NO ISLAND IS AN ISLAND

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The first two lectures in this series which commemorates the life and work of one of the greatest West Indians, Norman Washington Manley, were concerned with Manley and with Jamaica.[1] In honouring me with the invitation to deliver the Third Memorial Lecture you have specifically asked me to cast the net of analysis and reminiscence somewhat wider and to speak on the theme of the Caribbean or, as I would prefer to say, the West Indies. It is a theme, of course, that was central to Norman Manley's life and work. Indeed, it was in his role of a committed believer in West Indian unity that I first came under Manley's spell. He was the first West Indian politician to move and inspire me in that cause: and it was here in London, at the LSE, during one of his visits in the early 1950s. The preparatory work on West Indian federation was gathering momentum and Manley shared with us—some of the generation that would play a part in its unfolding—his vision of the future West Indian nation. It is a vision I have never lost: or lost faith in. I was to see, and work with, Norman Manley in the coming years through the increasingly intensive West Indian conferences leading to the establishment of the Federation in 1957: conferences in which he played such a leading role.

My next reminiscence of 'N.W.' is very different. It was ten years later, 1964; the federal experiment was over; Jamaica was independent and Norman Manley was in opposition. A dream we had shared and which he had tried so hard to make come true—the dream of West Indian nationhood—lay shattered. The Federation of the West Indies which I too had worked to bring to independence had been dissolved on the very day—31 May 1962—that had been agreed upon, at the last West Indian conference Norman Manley attended (May/June 1961), as the date for the independence of The West Indies, and thus for the establishment of the West Indian nation.

I was the Assistant Attorney-General of the Federation and involved in drafting what was to be the Independence Constitution. We were half-way through when the Referendum in Jamaica

answered 'No' to Federation and, as it was to transpire, to Norman Manley. I left Port of Spain, until then the Federal Capital, on 30 August 1962, the day before Trinidad and Tobago's Independence and 24 days after Jamaica's. I left for Harvard on a Guggenheim Fellowship where I would reflect and write on the prospects for the Caribbean—no longer the West Indies.

Looking back on it all now, did the acute disappointment which I felt border on petulance? Perhaps it did; but let it be said that we had been stirred by a loftier vision of nationhood than that which independence on an island basis seemed to offer: a vision of one West Indian nation, not of the 12 that did emerge. After Harvard, I joined my friend and former colleague, Harvey Da Costa, who had been Federal Attorney-General, in law practice in Jamaica. My name-plate, I am glad to say, is still there at the entrance to our old Chambers at 20 1/2 Duke Street, Kingston. It was in practice that I last encountered Norman Manley. He too had returned to the Bar, although he only did opinion work. He was a revered figure at the Bar, but caused more than a little concern among his younger colleagues by adhering resolutely to the low level of fees he had been accustomed to years earlier. Since he was 'N.W.', his fees were the bench-mark for us. But, let me turn, as you have asked, to the Caribbean.

"The islands are separated by miles of sea and to a close and more territorial political union it may be said 'opposuit natura'." So concluded Walwyn Shepherd in 1900, writing of the West Indies in the *Journal of Comparative Legislation*.[2] In other words, as the 20th century dawned, nature itself seemed to say 'no' to West Indian nationhood. Sixty-three years later, writing in *Foreign Affairs* just after Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago had become independent, Philip Sherlock had this to say:

> Division is the heritage of the Caribbean. The separateness of the islands in the archipelago that curves for a thousand miles from the tip of Florida to the mouth of the Orinoco is reflected in the fact that they have no common name. Each island shares with the others the same startling beauty of sun-drenched mountains and peacock seas; each has the same social configuration resulting from the same techniques of production, the

> intensive cultivation of one crop, and slavery. Yet the keynote is contrast, the dominant theme competition. The rivalries of Western Europe broke the region into segments, each tightly integrated into the trading system of the metropolitan power, sealed off in an almost watertight compartment and stocked with people brought together from Europe, a score of West African kingdoms and the central provinces of India. Nowhere else in the New World is there so sharp a juxtaposition of different races, languages, religions—different legal, educational and political systems.[3]

In 1975, in my last speech in the Caribbean before coming to London as Commonwealth Secretary-General, a speech I called 'To Care for CARICOM', I myself said this:

> A consequence of our relative success over the last ten years is a readiness to believe that unity is our natural state—one which will subsist despite ourselves. It is a dangerous falsehood. A history of colonialism and the geography of a scattered archipelago deny its validity. The natural state of our Caribbean is fragmentation; without constant effort, without unrelenting perseverance and discipline in suppressing instincts born of tradition and environment, it is to our natural state of disunity that we shall return.[4]

Yet there is another side that is unifying: and it, too, is part of our natural state and our heritage. It is the unmistakable, unchanging fact of a West Indian identity. Over 250 years ago, in 1722, Père Labat, writing about his travels among the islands and states, invoked that identity, so palpable to him, in support of the common destiny to which he saw us all committed as part of an even wider Caribbean. He wrote:

> I have travelled everywhere in your sea of the Caribbean from Haiti to Barbados, to Martinique and Guadeloupe, and I know what I am speaking about.... You are all together, in the same boat, sailing on the same uncertain sea... citizenship and race unimportant, feeble little

> labels compared to the message that my spirit brings to me: that of the position and predicament which History has imposed upon you... I saw it first with the dance... the merengue in Haiti, the beguine in Martinique and today I hear, *de mon oreille morte,* the echo of calypsoes from Trinidad, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Dominica and the legendary Guiana.... It is no accident that the sea which separates your lands makes no difference to the rhythm of your body.[5]

In many ways, the two and a half centuries since Labat sailed the Caribbean should have strengthened both the reality and the awareness of a common identity and developed among our people an instinct for unity. The shared experience of bondage that slavery and indenture imposed, the common experience of colonialism and, in later years, of struggle for release from it, compel a sense of community. An almost identical environment, propitious to the flowering of the cultural traditions of its transported people, ensures a socio-cultural unity. Joint patterns of colonial administration result in a uniform legal-political framework; transmitted traditions of the rule of law and of parliamentary democracy are part of a West Indian ethos. How natural, then, is our state of disunity, how real our heritage of division?

Perhaps, we need to look back before we can look forward with confidence. Let me try to do so by recalling two episodes in the constitutional cross-stitch of the Leeward and Windward Islands—today's OECS countries—who are once again exploring the ways of political unity: different people of a different age renewing the effort to overcome the vicissitudes of smallness by building bridges across a dividing sea.[6]

By the 1660s English settlements had been established in St. Christopher, Barbados, Nevis, Antigua and Montserrat; all of them—'the Caribbee Islands'—came under the executive authority of a common 'Governor-in-Chief' stationed at Barbados.[7] In the beginning, there was union. But the marriage was unpopular with the planters of the islands other than Barbados and, through political pressure locally and representations in London, a separation was arranged. In 1671, a special Commission was issued appointing Sir Charles Wheeler "Governor-in-Chief over

St. Christopher, Nevis, Montserrat, Antigua, Barbuda, Anguilla and all other Leeward Islands which His Majesty has seen fit to separate from the Government of Barbados."[8] Thus began the long series of island configurations, groupings and re-groupings, unions and federations and confederations, which were to characterise constitutional developments in the West Indies for nearly 300 years.

Wheeler's commission established no more than a personal union, but it was not long before the difficulties inherent in dealing with the islands separately and the obvious convenience that would result from a more centralised form of government convinced him of the need for a general assembly of some kind. It was his successor (Stapleton), however, who pursued the bold course of summoning such an assembly comprising representatives of the various island legislatures meeting on an *ad hoc* basis.[9] From a modest beginning as a consultative body the assembly gradually assumed the character of a Federal Council legislating on matters of common concern. In 1705, it passed an Act 'to settle General Councils and General Assemblies for the Caribbee Islands their peculiar Laws and Customs'.[10] In effect, it created a bicameral federal legislature having wide powers; a federal executive, of course, already existed in the person of the Governor. It has been suggested that, apart from the feeble New England Confederation of 1643, this Act represents the earliest attempt at federalism in the British Empire:[11] a not insignificant assertion.

Whatever its other claims to fame, however, this initial attempt at political union in the Leewards was a success; legislative activity quickly shifted back to the Island Councils. After a lapse of over seventy years the assembly (General Assembly) met for the last time in 1798 to discuss the resolution on slavery passed the year before by the House of Commons.[12]

The nineteenth century saw a revival of federalism in the Leewards. Peace in Europe after 1815 ushered in a period of calm in the West Indies and Whitehall could give more attention to the problems of government in the Caribbee Islands. In 1816, the experiment was tried of dividing the Leewards into two groups under separate Governors, but in 1833, as part of a more general policy of consolidation, the islands were again united under a common Governor,[13] with Dominica, which had been a separate

colony since 1770, added to the group.[14] However, the need which had prompted even earlier attempts at federalism in the 17th century persisted, and, in 1869, the Colonial Office, inspired by Canada's efforts two years earlier, became the champion of federalism in the Leewards. Sir Benjamin Pine was appointed Governor with a mandate "to form these islands into one colony, with one Governor, one Superior Court and one Corps of Police":[15] a formula for Union not so unlike that currently being advanced by some OECS leaders.[16] But Pine was soon to discover that even the most modest alteration in the *status quo* presented innumerable difficulties. "It must be remembered", he wrote, "that these islands, small and insignificant as they may be, have for centuries possessed forms of not only wholly unsuited to the times when they were founded, but which while ceasing to be applicable to present circumstances have kept up among the ruling classes a spirit of self-importance and narrow patriotism which may seem ludicrous but cannot be ignored."[17] Note that reference to 'ruling classes'; it has its present-day resonances.

The greatest obstacle to agreement was the proposal for a common Treasury: "What! they say," reported Pine on the attitude of the planters of St. Kitts, "shall the rich and prosperous island of St. Kitts share its overflowing Treasury with the bankrupt island of Antigua?"[18] Alexander Bustamante was to say as much at the Montego Bay Conference in 1947—three-quarters of a century later—when he described 98 per cent of the other islands as "pauperised and in a state of bankruptcy". "I have never heard", he protested, 'that in joining with bankrupts one can become successful or prosperous".[19] This time St. Kitts was among the bankrupts. Faced with an almost unanimous opposition from the islands, the Secretary of State was forced to abandon that nineteenth-century plan of union in favour of federation, though for a time he remained adamant over the strength of the central authority. When, after eighteen months of negotiation, Pine obtained the approval of all the Island legislatures, it was to a federal union far removed from Whitehall's earlier plans.

In 1871, the British Parliament passed the Leeward Islands Act,[20] and this, as amended by the Leeward Islands Legislature, embodied the federal Constitution which remained in operation until 'defederation' in 1957. The Act established the colony of the

Leeward Islands consisting of six presidencies—Antigua, St. Kitts, Nevis, Dominica, Montserrat and the Virgin Islands. These were later reduced to four, first by the amalgamation of St. Kitts and Nevis in 1882,[21] and later, in 1940, by the separation of Dominica.[22] Caught between the pressure for union from the Colonial Office and the determination of the Island councils to preserve the *status quo* a formula of political union was evolved which produced little more than a confederation. Judged even as such, it was far from effective. A former President of Nevis once described the resulting Leeward Islands Federation as "a government powerless in itself to do good, but which has developed great capacities for hindering any good being done by the several parts."[23] The Royal Commission of 1884 hoped that the inhabitants would "take the further step of securing all the advantages of co-operation by making the union real and complete",[24] but nothing was done and the federation entered the century in its old ineffectual form.

By the 1920s "defederation" had become a political catchword in the Leewards; yet the Wood Report of 1922 recommended neither a strengthening nor a loosening of the ties. The Fergusson Commission which conducted an inquiry into the possibilities of closer union between Trinidad, the Windward and the Leeward Islands, or some of them, reported in 1933 that so far as Trinidad was concerned "no proposal for closer political union with any of the northern islands would receive support at the present juncture and that it would be useless to discuss the matter further", and they advised that it would be impracticable to establish a 'real federation' between the Leeward and Windward groups. They suggested, however, the dissolution of the Leeward Islands Federation and the groupings of the islands of both the Leewards and Windwards under one Governor.[25] The resulting organisation would have been "an association of eight colonies under one Governor, but otherwise independent of each other and autonomous in every respect."[26] The proposal was referred to the island legislatures, but there was such a divergence of opinion, particularly over the justification of the additional expense involved, that the Secretary of State decided not to pursue it.[27] Nothing was in fact to happen until 'defederation' in 1957 as a prelude to the more inclusive federal union. No less than three hundred years had been spent in a contest

between rationality and pettiness with the latter consistently triumphant.

In the Windwards, meanwhile, the same forces were at work. Unlike the Leewards, they were all conquered colonies and so never enjoyed traditions of representative government to the same degree. In fact, during the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth centuries they felt the full impact of European wars fought in West Indian waters and although sporadic attempts were made to establish British authority over them, anything like organised government must have been virtually unattainable during those troubled years. It has been estimated, for example, that in the 170 years between 1633 and 1803 St. Lucia changed hands between the British and French no fewer than twelve times.[28] The real story of island groupings in the Windward begins, therefore, at a somewhat later date.

The Peace of Paris in 1763 had brought a temporary lull to Anglo-French conflict in the Caribbean; and Grenada, with the little Grenadines attached, St. Vincent, Dominica and Tobago were ceded to Great Britain. Grouped together as the 'Southern Caribee Islands', they were immediately formed into one Government at Grenada.[29] Once again, in the beginning, there was union. The experiment, however, was short-lived. In 1771, Dominica was separated and placed under a separate governorship, with a bicameral legislature of the old representative type. In 1776, St. Vincent followed suit. When, in 1783, Tobago was ceded to the French by the Treaty of Versailles the union had ended by elimination.

Where the War of American Independence left off, the French Revolutionary Wars took over; and not until the Treaty of Paris in 1814 was it finally decided that the English and not the French were to be responsible for the Windwards. All four of the "Southern Caribee Islands" were returned to Great Britain, with the addition of St. Lucia, but no attempt was made to revive the former union. In 1833, however, when Dominica was transferred to the Leewards;[30] a new arrangement in common administration was tried out among the remaining islands of the Windward group.

Barbados, not strictly a member of the Windwards and, since her separation from the Leewards in 1671, independently administered, was brought into the scheme of association and Sir

Lionel Smith was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Barbados, St. Vincent, Grenada and Tobago.[31] This was, however, a mere ghost of the former union. The separate island legislatures all continued to function; the sole co-ordinating influence was the common Governor-in-Chief who resided in Barbados which superseded Grenada as the centre of government; while the other islands were administered by resident Lieutenant-Governors.

Viscount Goderich was the Secretary of State at this time and he was greatly impressed with the possibilities of a real union of the Windwards.[32] But to a large extent his hands were tied. The islands by now what were euphemistically called all possessed 'representative' legislatures; under prevailing constitutional law it was no longer open to the Crown to legislate for them. Union, if it were to be achieved, must emanate from the island legislature themselves. It never did.

What changes have taken place since then have been confined to alterations among the constituent members of the executive union, and have been achieved by the simple process of amending the Governor's commission. In 1835, Trinidad and St. Lucia were brought into the so-called 'union', when a commission was issued to Smith, already Governor of Barbados, St. Vincent, Grenada and Tobago, appointing him "Governor and Commander-in-Chief over our said islands called Trinidad and St. Lucia in America."[33] From the beginning, however, Trinidad enjoyed a certain independence when Sir Henry George McLeod was appointed Governor of the Island.[34] From that time onwards, Trinidad developed as a separate colony.

In 1869, with Pine's mandate to federate the Leewards there came out of the Colonial Office a "Scheme of union" for Trinidad, Grenada and Tobago. Draft Letters Patent were prepared to give effect to the union, but the proposals clearly did not go beyond a common Governor and the scheme was abandoned in the same year. Nevertheless, Pine's moderate success in the 1870s in securing the federation of the Leeward Islands encouraged the Colonial Office to hope for similar developments in the Windwards; and, in 1871, Governor Rawson was instructed along such lines: "As you have been aware from the time of your appointment as Governor," wrote the Secretary of State to him some time later, "Her Majesty's Government are anxious that the

Islands of the Windward group should be federated under a stronger and more efficient system of administration than can be secured to each of them while they continue separate."[35] Far from convinced himself of the wisdom of 'confederation'—as the proposal was referred to in the Windwards—and certain of the opposition of the legislatures in Barbados, Grenada and Tobago he recommended that it should be preceded by the conversion of the now 'representative' legislatures into single chambers, in which the Crown would have power to bring about united action.[36] But if 'confederation' was distasteful to the island legislatures, confederation on the basis of Crown Colony Government was absolute anathema. In the minds of the planters—remember, it was still only the planters—the issues became intermingled; once that had occurred, the fate of 'confederation' was sealed.

Rawson was succeeded in 1875 by J. Pope Hennessy, at once a courageous administrator and a confirmed federalist. At the same time the Earl of Carnarvon became Secretary of State and one of his first acts was to dissociate the issues of confederation and internal constitutional amendment. Carnarvon's ability for compromise, however, soon led him to disavow one of the Scheme's cardinal features. Confronted with the opposition of the Barbados House of Assembly to a common treasury, Carnarvon agreed that "this community of financial arrangements" need not be a feature of the confederation and that, subject to such contributions as might be agreed to be levied for the maintenance of joint public institutions, the revenue and expenditure for each island would be administered separately as before. 'Confederation' was taking on its real meaning. In the result, Hennessy's actual proposals 'a scheme for administrative confederation' amounted to little more than a six-point programme for the creation of certain common public institutions financed by the islands of the Windward group, including Barbados.[37]

In the smaller islands the proposals were favourably received, but in Barbados by this time the very mention of the word 'confederation' had become the signal for political agitation. The House of Assembly was adamant, and in 1876, on a motion proposing a joint conference of representatives from all the island councils to discuss the matter, it passed a resolution in the

following terms: "That the House of Assembly in Barbados have no intention to become one of a Federation of Islands, or to merge their independent separate legislatures, either for local or general purposes of legislation in a federative legislature."[38] The story of the events following has often been told. Suffice it to say that the opposition of the planters hardened and became organised and at the same time there arose a more widely held fear and distrust of 'confederation'—a situation, in Pope Hennessy's view, deliberately created by the systematic misrepresentation of the proposals by their enemies. Local demonstrations grew into riots and there was talk of landing troops to maintain the peace. Proposals from Pope Hennessy for reform in the system of land tenure ensured his unpopularity with the planters who petitioned the Secretary of State for his recall. Towards the end of the same year Pope Hennessy was promoted to Hong Kong.[39]

In 1884, the Royal Commission seeking a formula of closer association in the Windwards, recommended that the four islands of Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Tobago should separate from Barbados to form "a real union among themselves."[40] Local feeling in the islands other than Barbados was, however, unanimously against the proposal and nothing was done to implement it; union without Barbados was obviously a much less attractive proposition than confederation with her. Notwithstanding this, the separation from Barbados was arranged in 1885, but in all other respects the constitutional position remained as before.

In 1899, following a recommendation of the Royal Commission of 1896, Tobago was converted into a local government district of Trinidad and since that year has remained a part of the renamed colony of Trinidad and Tobago; Tobago's place in the Windward union being taken by Dominica in 1940. Until the establishment of the Federation of the West Indies in 1957, the system established for the Windward Islands in 1885 remained intact. The governor resided in Grenada and was the common executive head, while the other islands were presided over by resident Administrators working in co-operation with and under the authority of the Governor. There was no common legislature and, as a consequence, neither common laws nor a common treasury or tariff. Indeed, apart from special arrangements relating to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, the only

expressions of functional unity were in the common audit system established in 1889, and a common lunatic asylum at Grenada. Within the latter years of the union the nucleus of a central civil service had been provided through the addition of specialist officers to the Governor's staff but even "administrative confederation" remained unrealised. Rationality had not triumphed in the Windwards either.

Jamaica was over a thousand miles removed from the scene of these activities in the Lesser Antilles and, not surprisingly, was a stranger to them. Isolated though she was, however, she has played a small part in this story of regional groupings taking under her wing the Turks and Caicos Islands, grouped together more than six hundred miles to her extreme north-west and the Cayman Islands on the west. The Caymans had been vaguely associated with Jamaica from as early as the middle of the seventeenth century, and in 1863 they were, by an Act of Parliament, definitely placed under the authority of the Governor and Legislature of Jamaica.[41] The connection with the Turks and Caicos Islands has a somewhat longer history. They are geographically the southernmost of the Bahamian group and were included originally in the colony of the Bahamas. In 1848, however, they were separated from the Bahamas and became subject to the supervision of the 'Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of the Island of Jamaica'. Ten years after the position of the Cayman Islands had been clarified a similar treatment was applied to the Turks and Caicos Islands and under the authority of an Act in Parliament they were finally annexed to and became a dependency of Jamaica.[42] It might be mentioned also, when talking of Jamaica's part in this story of regional association, that between 1862 and 1884 the administration of British Honduras had been placed in the hands of a Lieutenant-Governor acting under the authority of the Governor-in-Chief of Jamaica. British Guiana is thus the only territory in the area which has not experimented with these early constitutional linkages; but British Guiana is itself the product of a union of the three former Dutch colonies of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice.[43]

It was only late in these experiments that there began the movement towards a wider political association of all the West Indian colonies and it is tempting to suggest that the early regional groupings in the Lesser Antilles have been a part of an

evolving pattern of this federal movement. It is clear that there never was such symmetry in the constitutional developments. In the first place, the circles of association have not generally widened. The Leewards lost first Barbados and later Dominica; while contraction has been the theme of all Windward development. In 1835, the Governor of Barbados held six islands under his executive authority; by 1889 Barbados was on her own, and Trinidad and Tobago had united outside the Windwards, and until 1940, when Dominica returned, the Commission of the Governor of the Windwards extended over only three of the former islands. It follows that the circles have never merged. Attempts in 1934 and 1947 to achieve a Windward-Leeward Union both ended in failure, and there was little done hitherto to bring the eastern and western groups together.

There clearly has not been any ordered constitutional progress towards political unity. Yet it is undeniable that from the very beginnings of British influence in the Caribbean there has been a centripetal force steadily driving these territories together. The source of the energy has not always been the same. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a period of constant struggle for supremacy of metropolitan authority, it derived from the need for common defence. In the nineteenth century, in a time of comparative peace, it derived from the need for greater efficiency and economy in the administration of the territories, and its impetus came from those responsible for their administration. This need remained, but the twentieth century has added a new and more dynamic force generated by the demand for political independence and the concomitant desire for economic progress.

It is in this respect that these regional groupings, achieved or merely contemplated, are so important; for they represent the earliest stages in the growth of the idea of association which reached maturity in the Federal experiment. Its development was by no means easy. The impotence of the Crown before the doctrine of Campbell v. Hall,[44] and, indeed, the recognition by the Colonial Office, even after the actual power to legislate had in many cases revested in the Crown, that in matters such as a union of territories nothing should be done which did not meet with the approval of their legislatures, in effect gave the island councils a veto over any such scheme. It was on this basis in 1885,

after the Windward Islands had surrendered their representative institutions in return for Crown Colony Government, that Her Majesty's Government declined to impose a union which it obviously favoured after it had been made clear by the island councils that 'they would have none of it'.[45] The battle for unity had, therefore, to be fought in the local legislatures, and in most cases, as we have seen, it was lost.

A congenital parochialism; a fear on the part of the wealthier islands of having to carry their weaker associates; a sense of security in entrenched power: all contributed to form an effective resistance at this level. At the heart of this was the fact that the 'old representative system', which traditionally has been regarded as a proud inheritance, and which, in the islands, in many cases preceded the establishment of Crown Colony Government, was truly representative in little more than name. As late as 1876 in Barbados the Lower House was returned by an electorate of 1,000 out of a population of 180,000.

In 1849, an intriguing proposal came from an anonymous 'officer of the Jamaica Government' who suggested the establishment of 'the West Indian Joint Stock Company' with a Court of Directors who would take over from the Colonial Office the direction of the affairs of the Colonies.[46] Another proposal was made in the 1880s that the various colonies should join the Canadian federation as individual provinces. From time to time since then this proposal has been revived but nothing like the same concentration of effort which went into the early proposal has since been achieved. Sir John MacDonald was supposed to have given his blessing to the project and a vigorous campaign on its behalf was launched in Canada by its champion—a Canadian journalist named A. Spencer Jones. The proposal got as far as being debated in the Jamaica Legislative Council but was rejected.[47]

These individual efforts were carried over into the twentieth century, and of them perhaps the most important, certainly the most comprehensive, was the plea made in 1911 by the Honourable C. Gideon Murray, later Viscount Elibank, then a member of Parliament and a former administrator of St. Vincent. Murray's scheme of political association was confined to the eastern group of the West Indian colonies and his proposal was modelled on the lines of the Australian Federal Council of 1885.

In short, there was to be an association of legislatures through a General Assembly, founded on 'the principle of legislation for States or Governments in their corporate or collective capacities and contra-distinguished from the individuals of whom they consist'.[48] The scheme was unfavourably received by the West India Committee to whom it was first unfolded and it later failed to arouse enthusiasm in the colonies.

The First World War interrupted these individual efforts, but with the advent of peace the possibility of unity was again pursued. In 1920, Sir Edward Davson, then President of the West Indian Associated Chambers of Commerce, put forward a plan of association embracing all the colonies. Even more modest in its nature than Murray's the scheme provided for a Central Conference composed of official and unofficial representatives of the various colonies with a permanent secretariat and meeting at fixed intervals to make recommendations on matters of common interest. The authority of this representative body was admittedly to be only advisory; its decisions were in no way binding on the individual governments. The scheme was submitted to the Secretary of State, and he referred it to the legislatures. In a majority it was favourably received, but there were some important exceptions; Barbados politely declined the invitation. In the absence of unanimity, the matter was allowed to remain in abeyance.[49]

In 1922, the Wood Report was published.[50] Major Wood's mission on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies had been promoted by the growing demand throughout the territories for a larger measure of representative government, and he was, therefore, more particularly concerned with this aspect of constitutional reform than with the larger question of federation. He did, however, consider it, and in so doing he conceded 'that it would be to the evident advantage of these colonies to secure the machinery for greater unity and co-operation'. Nevertheless, he advised that there were practical and political objections which made the establishment of federal government at that time impossible. The practical objection to 'federating an archipelago' lay in the barriers to social, economic and political integration which the stretches of water inevitably create. Again, that 'dividing' sea! These barriers, he suggested, had not yet been sufficiently demolished by the development of a West Indian

consciousness, and, as a result, there was not a deliberate demand of local opinion for political unity. 'So long as public opinion stands where it does today', he concluded, 'it is both inopportune and impracticable to attempt amalgamation of existing units of government into anything approaching a general federal system'.[51]

In the following year, on the initiative of the Jamaica Legislature, Sir Edward Davson's scheme for a standing Conference was revived and, following on a preliminary conference in London in 1926, the first West Indian Conference assembled in January 1929, in Barbados. The agenda comprised such matters as agriculture, the future of the sugar industry, a West Indian university, aviation and shipping, marketing and publicity, the extension of scientific research and problems relating to public health. For little more than a week the representatives of the colonies discussed the common problems facing their governments, and 'there was a deep-seated realisation that real progress could only be achieved through the development of inter-colonial unity and co-operation'.[52] Public opinion, it appears, had at last begun to move.

The 1930s began the final and decisive phase in the federal movement. During those years and after them the scene changed entirely and it is important before moving on, to note two features of the pre-1930 scene. The first is that the federal movement, if one can so dignify those sporadic flirtations, had not yet become a West Indian movement. Although the idea of political unity had attracted adherents beyond the pale of the Colonial Office, federation was yet too delicate a plant to flourish in West Indian soil. Neither Sir Edward Davson nor the Hon. Gideon Murray, unpretentious as were their proposals, were representative of West Indian political thought, and there had not yet arisen on the local scene any important body of opinion prepared to undertake the transplanting.

The second feature was more dynamic. During the period the case for closer association was put on a new and altogether more satisfactory basis than that nineteenth century preoccupation with administrative economy. Federalism, it was now contended, created the machinery for co-operation between the various colonies, and it was only as a result of such co-operation that social and economic prosperity could be secured in the changed

conditions of the modern world. This was the theme of Murray's proposal; it was also clearly the basis on which Major Wood had recognised the advantages of political unity. Major Wood's visit in 1921 had been arranged because of the demand which had arisen in the West Indies for a measure of representative government. This did not mean that there was a clamant demand for self-government.

What it did mean can only be understood against the background of constitutional developments in the individual colonies. The fifties and sixties of the nineteenth century saw the advance of the North American and Australian colonies from representative to responsible government. The sixties and seventies were marked in the Caribbean by the retrogression of the West Indian colonies from representative to Crown Colony Government.[53] In 1866, the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament was employed to so remodel the Jamaican legislature,[54] and this procedure was followed in 1876 to achieve a similar result in Grenada, Tobago and St. Vincent.[55] British Honduras and the Leeward Islands undertook the conversion themselves by virtue of their constituent powers. Only Barbados, the Bahamas, and Bermuda retained their institutions intact. The constitutional process by which the change was made was the abolition of the bicameral legislature and the reconstitution of a nominated Legislative Council in its place. In effect, the elected lower house was destroyed and the nominated upper house preserved as the sole legislative body.

By 1876, of the thirteen 'old representative' legislatures eight had lost their elected members entirely. Only in Barbados, the Bahamas, and Bermuda, and in Dominica and Montserrat in the Leeward Islands Federation were elected representatives employed in the business of government. Of the others, Trinidad and St. Lucia continued with wholly nominated chambers, and, in 1870, when the elected majority was demolished, the council of British Honduras assumed a similar form.[56] British Guiana persisted with the nicely balanced Dutch arrangement.

In 1884, after eighteen years of pure Crown Colony Government, Jamaica commenced the climb back to representative institutions with the reintroduction of elected members to the Legislative Council.[57] Her example, however, was not followed in the other colonies: indeed, in 1898 Dominica and Antigua were

compelled to accept wholly nominated chambers.[58] By the end of the century, only Barbados, the Bahamas, Jamaica and British Guiana returned elected members to their legislatures. In Jamaica, although the elected members had been increased in 1895 from nine to fourteen,[59] they were nonetheless in a minority, while in British Guiana an elected majority existed only in respect of financial measures. The first two decades of the new century brought no substantial changes in the composition of the councils and, although the political situation had altered vastly since the 1860s, the expedients which were then adopted continued to be employed.

It was against this background that Major Wood investigated the demand for 'representative government'. It amounted in most colonies to a demand for the re-introduction of the elective principle, and in others, such as Jamaica and British Guiana, where the principle was already active, to a demand for an elected majority in the council. In many cases these demands were coupled with proposals for a liberal franchise on which such members would be returned; for from the point of view of the disfranchised section of the community an elected majority would otherwise be worth very little. It must be stated, however, that this latter claim for an extension of the franchise was neither strenuously nor generally pressed in 1921, the reason being that the working class movement which brought the question of electoral reform to the fore in the thirties had only just begun.

Major Wood advocated no sweeping reforms, but the elective principle was to progress slightly. He proposed an elected majority for Jamaica, and recommended an elected minority on the councils of Trinidad and the Windward Islands. He did not approve of similar reforms for the Leeward Islands, but he did leave open the question of their applicability to Dominica. British Honduras was not considered, and although British Guiana was, he proposed no changes. The question of franchise was almost entirely untouched. The Report, in the result, fell short of the aspirations of the new indigenous political movements, and the attempts to implement its recommendations did not result in political calm.

By 1930, elected members had been introduced into the councils of Trinidad,[60] the Windward Islands[61] and Dominica,[62] in no case, however, was there a majority of non-officials, and

in all cases elected numbers were in a minority. Jamaica had not received the proposed increase in elected members, and although she enjoyed an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council, had to be content with an elected minority. Meanwhile, British Guiana had lost her Dutch legislative institutions and with them the elected majority which had existed in the Combined Court.[63] In 1935, British Honduras,[64] and, in 1936, the Leeward Islands,[65] adopted elected minorities. These new vestments, however, were but the trappings of representative government. The franchise was restricted to a mere fraction of the population. As late as 1938, the registered electorate of Trinidad was 6.6 per cent of the colony's population, and the corresponding figure for Barbados in the same year was 3.3 per cent. Moreover, a wide gap yawned between the electoral qualification and that for membership of the Council. In Trinidad in 1938 the income qualification for membership of the Legislative Council was six times as high as the income qualification for registration as a voter; in Barbados the multiple was four.

The call for political reform grew louder and more insistent throughout the thirties. The economic depression brought to maturity the growing working-class movement, and the demand for economic justice dominated the social scene. The initiative in political agitation passed to these working-people's hands and the need for social reform reinforced the demand for constitutional advance. Between 1935 and 1938, labour unrest produced a succession of serious strikes throughout the islands and attention was forcibly called to the need for remedial measures. As a result, in 1938, the West India Royal Commission was appointed with wide terms of reference "To investigate social and economic conditions in Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Windward Islands, and matters connected therewith, and to make recommendations".[66]

These movements of the thirties were, of course, centred in the respective colonies, and the traditional insistence on reforms in the individual legislatures was by no means dropped. Extension of the franchise and of the elected membership of the Legislative Council was the immediate demand. In fact, however, the situation had altered rapidly since 1921 when Major Wood (later Lord Halifax) had reported "the absence of a popular

demand of local opinion for federation." By 1938, the concept of federation had been transplanted and was flourishing in West Indian soil. The explanation of this lies almost wholly in the political situations which had developed during the period.

Neither the 1921 Wood Report nor that of the Closer Union Commission of 1932 had resulted in any substantial satisfaction of the demands for constitutional reform; as a result, West Indian leaders of the new labour movements struggled in an atmosphere of political frustration. Already, however, the practical advantages of co-operation had been recognised, and the system of intercolonial conferences had established a basis of functional association. Gradually the idea began to take root that the path to political progress lay through a federal union. As a political entity, it was argued, the colonies, through a co-ordination of their economic and political strengths, would be in a position to establish their economic stability and demand their political independence. Economic prosperity and political freedom would be the twin products of federation. In any event, dominion status for a federal union held safer promise of attainment than self-government for the individual colonies. The idea possessed obvious attractions and it is noticeable that throughout these years whenever the need for social and political reform was advanced the claims of federalism were never far behind.

The West Indian Conference of 1932 was the first demonstration of the new movement. In that year the Closer Union Commission had been appointed, and when it was revealed that its terms of reference did not embrace either the possibility of a West Indian federation or the problem of internal constitutional reform, a number of grass-roots West Indian politicians gathered at Roseau in Dominica with the avowed purpose of elaborating proposals for federation. The Conference was attended by representatives from Barbados, Trinidad, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and the Leeward Islands. They decided that it was "desirable in the general interests" of those colonies that a federation should be effected, and they proceeded to design a federal structure and draft the first indigenous federal constitution for the West Indies.[67]

Let the flowing oratory of 'Captain' Cipriani of Trinidad as he brought the Dominica Conference to a close, catch the fervour of those early West Indians:

> And now as I pull the curtain down on the final stages of this important and far-reaching meeting, and watch the West Indies take on her mantle of nationhood and dip behind the horizon like some threatening storm-cloud only to rise again on the dawn of a new day, I look forward and see in letters of fire emblazoned: '**THE WEST INDIES MUST BE WEST INDIAN**'. And through the dark and grim grey dawn methinks I hear a whisper saying 'West Indians awake—awake West Indians: Victory, Freedom and Liberty is yours'.[68]

The West Indian National League was formed at Roseau to carry on the work of the Conference, but as an organisation it never played a real part in later developments. Nevertheless, political leaders in all the colonies kept the hopes of the Conference alive and maintained a certain identity of purpose. As the Royal Commission of 1938 reported—"it is evident that throughout the British West Indies contact is being maintained between those in each colony who are most interested in securing rapid political progress, and constitutional developments, such as the widening of the franchise, in any area may be found to reinforce the strength of the movement for federation of the whole group".[69]

Contact had indeed been maintained. Some time earlier the West Indies and British Guiana Labour Congress had been established, and in 1938 a conference of the Congress attended by representatives from Barbados, Trinidad and British Guiana was held in British Guiana with the object of preparing a memorandum for submission to the Commission. An extensive programme of social reform was agreed upon and a comprehensive scheme for federating all the British West Indian colonies was prepared.[70]

Such was the progress which federation had made since 1921. The Royal Commission became aware of the development at an early stage in their inquiry, and accordingly, they put to most of the witnesses who appeared before them in a representative political capacity the question whether they favoured the idea of the closer union of the West Indian colonies. In the words of their Report: "Almost every witness thus questioned was in favour of closer union, but few of them were able or prepared to define

the degree or nature of federation which they conceived desirable."[71] On the basis of their general impression, however, they doubted whether the time was yet ripe for the introduction of any large scheme of federation. Local pride, an active insularity, and the scepticism of well-informed opinion based on it, made them doubt the "readiness of West Indian opinion to accept federation in principle."[72]

Having advocated caution, the Commissioners were both more hopeful and more positive in their recommendations as to future developments. Their concluding remarks on the subject were important: "Nevertheless a combination into one political entity of all the British possessions in the Caribbean area is the ideal to which, in our opinion, policy should be directed. With that in view an attempt should be made to overcome local prejudice against federation, both by the exposition of its theoretical advantages and by testing these in practice, as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself, through the amalgamation of some of the smaller units."[73] In pursuance of the Commission's recommendations a Windward-Leeward Union was proposed at a Conference held in St. Kitts in 1947.[74] It is, of course, extremely doubtful whether such an association could have provided an adequate test of the advantages of a West Indian Federation.[75] Opposition to the proposal came from Montserrat in the Leewards, and, with much greater force, from Grenada in the Windwards. But the federal movement was not to be stayed; before further progress could be made the pilot scheme was overtaken by the major enterprise itself.

The war years drew the West Indian colonies much closer together. United in a common cause, they achieved a new identity of purpose and of action which went a long way towards destroying the psychological barriers which Major Wood in 1921 had found so obstructive to "federating an archipelago". These developments gave added vitality to the federal movement. The ramparts of separatism and prejudice had been breached; contact produced understanding; association revealed how unfounded were many fears. A West Indian consciousness had developed to the point where West Indian nationalism had been born. On the other side, the inadequacies of *ad hoc* expedients born of necessity had been painfully demonstrated, and a recognition of the need for federation now replaced in many minds a vague

appreciation of the advantages of co-operation.

But if the experience of the war years reinforced one aspect of the case for federation it weakened it in another. Political frustration had enhanced the attractions of federation. Now, for the first time since the 1860s, the West Indian colonies really began to advance politically. 'Representative' government, which was the goal of the twenties, was now firmly established. 'Responsible' government which, even in the thirties, must have appeared largely unattainable, was by the fifties within the grasp of Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and British Guiana. In all but Trinidad reform of the legislature was virtually complete; universal adult suffrage prevailed in all the colonies.

Such reforms were, in the main, the product of the war years and those which immediately followed. They were long overdue and, having come at last, everything changed. Federation, in particular, which possessed an appeal as a possible alternative to improbable local self-government, began to be suspect for that very reason. Much emphasis, therefore, was laid in the post-war period on the need for a guarantee that federation would not in any way prejudice political advance in the individual colonies. It was a sentiment evident in many of the speeches at the Montego Bay Conference in 1947. The destiny of the West Indies was now moving into West Indian hands.

Montego Bay itself was preceded by a meeting of the Caribbean Labour Congress which was really a meeting of leading West Indian political parties (other than Bustamante's J.L.P. which was in office in Jamaica) asserting, as it were, their right to be heard, and heard in support, at the very outset of the federal process. The names of those present tell their own story: Grantley Adams, V.C. Bird, Robert Bradshaw, Hurbert Critchlow, Albert Gomes, T.A. Marryshow, and Norman Manley himself among many others.[76] 'Knitting together', as Rex Nettleford put it, 'the ideas of federation, nationhood and self-government'. Manley, who led the Jamaica delegation, put the matter thus:

> I put first, and I put above all other things, the desire to see in the future a West Indian nation standing shoulder to shoulder with all other nations of the world. Is that a large ambition? I say it is the smallest ambition that responsible people can utter in the face of history. I say

> that we in the West Indies can prove one great thing to the world—and that is that a people, none of whom are native to these territories, all of whom have for one reason or another been torn from their countries and brought here, partly willingly, partly by compulsion or by distress in their own homelands, that we with our many strands, from Africa, from India, from China, from an assorted variety of European territories—we are capable of welding the power of that diversity into a united nation.
>
> I pray, before God, if we can prove that to the world, we would have accomplished something which would write West Indian history large across the pages of history for all times. It is a problem to stir and inspire every man who knows anything about the long and bloody history of the common humanity beset and perplexed and torn by artificial divisions without any real meaning in the face of the purpose of life.

But, he added:

> ...if we federate, we must federate as self-governing units who voluntarily surrender some of the power which each has over his own to the common whole. I reject totally any sort of mismarriage between colonial rule and federation, and I would predict for such a marriage such an abortion as politics has never seen; and I say that a federated West Indies cannot aim at any smaller immediate objective than dominion status. I cannot imagine what we should be federating about if it is not to achieve the beginning of nationhood.[77]

Alexander Bustamante was later at the Montego Bay Conference to assert with characteristic bluntness:

> Before I shall even advise the people of this country that they should have federation, I want to be told—and not just by word—I want documents to the effect that the same day federation comes the same day self-government comes....[78]

The Secretary of State was quick to reassure the Montego Bay Conference on this latter point[79] but even so, the Conference insisted on placing its position on record in terms of a resolution which recorded the view:

> that an increasing measure of responsibility should be extended to the several units of the British Caribbean territories whose political development must be pursued as an aim in itself without prejudice and in no way subordinate to progress towards federation.[80]

The truth is that a race had begun which no one could have foreseen even ten years earlier between independence on an island basis and West Indian nationhood fulfilled through an independent West Indian Federation. It was a race 'federation' was to lose. For the time being, however, even at Montego Bay, there were few who imagined that independence was achieveable at the level of the individual islands. Norman Manley could state the Federal aspiration in terms wholly compatible with Jamaica's political goals. He did so in words characteristically elegant and penetrating:

> How to marry expectation with reality, how to create a larger field for ambition, how to overcome the disadvantages of being too small to be heard in a world where silence means stagnation, how to make a real culture and a real unity out of all the richness of our diversity, how to show the world that differences of origin and colour can come together on a level of tolerance and oneness, how to overcome distance and poverty; these are the challenges that federation faces and may meet to make a worthy end.[81]

Norman Manley might so easily have become the father of the West Indian nation. As it was, when the moment came to lead the nation, political realities at home constrained this great man to stay at home, to decline the mantle of regional leadership and, ultimately, to take Jamaica to a separate independence. The referendum which Manley called to confirm Jamaica's commitment to Federation, and through it to West Indian nationhood,

was a wrenching experience for himself, as it was to prove to be for all West Indians. The moving account given us this evening by Rachel Manley, Michael's daughter, 'N.W.'s' granddaughter, of the night the referendum vote came in bears repeating for both its poignancy and historical significance.

Still a young girl, Rachel was close to her grandfather throughout the campaign and had fallen asleep after the polls had closed. Late at night she awoke and sought out 'N.W.'—to find him seated, as he often was, at the head of the long table in the family dining room. He was quiet and thoughtful, his head cradled in the thumb and index finger of his left hand—that meditative pose she knew so well. Before him on the table lay the Federal Flag which her grandmother, Edna Manley, had designed—a rising sun set on the white waving lines of the Caribbean sea, against a blue sky. "Pade", she asked, "did we win the referendum?" "No, 'Pie'", he replied, "we did not win; everybody lost". And so saying he wrapped her in the flag and hugged her close to him. Was he passing on the mantle of West Indian unity to another generation, in fact, to one once removed, conscious he had done all he could do in his time?

This year, the West Indies might have been celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Federation. I wonder what would have happened had Jamaica's referendum gone the other way? What would have happened had the decision taken at the 1961 Lancaster House Conference which settled outstanding details of the federal system, and fixed the date for the independence of the Federation, not been frustrated by the 'No' vote in that referendum? Perhaps the forces working for fragmentation—which led to both the referendum in Jamaica and the arithmetic of 'one from ten leaving nothing'—would ultimately have destroyed the Federation, even in a post-independence context. We cannot discount it altogether; but, somehow, I doubt that they would have succeeded had the vote in Jamaica been 'Yes' and the West Indies become independent as a federal nation on 31 May 1962. I believe with John Mordecai that the tenuous Lancaster House patchwork would have held,[82] that the Federation would have grown stronger and faith in it firmer; that, ultimately, Manley's early vision of a strong West Indian nation would have been fulfilled. Prospects for the Caribbean would now be very different.

But the present comes out of the past; and, not surprisingly for the West Indies, it seems to come out of a rejection of federalism. Yet, in a sense, federalism never had a real chance to be tried. The truly West Indian federal Constitution agreed in 1961 never ever became operational. It was not so much that federalism was rejected as that it lost out to separatism in the race to independence. In the result, however, the present has had to be built upon that reality with remembrance of the federal option, at most, as a yearning for what is not. The present has had to be constructed instead on a fragile regionalism. Having let federalism slip from our grasp—regionalism became a necessity, and we have spent the last twenty-six years—not always with total conviction—trying to make a virtue of it. That effort has been on the whole a triumph of practicality over inclination—the compulsions of mutual interest in regional co-operation overcoming our natural archipelagic instinct for contrariness and fragmentation.

So, is the dream really shattered—the one I shared with Norman Manley 35 years ago at the LSE? Was the vision of a West Indian nation only a mirage? If we failed in the 20th century, can we afford not to try harder as we approach the 21st? My answer, unequivocally is 'No'. The dream is not shattered; West Indian nationhood is not a mirage; we do have to try harder. There is something now almost evolutionary about West Indian unity: a historical rhythm reaching to fulfilment, a rhythm reinforced by the compulsions of present realities and future prospects.

Those realities, I suggest, compel West Indian unity both in how we perceive the world of the 21st century and in how we act to secure a place of dignity for the people of the West Indies within that world. Yesterday was 40 years since the arrival of the *Empire Windrush* bringing Jamaicans who would help in the reconstruction of post-war Britain and of their own lives which British colonialism had moulded. They and other West Indians who came here so long ago from different parts of our archipelago have no doubt whatever about their West Indian identity. They need no counselling about solidarity and common purpose as they contribute to the multi-racial society that Britain is, and strive to make it a more just and equitable place for them to dwell in. They cherish their island origins, but there is no room in Brixton or in Handsworth for the petty irrelevances of island rivalry.

So it is, as well, in the wider world; and will be increasingly on the economic, political, security and environmental fronts. West Indian governments, for example, who faced up to Britain's entry into the EEC in the 70s will face even more perilous problems in the 90s as the European Community becomes a single market with implications for sugar, for bananas, for rum and for much else vital to the Caribbean's future. In that decade and beyond, survival is going to dictate real, not minimal, West Indian unity. We surely defile the memory of every slave and every indentured worker who laboured on West Indian plantations in the service of Europe if in our island postures today we become mimic men and women of a plantocracy that kept the West Indies apart so that they might better sustain their petty structures of economic and political power. We do well to reflect on this as we celebrate this year 150 years of the end of slavery in the West Indies and the beginnings of indentured labour. For West Indians that common heritage of bondage is a heritage of oneness also—within our countries and between them. We need to remember this in all we do.

"The Roots of the Caribbean Community are not buried in doctrines of integration economics". So began the Report on the Caribbean Community in the 1980s by the group of Caribbean experts whom our Heads of Government asked to look to the future; and it continued:

> CARICOM is not just the product of economic regional planning. Responsive as it is to the economic and political realities of the post-war world, Caribbean regionalism is the outgrowth of more than 300 years of West Indian kinship—the vagaries of the socio-economic political history of transplanted people from which is evolving a Caribbean identity. Without that element of West Indian identity a Community of the Caribbean would be mere markings on parchment—a Community without a soul, without vision of a shared destiny, without the will to persist and survive. It is not without significance that in the very first words of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, the Heads of Government of the region expressed their determination 'to consolidate and strengthen the bonds which have historically existed among their people'.[83]

In the early 17th century, as the first people of the West Indies were being displaced by the new arrivals from Europe and the three hundred year regime of insularity was about to begin, John Donne was writing in England:

> No man is an Island entire of it self; every man
> is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main.[84]

Today, as we look to the 21st century, the truth every part of the West Indies must respect and to which each West Indian must respond is that NO ISLAND IS AN ISLAND ENTIRE OF IT SELF. Every inch of our West Indian region from Belize to Guyana is a piece of one nation, a part of one people, a bit of one world. The vision of West Indian nationhood that Norman Manley cherished has only sharpened with the passing years. Its pursuit will remain our central challenge until eventually we reach it.

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57. Order in Council of 19 May 1884, *Orders in Council,* 1884-1890, No. 9.

58. Wrong, op. cit., p. 73.

59. Order in Council of 3 October 1895, *Orders in Council,* 1895-1899, No. 41.

60. Trinidad and Tobago (Legislative Council) Order in Council of 16 April 1924 (1924) SR & O 1891.

61. The Grenada (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1924 (No. 1574), and the Saint Vincent (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1924 (No. 1575), Orders in Council of 21 March 1924, (1924) SR & O, pp. 1851, 1866.

62. Dominica Constitution Ordinance: An Ordinance to modify the Constitution and to provide for the Election of certain Members of Council, 17 October 1924, No. 21 of 1924.

63. The British Guiana (Constitution) Order in Council of 13 July 1928 (No. 561), (1928) SR & O p. 221.

64. British Honduras Constitution Ordinance: An Ordinance to provide for the Constitution and Legislative Council of the Colony, 17 July 1935, No. 13 of 1935.

65. Ordinances "to reconstitute the Legislative Council of Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Christopher & Nevis, and to provide for the qualifications and Election of members of such Council and for the Registration of Voters, 11 December 1936"—Antigua Constitution Ordinance: No. 20 of 1936, Montserrat Constitution Ordinance: No. 16 of 1936, St. Kitts-Nevis Constitution Ordinance No. 14 of 1936.

66. *Report of West India Royal Commission,* June 1945, op. cit., p. xiii.

67. Dominica Conference Recommendations, October-November 1932, Appendix B in *West Indies: Report on the Closer Union Commission* (Leeward Islands, Windward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago) April 1933, (Cmd. 4383), 1933, pp. 36-40.

68. Ibid.

69. *Report of West India Royal Commission,* June 1945, op. cit., pp. 326-327.

70. Ibid., p. 326.

71. Ibid., p. 327.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. For the conclusions of the Conferences, see *St. Lucia Gazette,* 14 February 1947.

75. See V.C. Bird at the Montego Bay Conference 1947, *Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies,* Part 2: Proceedings, op. cit., pp. 45-49, at p. 49.

76. Rex Nettleford (Edited with notes and Introduction), *Manley & the New Jamaica: Selected Speeches and Writings 1938-68* (Longman, Caribbean, London, 1971), p. 162.

77. Ibid., pp. 165-6 and 167.

78. Montego Bay Conference 1947, Part 2: Proceedings, op. cit., p. 26.

79. John Mordecai, *The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations,* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1968), p. 36.

80. *Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 11-19 September, 1947,* Part I: Report, January 1948 (Cmd. 7291), Resolution 2, p. 7.

81. S.S. Ramphal, 'Federalism in the West Indies', (1960) 6 Nos. 2 and 3 *Caribbean Quarterly,* p. 229, quoting Norman Manley. See also, Manley's speech at the Montego Bay Conference 1947; Part 2: Proceedings, op. cit., pp. 57-63.

82. Mordecai, op. cit., p. 382.

83. *The Caribbean Community in the 1980s,* Report by a Group of Caribbean Experts appointed by the Caribbean Common Market Council of Ministers (CARICOM Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana, 1981), p. 1.

84. John Donne (1572-1631), *Devotions* (written in 1623) VIII.