

APARTHEID

Apartheid – the propaganda and the reality

by Donald Woods

Foreword by Shridath Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General

**A study commissioned
and published by the
Commonwealth Secretariat**

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A study commissioned by the Commonwealth Secretariat for the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, in pursuance of the mandate of the 1983 New Delhi Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government to initiate a project in co-operation with the United Nations to counteract South African propaganda.

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Foreword by the Commonwealth Secretary-General

The study which follows is, I believe, unique in its detailed examination of the aims, methods and fallacies of South Africa's pro-apartheid propaganda. It is important for what it says, and also as evidence of the Commonwealth's role in the struggle to end apartheid. This leadership role in international action against apartheid is an inevitable consequence of the Commonwealth's commitment to the fundamental principles of multiracialism, equality, democracy and anti-colonialism. Apartheid is an affront to everything for which the Commonwealth stands.

When, in 1960, the massacre at Sharpeville alerted the world to the brutal reality of apartheid, South Africa's continued membership of the Commonwealth was already being actively questioned in an association changed and strengthened by the membership of its first black African country, Ghana, as well as its initial Asian members, including the India of Nehru. The shock of Sharpeville ran through the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, and hastened South Africa's departure from the Association in 1961.

Apartheid was, of course, equally repugnant to the principles of the United Nations as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Not surprisingly, therefore, on the evil of apartheid the Commonwealth and the United Nations have long been as one: only concerted global action, in support of the anti-apartheid struggle of the majority of South Africans themselves, can be effective in removing its stain on our civilisation.

In the years following Sharpeville, the international community at the United Nations reacted sternly against the South African regime's continued violation of human rights by instituting the trade boycott, establishing the Special Committee against Apartheid, adopting the Declaration and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and calling repeatedly on the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions against South Africa. And, of course, in 1974 South Africa was suspended from the General Assembly. It is significant that only last year Mr H E Oppenheimer, Chairman of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd, could have told the Governors of the Foreign Policy Association in New York that 'the

present world attitude really dates from the dismantling of colonialism and the withdrawal of South Africa from the British (sic) Commonwealth.'

Commonwealth action did not stop with South Africa's exclusion. Its Gleneagles Agreement of 1977 against sporting contacts with apartheid South Africa also set a standard for the international community and assisted in making possible the United Nations' International Declaration against apartheid in sport. And Commonwealth leaders have kept developments in South Africa under regular review. When they came to consider the situation at their New Delhi summit in November 1983, they reaffirmed their long-held view that apartheid is the root cause both of repression and violence within the country, and of South Africa's campaign of intimidation, destabilisation and outright aggression against neighbouring African countries, designed to force them to co-exist and co-operate with the apartheid regime.

In condemning these attacks, and reiterating that apartheid is a totally unacceptable denial of the inalienable rights of the African majority, Commonwealth leaders at New Delhi expressed concern at a particular aspect of the regime's policy, which was signalled above all by Pretoria's attempts to disguise apartheid with sham 'constitutional reforms', wholly excluding the African majority, while seeking to co-opt other non-white groups. This was an attempt to deceive the outside world through a campaign of propaganda aimed particularly at target countries with which the South African regime maintains strong economic ties. Commonwealth Heads of Government decided that the Commonwealth, as a key part of its struggle against apartheid, should take effective measures, in co-operation with the United Nations, to counteract that propaganda by disseminating the truth about apartheid and the situation in South Africa and in other African countries. This study by Donald Woods, a distinguished South African journalist whose experience has given him special insights into the struggle for democracy in South Africa and into the nature and methods of the forces which oppose it, is a direct result of that decision. It is the first of a series of measures to be taken as part of a programme to discharge the New Delhi mandate.

Mr Woods is the former editor of a major South African newspaper and author of several books on South Africa. He is uniquely qualified to expose South Africa's propaganda which he has observed closely over many years. In this specially commissioned study, he lists ten central claims on which that propaganda is currently based, and effectively demolishes each by showing it to be wholly fallacious. There is a message here for us all, but, in particular, for people in business, education, the media and public life who are bombarded by these propaganda

claims and are their special targets. I hope they will be dissuaded by Mr Woods' cogent presentation from accepting these claims at face value, and will be helped to see through the masquerade to the monstrous reality of apartheid.

The Woods Study could not be more timely. South Africa today stands, as perhaps never before, at the crossroads of history. Recent events underscore the necessity for all of us to look more critically at the situation there, as it appears to us through the media or other channels: to look, but also to act. We have a duty to repudiate apartheid as the most glaring contemporary example of racial injustice and bigotry. Alone in the world, the Pretoria regime enshrines racism in its basic laws and political institutions. The time has now come for ordinary citizens everywhere to exert maximum pressure, individually and through their governments, for fundamental changes in South Africa. We must not allow that pressure to be diminished as the regime burns its outermost, least essential defences, for example by repealing the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts, while retreating within the fortress laager of the basic apartheid laws which disfranchise the black majority, and which therefore constitute the red brick works of apartheid.

Pretoria is under greater pressure now from within and without. In the United States, a target area for South African propaganda, the groundswell of protest has dramatically heightened since the Commonwealth's New Delhi summit. But it is in South Africa itself that the tide is really turning. The people of South Africa have proved over the years their determination to resist tyranny and fight for their birthright by a variety of means. They have demonstrated unequalled courage, resilience and ingenuity in supporting their travail. All of us should salute them. The response of the authorities to the widespread challenge to the system has been in character — more repression and more massacres: even, as if to mock and cruelly repudiate it, on the 25th anniversary of Sharpeville. But it is too late for apartheid; the world is being roused to its true nature by the process of events inside and outside South Africa.

In this campaign to end apartheid, increasing knowledge of the innermost workings of the system, such as the Woods Study provides, can be invaluable. It will be effective, however, only if it leads to more practical and concerted action against apartheid, a crime against human dignity which can have no place in our world.

SHRIDATH S. RAMPHAL

Author's note

In this study, for ease of reading, there is occasional use of the term 'South Africa' in reference to the South African government and the term 'blacks' in reference to blacks of indigenous African descent, although most South Africans today, whether categorised by the Pretoria government as 'Bantu' or 'Coloured' or 'Indian' regard and describe themselves simply as blacks.

South African propaganda

The main thrust of South African government propaganda abroad is aimed at Britain and America, because these two countries are regarded in South Africa as vital to the continued control of the black majority by the white minority.

There is force in South Africa's assessment, because only the veto power of Britain and America in the United Nations Security Council protects it from mandatory economic sanctions — the action South Africa fears most on the international scene. Pretoria therefore aims most of its propaganda and lobbying at keeping both countries committed to this veto, and to maintaining close diplomatic, trade and investment links with them.

While it still aims at securing support for South Africa from businessmen, politicians and the public, its current line on propaganda no longer attempts to justify apartheid. Instead it claims that Pretoria has recognised its mistake and is trying to reform and ultimately dismantle its institutionalised racism. It pleads for patience and understanding from friends abroad during what it portrays as a necessarily slow and delicate process.

The American campaign

Because of the lobby disclosure laws in the United States, Pretoria's retention there of major law firms and lobby consultants such as Smathers and Symington, Smoak and Shipley, John Sears (former head of Reagan election campaigns), De Kieffer Associates and Baron Associates, is on public record. But these are only the tip of the pro-Pretoria iceberg. The full propaganda-lobby network is widespread and influential, backed by large cash resources.

For example, John McGoff of Michigan, whose chain of suburban papers extends nationally, headed, in 1979, what was later revealed to have been a \$30 million bid for control of the *Washington Star*. His opening bid of \$10 million was acknowledged to have been provided by the South African Department of Information. McGoff is one of a number of wealthy Americans on the far right of the Republican Party who are wooed by Pretoria and help to keep policymakers and policyshapers in America firmly behind the protective veto. These include bankers and industrialists as well as legislators, of whom Senator Jesse Helms is the most prominent.

Relatively little of the South African propaganda lobby is conducted publicly. Most of it is purveyed through discreet lunches, dinners and seminars on investment; the line is that apartheid is being reformed — slowly so as not to disrupt the economy. This approach is furthered in newspaper, radio and television comment by South African government representatives promoting a general image of a stable South Africa, offering security for investment. It is furthered indirectly through less obvious media messages, such as South African Airways and other travel advertisements offering sunshine, beaches, game parks and pleasure resorts.

The British Campaign

In Britain the South African propaganda lobby is even more subtle than in America, and is less public if no less heavily funded. There are no longer such blatant ploys as the press advertisements by the Club of Ten, but organisations such as the 'Committee for Fairness in Sport', the Springbok Foundation, the South Africa Association and the South Africa Foundation have been surfacing anew, with a softer sell, much of it focused on sport. One reason why the sports boycott is felt so sharply in Pretoria is that sport has long been offered as a symbol of normality. The image of a peaceful crowd watching a cricket Test suggests wider stabilities and gentleness, and it demonstrates international acceptability.

Recent propaganda developments include the sending to London of Dr Denis Worrall as Ambassador and cricketer Eddie Barlow to head an operation to get South Africa back into international sport. Both are English-speaking, and Worrall describes himself as 'opposed to apartheid'. The appointment of a South African Ambassador to London who openly declares such opposition on British television further indicates the new line now being adopted by Pretoria for overseas consumption.

Another aspect of Pretoria's tactics worth noting is its readiness to experiment with subliminal image-creation, some of it clever and some bizarre. Some examples:

Golfer Gary Player and heart surgeon Christiaan Barnard both admitted accepting government funding for 'promoting South Africa'. Pretoria's belief seems to be that the more white South Africans are seen on television screens, the less world audiences will think of South Africa as a predominantly black-populated country. For the same reason one of the projects considered in Pretoria before the revelations of the 'Muldergate' information scandal was the setting aside of £85,000 in inducements, through travel grants, to get the judges of the Miss World beauty competition to pick Miss (white) South Africa. The more white faces are associated with the words 'South Africa' the better Pretoria can obscure the reality that there are more than 25 million black South Africans and fewer than five million whites.

In line with the same thinking, the South African authorities gave generous co-operation to David Dimbleby's four-part series on the Afrikaners, *The White Tribe of Africa*, for British television. Though critical of the Afrikaners, its criticisms were less significant to Pretoria than the fact that international television audiences were being saturated with images of white South Africans — 'White Africans', moreover, repeatedly being equated with South Africa so that the world would increasingly think of whites when it thought of 'South Africans'.

The 'welcome distortion factor' in the series was the distortion of perspective, the suggestion that the Afrikaners represented a disproportionately significant segment of the population. Consequently Vorster, Botha and others readily consented to participate in the programmes. But, generally, most of Pretoria's approach to propaganda is less subtle, and its most direct and publicly-identifiable manifestations are through the news media and advertisements directed at America and Britain, in particular at Washington and London. The key images it aims to promote are 'reform' and 'stability'.

'Reform', 'Stability'

To summarise the campaign:

- Pretoria aims its propaganda mostly at Washington and London.
- It promotes an image of *stability* so that investors will feel their money is safe.
- It promotes an image of *reform* so that its apologists abroad can better defend Pretoria's interests.
- The overall aim is to preserve the US-UK veto in the UN Security Council against economic sanctions.
- Pretoria works partly through indirect or subliminal methods, but most visibly and challengeably through media statements, both editorial and advertising.

Ten Propaganda Claims

The main propositions put to advance Pretoria's claims are these:

- 1. Power** That white control of South Africa is complete and comprehensive; that Pretoria's military might guarantees the status quo permanently, and that black opposition is neither significant nor strong enough to challenge it effectively.
- 2. Vital Economic Link** That South Africa's strategic minerals are vital to Britain, America and the West and are unobtainable elsewhere, and that sanctions against South Africa would seriously damage the economies of America and Britain, in the latter case putting some 200,000 Britons out of work.
- 3. Allies of the West** That white-ruled South Africa is a valuable ally of the West; that the Cape Sea Route is vital to Western defence and can only be available to the West if Pretoria's status quo remains, and that the black liberation movements of South Africa are communist-dominated.

4. Apartheid Reformed That apartheid is being reformed to an extent which obviates significant black opposition, justifying US and Western support through 'constructive engagement'.

5. Black Wellbeing That black South Africans are materially better off in economic terms than blacks elsewhere in Africa.

6. Black Disunity That black South Africans are culturally, ethnically and politically fragmented into mutually-hostile tribes which are each being given separate nationhood in separate sovereign states for their own protection and for the accommodation of their separate cultural and political aspirations.

7. Freedom and Democracy That there are fewer civil liberties in the rest of Africa than in South Africa; that the South African press is 'the freest in Africa' and that South Africa is a developing multi-party democracy contrasting favourably with single-party states elsewhere in Africa.

8. Economic Strength That South Africa has one of the strongest economies in the world, enabling the country to stand alone if necessary, and that this economy is developing soundly.

9. Historic Right That whites arrived in South Africa at approximately the same time as blacks, occupied and developed more of the country than the 'black immigrants' did, and therefore have a moral claim to the present 'white-zoned' areas constituting 87 per cent of the country's territory.

10. Appropriate Moral Standards That white-ruled South Africa belongs to the 'Christian democratic West' which therefore owes it loyal support, but that because its problems are 'Third World problems' it should be judged as a Third World country in moral terms.

Although these claims are untrue and irrelevant to the moral indictment of apartheid, Pretoria's opponents cannot afford to ignore them. They all need to be addressed and refuted, because of the use to which they are put by Pretoria's allies for tactical obfuscation and as justifications of apartheid to gullible audiences.

For example, even if black South Africans were materially better-off than blacks elsewhere in Africa this point would in logic be irrelevant to the injustice of apartheid — political, social and economic discrimination on racial grounds between the inhabitants of one country. But since the claim is untrue, it can be countered on both grounds, the moral and the factual. Each of these claims, in fact, can be countered systematically in the light of the real facts.

Claim 1 — Power

That white control of South Africa is complete and comprehensive; that Pretoria's military might guarantees the status quo permanently, and that black opposition is neither significant nor strong enough to challenge it effectively.

The Facts

(a) White control of South Africa is neither complete nor comprehensive, and Pretoria cannot indefinitely secure the 'stability' it claims to guarantee.

(b) Pretoria's military strength is seldom measured against its military weaknesses, and

(c) There is abundant evidence that black challenge to white rule is increasing significantly.

(a) According to intelligence reports quoted in the American press in 1982, there were at least 42 armed clashes during the preceding year between guerrillas of the African National Congress and South African army or police units on South African soil. In spite of military censorship limiting reports of such clashes, the seriousness of the situation was corroborated by the South African government's proclamation of parts of the Northern Transvaal, the Eastern Transvaal and Northern Natal as 'operational areas'. Since the Nkomati accords there has been a decrease, though not a cessation, of these 'incidents', along with an increase in sabotage attacks, bombings and unrest deeper within the country. White farmers are abandoning the rural areas on such a scale because of guerrilla activity that the Government has introduced major tax concessions, security assistance and direct economic inducements to persuade them to remain. These include agricultural grants, increased patrols and the establishment of radio links for the border farms, as provided in the early part of the Smith regime's campaign against guerrillas in pre-independence Zimbabwe. A rough survey of one region in the Eastern Cape Province, far from any 'frontline' border, suggests that fewer than one-fifth of bomb or sabotage incidents are reported in the local press and fewer still on South African national radio and television. Consequently foreign correspondents are unable to report the real level of violent black resistance.

(b) South Africa's military strength is frequently exaggerated by Pretoria, for obvious tactical reasons, and the resulting picture is misleading. Just as it suits the Botha administration to allow British and American television crews to film flyovers by South African fighter squadrons and military or naval reviews, it does not always suit the African National Congress or the Pan-Africanist Congress to allow the televising of their guerrillas in

training or to talk numbers as Pretoria does. The viewing world therefore sees massive power on one side and relative impotence on the other.

Officially, South Africa has more than 250,000 fighting men trained for combat, with the core of the army given as 20,000, and with 35,000 conscripts, 150,000 reservists, 9,000 air force, 5,000 navy and 20,000 police regulars, as well as 13,000 police reservists and 15,000 voluntary commandos. But the figures, as monitored by the Committee of South African War Resisters, are considerably lower in most of these categories. Also, the levels of skill, professionalism and motivation of the South African forces are in many cases considerably lower than suggested in propaganda from military headquarters in Pretoria. To mention a few examples: some of the 150,000 reservists are paper entries only, there being numerous instances of mail addressed to 'reservists' long dead or over the age-limit of 60; the voluntary commando personnel figures are inflated, and in 1979 when there was a call-up of the Moot Kommando of Pretoria fewer than 10 per cent of the members responded. In May 1980 when 84 members of the same unit were summoned specifically by name, only 12 reported. After this, the head of the unit, Kommandant Wolmarans, said disciplinary action against the defaulters had proved ineffectual as it had been followed by mass resignations. Consequently service in commando units has now been made compulsory.

Military default is officially acknowledged to be on the increase, although the only disclosed figure was for the year 1978, when the Defence Ministry gave the figure as 3,814. Since the invasion of Angola in 1975 it is estimated that more than 30,000 young white South Africans have refused or evaded military service. White morale is also affected by the regime's failure to crush Swapo in Namibia, where troops (officially 17,000; according to Swapo 110,000) have suffered increasing casualties in recent years. These casualties, too, are considerably understated by Pretoria. For example, in 1982 the official death toll of military personnel was 77, but Professor R H Green of the Institute for Development Studies at Sussex University estimates the real figure at around 850, calculating further that the death toll among white South African soldiers since the Namibia War began could be as high as 2,500, which as a proportion of South Africa's white population is three times the relative rate of American deaths in the Vietnam War. Professor Green also estimates that the cost to South Africa of holding Namibia (around five million dollars a day) now constitutes about 9 per cent of Pretoria's total government spending for 1984/85.

(c) In spite of suppression of and by the media in South Africa, news of black resistance is on the increase. Within the past year two major organisations have come to prominence inside the

country — the United Democratic Front, a widely-based coalition broadly reflecting the multiracial philosophy of the African National Congress, and the National Forum, which reflects the Africanist approach of the Pan-Africanist Congress and the Black Consciousness Movement. Bishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Prize winner for 1984, is a member of one and a patron of the other. These are the first significant movements openly to defy the ban on organised expression of both philosophies within the country.

Another significant development within the country has been the sharp growth in membership and militancy of black trade unions during the past four years. Union membership has grown in this period from 220,000 to 670,000, of whom 271,934 are members of 'unregistered' unions (the most militant) openly expressing discontent with the status quo.

Another discernible change over the past decade has been the protraction of 'unrest' in the black townships. Previously the authorities were able to quell such disturbances within days if not hours, but since 1977 it has taken longer to reimpose police, para-military and military authority. In late 1984 and early 1985 riot patterns persisted through two months of police and military operations. Clearly black anger is more manifest and widespread than ever before.

Finally, the casualty figures and the extent of such 'unrest' may be taken to be greater than the scale disclosed, because independent journalists are seldom allowed into the areas affected at the time. After the Langa massacre on 21 March 1985, 19 African deaths were officially reported. Eye witnesses, however, claimed that up to 40 people had been killed, and a priest concerned in the funerals said 30 to 35 people killed in the initial police shoot-out were buried.

Conclusion **The extent of black resistance in South Africa is greater than reported abroad, on a wider scale than the authorities in Pretoria concede, and their capacity to contain it is exaggerated.**

Claim 2 — Vital Economic Link

That South Africa's strategic minerals are vital to Britain, America and the West in general and are unobtainable elsewhere, and that sanctions against South Africa would seriously damage the economies of America and Britain, in the latter case putting some 200,000 Britons out of work.

The Facts

(a) South Africa's strategic minerals — platinum, vanadium, manganese, chromium and ferrochrome — are available in other countries;

(b) The West's dependence on South African sources is grossly exaggerated; and

(c) The proposition that sanctions against South Africa would seriously damage the British and American economies is untested by comprehensive research; it is certainly untrue in the case of America, and probably untrue in the case of Britain.

(a) The sub-committee on Africa of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, under the Chairmanship of Senator George McGovern, published in 1979 a two-year survey of America's dependence on South Africa's minerals*. This survey showed such dependence to be substantially one of habit rather than necessity: alternative sources of key minerals existed in Australia, Brazil and other countries. It was later pointed out by Robert S McNamara that it would be in America's interests to develop such alternative sources.

(b) Evidence before Congressional and other committees of inquiry has indicated that in some sectors the West's own mineral development has been stultified by the long-held belief, fostered by the South African lobby, that only the South African grade of the relevant mineral was suitable for American industrial and military needs. Chrome is an example. Also, under apartheid South Africa has been able to obtain high quality black labour working long hours under tight discipline for low wages and has consequently been able to keep prices low enough to stifle competition.

(c) South Africa's claim that 200,000 British jobs depend on the South African market has not been tested, but some preliminary research in the steel, coal and apple industries indicates contrary possibilities. For example, Britain imports South African steel, which is marginally cheaper on delivery than domestic steel in the United Kingdom. (British steelworkers are paid far more than

* *Imports of Minerals from South Africa, United States Senate, 1979.*

the black steelworkers of South Africa.) Indications are that the consequent closures of British steel plants and redundancies in related industries cost Britain more in dole and welfare payments than the difference between steel-production costs in the two countries, so that importation of South African steel not only costs Britain more in the long run but actually increases unemployment. Similarly the importation of Cape apples has damaged Britain's own apple industry, causing further unemployment. Importation of South African oranges is certainly disadvantageous to the EEC because oranges from South Africa, which has no ties with the EEC, are subject to a 6 per cent tariff, while the tariff for oranges from the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, which have a formal association with the EEC through the Lomé Convention, is no less than 13 per cent.* Finally, some European countries — Denmark is the prime example — import large quantities of South African coal of a type obtainable elsewhere in Europe, including Britain.

Conclusion **Pretoria's claims about Western dependence on the South African economy are substantially and manifestly untrue.**

* *Sanctions against South Africa*, Barbara Rogers and Brian Bolton, 1981.

Claim 3: Allies of the West

That white-ruled South Africa is a valuable ally of the West; that the 'Cape Sea Route' is vital to Western defence and available to the West only if Pretoria's status quo remains, and that the black liberation movements of South Africa are communist-dominated.

The Facts

(a) If South Africa is a factor in the East-West superpower rivalry, which it should not be, the minority white government should logically be regarded as more of an embarrassment and a burden than an ally of the Western democracies;
(b) In practical strategic terms there is no 'Cape Sea Route' today;
(c) The black liberation movements of South Africa are not communist-dominated.

(a) The superpowers compete with one another to win allegiances in the Third World. In this context the inadvisability of the West being so closely identified with Africa's last remaining white minority government is self-evident.

(b) There is no longer a 'Cape Sea Route' in the sense of a limited seaway under the control of a specific country. In the days of sailing ships, Cape Town was a useful port of call, able to supply provisions and to shelter ships from the often stormy seas south of the Cape. But marine technology is far advanced today and modern ships do not need local ports. Besides, there are 2,000 miles of ocean between South Africa and Antarctica, and South Africa cannot claim to control this enormous area.

(c) The African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress are both committed to non-racial democracy in South Africa. Both liberation movements are broad-based and nationalist, and neither, in terms of leadership or policy, can validly be described as communist-dominated. Pretoria's efforts so to label them are clearly aimed at trying to alienate them from the West and at persuading the West that its interests lie in supporting the preservation of white minority rule in South Africa.

Conclusion

Western protection of South Africa is against the interests of both the West and the majority of South Africans.

Claim 4: Apartheid 'Reformed'

That apartheid is being reformed to an extent which obviates significant black opposition, justifying US and Western support through 'constructive engagement'.

The facts

(a) None of the 'reforms' announced or implemented by the Botha administration is significant, and none has struck at the core of apartheid. On the contrary, they are refinements which strengthen the core of apartheid;

(b) Continued support for 'constructive engagement' has brought no benefits to black South Africans, only further disadvantages.

(a) The essence of apartheid is white minority monopoly of political and economic power and control of the black majority. The new South African constitution strengthens this by creating an Executive President who now wields even more individual power to accelerate such policies as compulsory removal of black communities to rural Bantustans or 'homelands'; to treble the previous penalties under the pass laws (under which blacks can be expelled from urban areas) and therefore to deprive more blacks of South African citizenship and to enforce more severe restrictions on remaining urban blacks in the white-zoned areas.

At the same time the constitution is designed to co-opt the 'Coloured' and 'Indian' minorities into a partial alliance with the whites to reinforce resistance to black demands. Although these two minority communities heavily boycotted elections to their racially separate parliaments, showing their rejection of this attempt to co-opt them and demonstrating their solidarity with their African compatriots, the very presence, in a parliament of sorts, of darker-skinned 'MPs' will be used by Pretoria in its international propaganda to give the impression that major changes are occurring in South Africa, and that things are getting significantly better for at least some of the 'non-whites' there. The new tricameral parliament is in any case not a real power-sharing forum, because votes in the all-white chamber amount to more than the combined votes in the two smaller chambers, so that white power is retained, while the President's right to appoint members to his President's Council and to his Cabinet ensures that he holds the ultimate power.

South African propaganda relies heavily on world ignorance of the details of apartheid. For example it is widely believed abroad that the Immorality Act and Mixed Marriages Act, forbidding interracial sex and marriage, have always been the cornerstone of apartheid. They have not. For most blacks they have been no more

than an insulting irrelevancy. The cornerstone of apartheid is the disfranchisement of all indigenous black Africans, who constitute more than 80 per cent of the population. From this all the other 316 apartheid laws flow including, in particular, the Bantustan laws. Yet the South African government has claimed and received considerable credit abroad for undertaking to scrap the Immorality Act, although this undertaking was accompanied by a renewed commitment to the continued disfranchisement of the black majority.

(b) 'Constructive Engagement' purports to persuade South Africa to dismantle apartheid. However, four years of 'constructive engagement' have seen an acceleration of forced removals of black communities from white-zoned areas, an intensification of penalties under the influx control regulations (trebling of fines and prison terms) and an escalation of the war in Namibia, as well as an increase in South African bullying of neighbouring states, with incursions and invasions into several of these states, and rising numbers of blacks killed by white soldiers and policemen in South Africa. Sharpeville has now been joined by Langa and Crossroads as symbols of ruthless repression.

'Constructive engagement' has been interpreted by Pretoria as connivance by the West, enabling South Africa repeatedly to invade Angola, launch raids into Lesotho and Mozambique, sponsor and organise civil disruption in Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, and apply pressures on Lesotho to conform to Pretoria's requirements. Within four years of 'constructive engagement' Pretoria directly or indirectly caused the deaths of more blacks than in the previous 20 years. During the same period, the Namibian economy was plundered so that what was an economically viable territory now has a seriously impaired economy. Namibia's agricultural output in 1984 was less than half what it was in 1976; Karakul sheep herds are 40 per cent of what they were in 1978; the fishing industry, once a major economic asset, is only 20 per cent of what it was before seven years of gross over-fishing by South African and other foreign vessels, and mining is in serious decline. Diamond and uranium extraction have been intensified during the same period, as the operations of transnational corporations have continued in spite of United Nations Decree No 1 passed in 1974.

Conclusion **Black South Africans will settle for nothing less than the abolition of all the apartheid laws, and they regard 'constructive engagement' as protective collaboration for commercial gain.**

Claim 5: Black Wellbeing

That black South Africans are materially better-off in economic terms than blacks elsewhere in Africa.

The Facts Although this issue is irrelevant to the real contention about apartheid, since the central issue is the disparity in rights and conditions between racial groups in the same country, the claim that South African blacks are economically better-off than people elsewhere in Africa is frequently made by Pretoria's propagandists and surrogates. It also appears to carry some weight in Western business circles. Since this claim serves Pretoria at least as a confusing or distractive tactic, it should not merely be dismissed as irrelevant but branded as untrue.

The ascertainable facts indicate that in terms of earnings per capita South African blacks are materially worse off than the citizens of at least 12 other countries in Africa — Kenya, Gabon, Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Niger, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and Botswana. The device through which Pretoria inflates the relevant statistics is to take the earnings of blacks in the predominantly industrial 'white-zoned' regions of South Africa, which though low are in some cases higher than in a number of other African states, as the representative sample and to present these averaged out, excluding the figures relating to many rural and Bantustan regions which it has declared 'foreign territory'. In this way it deducts the real poverty of most of South Africa's blacks, who are regarded as 'non-citizens'. The result is a grossly inflated image of black earnings. But if the real total of black South Africans is included in an economic analysis, South Africa scores far lower in black earnings than would be expected of a country with rich mineral resources, advanced agriculture and developed industries.

The same use of selective arithmetic is discernible in Pretoria's claim that more than a million foreign Africans come to South Africa for employment. According to *South Africa Report* (March 22, 1985) detailed figures given by Minister Gerrit Viljoen reveal that 944,440 of these 'foreigners' are in fact black South Africans deemed to belong to the 'independent homelands' of Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana.

The Physical Quality of Life Index also gives South Africa a low rating. This index, devised as a truer measure of a country's economic performance in terms of its citizens' living standards than per capita gross national product, measures infant mortality, literacy, education, and nutrition standards. *In terms*

of this index, black South Africans are worse off than people in more than 20 African countries. Indeed, although South Africa has the most developed infrastructure in Africa, it has in the international context one of the lowest PQLI ratings in its comparable group of countries, coming second-last to Turkey.

In 1984, the Carnegie Corporation published the findings of a comprehensive two-year survey of poverty in South Africa, carried out by more than 300 academically-supervised researchers under strict scientific disciplines directed by Dr Francis Wilson.* The survey established that blacks in South Africa's rural areas have among the world's highest incidences of the malnutrition diseases, kwashiorkor and marasmus; that nearly half South Africa's 25 million blacks live below the minimum subsistence level; that one-third of black children under 14 years of age are underweight and stunted in growth, and that in percentage terms *the infant mortality rate is higher in South Africa than in such countries as Mozambique, Mexico and Cuba.*

Conclusion **While there is widespread international knowledge and concern over the political suppression of black South Africans, there is insufficient knowledge abroad of their economic suffering.**

* *Survey on Poverty in South Africa, Carnegie Corporation, New York, 1984*

Claim 6: Black Disunity

That black South Africans are culturally, ethnically and politically fragmented into mutually-hostile tribes which are each being given separate nationhood in separate sovereign states for their own protection and for the accommodation of their separate cultural and political aspirations.

The Facts

Unlike their counterparts in some countries of the north, South Africa's blacks do not have a tradition of tribal politics. For more than a century, no black political movement of significance has promoted or practised tribalism. Black South Africans have, on the contrary, long condemned tribalism as serving the 'divide and rule' policies imposed by whites. Tribalism is not easily accommodated within the sophisticated political thinking of urban blacks, and South African blacks have, in any case, in the relatively homogeneous Nguni culture (Xhosa — Zulu — Swazi — Ndebele) a lot in common.

Ironically, cultural differences are greater between sections of the white population. As languages English and Afrikaans differ more radically than any of the Nguni languages, yet there is no move to create separate territorial and political institutions to divide the white community in South Africa along ethnic and linguistic lines to protect each group's distinctive culture.

Finally, if the South African authorities really believed their own claim that blacks wished to be divided into ethnic 'homelands' they could have proved this in a black referendum on the policy, instead of having to impose it unilaterally.

Conclusion

That the politico-cultural homogeneity among black South Africans is precisely the reason why Pretoria legislates to divide them into false ethnic and political compartments.

Claim 7: Freedom and Democracy

That there are fewer civil liberties in the rest of Africa than in South Africa: that the South African press is 'the freest in Africa' and that South Africa is a developing multi-party democracy contrasting favourably with single-party states elsewhere in Africa..

The Facts

(a) Countries in the rest of Africa do not have racial statutes which deny or confer civil rights on the basis of skin colour, nor prohibitions against multiracial dwelling-areas and movement between cities without state permit, and few countries in Africa, even in military-ruled or one-party states, approach South Africa's authoritarian network of repressive measures against dissent, freedom of opinion and freedom of speech.

(b) The South African press is not the freest in Africa. Few African countries can rival the number or severity of governmental measures against publications and individual journalists (bannings, imprisonment without trial) — apart from the 27 laws in South Africa which limit freedom to publish, and the many extra-legal measures against journalists who publish material which significantly embarrasses the South African government abroad or is regarded as subversive of its authority within the country.

(c) South Africa claims to be a multi-party democracy but behind the trappings of multi-party toleration it is in effect a one party state. Three-quarters of its national population is disfranchised and the remaining officially-enfranchised quarter can in practice only elect Afrikaner nationalist governments. Even within the all-white electorate, a vote in the predominantly Afrikaner nationalist areas of the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Cape Province is weighted to be worth 1.4 votes in the English-speaking areas. As Afrikaners outnumber English-speaking whites by almost two to one, they have in consequence nearly three times the voting power. Furthermore, even if the Afrikaner nationalist vote split, the powers vested under the previous constitution (and even more so under the new constitution) would enable the governing party's leader to retain military, civil and administrative control.

Therefore the elections and by-elections held among the white community are not elections as they are understood in democratic countries. This is one of the reasons why there has been no change of administration in South Africa in 36 years. When the

last real challenge to government policy within the white parliamentary system was mounted by a group of dissenting senators in 1954, Premier Strijdom simply legislated to create enough extra senators to outvote the objectors.

Conclusion **In terms of civil liberties, South Africa's record is poor even in regard to whites, and even on matters unrelated to race.**

Claim 8: Economic Strength

That South Africa has one of the strongest economies in the world, enabling the country to stand alone if necessary, and that this economy is developing soundly.

The Facts In African terms South Africa does have a strong economy, but it is neither developing soundly nor would it enable the country to stand alone in the world.

Apartheid itself inhibits development. The Carnegie Report of 1984* found that the widespread poverty in South Africa was attributable not to world recession but to the apartheid laws which prevent the free movement of labour and artificially obstruct upward economic mobility for blacks. Current government policy is not correcting these economic errors but is compounding them by further enforcing the Bantustan laws.

The South African economy is not self-sufficient, but dependent on imports of oil and technology. Despite the spending of billions of rands in a ten-year search for oil, no economic deposits have been found. The oil-from-coal conversion process pioneered at South Africa's Sasol plants has proved expensive. Pretoria claims that more than half its oil needs are supplied by this process, but it appears that figures are inflated to boost white morale. Only 38 per cent of the country's oil needs are provided by the Sasol plants, the rest having to be bought, and at high prices on the spot market since the fall of the Shah deprived South Africa of regular supplies from Iran. The recent boast that South Africa now exports oil is a fact; what is not disclosed is the loss made on these transactions, conducted as a national morale-booster.

Similarly, Pretoria claims that the arms embargo encouraged the development of South Africa's own arms industry (which it did) and that the country is now self-sufficient in arms (which it is not). The latter claim is clearly negated by Pretoria's refusal to allow four Armscor agents to face trial in Coventry on charges of illegal arms purchase. In fact South Africa imports as many arms as it is able to smuggle into the country, and many arms manufactured in South Africa have foreign components.

South Africa's misleading claims about its supposedly robust economy extend beyond oil and arms production. The Government tends to base its budget estimates on optimistic gold

prices and forecasts. Pretoria also underplays the cost of the conflicts in Namibia and Angola, and of domestic disturbances in the Transvaal, Northern Natal and Eastern Cape. Drought forced South Africa to import cereals in the early 1980s. The combined result has been an embattled economy, with weak currency and inflation approaching 20 per cent a year.

Conclusion **Pretoria is concealing the full extent of the weakness of its economy from its own people as well as from the international community.**

Claim 9: Historic Right

That whites arrived in South Africa at approximately the same time as blacks, occupied and developed more of the country than the 'black immigrants' did, and therefore have a moral claim to the present 'white-zoned' areas constituting 87 per cent of the country's territory.

The Facts

Irrelevant though the migrations of the seventeenth century may be to contention about apartheid today, the claim that whites migrated earlier than blacks is also inaccurate — by at least seven centuries. The first white settlers give accounts of meeting settled indigenous populations, notably the Khoi and San, on their arrival, and carbon-dating and other tests have recorded more than 1000 years of African habitation in the country.

The parallel claim that Zululand is the 'traditional' homeland of the Zulu-speaking people, the Transkei of the Xhosas, and so on, is equally spurious. The borders of these 'homelands' were decided by bitter wars over land. The blacks, who eventually lost the wars, were initially contained in these areas by colonial government decisions.

The corollary of these claims is that whites *deserve* more land (to be exact 87 per cent of the country for 15 per cent of the people) because black South Africans lacked the background or intellectual capacity to develop it themselves. The assertion that certain races are 'superior', others 'inferior' is the core of racism. Leaving aside the cynicism of those who prohibit proper black education then criticise blacks for not being educated, the error of this claim is exposed by the remarkable black intellectual tradition in South Africa which was nurtured by previously independent missionary institutions such as Fort Hare University, Healdtown and Lovedale Institutes.

Conclusion

Territorial and political claims to white priority in South Africa are demonstrably false on historic as well as moral grounds.

Claim 10: Appropriate Moral Standards

That white-ruled South Africa belongs to the 'Christian democratic West' which therefore owes it loyal support, but that because its problems are 'Third World problems' it should be judged as a Third World country in moral terms.

The Facts By all the orthodox definitions South Africa is neither Christian nor a Western democracy. Its claim to democracy has been dealt with. As to religion, the sect of most Afrikaner whites, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, has been expelled from the international Reformed Church community because of apartheid, after having long been isolated from the rest of the world Christian community and only after the international reformed churches had attempted 'constructive engagement' with the Afrikaner church for more than 20 years.

South Africa claims at the same time to suffer 'Third World problems' (i.e. poverty and lack of infrastructural development), and so asks the international investing community to apply to it lower standards in wages, job security, personal freedom and political rights. The Carnegie Report of March 1984* confirmed several earlier studies when it demonstrated, on evidence over a two-year period, that poverty, ill-health and inequity in South Africa are the result not of lack of resources or lack of development but of apartheid's laws and policies which concentrate the goods of society in the hands of the white minority.

Conclusion **South Africa should be judged not as a Third World country but according to its government's claim to adhere to Christian and Western values — the basis of its appeal for Western support.**

An Additional Claim

In conclusion, much is made of the claim — constantly promoted by apologists of the South African government in justification of white minority rule — that the Afrikaner 'has nowhere else to go'. Afrikaners are, however, no different from other South African whites in this respect. Non-Afrikaner whites have no more rights of immigration or settlement elsewhere in the world than Afrikaners do.

If the claim is based on the greater assimilability of the latter because of their familiarity with the English language, the fact is that most Afrikaners speak English, and knowledge of Afrikaans additionally facilitates a comprehension of all the Germanic languages.

In propaganda terms the real purpose of the claim that Afrikaners have 'nowhere else to go' is promotion of the myth that the Afrikaners are significantly different from other whites who have lost the power to rule as minorities in countries such as Kenya, Zambia, Algeria, Malawi and Zimbabwe, and that the difference is motivation.

However, there is no evidence to suggest that Afrikaner whites have any special capacity to succeed where other minority groups have failed to halt the tide of black majority rule in Africa, and there exists a population with even stronger motivation in the South African context — that country's black majority.

Ultimately, however, the myth of the Afrikaner being unique in having 'nowhere else to go' is irrelevant, because no-one requires the Afrikaner to go anywhere. No black group or programme of any significance issues any demand for the expulsion of whites in general, or Afrikaners in particular, from South Africa. On the contrary, it is the policy of the liberation movements to accept whites as fellow citizens — but only on the basis of equal rights. What blacks require Afrikaners and other whites to do in South Africa is to acknowledge their identity as Africans, and to stop trying to create a synthetic corner of Europe in Africa.

Namibia

South Africa has illegally controlled Namibia (formerly South West Africa) since 1918, initially in breach of a League of Nations mandate and since 1946 in growing defiance of United Nations resolutions. In 1948 Pretoria began imposing the newly-codified apartheid statutes on the black majority in Namibia and since 1968 has been waging an escalating war against the broad-based liberation movement SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organisation).

In 1977 a call by most member states of the United Nations for mandatory sanctions against Pretoria for its military occupation of Namibia was headed off through the Security Council veto power of Britain and America, and as a compromise a five-nation 'contact group' was formed, consisting of Britain, America, France, West Germany and Canada, with the stated aim of persuading South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and permit free elections and full independence there.

Since then South Africa's propaganda strategy on Namibia has been to encourage successive representatives of the 'contact group' to believe in imminent breakthrough on the diplomatic front, while repeatedly renegeing on implied undertakings to progress towards real independence for Namibians.

By 1980 South Africa had broken a number of such undertakings, and pressure for sanctions had been building up again in the United Nations when the Reagan administration came to power in America and took the pressure off South Africa, allowing Pretoria to link the question of Namibian independence to the unrelated issue of Cuban troops in Angola.

Throughout the period of such 'linkage', a device facilitated by the Reagan policy of 'constructive engagement' with South Africa, Pretoria made use of American compliance to step up its war against SWAPO, to increase its military personnel in Namibia more than threefold, to launch repeated invasions and incursions into Angola and other states of the region including Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana, and to arm and sustain the UNITA forces fighting against the government of Angola.

At one time nervous about the Namibian issue provoking economic sanctions from the international community, Pretoria has since the advent of the Reagan administration in America and the Conservative administration in Britain functioned without constraint in its consolidation of military occupation of Namibia

and its campaign against SWAPO, and has recently defied even American and British objections to the setting up of an internal regime of its choice in the territory.

Meanwhile Pretoria's propaganda line on Namibia is to try to project an image of reform internally and success militarily against SWAPO, featuring frequent claims of successful engagements against guerrillas of SWAPO, inflated claims about SWAPO casualties and consistent understatement of South African casualties. In Washington, moreover, strong efforts are made to depict SWAPO as surrogates of Moscow, and as 'communist terrorists hostile to the West'.

International supporters of SWAPO in the West, such as the Namibia Support Committee in London, try to counter these tactics but have limited resources to pit against Pretoria's hugely funded lobbies. The Namibia Support Committee names three related organisations in London which disseminate propaganda for Pretoria: Namibia Information Service, Lloyd-Hughes Associates Ltd and Venture Communications.

Sanctions

As noted at the start of this study, the primary aim of South African propaganda abroad is to maintain the American and British vetoes in the United Nations Security Council against mandatory economic sanctions aimed at Pretoria. While both countries remained committed to rejection of anti-Pretoria sanctions in principle and as a matter of repeatedly-stated policy, Pretoria's task was relatively easy. In August, however, this principle was abandoned by President Reagan as a result of Congressional pressures, and Pretoria began looking increasingly to Britain for maintenance of its protection.

During September 1985 there was a proliferation of radio, television and newspaper arguments in Britain against sanctions, many advanced by the South African embassy in London, and the main claims put forward were:

1. That sanctions would not work.
2. That sanctions would harm the blacks more than the whites.
3. That most South Africans oppose sanctions.
4. That sanctions would make Pretoria more obdurate (the 'laager' argument).
5. That sanctions would be against the interests of the neighbouring frontline states, which would not welcome them.

That sanctions would not work.

This is usually preceded by the claim that sanctions 'have never worked'. But the following examples, published in *The Guardian* on September 12, 1985, dispute this claim:

- The United States successfully stopped South Korea in 1974, and Taiwan in 1976, from pursuing nuclear military projects by embargoing export shipments of trade goods;
- The United States used threats of tariff concession reductions against Rumania and Hungary to remove restrictions on Jewish emigration from those countries;
- In 1970 American denial of loans to Allende's Chile was instrumental in weakening the Allende government;
- The Carter administration's sanctions against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua significantly weakened that government's capacity to survive.
- Ironically, one of the most recent examples of successful sanctions was South Africa's threatened embargo on Lesotho to prevent sanctuary there for guerrillas of the African National Congress, and the success of similar economic pressures on Swaziland and Mozambique for the same purpose.

These are among about 30 examples of successful sanctions listed by the Washington-based Institute for International Economics, examined in detail by G.G. Hufbauer and J.J. Schott in their study: 'Economic Sanctions Reconsidered'.

On the subject of whether sanctions would work against South Africa, most opponents of such sanctions cite the case of Rhodesia as an example of sanctions failure. This, however, ignores the fact that sanctions were never comprehensively applied against Smith's Rhodesia, which was supplied throughout with strategic goods by the South African government. Yet the high cost to the Smith regime of such sanctions-busting, involving as it did the rerouting of shipments and the disguising of export sources, considerably undermined and ultimately eliminated Rhodesia's foreign currency reserves, weakening its capacity to withstand the Zimbabwean liberation movements.

That sanctions would harm the blacks more than the whites.

That most South Africans reject sanctions.

Those who make these claims ignore the persistent appeals of South Africa's most representative black leaders, who state in turn:

(a) That the impact of sanctions would be far greater on whites than on blacks, because it is the whites who benefit most by trade and foreign investment, owning as they do all the export and import companies and controlling as they do all the commerce and industry in the country;

(b) That even if they were to be harder hit by sanctions, most blacks would be prepared to suffer this to hasten the end of their greatest hardship — apartheid;

(c) That there has been complete unanimity for more than a quarter-century among all representative black leaders in South Africa on the subject of sanctions, including Chief Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress; Robert Sobukwe, Nyati Pokela and Zeph Mothopeng of the Pan-Africanist Congress; Steve Biko, Barney Pitsoana and Hlaku Rachidi of the Black Consciousness Movement; Bishop Desmond Tutu, Dr Nthato Motlana and Rev. Allan Boesak of the United Democratic Front and many other black leaders less well-known internationally.

The only prominent South Africans who have opposed sanctions have been whites, who cannot speak for the black majority, or blacks who hold governmental posts created and funded by Pretoria, and therefore have little credibility among blacks.

As recently as August 1985 a Sunday Times poll among black South Africans reflected a 49% choice of Nelson Mandela as their leader, Bishop Desmond Tutu coming second with 24%. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, often cited by British Government spokespersons as a major black leader, polled only 6%, and even in his home base in Natal polled barely half the votes of the locals for Mandela.

Recent polls also reflect majority black support for sanctions, despite laws in South Africa prescribing severe penalties for those expressing such support.

That sanctions would make Pretoria more intransigent (the laager argument).

The claim that South African whites would 'retreat into the laager' (a reference to the ring of ox-waggons the trekking Boers used to draw around themselves for battle) is not borne out by historical precedent. The only comparable examples from the past are:

(a) The embargoes aimed by the British at the Boer republic of Transvaal under President Paul Kruger, who in response did not, as threatened, stiffen his resistance to shortening the franchise-qualification period for the 'Uitlanders' (non-Afrikaner whites) but cut them progressively from 14 years, to six years, to four and ultimately two, by which time the British were already committed to war.

(b) The sports boycott, which many predicted would lead to even sterner laws against black participation in 'white' sport. The opposite happened, and by admission of Sports Minister P.J. Koornhof in 1977 it was the sports boycott which directly led to even the limited reforms allowing some degree of multiracial sport.

(c) The arms embargo of 1977 did not force the South African government 'into the laager', nor did the partial oil embargo. In fact both led directly to some of the limited reforms to the apartheid policy which, while inadequate, were nevertheless anything but intransigent responses to sanctions.

That sanctions would be against the interests of the neighbouring frontline states, which would not welcome them.

This claim is denied by those best qualified to deny it — leaders of the frontline states themselves. In a statement issued in Maputo, Mozambique, on September 15, 1985, they welcomed the escalation of international pressures for sanctions, called for application of sanctions and affirmed that they were prepared

to endure the consequences for the wider interests of the people of Southern Africa. They held that those consequences would be a relatively marginal additional cost to what they are already bearing as a result of Pretoria's military and economic destabilisation of the region, pointing out that such destabilisation over the past five years had already cost their countries ten billion dollars, taking into account some two billion dollars in lost economic growth resulting from direct and indirect South African action against them.

ANNEX

The anatomy of apartheid

A layman's guide to South Africa's racial laws

The whole world knows about apartheid and condemns it, but little is generally known about its basic details. The following is a summary of the main elements of apartheid and its application to all spheres of life in South Africa.

Background

Apartheid is South Africa's system of 317 laws making restrictions based on race, under which civil rights are reserved for fewer than five million whites and denied to more than twenty five million blacks. Officially instituted when the Afrikaner Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, this battery of laws systematised earlier segregation laws and customs into a comprehensive code of racial statutes which were augmented over the next thirty years. These included the Group Areas Act, which determines where people shall live, and the Bantustan enactments, under which blacks are relegated to marginal areas on the fringes of industrialised South Africa, effectively depriving them of citizenship and enabling the white government to disclaim responsibility for their economic and social development. Apartheid makes South Africa the only country in the world which legalises racism, making discrimination on the basis of skin-colour the law of the land. This is what marks the South African government out from other repressive regimes.

Constitutional rights

Blacks are deprived of civil rights under several statutes which govern the national franchise. They are forbidden to engage in political activity and to exercise their democratic rights. A limited form of regional franchise is allowed them in relation to the Bantustans or 'homelands'. Blacks who reject restrictions on normal political activity risk imprisonment or death, and since 1963 more than 100 have died violently in political detention by the Security Police, while tens of thousands have been imprisoned (many without trial, access to lawyers, relatives or friends) and thousands have died in political protests, many shot dead by the police or military. Statute law permits the South African Government to imprison any citizen without trial indefinitely, or to ban or banish any 'dissident'. Banishment means expulsion to a remote part of the country, and banning means being forbidden by state decree to travel, write, speak publicly, be quoted in the press, be in a room with more than one person at a time or speak with more than one person at a time. There is no legal redress or right of appeal against these decrees.

Property Blacks are forbidden by law to own freehold property in most areas, most of which are zoned for white ownership only. The Group Areas Act reserves the best urban, industrial and agricultural areas for whites and restricts blacks from even renting or occupying property in white-zoned areas without state permission. Generally such permission is given only to domestic workers — housemaids or gardeners who are required to live-in in the white suburbs — but such permission does not normally extend to their spouses, and a black housemaid's husband risks arrest and imprisonment if found by government inspectors in her room overnight.

These laws are part of the influx control statutes aimed at limiting the numbers of blacks in white-zoned cities. The Group Areas Act also bars blacks from owning business enterprises in the white-zoned areas, restricting such ownership and occupation rights to the Bantustans or the black townships. The townships are racial ghettos serving as labour pools of black workers needed by white employers. But even within the black townships married couples and families need state permission to live together. Such permission is refused if the authorities consider the families of workers to be 'surplus blacks'. Such people are forced to leave the township in order to keep down the numbers of blacks near the white-zoned cities.

Pass laws A pass book, which a black South African over the age of 16 has to carry at all times, is a booklet like a passport, only bulkier, having more pages than a normal passport. It contains the holder's photograph, fingerprints, personal details of employment, permission to be in a particular part of the country, qualification to work or to seek work in the area, and employers' reports on work performance and conduct.

The pass book is a double-edged sword which can be wielded by the state or the white employer. If a worker displeases the employer and the latter declines to endorse the book for the relevant period, the worker's right to stay in the area is jeopardised. Government officials can also expel the worker from the area by adverse endorsement in the pass book. This is called 'endorsing out' and can be done at any time for any reason, without explanation. Members of the family of a worker 'endorsed out' also lose the right to remain in the area and can be evicted and banished to a bantustan.

Blacks must not only possess a pass book but must carry it constantly. Forgetting to slip it into a coat pocket, mislaying it or having it stolen renders one liable to arrest and imprisonment. Every year more than 250,000 blacks are arrested for technical offences under the pass laws.

Education The Bantu Education Act was devised, as explained by Minister H F Verwoerd who introduced it, to provide blacks with different expectations and aspirations from whites. These differences were to be emphasised throughout their schooling, so blacks were restricted to separate schools with a different syllabus. For blacks the emphasis was on technical education, to equip them for practical work rather than the professions to which many whites aspired. The job reservation laws reserved the best jobs for whites and, as Minister Verwoerd pointed out, as blacks would only be tolerated near white areas if required to serve white needs, blacks had to be trained predominantly as artisans, tradesmen and semi-skilled labourers to be of maximum benefit to the national economy.

The relatively few blacks who aspired beyond this to higher education levels were segregated into black universities under a law ironically called the Extension of University Education Act. According to a recent survey by a Johannesburg-based foundation, only 14 per cent of blacks reach secondary school, and fewer still reach university level.

Health Whites have one doctor per 630 people; blacks have one doctor per 91,000 and in rural regions zoned for black occupation the ratio is one doctor per 174,000. Although South Africa is rich in minerals, rural poverty claims the lives of two out of five black children before the age of five.

Citizenship The 'Coloured' (mixed-race) and 'Indian' (of Indian descent) groups have now been given their own racially exclusive parliaments, although the all-white parliament has the overall authority. Government policy is to make the black majority non-citizens by declaring them citizens of the Bantustan territories, which are to be declared independent states along ethnic lines. Ultimately the aim is to have few if any black citizens, and so far eight million black South Africans have been stripped of their citizenship. There are at the moment four such 'independent' states — Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana. Only South Africa recognises these territories as 'independent', sovereign states.

Sex Under the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act and their amendments it is a crime to marry a person of a different race or to be shown to have or intend to have any sexual relationship or experience with someone of a different race. In April 1985, the South African government announced that the sex laws were to be repealed.

Sport Despite several recent dispensations allowing the top echelons of highly-visible sports to be integrated on the field of play, most South African sport is still racially segregated, because all state schools in South Africa are racially segregated, and more than 97

per cent of South African schoolchildren play sport only as members of uniraical teams.

At senior levels where team-integrated sport is permitted, blacks participating are exempted from apartheid in regard to the events or environs of the club or team concerned. Outside the stadium they revert to circumstances of segregated transport, racially-zoned housing, pass laws, votelessness, inferior sports grounds, poor nutrition, handicapped living conditions and inadequate facilities — which is why most representative black sports associations ask that the international boycott of South African sport should be maintained until all apartheid laws are removed.

Ethnicity To remove the concept of more than 25 million voteless blacks, the South African government has classified all blacks as members of certain tribes and has decreed that each designated major tribe shall be regarded as a 'nation' with its own national territory in the Bantustans, whether or not the designated 'tribesmen' live there. Thus five million Zulus are decreed to have rights only in relation to Zululand (KwaZulu); five million Xhosas in the Transkei and Ciskei, and so on for the Swazi, Ndebele and other groups — the theory being that each such group has a different language and culture. However, this is largely untrue. Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele are all Nguni languages, part of the main black culture of Southern Africa.

Prisons South Africa, with 31 million people, has a prison population of 118,000. In per capita terms this is the highest prison population in the world. South Africa also has the highest official execution rate in the world. But it is in the unofficial execution rate — the death toll of political prisoners who never face trial — that the grimmest statistics are to be found. Up to September 1985 more than 100 political prisoners had died violently while in Security Police custody for 'interrogation.'

Opposition Opposition which could effectively challenge the governing Afrikaner Nationalist Party peacefully by mobilising the support of most South Africans is prohibited by law in South Africa.

The biggest political movements supported by the blacks, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, are both outlawed by statute. Opposition movements which attempt to operate within the ambit of the law, such as the umbrella body, the United Democratic Front (UDF), have been constantly harassed by the police and security services, and had their leaders arrested. By September 1985 several prominent dissidents had died violently in shootings, car accidents and explosions, and 46 others faced charges of high treason.

General By September 1985 President P.W. Botha had announced his intention to restore citizenship to certain categories of blacks; to consider scrapping or amending the pass laws and possibly other apartheid provisions his administration considered 'outdated', but firmly ruled out any consideration of dropping the cornerstone of apartheid — the prohibition of democratic voting rights for the black majority.

Further reading Recommended reading for detailed treatment of South African propaganda projects dealt with briefly in this memorandum:

Race Propaganda and South Africa by John C Laurence. Gollancz, London, 1979.

Sanctions Against South Africa — Exploding the Myths by Barbara Rogers and Brian Bolton. Manchester Free Press, 1981.

South Africa at War by Richard Leonard. Lawrence Hill and Co., Westport, Connecticut, USA, 1983.

Survey on Poverty in South Africa, published by the Carnegie Corporation, New York, 1984.

Imports of Minerals from South Africa, prepared for the Subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service, United States Senate, 1979.

South Africa — The Road Ahead, address by Robert S McNamara at Witwatersrand University, 21 October 1982. Ref: The Lincoln Trust, London, 1984.

About the Author

Donald Woods, 51, was Editor-in-Chief of the *Daily Dispatch* in South Africa until October 1977 when he was arrested and banned for protesting over the killing of the black leader, Steve Biko. Mr Woods was forbidden to write, speak publicly, be quoted in the press, associate with or speak to more than one person at a time for a five-year period of virtual house arrest.

In January 1978 he escaped to Lesotho where he gained political sanctuary and was joined by his wife and five children. The family was assisted by the governments of Lesotho, Botswana and Zambia to reach London, where Mr Woods now works as a writer, lecturer and broadcaster on South African affairs. He is Director of the Lincoln Trust, which provides the international media with information about apartheid and the escalating conflict in South Africa.

In exile he has written three books relating to South Africa, *Biko* (Paddington Press, 1978) a biography which has been published in twelve languages, *Asking for Trouble*, (Gollancz, 1980) an award-winning autobiography, and *Black and White* (Ward River Press, 1982) a book about South Africa's use of sport as propaganda. The first private citizen to address the United Nations Security Council, he was awarded the Golden Pen of Freedom by the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers.

In 1985 he was appointed special consultant on South Africa to the Commonwealth Secretariat, in pursuance of the New Delhi summit decision of Commonwealth Heads of Government to counteract South African propaganda internationally.

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