and police training, where a number of permanent arrangements have already been established, there is also room for both wider and more intensive bilateral co-operation [9.61].

68. Member countries should take initiatives to increase the flow of intelligence information to and between small states [5.41].

69. Existing intra-Commonwealth bilateral defence co-operation programmes, which include the supply of military hardware and joint service operations, have proved their utility and should constitute a basis for expanded co-operation [5.51].

70. There have been occasions when a Commonwealth country has provided direct military assistance to a small member state at its request at a moment of crisis; this practice is worth maintaining [9.59].

71. The follow-up work on the establishment of a Commonwealth Risk Capital Facility being carried out by the Secretariat should pay particular attention to small states' needs and be completed as early as possible [9.67].

72. The Secretariat's capital markets programme should give increased attention to assisting small states to tap capital markets [9.64-9.65].

73. If a new round of multilateral trade negotiations is held, the Secretariat should arrange a meeting of small member states to discuss issues of special interest to them and also ensure that their interests are adequately represented in the negotiations [9.71].

74. Despite current budget stringency, the significant levels of Commonwealth bilateral aid to small states should not only be maintained but improved over time [9.29].

## **B. Specific New Measures**

75. In the event that a particular group of small states decides to set up its own regional security force, Commonwealth resources should, wherever possible, be made available on both a multilateral and bilateral basis [9.60].

76. Commonwealth governments should consider with sympathy requests for ad hoc forces to assist member states facing acute security problems [9.59].

77. All Commonwealth governments are urged to use their good offices to discourage insensitive and irresponsible reporting about small states, at least by the media in their own countries. This concern should also be brought to the attention of the Commonwealth Press Union [5.35].

78. The successful Australian funded scheme providing a joint New York office for the permanent United Nations missions for four of the Commonwealth's very small countries should now be accepted as a permanent measure and undertaken as a collective Commonwealth obligation, including a minimal contribution by the beneficiary countries. Resources should also be made available for similar facilities for other regional groups of small states that might seek such assistance [9.53-9.54].

79. We would strongly urge Commonwealth Heads of Government to consider ways in which the United Nations can be utilised to promote action for advancing the security interests of small states and, specifically, how the measures advocated in this Report could be brought to the attention of the international community [9.16].